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ABSTRACT
As China’s government leads the transition away from socialist planning, 
how does it build the regulatory institutions that it needs to manage the new 
market economy? Creating effective institutions, the rules that govern 
economic transactions that are enforced by regulatory agencies, the courts, 
media and business, lies at the heart of a successful transition. This thesis 
explains and evaluates institutional development in China’s stock market 
during 1984-2000. In the absence of private firms, public actors designed 
and controlled the development of institutions, orienting them to support 
their own particular industrial and fiscal priorities. These actors operated 
within a three-level hierarchy: the principals, the senior leadership 
(zhongyang); two sets of sub-principals, local (provincial-level) and 
ministry leaders; and agents, yw-level bureau leaders. The principals 
experienced two problems in establishing equity institutions that delivered 
their priorities, financial stability and market development. First, local 
leaders captured control of yw-level bureaux and used them to maximise 
investment and fiscal funds. Deficient regulation and regular financial crisis 
resulted. Second, at the central government level bureau leaders competed to 
defend their organisational interests. Policy stasis and gaps in regulation 
resulted. However, by 1996, the capital market was large enough to be used 
to support state-owned industry and by 1997 the instability caused by local 
policies had become a serious threat to the financial system. With their 
incentives thus altered, the senior leadership organised radical institutional 
change despite opposition at both levels. The result was the creation of a 
securities regulator with unrivalled administrative authority over the sector, 
well able to orient market development towards the zhongyang’s priorities. 
The thesis suggests that the central leadership can manage economic 
transition through the use of a portfolio of institutional techniques. These 
include restructuring sector-specific nomenklatura arrangements, 
recentralising key powers, creating oversight and reporting mechanisms, 
strengthening Party structures, and clarifying responsibilities within the 
Centre.
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Part I
Theoretical considerations
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1Introduction: Stock market regulation and institutional change in 
reform China
As for securities and the stock market, are they finally good or bad? Are they 
dangerous? Are they things that only capitalism has or can socialism also make use 
o f them? To decide whether they can be used we must experiment first...
Deng Xiaoping, Shenzhen, 19921
As China’s government leads the transition away from the socialist plan, how 
does it build the regulatory institutions required to manage the new market-based 
economy? Creating effective institutions, the rules that govern economic 
transactions that are monitored and enforced by regulatory agencies, the courts, 
accountants, media and industry participants, lies at the heart of a successful 
transition. At their most basic, market institutions define property rights, what 
Harold Demsetz defines as the ‘bundle of rights’ over the use, revenues and 
transfer of assets.3 Yet to ensure that use and trading in these rights is fair and 
transparent and that abuses are appropriately punished, a complex set of 
institutions must be created, including an architecture of rules as well as 
organisations to monitor and enforce compliance. For any developing country, 
creating such institutions is an enormous challenge, but the challenge is 
especially complex for China’s leaders.4 Significant public ownership of 
industrial assets inevitably leads to conflicts of interest for the government in its 
roles as both owner and regulator. The ambition of the Chinese Communist Party 
(Zhongguo Gongchandang, hereafter CCP) to retain a monopoly on political 
power prevents the emergence of the rule of law. Powerful local governments 
have had discretion over a wide range of policy and can act autonomously, often 
undermining the coherence of national policy. Moreover, limited private sector 
involvement in the economy and the policy-making process itself, as well as the 
lack of electoral competition, means that public actors are largely insulated from
1WWP (1992).
2 Williamson (1996), 377-379; Thatcher (1999), 9-15; Moe (1991), 117; Eggertsson (1996), 7.
3 Demsetz (1967).
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external pressures when they develop institutions. This is in contrast to Western 
experience where private-sector interests often lead institutional development. If 
the interests of market participants are not taken into account and public actors 
are allowed to institutionalise rent seeking arrangements, market development 
will inevitably suffer. Given these obstacles, can effective market institutions 
develop in such a context? What actors, central and local government officials, 
members of the legislature, institutional and individual investors, are involved in 
the designing the institutions that do develop? And to what extent will the 
structure and style of the institutions that are produced adhere to Western norms?
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo, hereafter 
SHGSE) opened on the 19th December 1990. Few other events could so 
powerfully have symbolised the radical nature of Deng Xiaoping’s market 
reforms. With the exchange offering trading facilities in the shares of eight 
enterprises, it was, apparently, a radical capitalist venture. For the first time in 
forty years, Chinese enterprises had the ability to access capital directly, avoiding 
the mediation of state-owned banks and the state credit plan.5 This new stock 
market had the potential not only to revolutionise the financial sector but it also 
offered a means of reorganising industrial property rights en masse. Thousands 
of state-owned enterprises (Guoyou qiye, hereafter SOEs) restructured into 
shareholding companies during the 1990s, issuing shares to their state owners 
and employees. A few were allowed to issue shares to the public and publicly list 
on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. Ordinary people could then open 
trading accounts, buy and sell shares and own small parts of the means of 
production. What is more, this new venture had gained the approval of the senior 
leadership of the CCP, a radical reversal of both the Party’s economic policies 
and Communist ideology. In Maoist China, the administrative plan had governed 
the distribution of industrial credit and the mono-banking system had 
monopolised capital allocation.6 Stock markets were not only unnecessary but
4 On institutional development in China, Goldstein (1994), 720; Huang (2000a), 31-71;
Lieberthal (1988), 137-8, 156; Nathan (1973), 52-62; Domes (1977); Huang (2000a), 24; Dittmer
(1995), 5.
5 Informal financing institutions like rural and urban credit co-operatives and financial societies 
that evolved during the 1980s involved mediation of some form, see Tsai (1999); Tam (1992); 
Chen (1998a); Cheng (2000b).
6 Peebles (1991), 18-58.
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were deemed counter-revolutionary; they represented capitalism at its speculative 
and exploitative worst. The Shanghai Stock Exchange at No. 422 Hankou Road, 
with 234 listed companies the largest exchange in Asia at the time, had been
tilclosed by the Red Army’s Military Management Group (Junguanhui) on 10 
June 1949.7 Such was the opprobrium stock markets enjoyed only thirty years 
ago that Vice President Liu Shaoqi, one of Mao’s targets during the Cultural
o t
Revolution, was demonised for wanting to establish one. During the 1990s, m 
contrast, the stock market’s ideological stock rose dramatically. After much 
debate, it was recognised in 1997 ‘as an important component of the national 
economy’ at the Party’s 15th Congress.9 According to General Secretary Jiang 
Zemin it has since become ‘an essential part of market socialism’.10 After ten 
years of remarkable development, its importance to China’s transitional economy 
was all but self-evident. By the end of 2000, the two stock exchanges together 
listed 1,050 firms, mostly SOEs, and boasted a tradable market capitalisation 
(TMC) of some Rmb 1.6 trillion, about 17% of gross domestic product (GDP). 
The market had become a major source of financing for state-owned industry and 
an important source of fiscal revenues. During 2000 alone companies raised Rmb 
144.9 billion through domestic stock issues while the tax on share trading 
brought Rmb48.6 billion into state coffers.11 Already Asia’s third largest by the 
end of 2000, Mainland China’s stock market was on course to overtake that of 
Hong Kong before the end of the decade.
China’s development of a stock market reflected both a regional and an 
international trend. Asia’s financial systems after 1945 were segmented and 
‘repressed’, based around interest rate restrictions, administrative credit 
allocation and protectionism. However, since the late 1970s they have all moved 
towards the market.12 Interest rates have been liberalised, walls between different 
financial businesses have fallen, credit rules have been relaxed and foreign 
institutions allowed in. Moreover, throughout the region there has been a shift
7 Cao (2000), 5.
8 RR (1969) translated in Bennett (1978), 202-203.
9 BR (2001), 22.
10 Preface to Zhou (1998).
11 Statistics supplied in private correspondence with the SHGSE.
12 Cargill (1986); Oh (1997), 9-53; FAIR (1991); McCullock (1998), 161-170; Greenwood 
(1986), 79-82; Cole, Scott and Wellons (1995).
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towards ‘disintermediation’, the withdrawal of funds from financial 
intermediaries (like banks), and an increase in direct lending to borrowers 
through debt and equity securities. Underlying economic conditions provided the 
basis for this shift. During the 1980s and 1990s the monetary and 
macroeconomic environments were mostly stable and, after several decades of 
growth, there was usually a huge base of savings present in the banking system 
ready to be mobilised. New theoretical orthodoxies encouraged governments to 
privatise state-owned assets and increase the efficiency of capital allocation by 
doing less. Private companies sought long-term financing and freedom from 
directed credit and government intervention. International conditions were also 
important: stock markets in Asia and elsewhere were nurtured by the world-wide 
liberalisation of portfolio capital flows after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system in the early 1970s. Western institutional investors sought to profit from 
Asia’s higher growth rates, especially in the early 1990s, as well as to diversify 
their risks. While Asia attracted US$600m in portfolio investment during 1977- 
82, it received US$12.4 billion during 1990-94.13 New technology helped too, 
facilitating capital flow between markets.
While the priority for any emerging economy’s financial sector should be the 
construction of a competitive banking system, an efficient equity market runs a 
close second.14 A stock market is useful for a number of reasons.15 First, it can 
facilitate investment in industry. As the World Bank notes in the case of China, 
issuance of stock can provide investment resources to areas of the economy left 
under-financed by an inefficient banking sector.16 Second, as long as prices 
reflect supply and demand, a stock market can improve the efficiency with which
1 7capital is allocated. If issuers compete for capital, share prices should reflect the 
value, at least over the long-term, of their businesses. Moreover, as Nicholas 
Lardy notes, China’s share market ‘can increase competition...and stimulate
13 Griffith-Jones (1998), 31.
14 Blommestein (1994).
15 On finance and development, Mckinnon (1973); Shaw (1973); Dooley (1987), 31; Mckinnon 
(1991); Cole and Slade (1991). On stock markets and development, Calvo (1991); Fischer and 
Reisen (1993), 105; Pardy (1992), 8; Van Agtmael (1984), 4-8; Cho (1986).
16 World Bank (1995a), V.
17 Grossman (1989), 1-4; Diamond (1967), 759, 770; Allen (1995), 86-87; Hayek (1945), 527.
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1 Rbanks to allocate investment resources more efficiently.’ Third, as Anthony 
Neoh observes, the stock market can play a crucial role in managing private 
assets and providing pensions and other forms of long-term private asset 
management.19 And fourth, a stock market can provide an important vehicle for 
attracting foreign investment to a capital-hungry developing economy. However, 
some economists have reservations about the utility of a stock market, especially 
during the early stages of economic development. ‘When the capital
development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino’,
00noted John Maynard Keynes, ‘the job is likely to be ill done’. More recently
Joseph Stiglitz has questioned the utility of stock markets because of the
difficulties involved in creating the complex institutions that are required before
01they can be economically useful.
As part of the move towards the market, the development of a stock market is an 
important step forward in the liberalisation of a ‘repressed’ financial sector. 
However, far from the state ‘withdrawing’, and reducing its administrative 
capacity and mechanisms of oversight, China’s new market has been 
accompanied by the construction of new bureaucracies, the creation of new 
administrative powers and the promulgation of hundreds, if not thousands, of 
new regulations. This, however, is hardly surprising.22 Even assuming a 
successful transition to a market economy, the opposite of a planned economy is 
not a ‘free’ market but a regulated one in which the state develops a new 
regulatory relationship with the economy.23 Regulation is here understood as the 
supervision and control of the activities of private firms and individuals, usually 
by a public agency. The recent trend of deregulation is better understood as ‘re­
regulation’, as governments across the world have withdrawn from the economy 
as owners and planners, and instead created rules and instituted arrangements 
with which to govern market-based transactions. As Giandomenico Majone 
notes, when plans give way to markets the state must change ‘from a producer of
18 Lardy (2000), 4.
19 Neoh (2000), 1-2.
20 Quoted in Caporaso (1992), 111.
21 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); Liu (2000b).
22 Janos Komai noted bureaucracy’s tendency for ‘self-reproduction’ given the continued 
dominance of state ownership, Komai (1990), 139-140. On administrative reform in 1990s 
China, Yang (2001b).
23 Vogel (1996), 3-25.
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goods and services to...an umpire whose function is to ensure that economic 
actors play by the agreed rules of the game’.24 In China’s case, Tony Saich notes 
that an increase in state capacity is actually a prerequisite for an effective market
9  ^to function. The Chinese state has yet to reach the end point of Majone’s 
transition and to become solely an umpire, but it has made much progress. Many 
of the state’s basic institutions have helped underpin the transition. Looking 
west, to Eastern Europe and the former-Soviet Union, many have drawn the 
conclusion that the so-called, and much stylised, ‘big bang’ liberalisation 
(sudden and comprehensive price reforms combined with wholesale 
privatisation) failed because the ‘right institutions’ were lacking. Analysts 
contrast this experience with China, where an incremental reform process has 
been successful, if somewhat directionless and problematic, apparently because 
the institutions of political governance provided stability. Qian Yingyi and Xu 
Chenggang, for instance, argue that China’s ‘M-form’ structure of government 
(in which regional governments enjoy extensive powers) allowed it the flexibility 
to experiment with reforms, in contrast to the central ministry-dominated ‘O- 
form’ arrangement of the Soviet state, which doomed it to failure when it
97attempted reform. However, other areas of economic reform have suffered from 
serious institutional failure. Edward Steinfeld describes a situation in which 
renegade bureaucracies do not respect ownership rights (even in the rare instance 
that they are clearly delineated), courts do not enforce laws, profit incentives at 
SOEs are opaque and regulatory authority is blurred between competitive and 
inefficient state agencies. Commercial banks do not lend on the basis of rational 
credit assessment but because of administrative interference and bribes. The state 
has failed to provide a key public good, reliable institutions, and ‘Chinese
98financial markets are in chaos today’, Steinfeld asserts, as a result. X. L. Ding 
has shown that effective constraints on bureaucrats are lacking, resulting in the 
large-scale stripping of state assets.29 The continued dominance of the Party 
undermines another aspect of the necessary institutional infrastructure: the
24 Majone (1994), 80-81.
25 Saich (2001a), 2-5.
26 Miller (1996); Pozananski (1992); Lipton (1990); Bruno (1988).
27 Qian (1993); Qian (1998). See also Lin (1989), 106; Goldstein (1996), 149, 169.
28 Steinfeld (1998), 38, 39, 57, 70.
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courts. Guo Sujian argues that there is no ‘rule of law’ in reform China, but, 
instead, Party officials use the law instrumentally, bending it around their own 
policy decisions and ensuring that they themselves are unconstrained by its 
demands.30
Capital markets are especially reliant on credible institutions because of their 
need to co-ordinate actors across space and time. Because of the time lag 
between investment and return, the information asymmetries inherent in financial 
transactions, and the manifold opportunities these provide for cheating, it is 
generally accepted that there must exist credible and enforceable rules that allow 
investors confidence enough to extend financing to firms in the hope of future 
returns and redress in the event of fraud. Rules must limit the ability of powerful 
political actors to expropriate wealth from the market. The quality of securities 
regulations and statutory law, and the powers of the agencies mandated to 
develop, administer and enforce them, will inevitably determine whether 
financial resources are efficiently allocated, how much transaction costs cost and 
to what extent administrative power will interfere with forces of supply and 
demand.31 The style and efficacy of institutions will also determine to what 
extent investors are protected, and therefore if and how they choose to 
participate. Without such institutions in place, Douglass North argues, capital 
markets will not develop.32 This point, which echoes Stiglitz’s concern, is 
important: if information asymmetries are not corrected, if constraints on price 
manipulation are not in place, and if the forces of supply and demand are not 
allowed to determine prices, then the utility, and size, of a stock market will be 
limited. China’s equity institutions matter because they will determine the 
success or failure of the market they govern.33
29 Ding (2000). Also Lu (2000); Wedeman (1997) and Smyth (2000). Bureaucrats are ‘permanent 
employees of large organisation whose own contribution to organisational effectiveness cannot 
be directly calculated’, Downs (1967), 24.
30 Guo (1999b), 84.
31 Williamson (1985), 17,29. On regulation, Selznick (1985); Baldwin (1999); Hood (1994); 
Burki and Perry (1998), 1-28; Weaver and Rockman (1993), 445-461. On financial regulation, 
see Burki and Perry (1998), 67-85; Cole and Slade (1991), 337; Gomulka (1992), 57-62; Sikorski
(1996), 5, 9-11.
32 North and Weingast (1996), 164; Benham (1997), 45-46; Horn (1995), 18.
33 Burki and Perry (1998), 15.
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By 2000, extensive and impressive institutional development had occurred in 
China’s equity market. On the organisational front, regulatory organs at both the 
local and central levels of government had been established. The China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (.Zhongguo Zhengquan Jiandu Guanli 
Weiyuanhui, hereafter CSRC), the national regulator, enjoyed wide-ranging 
administrative, executive and judicial powers. The sector was governed by 
statutory legislation passed by the National People’s Congress (Quanguo Renmin 
Daibiao Dahui, hereafter the NPC) in 1998, and a large body of administrative 
rules and regulations issued by the State Council, its member bureaux and local 
governments.34 Standard and increasingly detailed procedures for a wide range of 
activities, from corporate disclosure to issuance applications to M&A, had been 
promulgated and have been increasingly implemented. However, there is also 
substantial evidence to suggest that China’s equity institutions are not as reliable 
as they could be. Witness, for example, the large number of scandals involving 
price manipulation by large individual investors (zhuangjia), SOE and 
investment fund managers, and the many grossly fraudulent initial public
-5 C
offerings (IPOs) that took place during the 1990s. Weak institutions, 
understood as rules that are weakly implemented, enabled powerful actors, 
whether they be well-capitalised speculators or members of the state itself, to 
expropriate wealth from the market. Although there has been a rise in 
administrative punishments in recent years, relatively few abuses have been 
investigated; as of year end 2000 only two securities crimes had been brought to 
the criminal courts and the civil courts did not offer private investors redress.36 
There is a large gap between formal institutions and actual practice, a gap that 
has caused deep-seated, popular cynicism about the market. This is perhaps best 
summed up in the Chinese phrase ‘bu guifarC (not well-ordered or rule-abiding), 
an all-too-common idiom used by everyone from Premier Zhu Rongji to the 
millions of Chinese individual investors to describe their stock market. Others, 
including the economist Wu Jinglian, have echoed Keynes and simply compared
34 When not referring to the Shanghai and Shenzhen leaderships, the terms ‘local government’ 
and ‘local leaders’ refers to provincial government, unless otherwise stated, rather than to sub­
provincial levels of government. ‘Bureau’ refers to government units and ‘department’ refers to 
Party organs, Huang (1996), 28, fh. 3. The CSRC is also referred to by the term bureau, although 
the regulator is not formally a government organ.
35 Green (2000a); EIU (2000c).
36 Cai (1999), 141
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the market to a casino, making the point that at least in a casino the rules are 
enforced.37
Equity institutions in China and the West
Best practice securities regulation is based around three objectives. First, 
investor protection. This necessitates full disclosure by market participants, the 
licensing of qualified institutional investors, and a comprehensive system of 
inspection and enforcement. Second, fairness and efficiency, requirements that 
translate into the need for equal access to information, fair treatment of orders 
and transparency in the pricing and volume of trading. Third, best practice also 
aims to reduce systemic risk. Regulatory agencies should isolate individual firm 
failures and minimise risks that threaten to cause instability in the wider financial 
system. These broad objectives translate into a diverse set of detailed standards 
and rules which impact on regulatory practice in each part of the market, as 
Figure 1 illustrates.
37 Wu (2001), 1-23.
38 IOSCO (1999).
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Figure 1. Securities regulation: a summary of best practice
Area o f  activity Best practice regulation
Listed firms
Market
intermediaries
Regulatory agency
Advisors
Full, accurate and timely disclosure of all information material 
to investors’ decisions.
High quality accounting and auditing standards. Independent 
checks to ensure that disclosures are accurate and full.
Fair treatment of all investors.
Good standards of internal organisation and operational 
conduct, as well as the proper management of risk.
Consistently applied minimum standard of entry, with on-going 
capital and other prudential requirements.
Procedures to deal with the failure of a firm to minimise loss to 
investors and systemic risk.
High quality accounting and auditing standards. Independent 
checks to ensure that disclosures are accurate and full. 
Operationally independent and accountable.
Clear and consistent regulatory process.
Promotes transparency of trading and can detect and deter 
manipulation and other unfair trading practices.
Comprehensive inspection, investigation, and surveillance 
powers.
Power to enforce the law through administrative sanctions and 
through the civil and criminal courts. Fair and expeditious 
process for discipline and complaint resolution.
Licensing regime for investment advisers with minimum 
standards of entry._____________________________________
Adapted from (IOSCO 1999).
Such rules rely on organisations, whether they be government bureaux, 
independent regulatory agencies or industry associations, to develop, refine and 
enforce them. In each jurisdiction, the powers and responsibilities enjoyed by 
these agencies, as well as their relations with government (the executive, 
legislature and judiciary), FIIs and self-regulatory organisations (SROs) will 
vary.39 The term ‘equity institutions’ is used to refer to this arrangement of 
organisations, their responsibilities and powers. The difference between equity 
rules and equity institutions is broadly similar to the distinction Davies and North 
make between an institutional environment, ‘a set of fundamental political, social 
and legal ground rules’, and an institutional arrangement, ‘an arrangement 
between economic [or political] units that govern the ways in which these units
39 Self-regulation; ‘an organisation or association developing a system o f rules that it monitors 
and enforces against its own members’, Baldwin (1999), 39, 69-71. See also Emery (1984).
23
can co-operate and/or compete’.40 Equity institutions can vary a great deal and 
their arrangement will influence the style and effect of regulation. They influence 
the ability of business to ‘capture’ regulation, i.e. to orient it to serve their 
interests, as well as the susceptibility of regulatory organs to interference from 
political actors. Equity institutions also affect the costs, flexibility and efficacy of 
regulation, the frequency and severity of investigation and punishments, as well 
as the regulator’s own legal responsibilities and liabilities.
Equity institutions vary widely from one jurisdiction to another. In the United 
States, stock market regulation has been organised since the 1930s around the 
twin structures of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), an 
independent federal agency entrusted with legislative, executive and judicial 
powers, and independent SROs like the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 
While the SEC is answerable to Congress, it is insulated from political 
interference in its policy development and day-to-day administration by rules 
governing the appointment of its commissioners and other safeguards. At the 
same time, this arrangement allows autonomy for the SROs to operate 
independently as profit-making businesses. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, 
between 1986 and the late 1990s equity regulation was governed by the 
Securities and Investment Board (SIB) system, an association of industry 
participants, which oversaw other SROs like the London Stock Exchange and its 
member companies.41 These SROs wrote their own rules, modelled on a 
rulebook issued by the SIB, and implemented regulation under SIB 
supervision.42 The board was overseen by a government ministry, the 
Department of Trade and Industry, and was answerable to parliament. In 
comparison with the American arrangement, SRO-led regulation allows for 
greater flexibility in regulation and enforcement, greater expertise to be applied, 
and it is also cheaper to operate. However, the arrangement had at least one 
serious flaw: it failed to protect investors. The SIB was widely believed to be 
insufficiently active in enforcing regulation, a weakness that led to accusations of
40 Davis and North (1971), 6-7. It is also similar to what Steven Vogel calls ‘the regulatory 
regime’, Vogel (1996), 20.
41 Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1998), 520-524; McDonald (1998), 506-511; Baldwin (1999), 63- 
64.
42 McElwee (2000), 15.
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regulatory capture by business. A second problem was that as global financial 
markets integrated in the 1990s, the large number of sector-specific SROs, 
including the SIB, remained uncoordinated. FIIs were confused by the different 
rules required by different SROs and bad practice flourished in the gaps in- 
between the different regimes.43 In contrast, the independent agency approach 
tends to provide tougher enforcement practices and to be less vulnerable to 
capture by business interests 44 Both arrangements, however, ensure that the 
regulator is independent of government. A third arrangement is one in which 
regulation is designed and implemented by a government bureau, most often the 
central bank or ministry of finance, as in France and Japan. One advantage of 
such an approach, especially in a developing country context, is that equity 
policy can be more easily dovetailed with macro-economic and industrial policy. 
However, this arrangement does tend also to create conflicts of interest and 
facilitates political interference in the execution of regulation. Of course, such 
simple caricatures of equity institutions inevitably gloss many of the important 
details of such arrangements in different countries, as well as their development 
over time. However, this short summary provides an indication of their 
importance and how they might affect a market’s development.
How to organise equity institutions is one of the most important issues facing 
policy makers overseeing a programme of stock market development. What 
particular arrangement will balance the requirements of development, stability, 
transparency and fairness? Which parts of the government bureaucracy, if any, 
should be involved? To what degree should equity institutions be centralised or 
managed by local government? How much should executive organs lead and 
how much should others, market participants, the legislature, the courts and 
private associations, be enfranchised in the rule-making and supervision 
processes? These are the questions that have faced senior reformers developing 
stock market regulation in China during the late 1980s and 1990s. Their 
responses have changed over time. During 1984-92, policy- and regulation- 
making powers were concentrated in the hands of local government and the
43 McDonald (1998), 501-503; Ogus (1998); Baldwin (1999), 63-72; Francis (1993), 203-238.
44 The UK government established the Financial Services Authority in 1998, an independent 
regulatory agency, McElwee (2000), 15-18; Claessens and Klingebiel (2001), 33.
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People’s Bank of China (Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang, hereafter PBoC). China’s 
two stock exchanges were established in late 1990 as de jure SROs, but were 
actively overseen by the Shanghai and Shenzhen municipal governments. Central 
government had a minimal role. In October 1992, however, after the rioting in 
Shenzhen, the central government re-organised the institutions of the sector. The 
State Council Securities Committee (Guowuyuan Zhengquan Weiyuanhui, 
hereafter SCSC), a senior meeting system, assumed formal policy-making 
powers and the CSRC was established as its administrative agency. However, at 
the same time, local leaders established securities commissions and 
administrative offices that allowed them to retain significant influence over the 
listing process and enforcement of secondary market regulation. Authority was 
awkwardly distributed between central and local leaders and between different 
central government bureaux. As a result, management of the sector became 
fragmented and disputed. Many of the rules formulated by central government 
were manipulated, undermined or simply ignored by local officials. A mild 
reorganisation of institutions occurred in 1995, after a Treasury bond futures 
scandal in February of that year. However, it was only during 1997-98 that a 
second major round of institutional change took place. Powers were then 
centralised in the CSRC and the SCSC was dispersed. By 2000, the CSRC had 
gained a bureaucratic rank equivalent to a ministry, its own local offices and 
wide-ranging policy-making powers. The influence of local government leaders, 
the PBoC and the stock exchanges themselves over both policy and regulatory 
development was radically reduced. The Securities Law consolidated this new 
institutional framework and elevated it to the level of statutory law. Thus in the 
third phase of institutional development during 1997-2000, fragmented and 
disputed equity institutions were clarified, consolidated and formalised. Long 
standing disputes were resolved, local leaders were sidelined, effective 
mechanisms for the monitoring of local bureaux by central government were 
introduced and a highly centralised system of regulation was created.
Explaining institutional change
Why did institutional development occur in such a way? Theories of regulation 
provide a number of possible explanations. From a traditional ‘public interest’
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perspective, governments are understood to regulate markets in order to prevent 
market failures, e.g. natural monopolies, negative externalities, and information 
asymmetries et al. Regulation is a public good that government provides and 
develops without gain to itself.45 This is the underlying assumption of official 
rhetoric in reform China, as it is in Western markets. The Securities Law claims, 
for instance, to ‘protect investors’ legitimate rights and interests [and] to 
safeguard economic order and the public interests of the society...’ (Art. 1). 
From such a perspective, changes to institutions of regulation can only be 
explained by market development, organisational learning, technological change 
and faulty regulation being revealed to be a mistake. Lacking experience in 
financial markets in the initial stages of development, it is likely that these 
factors have some explanatory utility for the changes witnessed in China’s equity 
institutions. However, they can not explain why such radical institutional change 
took place over such a short period of time. Nor do they provide a convincing 
account of agency: they do not identify which actors sponsored (and which actors 
resisted) institutional development. Nor, of course, do they explain why 
bureaucrats would be interested in providing regulation in the public interest in 
the first place.
An alternative approach to regulatory development is provided by neo- 
institutional and Chicago school accounts 46 In general, these accounts argue that 
private actors, responding to incentives embodied in changing relative prices or 
other factors that shift their preferences (new economies of scale, externalities, 
risks or costs involved in running the current institutions), seek changes to rules 
which they believe will profit them (or protect them from loss).47 Property rights 
law is seen to have evolved in response to the demands of private firms operating 
in increasingly complex and specialised societies where owners were not 
managers, capital needed to be accumulated and vast chains of transactions 
required co-ordination.48 The economic theory of regulation (ETR) developed by 
George Stigler and Samuel Peltzman and influenced by the Chicago School and
45 Breyer (1998), 60-73; Krueger (1996), 171; Hood (1994), 20-21.
46 Horn (1995), 37.
47 Davis (1971), 10, 59; North (1990), 83.
48 North and Weingast (1996), 134-139. Libecap (1996), 58.
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Mancur Olson, takes this interest-based approach one step further.49 Making the 
assumption that all actors, including those within regulated firms and 
government agencies, are rational and profit seeking, the ETR argues that private 
firms themselves demand regulation. The coercive power of the state (regulation) 
is a useful commodity for private business to purchase since it can be used to 
raise the costs of market entry for potential competitors and to set rates above 
cost, allowing rents to be shared among incumbents. Firms seek these benefits 
and politicians in government respond, providing and developing regulation in 
exchange for money and votes.50 Other competitors for the benefits of regulation, 
such as consumers, are disadvantaged by their collective action problems. The 
ETR has been deployed to explain regulatory change in the securities sector in 
the United States. For example, the SEC’s development of extensive disclosure 
requirements has been viewed as benefiting accountants, lawyers and 
underwriters, while only confusing small investors.51 The SEC also stands 
accused of defending fixed commissions during the 1960-70s, thus favouring 
securities companies over small investors, until Congress and the Justice 
Department forced it to liberalise rates in 1975.52 But the ETR has, of course, 
been criticised for its rigid assumptions about the interests of the bureaucrats and 
politicians involved in regulatory change, its often false equation of the winners 
of regulatory policy with its advocates, and its apparent inability to explain the 
rise of environmental regulation (where apparently insurmountable collective
C ‘3
action problems were overcome) and the recent wave of de-regulation. Other 
explanations of regulatory change have taken into account competing interest 
groups, the heterogeneous incentives facing public officials in different parts of 
the state, and the role of ideas.54 Steven Vogel, for instance, offers an account 
based on government ‘orientation’ (the ideas of the political elite) and the 
structural relationship between the executive and bureaucracy.55 Despite these 
drawbacks, however, neo-institutional theories and ETR offer some useful
49 The ETR was based on the theory of ‘regulatory capture’, in which business interests gained 
influence over regulatory agencies originally established in the public interest, Bernstein (1955); 
Kolko (1963); Levine and Forrence (1990), 178; Olson (1965);Peltzman (1976); Stigler (1971).
50 Stigler (1971), 3-4.
51 Phillips (1981), 51, 87, 111-119. Kripke (1979), 1-36.
52 On ‘regulatory capture’ at the SEC, Woodward (2000).
53 For critiques of ETR, Reagan (1987), 33-34; Baldwin (1999), 22-23; Doran (1979), 169-170.
54 Noll and Owen (1983).
55 Vogel (1996), 3-15.
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explanatory tools for use in the Chinese case. The key insights of neo­
institutionalism are that economic incentives are the ultimate source of 
institutional change and that self-interested actors are the first movers in 
effecting that change. For its part, ETR reveals the strategic nature of regulation 
and how it can be oriented towards delivering economic goods to powerful 
actors. These insights will prove useful in understanding institutional 
development in reform China.
Research question, design and problems
Asking how regulatory institutions develop in reform China is a significant 
research question for at least four reasons. First, it helps us assess the 
sustainability of China’s gradualist approach to economic reform. Economic 
growth may have been sustained throughout the reform period, but if underlying 
market institutions are not effectively built, future growth will be undermined. In 
particular, if equity institutions are not properly constructed, then the benefits 
that the stock market offers the wider economy will be constrained. Second, the 
thesis focuses attention on the issue of state capacity in China. Extensive 
research, reviewed below, has shown the detrimental effects of a weak central 
government unable to implement its policies. While this thesis reveals extensive 
implementation bias (where policies are mis-implemented) and autonomous 
institution building by local leaders, often with disastrous consequences, it also 
shows how the central government is, through careful sector-specific institution- 
building, ultimately able to control economic development. The fact that the 
Chinese state appeared significantly better co-ordinated in 2000 in the equity 
sector than at any time since 1986 is enormously significant for our 
understanding of how the Chinese state is evolving. Third, the research question 
prompts an examination of how the contemporary Chinese state operates as a 
whole. While particular attention has been paid in other research to the dynamics 
of the Centre-Local relationship, the thesis, while focusing considerable attention 
on this also attempts to explain and evaluate the roles played by other parts of the 
state, including the resurgent legislature, the members of the executive and the 
Party in institutional reform. Which organs of the state dominate regulatory 
development? And how has economic reform affected the ways in which the
29
different parts of the state operate and are co-ordinated? Fourth, the thesis 
employs and develops theories of financial regulation that have been used to 
explain regulatory practice in developed Western markets. Few other studies 
have applied such theories to reform China and an explicit comparison between 
the different reasons for why regulation takes place and what it achieves should 
provide insights into the evolving relationship between the state and the market 
in China.
Stock market institutions first appeared in the late 1980s, but were rudimentary, 
fragile, highly localised, and implemented on a largely ad hoc basis by local 
government leaders, with minimal central government involvement. The end 
point of institutional development in the equity sector, at least in 2000, was a 
highly centralised, sector-specific government regulator equipped with extensive 
mechanisms of monitoring and control over its local offices, and closely 
overseen by the central government and Party leadership. The development of 
this institutional arrangement is what this thesis seeks to explain. I adopted a 
single case study and a historical institutional framework.56 The complexity of 
stock market development, even within the short span of sixteen years, and the 
wide range of institutions that have been created, meant that a single case study 
approach was well suited to the task. It allowed the opportunity for detailed 
research to be done, allowing the thesis to make a meaningful contribution to 
knowledge in this one important area of China’s political and economic 
development. In particular, the thesis intends to make considerable contributions 
to empirical knowledge about local leaders’ sponsorship of equity markets, 
(including the Securities Trading Centres, an almost entirely undocumented 
phenomenon), the drafting process involved in creating the Securities Law, the 
style of post-1997 equity regulation and changes in state capacity during the 
1990s. Given abundant resources, an in-depth comparative study of institutional 
development in the securities, banking and insurance systems would have been 
profitable, although chapter twelve does attempt to draw some general 
conclusions about wider institutional development in China over the past decade. 
However, the single case study retains its comparative nature because it allows
56 A research design adopted also by Solnick (1998), 255; Thelen and Longstreth (1992), 1-32; 
Vogel (1996), 15-16; Haggard (1998), 99; Evans (1992), 164. See also Zysman (1983).
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for hypotheses and models developed elsewhere to be applied to a new area of 
research.
A rational ‘framework’ rather than ‘theory’ is employed. Principals, sub­
principals and agents, operating within a simplified three-level version of the 
state, are identified, as are their interests vis-a-vis equity market development. 
The thesis also identifies and explores the principal’s information and 
compliance problems and the strategies they use to resolve these problems (as 
well as the counter-strategies deployed by sub-principals and agents to protect 
their own autonomy and divergent interests). However, some of the problematic 
behavioural assumptions of neo-classical theories are avoided. This is partially 
because of the arduous data demands of game theoretic models and the severe 
constraints on all types of data and limited access to interviewees that still 
characterises research in China.57 The project had to cope with a wide variety of 
data constraints: information on the policy process at the senior level, as well as 
on Party and factional activities within China’s financial policy-making
CO
community, and in the localities, was generally unavailable. Moreover, 
empirically identifying the preferences (interests) of bureaucrats is impossible, a 
common problem for political scientists studying China.59 Bureaucrats in other 
countries are known to be keen to maximise their autonomy, to enhance the 
security of their employment, to render clientilistic favours, to shirk, to 
aggrandise budgets and/or revenues or simply try to get rich. However, the 
interests of bureaucrats (as individuals and as groups) and their strategies to 
attain them, are extremely complex and vary considerably across time and 
functions, as Patrick Dunleavy, among others, has shown.60 Some bureaucrats 
have even been known to act in the public interest, simply implementing policies 
that they believe are in the public interest. In the thesis, bureaucrats are assumed 
to be rational and to seek, for the most part, to maximise their personal career 
security and the revenues that accrue to their bureau or level of government.
57 On rational choice designs, Simon (1957); Allison (1971), 70-72; Dunleavy (1991), 147-205; 
Green (1994), 13-95; North (1990), 17-27.
58 A faction is a small group of people ‘mobilised on the basis of clientilistic ties to engage in 
politics’, Nathan (1973), 40. See also Tang (1976); Nathan (1995) Dittmer (1995); Huang 
(2000a); Pye (1981); Hongwu (1998).
59 Huang (1990b), 440.
60 Dunleavy (1991); Przeworski (1997), 420.
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These assumptions were supported by the results of much of the empirical 
research. However, some bureaucrats involved in the sector did appear to also 
have a keen sense of the ‘public interest’ and to take this into account when 
determining policy. Thus this preference is not ruled out as an explanatory factor 
at certain times. A third reason for choosing a historical-institutionalist 
framework rather than a game theoretic one was that the institutional 
environment changed rapidly throughout the period under examination. The 
ideological legitimacy of the stock market, its importance to senior policy makers 
as a source of funds, the role of the NPC in the policy-making process, the 
influence of the Shanghai and Shenzhen administrations and other localities, and 
elite politics within the central government, all changed significantly during 
1984-2000. The thesis is therefore essentially qualitative in its approach, using 
quantitative data wherever possible. While the limitations to the research 
identified above place constraints on the arguments presented, they do not 
undermine its central observations and argument. These issues are further 
discussed in chapter twelve.
The main research was carried out in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen and Hong 
Kong, during ten months of fieldwork between November 1999 and October 
2000 and June 2001. A variety of text-based sources, both primary and 
secondary, were used, including media, notably the Shanghai Securities News 
(Shanghai Zhengquanbao), the China Securities News (Zhongguo
Zhengquanbao), the South China Morning Post and numerous Chinese academic 
journals. A number of secondary texts in Chinese also proved helpful.61 Only a 
small number of internal stock exchange, CSRC and NPC documents were 
available for consultation. One important source of primary evidence was 
interviewees. I carried out around 60 confidential interviews with members of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the CSRC and various financial 
institutions. A list of interviewee positions, institutional affiliations and dates is 
provided in Appendix A. Interviews were usually arranged in one of two ways. 
The first, less successful approach, involved me identifying targets from press 
and secondary sources and then approaching them directly using a letter, fax or
61 For example, Hu (1999a); Zhang (1998); Jin (1999); Dong (1997); Li (1998b); Cao (2000); 
Huang (1999d); Hong (2000).
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email. More often than not these requests were turned down or simply ignored. A 
second route involved relying on a small number of contacts in senior positions 
to arrange interviews on my behalf. I provided a short list of issues (e.g. 
CSRC/stock exchange relations), about I was interested in finding out more and 
the contact then sought to arrange an interview with a colleague and/or friend 
with knowledge or personal experience of this area. About half of my requests 
were met. Interviews were then conducted in English and Chinese with 
guarantees of anonymity. They usually lasted about one hour, took place in 
private and were not recorded. I would usually prepare a list of questions about 
the issue about which most of the interview would be structured. However, I also 
asked more open-ended questions which often led to other topics of conversation, 
e.g. what other positions have you worked in?
Most interviews involved detailing policies and events already known about in 
broad outline. Many of them were extremely useful in providing the details of 
organisational structures, how policies were implemented, and what problems 
were involved. On a small number of occasions, I was aware that I was being 
given the official line and nothing more. However, many of the interviewees, 
especially those to whom I was introduced by a senior contact, were willing to 
talk openly about what ‘really’ happened. Three factors seemed important in this: 
guarantees of confidentiality, my ability to show that I already knew more than 
the official line, and the fact that I was introduced by a colleague/friend. A 
number of interviews also expressed admiration for the research project and the 
general importance of academic work. Since systematic interviews were 
impossible to organise it was difficult to cross check information provided by the 
interviewees. However, whenever an opportunity did arise I did attempt to do so 
and on a handful of occasions was able to organise a second interview to check 
information and pursue other lines of enquiry.
Literature in English on the Chinese stock market can be divided into four main 
categories. First, a broad but limited body of work provides accounts of market 
development.62 Some mention is made of competition between bureaucratic
62 Xia, Lin and Grub (1992); World Bank (1995a); Kumar (1997b); Goddard (1997), 86-166; Hu 
(1993); EIU (1998), 86-94,156-173; SIA (1996a); Walter and Howie (2001); Hertz (1998).
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organs, and the state’s tendency to ‘intervene’ in the sector but no extended 
analysis of such phenomenon is offered. Of the best studies available, Carl 
Walter focuses on the market from an investor’s perspective and is reliant on 
English language sources. Mei Xia, the World Bank and Ellen Hertz all provide 
in-depth examinations of market institutions but only at fixed points in time, all 
before 1996. None provides an account of the dynamic nature of institutional 
change over time. Another literature has examined the process of gufenhua 
(‘stockification’) by SOEs and the shareholding system in China in the context of 
industrial reform. Emphasis is placed here on the process of enterprise 
restructuring and the utility of share issuance in improving firm governance. A 
third body of work provides accounts of the sector’s regulatory development 
from a legal perspective.64 Emphasis is placed on explaining the formal rules: 
actual practice, as well as the process of rule-creation, is not explored. A fourth 
set of writings, more technical in orientation, tests financial theories with 
reference to the Chinese stock market.65 None of these studies has focused 
attention on how the state has developed policies, regulation and institutions for 
its equity market, nor examined the variety of state organs involved or the intense 
conflicts that took place between them.
A preview o f the argument
Imagine the Chinese state as a three-layer hierarchy of principals and agents.66 
An agency relationship arises when a principal delegates some rights to an agent 
who is bound by a contract to represent the principal’s interests in return for a 
payment of some kind. At the top of the Chinese state, a small band of policy­
makers occupying senior positions in the party and government, the zhongyang, 
are assumed to be the ultimate principals of equity regulation. They set the
63 Hannan (1998), 127-155; You (1998), 177-190; Karmel (1994); McNally (1998).
64 Yao (1998); Cohen (1997); Leung (1993); Nicoll (1998); Cai (1999); Tokley and Ravn (1998); 
Chun (1998).
65 Lee (1997); Wong (1998); Xu (2000).
66 On principal-agent relations, Williamson (1996), 4-9; Solnick (1998), 24. On three-level 
hierarchies, Tirole (1986), 182-185.
67 The zhongyang (literally, ‘the Centre’) denotes the senior leadership, made up o f members of 
the Central Committee (who also occupy other senior Party and government posts). It is used in 
distinction to the terms central government, which refers solely to executive government organs 
and officials ‘the centre’, which refers to central government and leadership generally in contrast 
to the local level, On Party and government structures in China, Saich (2001b), 80-140.
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broad parameters for market development, define major policies and ensure that 
equity development supports their wider political and economic goals. For these 
zhongyang leaders, equity institutions should ideally guarantee financial, as well 
as social, stability and provide support for industrial policy. To implement these 
aims, they rely upon two sets of agents: leaders of central government bureau and 
local government. These agents implement policy, collect information, and 
develop detailed policy. However, they also operate as ‘sub-principals’, assisting 
the principals in monitoring and controlling the third-level actors, local yw-level 
bureau leaders, those that implement policy and regulate the market on a day-to- 
day basis.
As in any complex organisation, senior leaders must solve the principal-agent 
problems of limited information, bounded rationality and opportunism. They can 
only do this through creating effective institutions: a governance structure that 
ensures that they have sufficient knowledge about their sub-principals’ and 
agents’ behaviour, that both have sufficient incentives to act loyally and that 
mechanisms to discourage defection also exist. During the 1990s, zhongyang 
leaders experienced two problems in building such institutions. First, local 
leaders ‘captured’ key equity institutions. ‘Institutional capture’ occurs when a 
group of sub-principals gains de facto control of regulation and policy-making
o
powers through their administrative control of a y'w-level bureau. Without 
effective oversight from above, this enables them to orient the development of 
institutions to support their own interests. The problem in the equity sector was 
that local leaders did not share the interests of their zhongyang principals and had 
the capacity to defect, often spectacularly. During 1990-97, local leaders used 
their capture of equity institutions to maximise local tax revenues and investment 
funds as well as to minimise regulation. Their strategy resulted in fast market 
development and regular financial instability. 'The arrangement of institutions 
local leaders established was stable and highly resistant to attempts by central 
bureaux leaders to monitor, intervene or punish defection. However, poor 
Centre-Local co-ordination has not been the only challenge facing the 
zhongyang. A second set of problems have confronted them at the central
68 Unlike regulatory capture, which describes the actions of private actors vis-a-vis public 
agencies, institutional capture describes public actors vis-a-vis state institutions.
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government level where bureau leaders competed to institutionalise their own 
influence over the equity sector in support of their own organisational goals. This 
obstructed the rise of the CSRC. The resulting lack of clarity within central 
government meant that local leaders enjoyed autonomy from effective 
supervision.
Given the apparent resistance of the Chinese policy-making process to sudden 
and radical change, and what we know of institutions in general, major 
institutional change should not have occurred.69 However, it did: twice in the 
space of five years. What explains this? Institutional change required two things 
to change in the incentive structure of the zhongyang leadership. First, growth in 
the stock market, which heightened zhongyang leaders’ interest in it. Once the 
market was large enough to be credibly integrated into its industrial reform 
policies equity institutions mattered. However, this was not sufficient to prompt 
institutional change. For this crisis, a sudden and acute threat to the continued 
viability of the market, and the state that backed it, (or at least the credible threat 
of crisis), was required. Low-level defection of local agents, listing poor-quality 
firms for example, was tolerated since it had only a marginal impact on 
zhongyang leaders’ core interests and was largely hidden from both the public 
(and central government) gaze. However, as soon as defection became 
spectacular and destabilising, zhongyang leaders took an interest. It alerted them 
to problems in institutions and raised the incentives for re-organising them, 
which they did in 1997-98.70 The post-1997 settlement, in which the CSRC 
gained institutional capture, is labelled ‘market socialist regulation’. Market 
socialist regulation is an arrangement of institutions centred on a government 
bureau with highly centralised powers, minimal oversight by organs outside the 
executive and the Party, and no participation by industry groups or SROs. By 
empowering one sub-principal (a central government bureau) over another (local 
government) the senior leadership had by 2000 largely succeeded in its search for 
an institutional arrangement that supported its core interests. However, the post- 
1997 institutions still did not deliver best practice securities regulation because of 
its political mandate to support industrial reform. Looking to the future, the
69 North (1990), 6; Garrett and Lange (1996), 54-70.
70 Lampton (1987b), 171.
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thesis argues, institutional change will continue to be dominated by public actors 
but market socialist regulation will be increasingly constrained by the state’s 
need to attract private investors into equities as it accelerates its sale of assets to 
fund its huge liabilities.
Chapter plan
Chapter two introduces the main actors. It identifies the important 
characteristics and interests of investors (both institutional and individual) and 
government actors (the senior leadership, central government leaders, local 
leaders, and local bureaux leaders) and explains which actors are significant in 
terms of designing and implementing institutional development. It also examines 
the structure of the Chinese state and the permanent state institutions which serve 
to co-ordinate actors across its different organs. Chapters three to ten each take a 
separate piece of the institutional framework and examine its development across 
time. This structure allows a detailed focus on the development of important 
institutions over time, although the lack of chronological progression may, at 
first, be slightly disorienting.
Part II is concerned with institutional development at the local level. It shows 
how local leaders achieved institutional capture, how this delivered important 
economic goods and how, after 1997, it was replaced by central capture. 
Chapter three examines the sector’s early developments. During 1986-90 non­
state actors at both the local and central levels took the lead in designing and 
lobbying for the institutionalisation of new, informal share markets. As the 
advantages of stock market growth became evident, local political leaders moved 
to formalise their operations in the form of stock exchanges. Non-government 
sponsors of more market-oriented institutions were sidelined as these local 
leaders gained control of the new institutions and nurtured market development. 
Chapter four shows how local leaders captured the issuance process until 1997. 
During the early 1990s, provincial-level leaders throughout China established 
securities management commissions (Zhengquan Guanli Weiyuanhui, hereafter 
SMCs), senior meeting systems, and securities administration offices 
{Zhengquan Guanli Bangongshi {.Zhengguanban), hereafter SAOs), y'w-level
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bureau under their administrative control. These allowed the IPO process to be 
systematically exploited to support the financing of local SOEs, many of poor 
quality. Chapter five reveals the Centre-Local split in equity institutions at its 
most extreme. It shows how a network of yw-level bureaux in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen were used by the local leaderships to implement an aggressive and 
highly effective development program for the secondary market during 1995-97. 
The crisis triggered by this ‘equity developmentalism’ prompted the zhongyang 
leadership to organise the take-over of local institutions. Chapter six shows how 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, initially established as SROs under 
the management of local leaders, were also oriented to developmental goals 
during 1993-97 and effectively resisted oversight by central government bureaux. 
The chapter also shows how by 1998 the exchanges had lost their SRO status and 
had been brought under the direct administration of the CSRC. Local capture of 
equity institutions was not solely limited to Shanghai and Shenzhen. Chapter 
seven shows how local leaders built securities trading centres (STCs), quasi­
stock exchanges, in direct contravention of State Council policy and used them to 
raise revenues and channel funds towards their favoured investment projects.
Part III examines the development of equity institutions within the central 
government and the problems zhongyang leaders experienced in co-ordinating 
the central bureaux, an equally serious problem for them as preventing defection 
by local leaders. The CSRC’s organisational rise from an administrative office to 
a ministry-ranking organ is recounted in chapter eight. The regulator was 
effectively prevented from fulfilling its policy and regulatory mandates before 
1997 by both local and central bureaux leaders. However, once the zhongyang 
leadership had become fully recognisant of the benefits (and threats) that the 
developing market entailed, and were forged into action by crisis, they 
determined that concentrating powers within a single sub-principal, the CSRC, 
was the best means to ensure that their interests were protected. Chapter nine 
shows how zhongyang leaders attempted to co-ordinate central bureaux, provide 
policy direction for stock market development and constrain local leaders’ 
developmental urges during 1993-97 through the SCSC. However, the 
commission operated as a veto-point for key regulatory improvements, 
undermined the CSRC and failed to curb defection by local sub-principals. In
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terms of China’s Constitution, the most authoritative institution maker in the 
polity is the legislature, the NPC. Chapter ten examines how NPC members 
influenced the development of equity institutions through the drafting the 
Securities Law during 1992-98. It shows how a two-track policy process opened 
up as NPC drafters attempted to undermine institutional capture of the market by 
introducing market mechanisms into the draft, in opposition to State Council 
policy. Although most of its more radical proposals were rejected, the NPC did 
succeed in implementing important constraints on the activities of executive 
organs and can be seen to have played a valuable role in the institutions building 
process.
Part IV evaluates the post-1997 ‘end-point’ of institutional development and 
presents the conclusions of the thesis. Chapter eleven examines the post-1997 
institutional settlement in detail, and provides a comparison of China’s equity 
institutions with those of the United States. The chapter also examines the 
consequences of this institutional arrangement on enforcement policy, arguing 
that since market socialist regulation is primarily interested in supporting SOE 
reform policy, it fails to provide protection to investors, transparency and 
fairness. Chapter twelve presents the conclusions of the thesis and explores the 
implications of these conclusions for other areas of research on reform China. 
First, it argues that the senior leadership can improve state capacity through a 
broad portfolio of sector-specific institutions, including, most importantly, 
nomenklatura. Second, it explains why, contrary to the implications of neo- 
institutional theory, China’s stock market has grown without adequate market 
institutions. Third, it identifies the three major policy issues that now dominate 
the zhongyang's agenda and considers how they will impact upon the future 
institutional development of the stock market.
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2Investors, bureaucrats and the institutions of the Chinese state
Develop and perfect securities markets with Chinese characteristics 
Inscription at the SHGSE, General Secretary Jiang Zemin, 199271
The government exercises unified and overall management o f the stock market without directly or 
excessively intervening in its operations.
Xinhua, 199372
In this chapter, the actors who are able to influence the development of China’s 
equity institutions are identified. Two types of market actors, institutional and 
individual investors, are considered, as well as four groups of bureaucratic 
actors: China’s senior political leadership (the zhongyang), leaders of bu-\eve\ 
bureaux (ministries and commissions), local (provincial-level) leaders and local 
yw-level bureaux leaders, the actors who directly oversee the implementation of 
policy and regulation. The interests of each of these actors are considered, and 
the question of how such interests impact on their institution-building activities is 
addressed. The next step is to identify the principals and agents among these 
actors and consider the state institutions which, like the nomenklatura system are 
generally not subject to change, that govern relations between them. Care is 
taken to distinguish between the stable institutions of the Chinese state and those 
institutions, the subject of the thesis, that are specific to the equity sector.
Stock market investors: institutions, individuals and interests
This section considers the interests of investors in China’s stock market, both 
individuals and financial institutional investors (FIIs), in institutional change, and 
assesses their ability to influence such change. It is argued that neither group is 
likely to be able to effect institutional change or effectively lobby for such 
change. However, because of the close links between FIIs and the state, public 
officials are at any rate likely to develop regulation that maximises the profits of 
FIIs.
71 Xinhua (1993f).
72 Xinhua (1993b).
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Institutional investors
In developed markets, FIIs are often powerful actors in fostering regulatory 
change. It was insistent lobbying by FIIs, for instance, which saw the dismantling 
of the 1933 Glass Steagall Act (which separated commercial and investment
H'Xbanking) in the United States in 1999. In China, however, because of the 
relative immaturity of the market, FIIs are small and underdeveloped. Their 
assets and profits are limited, their holding of Chinese equities is small, and their 
lobbying power is weak. China’s FIIs include securities companies, trust and 
investment companies (TICs), investment fund management firms and insurance 
funds.74 The former three groups can join the stock exchanges as members; the 
others trade through legal person accounts via brokerage facilities provided by 
the securities companies.75 Stock exchange FII membership during 1991-2000 is 
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Institutional membership of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges, 1991-2000
SHGSE SHZSE
1991 26 15
1992 101 111
1993 378 426
1994 569 496
1995 577 532
1996 547 542
1997 493 373
1998 317 329
1999 310 -
2000 305 326
Sources: SHGSE and SHZSE fact 
books and websites.
Most securities companies and TICs trade at both exchanges: the total number of 
such firms peaked at around 600 in 1995, the majority of them TICs, and 
subsequently declined to around 350.76 As of the end 2000, there were 96 
dedicated securities companies, about 30 of which had registered capital of
73 Economist (1999); FOMC (1999); Teweles (1998), 11.
74 Commercial banks have not, since the early 1990s, been allowed to engage in securities 
business. The ban was formalised in the Commercial Bank Law (1995, Art. 43) to prevent the 
movement of savings deposits into the share market. Bank managers have, however, found 
numerous routes to evade the ban, EIU (2001b).
75 An investor may legally open one ‘share account’ at a stock exchange, but may open multiple 
‘capital accounts’ at securities companies’ branches, Interview-46, Shenzhen, 2001.
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Rmb500m or above, and could thus legally engage in underwriting and 
proprietary trading. The Securities Law ruled that companies without this capital 
could only broker shares. There are no publicly available figures on their holding 
of equity, although the amount is almost certainly less than 10% of TMC. 
China’s investment fund sector is also still small, having only been established in 
its modem form in 1998. By the end of 2000, China’s 34 closed-end investment 
funds had issued Rmb56.2 billion worth of units and held less than 4% of 
TMC.77 Contrast that with the United States where during the 1990s, around 50% 
of stock market capitalisation was held by institutional funds. Until 1999, 
insurance funds were not permitted to own shares; after this time, a select 
number were permitted to purchase small amounts of investment funds. Pension 
funds have not, as of the end of 2000, been allowed to buy equities. China’s 
SOEs have also been important players in the share market although statistics on 
their share holdings are also unavailable. They were banned from share 
investment during 1997-99 because of fears that they were speculating with 
public funds intended for industrial investment, though many continued to trade 
with the complicity of their brokers.78 According to official figures, individual 
investors at the SHGSE held Rmb367.3 billion worth of shares, 89% of TMC, 
while FIIs (excluding SOEs) held only Rmb43.9 billion, only 11% of market 
value, at the end of 1999.79
Although their managements enjoy operational autonomy and are profit-oriented, 
the majority of China’s FIIs are shareholding companies, with state organs 
owning the majority of their equity. The government has significant 
administrative influence over their operations. Appointments to the senior 
management of all FIIs were subject to the approval of either the local or national 
branches of the PBoC or the CSRC throughout the 1990s. The PBoC itself 
appointed many management teams; now boards of directors do so, usually in 
negotiation with the CSRC. Most companies operate CCP committee systems 
which organise political work within the firms and the sector’s industry
76 Kumar (1997a).
77 CSRC (2001), 7.
78 Interview-46, Shenzhen, 2001.
79 COL (2000e).
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grouping, the China Securities Industry Association (SIA), is run as a de facto 
subsidiary of the CSRC, its top management being appointed by the regulator.
In addition to FIIs, however, financial management companies, financial 
consultancies and successful individual investors have offered informal asset
Q / \
management services from the late 1990s onwards. These privately raised 
funds (simu jijin) were estimated to be worth some Rmb800-900 billion in mid- 
2001, some 45% of TMC, around ten times the amount managed by the FIIs.81 
Securities companies also offer similar informal asset management services. 
Many SOEs use these intermediaries to disguise their speculative use of public 
funds. Most of this money is traded through individual share accounts, and is 
therefore indistinguishable from the funds of individual investors. These informal 
institutional investors (Ills) were mostly unregistered and entirely unregulated up 
until the end of 2000. They are suspected of being the prime practitioners of 
insider dealing, using hundreds, sometimes thousands, of fake share accounts in 
order to manipulate prices. China’s FIIs are relatively small, state-owned and 
partially integrated into the administrative structure of the state and Party. Ills are 
privately owned, most are small in size (although as a group they are the 
dominant holders of equity), but because of their informal status and desire for 
secrecy are not active lobbyists of government.
What kind of regulation would such actors be interested in? In general, 
institutional investors in any market resist administrative interference and seek to 
maximise self-regulation, as well as financial supports, for their industry. They 
also tend to advocate minimal punishments, administrative and legal, for illegal 
activities. Given their superior access to financial resources and inside 
information, FIIs and Ills can profit from the poor enforcement of rules and weak 
disclosure by listed companies more than individual investors. Engaging in price 
manipulation is especially easy in China because of the peculiar capital structure 
of listed firms. Throughout the 1990s, the state has retained ownership of the 
majority of the equity of all listed firms in the form of state and legal person 
shares, as Figure 3 shows.
80 Interview-47, Shenzhen, 2001.
81 EIU (2001f); SZB (2001).
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Figure 3. China’s share categories
Type Description
Individu 
al A- 
shares
Domestically listed shares, denominated in local currency, owned by 
individuals and legal persons. Foreign investors may not own these shares, 
which make up about one third of a typical listed company’s equity.
Individu 
al B- 
shares
Domestically listed shares of China-incorporated companies, denominated 
in US$ in Shanghai and HK$ in Shenzhen, owned by individuals and legal 
persons. Initially reserved for foreign investors, domestic institutions and 
individuals now account for most trading.
Legal
person
shares
About a third of every listed firm’s equity is transferred to domestic 
institutions (stock companies, NBFIs, and SOEs with at least one non-state 
owner) and can not be traded on the stock market. During late 2000 an 
active auction market in legal person shares developed.
State
shares
About a third of equity is transferred to the state (central and local 
government bureaux, as well as SOEs wholly owned by the state). The 
ultimate owner is the State Council but these shares are managed by 
bureaux of the State Asset Management Administration. State shares are 
not tradable.
H-shares Shares of PRC registered companies listed in Hong Kong.
Red-
chips
Shares of companies registered overseas and listed abroad (principally in 
Hong Kong), having substantial Mainland interests and controlled by 
affiliates or bureaux of the PRC government.
Figure 4. Capital structure of listed companies in 2000
Share type Proportion o f total, %
State shares 37
Legal person shares 26
Other 2
A-shares 26
B-shares 5
H-shares 4
CSRC (2001), 138.
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As Figure 4 shows, as of 2000 state shares made up 37% and legal person shares 
26% of the total market capital structure. This equity is non-tradable. Tradable 
A-shares only made up 26%.82 The differentiation between share types was not 
eroded during the 1990s; instead the proportion of non-tradable shares actually 
increased. In 2001, 79 companies went public: 80% of their 117.95 billion shares 
were non-tradable. This small float and rigid share structure has implications 
for the trading practices of investors, as well as for corporate governance. 
China’s institutional investors can not gain ownership rights in the companies 
into which they buy. A M&A market can not develop since majority stakes are 
not tradable, all take-overs take place through administrative agreement, 
requiring local government and the CSRC approval. FIIs and Ills therefore have 
a limited interest in long-term investment: a trading strategy oriented to 
maximising income from short-term increases in the capital value of shares, 
rather than dividend income, results. The equity structure also damages corporate 
governance, which increase the incentives for short-term ownership. Dominant 
shareholders, mostly state bureaux and SOEs, have tended to treat listed firms as 
assets to be exploited: IPOs and rights revenues are ‘loaned’ to parent and 
subsidiary companies and not repaid (a form of asset stripping), minority 
shareholders rights are ignored, few dividends are paid, and administrative 
interference in firms’ management is extensive.84 The huge extent of rights issues 
is another indication of the extent to which small shareholders’ interests are
or
ignored. Given this environment, which advantages short term investment, FIIs 
and Ills will be interested in regulation that facilitates profitable short-term 
investment or, in other words, regulation which allows for frequent and rapid 
increases in share prices and manipulation.
In most developed Western markets, because of their extensive resources and 
small number, FIIs tend to enjoy considerable influence over the development of 
regulation. Indeed, from an ETR perspective, we would expect them to capture 
control of the regulatory agency. The lack of any clear public-private divide, 
however, ensures that the ETR is not suitable for explaining institutional
82 Only these shares are included in the TMC measure, CSRC (2001), 138.
83 Wu (2002).
84 Wei (1998); Jiang (1999b); Chen (2000); (1999); Green (2000d); CSRC (2001).
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development in reform China: there is no reason for the government of a one- 
party state to trade regulation in exchange for funds (or, indeed, votes). However, 
monopoly public ownership creates a natural harmony of interest between FIIs 
(and Ills) and the state. Instead of receiving campaign funds et al., the state 
benefits directly from the profits and taxes provided by the securities companies, 
investment funds and SOEs. The state benefits through the profits these 
companies distribute directly to state shareholders, the corporate taxes they pay 
and the taxes that are levied on the trading they engage in. The state will 
therefore be interested in maximising trading turnover and the profits of FIIs. 
State officials will also be interested, of course, in creating and supporting 
demand in the market so that SOEs can raise investment and working capital. 
Public actors therefore have incentives to orient regulation to favour FIIs and 
even Ills. In other words, the type of regulation ETR predicts, regulation in 
support of the interests of large market participants, is likely to occur.
Small investors
Individual investors have an interest in good quality regulation that protects their 
investments and lives up to the IOSCO principles outlined in the previous 
chapter. Given their limited resources, the development of effective regulation 
will advantage them more than it does large institutional investors. They will be 
interested in full and honest disclosures from listed companies and effective bars 
on large investors leveraging their access to superior information and larger 
funds to engage in fraud. They will be interested in the enforcement of 
punishments for fraud and in regulation that is administered independently of 
government and the Party. However, small investors lack mechanisms for 
pursuing these interests and public actors in China generally lack incentives to 
provide these goods. A bias to poor regulation is therefore likely to occur.
Figure 5 shows the growth of share accounts over the 1990s. By the end of 2000, 
there were around 60m. Small investors are concentrated in Shanghai and 
Guangdong province, which together hosted around 30% of all accounts.86 Most 
investors are not rich: the majority had annual incomes of Rmb6,000-24,000 in
85 EIU (2001c).
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1999, and traded funds of Rmb50,000-100,000, as Figure 6 and Figure 7 and 
show.
86 CSRC (2000), 261.
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Figure 5. Number of investor accounts at the SHGSE and SHZSE, 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of investor accounts 2.17 7.78 10.59 12.42 23.07 33.33 39.11 44.82 58.01
m
CSRC (2000), 260; CSRC (2001), 194.
Figure 6. The monthly incomes of investors at the SHGSE in 1999
Monthly income, Rmb <500 500-1,000 1,000-2,000 2,000-4,000 >4,000
Proportion of accounts, % 14 40 35 7 4
Liang (2000), 47.
Figure 7. The size of investor accounts at the SHGSE, 1999
Amount o f funds, Rmb <20,000 20,000-50,000 50,000-100,000 100,000-200,000 200,000-500,00 >500, 000
Proportion of accounts, % 18 12 44 12 9 5
Liang (2000), 47.
Figure 8. A-share investors at the SHGSE and SHZSE, 1999-2000
1998 1999 2000
Total number of investors 38.93 44.62 57.74
Legal person investors 0.14 0.18 0.26
Individual investors 38.79 44.43 57.48
m
CSRC (2000), 260; CSRC (2001), 194.
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Figure 8 shows the number of registered share accounts in 1998-2000 for 
institutions (legal persons) and individuals. Since institutional accounts 
numbered 260,000 in 2000 one can conclude that (in theory at least) over 99% of 
share accounts belong to individuals, in control of their own private assets and 
investing independently of the government and the Party. The commonly made 
inference that China’s stock market is dominated by small, private investors is
on
supported by the high turnover rates. As Figure 9 shows, turnover rates, which 
measure how often a share is traded, are typically five to six times higher in 
China than in developed markets, and are also significantly higher than those in 
other Asian stock markets. Lower turnover rates reflect higher concentrations of 
long-term holdings, and therefore tend to indicate greater institutional 
investment.
87 Individual investors usually hold shares for less than one month, COL (2000d).
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Figure 9. Trading turnover rates at stock exchanges around the world, 1993-99
Shanghai Shenzhen Taiwan Hong Kong South Korea New York Tokyo London
1993 341 213 252 61 187 47 26 81
1994 787 472 366 40 174 53 25 77
1995 396 180 228 37 105 53 27 78
1996 591 902 243 44 91 59 27 58
1997 326 466 407 91 146 52 33 44
1998 297 284 314 62 207 66 34 47
1999 423 372 289 51 345 75 49 57
%
Note: in the case of Shanghai and Shenzhen, the turnover rate is calculated by dividing the annual trading volume of shares by the 
number of tradable shares.
CSRC (2001), 255.
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Given the apparent huge numbers of individual investors, one might expect 
public actors to deliver good quality regulation in response to their concerns. Yet 
the numbers, and importance, of individual share investors in China is easily 
overstated.88 The actual trading population has been considerably smaller than 
the headline figure for accounts throughout the 1990s, perhaps only about one 
fifth of the size. This is due to four factors. First, a large number of investors 
trade on both exchanges, meaning that the headline figure should be reduced by 
around 20% to cancel out the duplication of accounts. Second, some 30-50%, 
much more by some estimates, of these accounts are counterfeit, opened using 
false names by FIIs, Ills and wealthy individuals. Multiple accounts allow them 
to ‘match orders’, i.e. to sell shares between linked accounts to create the
on
impression of trading volume and to push up prices. Having multiple accounts 
has also facilitated their entry into BPO lotteries: the larger the number of 
accounts one controls, the greater the chances of gaining the right to buy IPO 
shares.90 The dramatic rise in share prices in the first few days of trading 
guaranteed successful bidders huge profits throughout the 1990s. Third, many 
individual investors opened accounts to take part in this IPO lottery but they did 
not hold on to the shares if they were successful, and can not be considered to be 
active investors. Only in 2000 did regulations force IPO lottery entrants to hold 
shares in the secondary markets. Fourth, many accounts have fallen disused after 
their holders sustained losses and lost interest in the market. Data from the stock 
exchanges shows that only around 40% of share accounts contained shares as of 
mid-2000.91 Only 10,000-100,000 accounts were active on a typical trading day 
at the SHZSE in that year. A generous estimate would therefore put the number 
of individuals actively trading shares at the end of 2000 at 5m to 10m, a fraction 
of the 57.7m share accounts, and far less than 1% of China’s total population. 
Outside periods of extremely active trading, during late 1996 to early 1997 for 
example, the figure has probably not risen above 15m. The influence of small 
investors was probably greatest in the early 1990s. The high turnover of shares
88 EIU (200If).
89 Interview-45, Shenzhen, 2001.
90 The IPO lottery system, implemented in 1992, was designed to allocate the right to buy IPO 
shares to a small number of the subscribers. A bank account, replete with sufficient funds, must 
be nominated by the investor and if the account is chosen in the lottery, the investor may 
purchase shares, EIU (200lg).
91 COL (2000e).
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reflects the speculative trading strategies of FIIs and Ills rather than the number 
of individual investors in the market.
In addition to their limited numbers, small investors face many barriers that 
prevent them from effecting institutional change. In any market, as a dispersed 
group, they face collective action constraints on their ability to organise. These 
organisational problems are multiplied in China. There is no ballot box and 
therefore no political competition for their support; civil associations organised 
outside the state remain restricted; and the courts did not as of 2000 offer the 
opportunity for private suits or class actions.94 There is no independent press that 
could campaign on behalf of a small investor readership. Three government- 
owned and CSRC-licensed newspapers are allowed to report official notices and 
dominate coverage. They are censored by CCP-appointed editors and have 
tended not to report corruption. A small number of other publications, including 
Caijing Zazhi (Finance Magazine) and Nanfang Zhoumo (Southern Weekend), a 
newspaper, have broken stories of wrong-doing, but these are recent exceptions. 
In sum, small investors have very limited means to put pressure on public actors 
to develop equity institutions that protect their interests.
In response, many investors have exited the market. However, there are 
disincentives for doing so since few other instruments of asset management are 
available. Bank deposit interest rates have been set artificially low throughout the 
1990s to enable the banks to make low-interest loans to the SOE sector. 
Investments abroad have not been possible because of capital controls.95 Of 
course, the ultimate weapon that small investors have for advocating better 
regulation is protest. Demonstrations in Shenzhen in 1992, for example, 
highlighted gross misconduct by local officials and resulted in the wholesale 
reorganisation of regulation. Individual investors evidently had an immediate 
impact upon institutional development at this point. However, such protests have 
been rare, especially considering the numerous scandals that have accompanied
92 Interview-46, Shenzhen, 2001.
93 Collective action only succeeds if a group is small, able to deploy ‘selective benefits’ (i.e. 
benefits only to participants), or is able to use coercion, Olson (1965), 2-25.
94 Gamble (2000); Potter (1999), 674.
95 EIU (200le).
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the market’s development. Protest only takes place when a regulatory problem is 
felt intensely in one geographical area, affects a large number of people, and is 
relatively simple to comprehend. One would therefore expect political leaders to 
take such problems into some account and to moderate their strategies 
appropriately. However more complex, hidden and dull problems in the 
regulatory structure that affect a large number of dispersed investors over a 
longer period are far less likely to trigger protest and are therefore less likely to 
be addressed by public actors.
The state: actors and interests
Having ruled out investors as sources of institutional change, the interests of
government and Party leaders in terms of equity market development and the
institutions that underpin it are now considered. In the absence of private
business, and with individual investors lacking means to pursue regulatory
change, bureaucrats enjoy relative autonomy in creating equity institutions. The
most obvious interest they have in developing a stock market is the finance it can
provide SOEs. The banking system became increasingly indebted during the
1990s, forced to continue administrative lending to the loss-making SOE sector.
While official statistics continued to claim that non-performing loans (NPLs)
remained at low levels, Nicholas Lardy calculates that by year end 2000, the four
state banks were insolvent.96 Apparently in an attempt to hold this problem in
check, a decision appears to have been made in 1997 to restrict bank lending,
Q7
following the suspension of credit quotas at the beginning of the year. With 
bank financing increasingly restricted, the state increasingly turned to the stock 
market.
Figure 10 shows how the equity market has raised Rmb656 in funding, almost all 
for the SOE sector, during 1991-2000.98 Only some 40 non-state firms were 
trading publicly by the end of the 1990s, most of them through taking over listed 
SOEs through CSRC-approved M&A deals involving off-exchange transfers of
96 Lardy (1998), 115-124.
97 OECD (2000), 84.
98 This figure includes funds raised through initial and rights and secondary offerings, and from 
overseas issues, as well as those in the Mainland.
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LP and state shares." Figure 11 shows how the stock market compares with bank 
loans as a financing route for industry. By 2000, it was still clearly a secondary 
source, providing only a tenth of the capital provided by the banks, but it had 
grown enormously through the decade and especially since 1997. IPO financing 
has benefited both local and central leaders, although since the large majority of 
the 1,050 firms listed by the end of 2000 fell under the administrative control of 
local leaders, the former have profited proportionately more. Given the 
importance of SOE reform to all levels of government, it would be reasonable to 
expect that political actors shaped the institutions of equity regulation around 
maximising these revenues.
99 Only a handful of private firms had been allowed to IPO. They have tended to be new economy 
companies with good political connections; many have state-affiliated organs among their 
owners. The Fuxing Group, a non-state Shanghai-based pharmaceuticals company, listed in 1998 
with Shanghai government backing, raising Rmb348m. Shaanxi province’s Jinhua, a high-tech 
firm, issued Rmbl78m worth of shares in 1997 and Shenzhen’s Taitai Medicine, a successful 
family-run concern, listed in Shanghai in 2001, Green (2001), 26.
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Figure 10. Total raised capital from share issuance, 1991-2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Total value of share issuance 0.51 9.41 37.55 32.68 15.03 42.51 129.38 84.15 94.46 210.31 655.97
Rmb billion
Note: Includes A, B, overseas-listed H-shares, as well as rights and secondary offerings. 
CSRC (2001), 33.
Figure 11. Stock market and bank financing compared
Domestic capital raised through stock issues Total bank loans Issues as a proportion o f bank loans, %
1993 27.6 634.5 4.36
1994 10.0 721.7 1.38
1995 8.6 934.0 0.92
1996 29.4 1,068.3 2.76
1997 85.6 1,071.2 7.99
1998 77.8 1,149.0 6.77
1999 89.7 1,084.6 8.27
2000 149.9 1,334.7 11.23
Rmb billion
Note: includes banks loans made by shareholding banks and loans to non-corporate borrowers. 
CSRC (2001), 13.
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In addition to investment revenues, the stock market has been an increasingly 
important component of fiscal revenues, both local and central. Figure 12 shows 
developments in the stamp tax (yinhuashui), the tax levied on each share 
transaction. The first tax on share trading was levied on the seller in June 1990 
by the Shenzhen government at 0.6% of the value of the transaction and in June 
1992, the National Tax Bureau assumed control over the rate.100 Stamp tax rates 
have always been set relatively high. The 0.4% rate, levied on both sides of the 
transaction, in place from 1998 to mid-2001, is much higher than most other 
countries’ rates, as Figure 13 shows. Given the high tax rate, and high share 
turnover, it is not surprising that stamp tax revenues have grown significantly 
through the 1990s. Figure 14 shows how they had increased to Rmb48.59 billion, 
some 3.6% of total government revenues, by 2000.
100 A 20% tax was also levied on income derived from securities (interest payments on bonds, 
and dividend payments on shares) from October 1993, under the auspices of the Individual Tax 
Law, Dong (1997), 45; Wang (1993), 27; Li (1998b), 174; Hu (1998), 9.
Figure 12. Developments in China’s stamp tax, 1990-2000
28^ June 1990
23rd November 
1990
October 1991 
12th June 1992
May 1997 
12th June 1998
1st June 1999
SHGSE
Introduces a 0.3% 
rate on both sides
SHZSE__________
A 0.6% stamp tax 
introduced for the 
first time in 
Shenzhen, paid by 
seller
A 0.6% stamp tax 
introduced for the 
buyer
Both sides reduced 
to 0.3%
The National Tax Bureau and SCORES 
assume control and clarify the rate to be 
0.3% for each side of the trade 
The rate is raised from 0.3% to 0.5% 
National Tax Bureau, with State Council 
authorisation, adjusts the rate from 0.5% 
to 0.4%
The B-share stamp tax is adjusted from 
0.4% to 0.3%
Yang (2000a), 24; Zhang (1999), 63.
Figure 13. Stamp tax rates in developed and developing countries, 1999
Country Share stamp tax, %
United Kingdom 0.05
Italy 0.15
Australia 0.15
Hong Kong 0.13
South Korea 0.30
Brazil 0.03
Singapore 0.05
Taiwan 0.30
Yang (1999a), 24-25.
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Figure 14. Stamp tax collected by the state, 1993-2000
Total stamp 
tax, 
Rmb billion
Total stamp tax as a proportion o f total financial 
revenues, %
1993 2.20 0.51
1994 4.88 0.93
1995 2.64 0.42
1996 12.80 1.73
1997 25.08 2.90
1998 22.58 2.29
1999 25.10 2.21
2000 48.59 3.63
CSRC (2001), 16.
Some analysts, including Hua Wannian, claim that the government, at both 
central and local levels, has purposelessly nurtured bull markets and heavy 
trading volume to maximise such revenues.101 During the height of the bull 
market in June 1999, for instance, a bull triggered by a Renmin Ribao editorial in 
May 1999, the government took Rmb5.7 billion in stamp taxes in a single month, 
some Rmb300m every trading day. Local governments have also benefited from 
the corporate taxes levied on the stock exchanges, securities companies and other 
FIIs. The SHZSE paid Rmb220m in taxes to the Shenzhen government in 2000 
(Figure 15). 89 dedicated securities companies paid Rmb6.2 billion in taxes on 
their business in fiscal 2000, some 0.5% of total fiscal revenues, Rmb2.7 billion 
in 1999, as Figure 16 shows. Tax revenues on all institutional investors, 
including SOEs, would be several times greater, although data is unavailable. 
One would reasonably expect government leaders at the central and local levels 
to develop institutions and policies that maximised these revenues and to 
compete against each other to capture them.
101 Hua (1999), 67,13-14.
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Figure 15. Total taxes paid by the SHZSE, 1992-99
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Total tax paid 68.3 107.6 287.4 32.8 70.9 135.7 62.5 220.3
Rmb m
SHZSE annual reports, 1991-99.
Figure 16. Profits and tax contributions of the 89 dedicated securities
companies, 1999-2000102
Total net 
profits
Total tax 
contribution
Average net 
profits
Average tax 
contribution
1999 5.0 2.7 0.06 0.03
2000 13.1 6.2 0.1 0.07
Rmb billion
Note: taxes levied on the securities operations of TICs and finance companies are not included. 
Author’s calculation based on statistics supplied by the SHZSE.
However, while state actors would be expected to design and implement 
institutions that maximise these revenues, an equally important consideration for 
them is the potential threat presented by the stock market. For example, inflation 
caused by over-investment, of which securities issuance has historically been a 
contributing factor, has been a threat to social stability and to the coherence of 
the macro-economic plan. This was an acute problem in 1988-89 and 1993-94. 
Another obvious threat was financial system crisis. In 1998 Premier Zhu Rongji, 
the senior zhongyang leader with responsibility for economic policy since 1993, 
informed legislators in the NPC that he believed a sudden financial crisis to be a
i mmore serious risk to CCP rule than unemployment. There are the obvious 
dangers of runs on the insolvent banks and, as Carlson Holz shows, a ‘bankrupt’ 
state unable to meet its financial liabilities.104 In addition, a serious financial 
crisis could be triggered by problems in the stock market. Securities companies, 
banks, TICs and SOEs speculating with public funds and private savings, leading 
to large losses, could cause immense damage to the financial system. The stock 
market could also trigger social instability if a large-scale fraud, (when securities 
companies steal customer funds, for instance), hurt enough small investors. Thus, 
senior political leaders’ ideal equity institutions would both aim to maximise the
102 The 1994 fiscal reform resulted in all business taxes being collected by the local government, 
Saich (2001b), 153-160.
103 O'Neill (1998). On financial crisis in China, Lardy (1999); Lardy (2000).
104 Holz (2001).
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state’s financial revenues from the market and ensure that financial crisis was 
avoided.
Given then this set of interests on the part of public actors, and the fact that they 
have enjoyed relative autonomy in which to build institutions that support these 
interests, why has so much institutional change occurred in such a short period of 
time? A stable political elite would be expected to be able to plan, methodically 
pursue, and steadily implement institutional change that supported these ends. 
This has, however, not occurred; the share market has veered between crisis and 
stagnation several times during 1984-2000, several institutional reforms have 
been implemented and then reorganised, and informal practice has diverged 
enormously from the formal rules. This raises the question of state capacity. 
According to Joel Migdal, a strong state is one which ‘has capacities to penetrate 
society, regulate social relations, extract resources and appropriate or use 
resources in determined ways’.105 One of the essential characteristics of such a 
state is that it is internally co-ordinated, able to ensure that local officials 
implement decisions taken by the top leadership and that information about 
implementation, or lack thereof, is efficiently delivered back to the top 
leadership. Analysis of the stock market in China has tended to assume that this 
is so. Carl Walter, for example, claims that ‘the markets are operated by the state, 
regulated by the state, legislated by the state, [and] raise funds for the benefit of 
the state by selling shares in enterprise owned by the state’.106 While correct from 
a macro perspective, such analysis tends to overlook the fact that the Chinese 
state is not a unified, coherent organisation able to systematically exploit the 
market for its own ends. As analysts such as Wang Shaoguang and Hu Angang 
have shown, a lack of state capacity, understood largely as poor Centre-Local co­
ordination, has led to a number of problems, including undermining the state’s 
financial resources and causing unequal growth. It is necessary, therefore, to 
comprehend the interests of different parts of the state vis-a-vis equity 
institutions and the permanent state institutions that join them together. As the 
chapters below show, bureaucrats at different levels of the government and in 
different functional bureaux have had divergent interests when it comes to equity
105 Migdal (1988), 260-264.
106 Walter and Howie (2001), 4.
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market development. Actual policy and institutional development has been the
1 0 7product of a competition between them.
Zhongyang leaders
Consider the senior leadership within the zhongyang,, the 30-odd members of the 
Political Bureau of the Central Committee and its standing committee, many of 
whom also occupy senior positions in the State Council (and some in the 
provinces).108 Guided by the Central Finance and Economics Leading Group 
(Zhongyang Caijing Lingdao Xiaozu, hereafter FELG), the ultimate policy­
making body in economic affairs, they are the ultimate arbiters of financial 
market development and regulation.109 The FELG has been made up of Jiang 
Zemin, Li Peng and Zhu Rongji, the top Party leadership, through most of the 
1990s; vice premier Wu Bangguo was reported to have joined in early 1995; 
followed by vice president Hu Jintao in late 2000. A FELG office and the Central 
Committee’s Financial Work Commission (Jinrong Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, 
hereafter FWC), established in 1998, as well as various research institutes 
associated with the State Council, supply advice on policy and personnel. One 
would expect this senior leadership to be interested in developing regulation that, 
first, ensured financial stability. This in turn would help guarantee social 
stability: Deng Xiaoping’s 1989 coinage of the imperative ‘stability above 
everything’ (wending yadao yiqie) echoed throughout the 1990s.110 The threat of 
financial instability is one these leaders take seriously since it threatens their own 
political legitimacy and, if serious enough, could trigger social instability and 
ultimately regime change.111 Second, their preferred equity policies would 
support national economic growth and state-owned industry. The incentives 
which zhongyang leaders faced were not static, however: they have shifted as the 
stock market has grown in size and significance. Few benefits accrued to them 
when the market was new and small. Its small size prohibited ministry-
107 Allison (1971), 3-24 on the organisational/bureaucratic model o f policy-making.
108 Lieberthal (1988), 35-41. One quarter of the Politburo chosen at the 1992 14th Congress were 
regional leaders, as were five of the 1997 15th Congress, including the Shanghai Party Secretary 
Huang Ju, Saich, T. (2001b), 90.
109 Li (1994b), 30; Wang and Fewsmith (1995), 345-362. On leading groups, see Shambaugh 
(2000), 160-173; Shambaugh (2001), 104-106.
110 Fewsmith (2001), 35.
111 Pei (1999).
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administered enterprises, which tend to be larger than enterprises controlled by
t 1local authorities, from listing. The fiscal revenues it provided were also small 
and ideological resistance in the early years further discouraged zhongyang 
leaders from strongly supporting development or from taking an active interest in 
institutional development. However, the incentive structure shifted as the market 
grew in size, as larger SOEs could be listed, as stamp tax revenues increased, as 
ideological opposition weakened, and as the potential of stock market instability 
infecting other areas of the financial system grew more serious. As the market 
grew, zhongyang leaders had greater incentives to actively orient equity 
institutions towards supporting national industrial policy and ensuring financial 
stability. They have depended on two sets of ‘sub-principals’ to deliver these 
goals: leaders of central government bureaux leaders and local government 
leaders.
Local leaders
The leaders of Shanghai and Shenzhen, the Party secretaries and mayors, are the 
subordinates of the zhongyang leaders.113 From 1984 to 1998, they acted as the 
zhongyang's primary agents in stock market regulation and, in turn, acted as 
principals over the municipal bureaux mandated to implement these policies; the 
stock exchanges, the SAOs, and the local branches of the PBoC. Provincial and 
sub-provincial leaders throughout China were also involved in governing their 
own local share markets. Their de facto responsibilities included overseeing the 
issuance of equity by local enterprises, overseeing on-going disclosures, and 
supervising any local trading of securities. The problem for the zhongyang 
leadership has been that these local leaders tended to defect.
Unlike in the USSR, local government in China has long enjoyed significant 
autonomy from the centre in terms of investment planning, policy development
112 On SOE size, Wong (1987), 388-389.
113 Shanghai’s Party secretary and mayor occupy, like provincial party secretaries and governors, 
a ministry (zhengbu or bu) rank. However, Shanghai is an ‘super province’ since its Party 
Secretary was a member of the Politburo and its taxes were a major contribution to national 
revenues. Thus, its leaders are accorded greater importance than most other provincial-level 
leaders. The Shenzhen leadership occupies a more junior rank, equivalent to a vice-ministry
(fubu), but this is complicated by the fact that the Guangdong provincial leadership, at a similar
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and budgetary powers.114 Local governments at the provincial level and below 
were responsible for formulating plans and balancing industrial inputs and 
outputs in the pre-reform era. However, under Mao the central government still 
set their budgets and appropriated most of their financial resources: local 
government could not levy or spend as its chose.115 In the early 1980s this 
changed, as the autonomy of local actors was enhanced in enterprise 
management and, most importantly, over the fiscal system.116 In 1984, a new tax 
contract system (caizheng baoganzhi) allowed local authorities to retain profits
11 7in excess of a fixed amount payable to the centre. The result was that local 
governments became the residual claimants over the returns of SOEs operating 
within their jurisdictions. Fiscal incentives also slanted their industrial 
preferences, encouraging them to nurture high-tax contributing, short-production
1 1 Q
cycle, light industry, notably tobacco factories and breweries. The change also 
gave local leaders an interest in building sources of investment capital 
autonomous of central government and outside the budget.119 Local leaders 
directed bank lending, manipulated local fiscal policy and nurtured extra- 
budgetary funds in order to maximise their own investment resources.120 Two 
other changes have enhanced the autonomy of local leaders during the reform 
period. As David Lampton argues, one way for reformers within the central 
government to promote their agenda, bypass ideological opposition within 
Beijing, and build political support has been to distribute reform ‘experiments’ 
(and concomitantly devolve down wide-ranging policy-making powers) to local 
governments.121 This has the effect of extending de facto autonomy over key 
policy developments to local leaders. Second, Centre-Local co-ordination 
problems have been exacerbated by the loss of socialist ideology, and fear, as
‘super-provincial’ rank to that of Shanghai, sometimes acts to defend Shenzhen interests, Bo 
(1998), 1-3.
114 Autonomy which became extreme and dysfunctional during the Great Leap Forward (1957- 
60) and Cultural Revolution (1966-76) periods, Ferdinand (1991), 231-237; Goldstein (1996), 
149-155; Breslin (1996a), 152; Bo (1998), 16-18. See also Liew (1997), 59-60; Zhao (1994), 26- 
27; Chang (1996), 79-80, 91; Hu (1996), 68; Prybyla (1996), 23-41.
115 Ferdinand (1987), 3.
116 Fiscal reform began in Jiangsu province in 1979, but was then rolled out nation-wide in the 
early 1980s, Ferdinand (1987), 7-9; Walder (1997), 437.
117 Huang (1996), 57-58, 306-309; Naughton (1995), 178-187.
118 Chang (1996), 86-87.
119 Naughton (1987), 51-53; Huang (1990b), 455-458; Yang (1996), 2-4.
120 On off-budgetary funds, see Tsai (2000); Gore (1999), 32; Lu (2000), 208, 216.
121 Lampton (1992), 54; Shirk (1993), 140-141.
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tools of coercion.122 While Mao could call on considerable ideological resources, 
as well as administrative powers, to launch the Great Leap Forward (1957-60) 
and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) at the local level, few such resources were 
available to zhongyang leaders in the 1990s.
Barry Weingast’s work on federal systems (and unitary ones where extensive 
powers are devolved down to local actors, as in the case of the PRC) suggests 
that by decentralising decision-making powers and encouraging competition for 
resources among locales, local officials are given incentives to support industrial 
development.124 However, another result in China has been that local leaders 
have developed into economic interest groups (liyi jituari) with preferences of 
their own, and that their willingness to act as honest agents of the zhongyang 
leadership has been diminished.125 Such is the extent of ‘administrative 
localism’, the defection of local leaders from central government policy, that 
some analysts even spoke of the Chinese state ‘deconstructing’ and of 
‘federalism, Chinese-style’.126 However, this is an exaggerated view: since local 
leaders are not entirely independent of their principals, defection tends to be 
considered, strategic and ad hoc.
How do these local interests play out with regard to the stock market? Consider 
the interests of leaders in Shanghai, Shenzhen and in other locales. In general, 
they will interested in maximising investment funds from the issuance of shares, 
supporting the FIIs that they own, and less interested in developing the best 
practice regulation outlined in the previous chapter. They have incentives to 
sponsor rapid secondary market development, in order to promote demand for 
IPOs and to maximise their revenues from stamp taxes, as well as taxes levied on 
FIIs, and profits from those SOEs and FIIs which they own. They will be
122 Dittmer (2001); Chung (2001), 47-49.
123 Zhao (1994), 21-23.
124 Weingast (1995); Tiebout (1956); Qian (1997), 85-91. See Nee (1996) for a rebuttal. 
Williamson is also sceptical, Williamson (1996), 334.
125 ‘The failure of the regime to be ready with an alternative framework of legal powers for levels 
of government in the early part of the decade has meant that local officials have de facto been 
able to exploit their own freedom of manoeuvre to the maximum’, Ferdinand (1991), 239. On 
implementation bias and state co-ordination, see Lieberthal (1988), 3-4, 22-27; Nathan (1990), 
26-31; Breslin (1996b), 689-694; Lin (1989), 125-136; Lampton (1987b), 165-166; Lampton 
(1992), 34; McCormick (1987); Bachman (1987); Breslin (1996a), 695-704; Oi (1999), 9.
126 Goodman (1994); Weingast (1995).
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interested in rapid share listings, development of new instruments (corporate 
bonds, convertible bonds, futures, options, etc.), opening the market up to foreign 
investment, and are likely to nurture FIIs with favourable tax treatment and 
loans. Good quality regulation, in contrast, entails a number of costs to them: it 
restricts market growth, limits trading volume and also prevents indebted and 
otherwise problematic firms from listing, all of which run against local leaders’ 
economic interests. Two additional factors diminish their incentives for 
promoting effective regulation. First, they face a moral hazard problem since 
they are partially insulated from the consequences of poor regulation: while they 
make exclusive gains from fast stock market growth, most of the costs associated 
with inflation, firm insolvency or financial instability will be assumed by the 
central government. It is the central government that ultimately underwrites the 
national financial system. Second, poor regulation is cheap and easy to practice. 
Unlike bank loans, or the inflation that results from excess investment, both of 
which can, to some extent, be measured and identified by central government 
officials, defective regulation can be easily disguised. Listing firms’ balance 
sheets can be falsified; prices in the secondary market manipulated; standards for 
issuance informally relaxed: such phenomenon are easily made invisible, both to 
the public and to central government officials, especially if local bureau operate 
independently of central government oversight. The lack of an investigative 
media compounds this problem. Moreover, poor regulation is not costly to 
provide in terms of financing and staff etc. Given autonomy to develop 
institutions, as they had during 1986-92, and to a lesser but still significant extent 
during 1993-97, local leaders can be expected to mould equity institutions to 
support their own economic objectives, ‘hardwiring’ the activities of their 
subordinate local bureaux to support the above objectives.
Andrew Wedeman identifies ‘institutional corruption’, ‘the pursuit of gain by 
institutions acting collectively and relying on the authority or resources of the 
[state] to generate or extract income improperly’ as a common problem in reform 
China. Institutional corruption involves a network of public leaders, is essentially 
predatory and has a negative impact upon regime stability. Although he uses the 
term ‘institution’ to denote organs capable of action rather than a structure of 
governance, Wedeman’s argument, based on the expropriation of rural bank
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deposits during 1992 by bank officials and local leaders to fund coastal 
investment, is similar to that advanced here. The three stock market scandals of 
the 1990s examined in the following chapters show how yw-level bureaux leaders 
within Shanghai and Shenzhen colluded with their municipal leaders to 
maximise financial resources for local firms and budgets, with worrisome 
consequences for financial and social stability. Each time the zhongyang 
leadership had to deploy central government personnel to intervene and then to 
reorganise institutions to ensure that the zhongyang was adequately protected. 
There, however, is at least one important difference between this case study and 
Wedeman’s. In the equity sector, the ‘manipulation’ of institutions for local (and 
central) government gain has not occurred on an ad hoc basis. Institutional 
capture is shown to be an integral part of the process of institutional development
19 7itself, providing economic goods to political actors on an on-gomg basis.
Bu-level bureau leaders
When considering Centre-Local relations in China, central government leaders 
are sometimes implicitly assumed to be a coherent set of actors with equal access 
to information, a common understanding of their own shared preferences, and 
agreed strategies for maximising them. As a heuristic aid for studying Centre- 
Local relations this assumption is useful, but it should not disguise the fact that 
significant principal-agent problems also exist within the central government, 
between zhongyang leaders and their agents in State Council bureaux. While the 
former set broad political and economic goals, it is bureau leaders and their 
subordinate bureaucracies which are charged with developing and implementing 
detailed policies, collecting information, and supervising agents at the local level. 
Thus, a second organisational issue for the zhongyang leadership is how to best 
structure the institutions to ensure that their interests are represented within
1 9 8central government. They will need to decide how best to distribute powers 
and responsibilities between central government bureau, how to co-ordinate 
overlapping policy-making processes and how to establish their own monitoring 
mechanisms. They must also work out how to co-ordinate the activities of their 
two sub-principals.
127 Wedeman (1997), 806-807.
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The central government is divided up into functional bureau (xitong), 
commissions (wei) or ministries (bu), each with unique responsibilities. This is 
useful, Lampton argues, since it embeds specific responsibilities in each 
bureau.129 Major policy initiatives will involve a number of different xitong: 
good ideas are only implemented if agreement can be reached among them. 
Otherwise, the top leaders are assured that the ‘upturned sieve’ will bring 
unresolved (and therefore problematic) issues to their attention. There are various 
institutional mechanisms for co-ordinating the work of central government 
officials. The State Council leadership, made up of the premier (himself a senior 
member of the zhongyang), his deputies and secretary generals, also serves to co­
ordinate the xitong, and the xitong with the Party. At a lower level, xitong like the 
State Planning Commission (Guojia Jihua Weiyuanhui, hereafter SPC and, as of 
1998, the State Development and Planning Commission, Guojia Fazhan Jihua 
Weiyuanhui, hereafter SDPC) and the State Economic and Trade Commission 
(Guojia Jingji Maoyi Weiyuanhui, hereafter SETC), serve to co-ordinate policy 
in areas that stretch across numerous ministries. Partly because of these 
mechanisms, zhongyang leaders have fewer problems monitoring the activities of 
xitong leaders than monitoring those of the local leaders. Membership of a 
collegiate executive, the State Council, also constrains the actions of central 
leaders in a way that local leaders never experience: defection is not a major 
issue at this level. However, poor co-ordination between central bureaux is an 
equally dangerous problem for zhongyang leaders.
Analysts of Chinese politics have long noted the marked capacity of central
i ingovernment organs for debilitating conflict. Bureau leaders tend to protect 
their organisations’ particular interests, a phenomenon known as ‘bureau 
protectionism’ (bumen baohu zhuyi), and have a well-developed capacity to veto 
policies antagonistic to these. David Bachman traces the lineage of this form of 
‘organisational’ politics back to the 1950s, when a coalition of bureau leaders 
supported the Great Leap Forward in order to protect their own bureaucratic
128 On administrative reform, Yang (2001b).
129 Lampton (1992), 38.
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interests.131 Kenneth Lieberthal and Michael Oksenberg argue that this form of
politics has become further exaggerated under reform. The dispersal of authority
throughout the Chinese state, between government and Party, between State
Council members and between central and local bureaux, has led to a
‘fragmented, segmented and stratified’ state. As a result, they argue, the policy
process at the State Council level is slow and negotiated; policy change is always
incremental. Susan Shirk characterises the policy process as ‘balancism’
(pingzheng zhuyi), the systematic formulation of policy through compromise and
‘satisficing’ each interested and influential actor.132 Turning to the stock market,
the interests are in place to lead us to predict that policy and institutional
development proceeded along similar lines. As the market has developed, it has
impinged on the interests of numerous central bureau leaders. All ministers
would be interested in gaining public listings for firms under their supervision:
intense competition would therefore result. Share issuance affected macro-
economic aggregate demand and the supply of credit, and thus interested the SPC
leadership. Issuance of securities, especially local government debt with high
coupons, at times diminished the take-up of Treasury bonds, a matter of concern
for the MoF. For its part, the PBoC leadership was, at least in the early 1990s,
extremely concerned with the negative effect share investment had on the level
of saving deposits. The issuance of foreign currency B-shares, and the issue of
foreign entry, has involved the State Administration for Foreign Exchange, while
1 ^the creation of new fiscal revenues involved the tax authorities. Thus, the key 
issue for the zhongyang leadership has been how to organise the institutions of 
central government to ensure that such conflicting interests can be effectively co­
ordinated and resolved. For most of the 1990s they failed. Much of the evidence 
presented in the thesis supports the ‘fragmented state’ model of the Chinese state: 
inter-bureaucratic competition and extensive mis-implementation were common 
characteristics of the institution-building process. However, the thesis also points 
to the limits of this model. Sudden, and often extremely progressive, policy and 
institutional change also took place during the 1990s, and developments since
130 Lieberthal (1988), 3-5, 22-30; Lieberthal (1992), 12; Chen (1998b), 116; Lampton (1992), 34- 
39; Shirk (1993), 5-11; Tanner (1999), 22-27; Naughton (1992), 245-250.
131 Bachman (1991), 29-56.
132 Simon (1957); Allison (1971), 70-74; Lieberthal (1988), 269-338.
133 CD (1993b).
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1997 have shown that the senior leadership is capable of developing institutional 
mechanisms to effectively co-ordinate the central government when incentives to 
do so are sufficient.
Ju-level bureau leaders
The leaders of local yw-level bureaux, such as PBoC branches, the stock 
exchanges and the SAOs, direct the actual implementation of policy and 
regulation. They usually have two principals, central government bureaux leaders 
and local leaders. It is assumed that these bureaucrats wish to maximise the 
revenues of their bureau and to advance their careers. As a result, they can be 
expected to selectively comply with the directives of their dual superiors, 
defecting ‘when they have a strong incentive to do so or when they think they 
can get away with it’.134 Defection which can be disguised, which will result in 
large gains and which will only attract mild punishment if discovered is likely to 
be common. Defection from one sub-principal to support the other one will be 
too. Previous work shows that PBoC branch directors, despite being part of a 
xitong hierarchy, were extremely vulnerable to the influence of local leaders 
throughout the 1990s. The behaviour ofy'w-level bureau depends to a large extent 
on the type of administrative relations that its leader has with his superiors.
Co-ordinating the Chinese state
To comprehend how the divergent interests of zhongyang leaders, central 
ministers and local leaders in equity institutions have been resolved (or left 
unresolved) one must consider how these interests are filtered through the 
institutions of the Chinese state.135 The Chinese political system is unitary, not 
federal: local government derives it authority and decision-making rights solely 
from the central government. However, the state is structured along both sectoral 
and geographical lines by vertical, functional bureau (xitong) and local (difang) 
government structures. Difang government is supposed to complement the 
xitong structure by providing co-ordination between agencies at the level of 
implementation and by facilitating information sharing. The formal relations
134 Huang (1996), 9-10,310.
135 Ibid., 27-62.
136 Zhao (1994), 19; Schurmann (1968), 88-90; Lampton (1987a), 14; Barnett (1967), 6-8,441.
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between organs within the two structures are governed by three factors; 
bureaucratic rank (xingzheng jibie), formal classification of the type of 
bureaucratic relations (guanxi) and the locus of primary authority (weizhu). 
Although the bureaucratic ranking system of the PRC is notoriously complex it is 
the primary means of defining how different bureaux (and their leaders) relate to 
one another. A summary of the ranking system within the two structures is 
provided in Figure 17. For instance, in general, a ministry enjoys the same rank 
as a province.
Figure 17. The ranking system of central and local government bureau
under the State Council137
Central government Local government
Comprehensive ministry [wei], 
e.g. SPC (as of 1998, SDPC) 
Ministry [zhengbu], e.g. MoF
Vice ministry \fu bu]
General Bureau [zongju] 
Bureau [ju or si]
Division [chu]
Section [ke]
‘Super-province’ e.g. Shanghai, Guangdong
Province [sheng], centrally-administered 
cities [zhixiashi], autonomous regions 
[zizhiqu]
Provincial capitals [fusheng], e.g. 
Guangzhou, Plan-autonomous cities [Jihua 
danlie chengshi]m , e.g. Shenzhen 
Provincial commission [weiyuanhui]
Bureau [ting or ju]
Division [chu]
Section [ke]
Lieberthal (1988), 143; Bums (1989), x-xxxii; Interview, Shenzhen, June 2000.
Rankings are strictly adhered to. A bureau can not issue instructions to a superior 
or equal-ranking bureau, even if the document falls squarely within its policy 
remit. Neither can its leaders negotiate on equal terms with those of a superior 
bureau. There is a strict division between the xitong and difang structures. 
Ministries can not issue binding documents (mingling, jueding or zhishi) to 
provincial governments unless specifically authorised by the State Council; 
otherwise they must rely on non-binding instructions and guidelines (tongzhi). 
Most local y'w-level bureaux are overseen by both a xitong and a difang bureau. 
For example, up until 1998, the Shanghai PBoC was overseen by both the 
Shanghai and PBoC leaderships. Authority between the two sub-principals is
137 As well as their government ranking, officials have personal ranks, which they carry with 
them through the bureaucracy, and positions within the CCP hierarchy, both of which will also 
influence their authority.
138 Plan-autonomous, or ‘line item’, cities were elevated to provincial status, allowing them to 
receive priority status in the allocation of funds and materials, Wong (1995), 82.
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formally divided through a classification of relations. If a sub-principal enjoys 
‘administrative leadership’ relations (xingzheng lingdao guanxi) over a yw-level 
bureau then it determines policy, as well as appointments, dismissals, payroll and 
other welfare functions for that bureau. If it enjoys ‘professional’ (or ‘business’) 
leadership relations (yewu lingdao guanxi) then it has influence over policy and 
operations, as well as some influence over personnel matters. These two types of 
relations can be glossed as management (guanli) and supervision (fiandu) 
relations respectively: the former is more influential, primarily through its 
control of appointments.139 In addition, primary (weizhu) authority is usually 
allocated to one of the two sub-principal bureaux, though it normally resides with 
the bureau with guanli relations. During reform, it has been common for a 
provincial government to enjoy both primary management and supervision rights 
over a yw-level bureau and for a ministry to enjoy secondary supervision rights. 
This was the situation for the Shanghai PBoC until 1998.
In addition, the PRC has a number of mechanisms through which members of 
different parts of the state are co-ordinated. Lieberthal and Oksenberg single out 
meeting systems, work conferences and personnel and policy networks as 
significant instruments for principals within the zhongyang, and sub-principals at 
lower levels, to ensure compliance from their agents.140 A highly persuasive 
account is provided by Yasheng Huang who, alongside these mechanisms, 
stresses the importance of the zhongyang's control of appointments 
(nomenklatura) in influencing the behaviour of its agents.141 In the ‘one-level 
down system’ (yiji guanli) of nomenklatura, in operation since 1983, senior 
leaders appoint, via the Central Committee’s Organisation Department 
{Zhongyang Zuzhibu, hereafter CCOD), junior leaders at one level below them in 
the rank structure.142 Thus all State Council and provincial leaders are appointed 
directly by the zhongyang. /w-level leaders are in turn appointed by ministerial 
party groups (for posts within the xitong structure) and by provincial party
139 Huang (1996), 29-31.
140 Lieberthal (1988), 152-159, Lampton (1987a),17.
141 Li (1998a), 3.
142 In the early 1980s a ‘two-level down’ system (xialiangji guanli) allowed leaders to appoint 
leaders to bureau two ranks below them, Bums (1989), xvii-xxviii.
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committees (for local bureau).143 However, as Huang notes, the CCOD also 
monitors, and since 1990 has had veto powers over, the selection of y'w-level 
officials. Other strategies, including short tenure, rapid rotation around different 
posts, selective integration within the zhongyang (when a senior local leader is 
concurrently a member of the Politburo) are well honed, Huang argues, and have 
proven effective in curbing ‘administrative localism’. These political institutions 
are still authoritative, and alleviate principal-agent problems by converging, at 
least in part, the preferences of the different actors, as well as by providing 
monitoring functions.144
However, there are problems with this argument. The nomenklatura system 
Huang describes was constant throughout the 1990s, and therefore can not 
explain the marked shift that occurred in equity policy from extensive 
administrative localism in the early 1990s to the highly centralised form of 
regulatory development that characterised the late years of the decade. Other 
research supports the view that the utility of nomenklatura is limited. Andrew 
Wedeman argues that the nomenklatura system only allows zhongyang leaders 
leverage over the provincial leaders whom it appoints, but is not transitive to the 
bureau level.145 Here, information asymmetries and the embedded practices of 
local bureaucrats mean that administrative localism has a relatively free rein. Li 
Lianjiang and Kevin O’Brien endorse this view, finding that agents are ‘hyper 
responsive’ to their immediate principals (the more authoritative sub-principals) 
and indifferent to their nominal superiors higher up the chain of authority.146 
Steven Solnick, based on his study of institutional disintegration in the Soviet 
Union, argues that the integrity and efficacy of nomenklatura systems should not 
be assumed to be fixed and exogenous to a reform process. He argues that 
administrative capacities are vulnerable to change and a nomenklatura system 
can not guarantee effective principal-agent co-ordination if reforms devolve too 
much power to the local level, exacerbate information asymmetries, increase the
143 Moreover, in 1990 appointment of leaders within centrally-administered cities, such as 
Shenzhen, reverted to the CCOD.
144 Li (1998a), 3; Huang (1996), 119-122, 305-313.
145 Wedeman (1999), 120-122.
146 Li (1997a), 5.
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gains of opportunism, and if principals are slow to punish rebellious agents.147 
Given the limitations of the nomenklatura system, the following chapters attempt 
to identify the other institutional mechanisms that ensured principal-agent co­
ordination and that, by the end of the 1990s, had greatly improved state capacity. 
Reorganisation of the nomenklatura system within the equity sector itself was 
important but so was a wide-ranging portfolio of other institutional changes, 
including restructuring of the xitong, reducing the economic incentives for 
intervention by local leaders, introducing Party oversight, and centralising of 
specific policy and regulatory powers.
Concluding remarks
This chapter has identified the actors involved in institutional change in the 
equity sector, their interests, and the state institutions through which they 
interact. It has argued that the source of institutional change in reform China is 
public actors, rather than private, and that public actors will design regulation to 
support their budgetary and policy interests. It has shown that while the 
zhongyang leadership, and to a large extent central government bureau leaders, 
will seek to build institutions that guarantee stability and support national 
industrial policy, local leaders have incentives to build equity institutions that 
support fast equity market growth and neglect regulation. These divergent 
interests mean that a competition over defining equity institutions will take place, 
a competition where the zhongyang attempts to ensure that yw-level bureau 
leaders support their interests rather than those of local leaders.
147 Solnick (1998), 234-240.
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Part II
Local institutional capture
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3Nascent equity markets and local institution building, 1984-90
It seems that some capitalist concepts can be applied under the socialist system.
Deng Xiaoping, 1992148
During the late 1980s there was a groundswell of share issuance by Chinese 
enterprises, the result of widespread shareholding (gufenzhi) reforms within the 
SOEs.149 Despite bans announced by the State Council, informal equity markets 
appeared on factory shopfloors as employees traded the securities issued to them 
in lieu of wages. These markets soon spilled over onto the streets. By the end of 
1988, the country was covered by a patchwork of small and vibrant curb markets 
where shares, as well as Treasury and local government bonds, were informally 
traded. The first formalised share trading, at an over-the-counter (OTC) market, 
took place in Shenyang, Liaoning province, in August 1986.150 Four years later, 
institutionalisation of the sector took a colossal leap forward with the 
establishment of two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen. During the 
space of six years, a new commodity, equity, as well as an entirely new market in 
this commodity, had been created.
Given that a new market had sprung up, without the intention or even the 
permission, of most central government leaders, a dilemma now confronted 
them: if this market was not to be closed down, what institutions should be put 
into place to govern its operations? Three basic choices about the institutions of 
the sector were made. First, rather by default than by design, the PBoC took on 
the primary management role of the market and its institutions. This led to a 
number of problems including, most importantly, over-issuance, a phenomenon
148 YW ( 1992).
149 Li Yining made the first public call for shareholding enterprises in 1980, in an article entitled 
Thoughts on the Development of the Stock Market in the Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily). The 
idea was supported by ‘reader’s letter’ in the 12th November 1980 Renmin Ribao, SCMP (1990); 
Liu (1987); Yanjiusheng (1984), 18; Lin (1989), 102-103. For accounts of the initial stockholding 
experiments, see Qin (1991) and Li (1998b), 53-59. On enterprise reform in the 1980s, Jackson 
(1986) and Chamberlain (1987); Liew (1997), 77-81; Naughton (1995), 205-211.
150 An OTC market is a negotiated-price market run by a market maker, Teweles (1998), 195- 
199.
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which can be traced back to the institutional capture of PBoC branches by local 
leaders. Second, local leaders were granted extensive autonomy to define and 
develop the institutions of both the primary and secondary markets; central 
government bureaux had minimal mechanisms of oversight or control. For their 
part, zhongyang leaders acquiesced to these ‘experiments’ while attempting to 
implement macro-controls over the scale and location of stock issuance and 
trading, with variable success. Third, initially institutional change was advocated 
and planned predominantly by non-government actors who supported market- 
oriented institutions. They played a key role in fostering the market’s initial 
growth and ideological acceptance. Financiers within the Shanghai and Shenyang 
banks pushed for the creation of trading counters and then managed these 
counters. Within central government, a group of financiers and economic 
reformists worked to persuade key members of the zhongyang of the need to 
experiment with share trading, and then went on to design the stock exchanges. 
However, local leaders soon became interested supporters of the new share 
market as its potential to support their economic objectives became clear. By the 
end of 1990, non-government actors had been sidelined and equity institutions, 
including the stock exchanges, their design, development, implementation and 
management, were entirely controlled by the state.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first looks at China’s early 
shareholding reforms, the emergence of equity in the 1980s and the institutional 
arrangements that governed its issuance. The second section examines the 
emergence of secondary markets in equity, the creation of the OTCs in 1986 and 
the roles played by non-government actors and bureaucrats in establishing 
China’s stock exchanges in 1990.
Shareholding reform and China’s first share
China’s shareholding reforms began in the early 1980s. During 1980-86, 20 
shareholding companies were established using three methods.151 Some SOEs 
transformed themselves into stock-holding companies by carrying out asset 
evaluations, gaining local (city or provincial) approval, and then issuing shares to
151 Hu (2000), 15-16.
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outside investors and/or employees. With government approval a small number 
of SOEs were merged to form a single shareholding entity. A third method was 
when assets from different SOEs were extracted and brought together to form a 
new shareholding company. On 28th December 1987, the Shenzhen Development 
Bank was established, the product of the merged assets of six urban credit 
unions. All these companies, however, were created on an ad hoc basis without 
any kind of authorisation or even policy framework being provided by central 
government. In 1986 the State Commission of Restructuring the Economic 
System (Jingji Tizhi Gaige Weiyuanhui, hereafter SCORES) began more 
systematic shareholding experiments, with clear zhongyang backing, in 
Shenyang and Guangzhou. Shanghai also received dispensation to experiment 
with different corporate forms. Premier Zhao Ziyang, one of the chief exponents 
of these reforms, was in the ascendancy. On 18th August 1986, the Renmin Ribao
ran an editorial entitled ‘The stock-holding system is the new foundation of
10 • socialism’. In late 1986 Zhao made a widely publicised, and extremely radical,
call for SOEs ‘to take the lead in transforming the existing fund-raising system
so that all their capital is raised through the issue of stock and bonds’.153 By
November 1986, Shenyang had 216 shareholding enterprises, Beijing seven and
Shanghai 1,500 enterprises with issued securities (mostly bonds and debentures)
worth Rmb300m.154 In 1987 the shareholding experiment was nationalised,
although it remained, officially at least, one of a number of experimental
reforms. Its scale was supposed to be tightly controlled: the contract
responsibility system was being rolled out on a far more comprehensive basis at
the same time. But shareholding had high-level backing: official publications
argued that stocks ‘help mobilise more social funds, increase responsibility in the
use of money [and] improve economics results’.155 At the October 1987 13th
Congress of the CCP, Premier Zhao argued that ‘distribution of bonds and shares
[is] a necessary attribute of large-scale socialised production’.156 Economic
reformers within the central government liked the shareholding structure
because, in theory at least, it minimised local administrative interference in
152 Liu (1997), 13.
153 Dai (1986), 8.
154 Shenzhen’s first standardised equity issue (Shenzhen Development Bank) took place in March 
1987, Lee (1997), 11; Zhang (1998), 68; Guo (1999a), 327; Dong (1997), 125; Li (1998b), 54.
155 BR (1987), 19.
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enterprise management. For their part, local leaders approved because of the new 
capital that could be raised through the sale of equity to state organs and to the 
public. As a result the shareholding experiment quickly got out of hand. By the 
end of 1988, 3,800 enterprises had restructured and issued stock with local 
government assistance.157 This was despite central government attempts in both 
1985 and 1987-88 to restrain the scale of restructuring.
There is some dispute over which company qualifies as having issued reform 
China’s first share. All the early so-called ‘shares’ issued between 1980 and late 
1984 resembled debentures: capital was returned at maturity and the company 
often paid interest as well as dividends to its ‘shareholders’.158 Both Lee 
Hingwah and Cao Jianwen report that Chengdu Shudu Building floated Rmb20m 
worth of ‘shares’ in June 1980, the first documented issue of corporate 
securities.159 It is unclear who subscribed, but the issue was most probably 
limited to state bureau and employees and was almost certainly a debenture. In 
November 1983, three Shenzhen companies, Baoan Investment, Yinhe and 
Sanhe, began restructuring into shareholding enterprises. Baoan was the first 
SOE in China to do so. They all then issued ‘shares’ (i.e. debentures) on a private 
placement basis to legal persons, a practice known as dingxiang (literally, ‘fixed 
direction’).160 These ‘shares’ could not be legally traded.
The first official government document on the subject of share issuance was 
released by the SCORES in May 1984.161 The first national regulations on 
securities were then promulgated in July 1984.162 This brief document allowed 
newly-established collectives, but not SOEs, to issue shares, thereby paving the
156 Jiang (1990), 155.
157 Few of these cases involved actual change of ownership: 85% issued (often unstandardised) 
equity and debt to their employees, 13.5% to other enterprises and only 1.5% to the general 
public, Naughton (1995), 218.
158 Hu (2000), 21-22.
159 Cao (2000), 14; Lee (1997), 10.
160 Although Cao notes that Rmb9.4m of Baoan’s ‘shares’ were sold to individuals. Dingxiang 
type shares were abolished under the Company Law, Xinhua (1992a); Huang (1999d), 117-119. 
In China, a legal person is an organisation which possesses civil legal capacity and assumes civil 
liability, Tao (1999), 210, fii 33; Cao (2000), 14.
161 ‘Main points of the discussion about experimental work in urban economic restructuring’ 
allowed workers to invest in shares and companies to distribute dividends. The first local equity 
regulations, issued in August 1984 in Shanghai were ‘The temporary management measures on 
the issuance of shares’, Huang (1999d), 94; SZB (1993m); Wen (1998), 122.
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way for the Feile and Yanzhong issues later that year.163 It authorised the central 
bank to approve all issuance. On 18th November 1984, the trust department of 
the Jingan (Shanghai) branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC), with the approval of Shanghai PBoC’s Financial Administration and 
Management Department (Jinrong Xingzheng Guanlichu, hereafter FAMD), 
issued 33,000 shares in Shanghai Feile Acoustics.164 This was the first share in 
China to be issued without the promise of a return of principal and therefore 
qualifies as reform China’s first issue of standardised equity.165 However, it was 
also a dingxiang issuance. In January 1985, Shanghai’s Yanzhong Industries 
made the first confirmed public issue (i.e. non-dingxiang) of standardised 
shares.166 Both Feile and Yanzhong were collective companies. Indeed, nearly all 
of the early share-issuing companies were collectives rather than SOEs. By 
November 1985, around ten companies had issued shares to the public in 
Shanghai and the city’s first dedicated broker, Jinjiang Trust Company, had 
opened for business.167 Budgetary allocations for SOEs were mostly still 
guaranteed, reducing the incentives for SOE managers to seek alternative routes 
for raising capital. Moreover, the ideological sensitivity of securities issuance 
discouraged them, and their administrative patrons, from such dubious 
experiments. The first SOE to issue standardised shares was Shanghai’s 
Zhenkong Electronics on 24th January 1987.168
The rush to share issuance and governance problems at the People’s Bank, 
1986-88
During 1986-88 the issuance of securities across the country ‘grew out of the 
plan’, or rather grew out of the quota set by the PBoC and SPC.169 Unofficial 
securities issuance, often informally authorised by local government bureaux, not 
by the central PBoC, expanded massively. Of course, no two statistical sources
162 Zheng (1994), 17; SZB (1994g).
163 Collective companies could issue time-limited ‘shares’ (debentures), or non-limited ‘shares’ 
(equity). They had to pay interest at the one-year bank deposit rate, but could also pay dividends 
up to 3-5% of the share’s face value. Although the regulations banned ‘real-time’ (xianhuo jiaoyi) 
trading, shareholders wishing to sell their shares were allowed to use bank trust department to sell 
their shares, Zheng (1994), 17.
164 Hu (1999a), 97.
165 Zheng (1994), 18, 21,25; Li (1998b), 55.
166 On issuance procedures, Zhang (1999b), 54-56.
167 Dodwell (1985).
168 Zheng (1994), 53.
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for issuance (and trading) for this period agree. The author has therefore used a 
variety of sources and allowed the contradictions to stand. By the end of 1990, 
some Rmb4.2 billion worth of shares had been issued throughout the country, 
Rmbl.7 billion of these publicly. Figure 18 shows the regional breakdown of this 
issuance. Issuance in Shanghai is illustrated in Figure 20. It is unclear how much 
of this equity was standardised. Outside Shanghai and Guangdong, issuance was 
particularly high in Sichuan, Shandong and Liaoning provinces where the 
shareholding reforms had been implemented by local leaders with particular 
enthusiasm. Figure 19 shows the situation nation-wide. Issuance peaked in 1988 
and then subsided as monetary retrenchment was implemented in 1989. 
According to Dong Shaoping, by the end of 1990, more than 2,700 enterprises in 
Shanghai had issued securities: Rmbl.8 billion of enterprise debt and Rmbl.2 
billion of equity.170
169 Naughton (1995), 8-9.
170 Dong (1997), 129.
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Figure 18. Total share issuance by region, at end 1990
Public issuance Non-public issuance Total issuance
Shanghai 868.8 275.3 1144.1
Guangdong 317.3 438.5 755.8
Sichuan 58.7 553.6 612.3
Shandong 30.0 239.2 269.2
Liaoning 118.0 136.1 254.1
Zhejiang 30.3 196.6 226.9
Hubei 14.2 141.8 156.3
Jiangsu 120.3 4.9 125.2
Hainan - 95.6 95.6
Hebei 47.5 29.5 77.0
Guangxi 5.6 - 56.0
Henan 22.0 33.5 55.5
Jaiangxi 11.7 28.3 39.9
Yunnan - 39.6 39.6
Shaanxi 4.2 34.5 38.8
Hunan 6.3 31.0 37.2
Xinjiang 2.7 33.0 35.7
Guilin 0.4 33.4 33.8
Beijing 2.6 29.9 32.5
Guizhou 0.6 30.5 31.2
Shanxi 8.7 21.8 30.5
Heilongjiang 0.3 18.0 18.4
Anhui 13.2 3.4 16.6
Fujian 2.6 11.2 14.7
Jilin 1.5 6.8 8.3
Inner Mongolia 0.3 6.1 6.4
Total 1,739.4 2,461.7 4,201.0
Rmb m
Hu (2000), 24.
Figure 19. National share issuance, 1987-1990
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total
Share issuance 1.0 2.5 0.7 0.4 4.6
Rmb billion
SIA (1994), 455-456.
81
Figure 20. Corporate securities issuance in Shanghai, 1984-1991
Corporate equity Internal corporate debt Internal corporate equity
1984 0.5 - -
1985 5.3 - -
1986 - 139.6 102.2
1987 78.5 47.4 67.3
1988 44.9 10.1 83.4
1989 23.6 41.6 22.9
1990 9.0 54.7 10.9
1991 132.7 30.5 7.9
Rmb million
‘Internal’ refers to the practice of issuing securities to staff, often in lieu of wages. ‘Corporate 
equity’ appears to be a mixture of dingxiang shares, as well as debentures and standardised shares 
sold to external individuals and institutions.
SZN (1993), 292.
The first State Council promulgation on securities was the ‘Circular on 
strengthening the management of shares and bonds’ issued in March 1987.171 
This banned SOEs from public issuance and mandated local governments to 
‘rectify’ those large SOEs that had already (illegally) issued shares openly. Any 
public issue, it re-affirmed, required permission from the PBoC. As such the 
circular was the central government’s ineffective first stab at restricting 
countrywide issuance, a campaign that would intensify as 1987 progressed. The 
problem was that share issuance on this scale contributed to inflation. In 1988, 
the year when securities issuance nation-wide totalled Rmb2.5 billion, national 
inflation ran at 20%.172 Inflation was primarily caused by a dramatic increase in 
money supply issued in the form of bank loans throughout the country, but 
securities issuance contributed. As well as excess issuance, chaotic interest rates 
(on debt and debenture issues), a phenomenon that threatened to draw down bank 
deposits as investors sought higher rates of return in securities caused additional
17^problems. By the end of 1988, as wage-price inflation spiralled out of control 
in the urban centres, many members of the senior leadership had already turned 
against the shareholding reforms, and their most senior supporter, Zhao 
Ziyang.174 During 1989, as share issuance sharply contracted as central directives 
on curbing investment became more severe and local leaders reoriented their
171 SHGSE (1993), 444-445; Hu (1999a), 119-120.
172 Girardin(1997), 90.
173 Zhang (1998), 124.
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behaviour to the new political situation. It was not until early 1990 that issuance 
once again expanded.
The problems of excess bank lending and securities issuance can be sourced back 
to the same institutional problem: local capture of PBoC branches. From the 
issuance of the first standardised shares in December 1984 to August 1992, the 
PBoC, operating under the State Council, was responsible for all rule drafting,
i nc
regulation and supervision of the equity sector. It also authorised all 
issuance.176 These activities were undertaken by its FAMD, which the PBoC 
established in November 1984.177 On 29th May 1985, the Shanghai FAMD issued
178  •its first regulations governing share and debenture issuance. Enterprises’ IPO 
applications were first to be checked by a local bank and then sent on to the 
Shanghai ICBC’s trust and investment division, which, at the time, had 
rudimentary underwriting, brokerage and proprietary trading functions. If 
approved, the application would then be passed onto the Shanghai FAMD for 
authorisation. If successful, the application would be passed to the central PBoC 
for approval. But branches of the PBoC suffered institutional capture: their staff 
operated under the administrative authority (guanli) of local government leaders 
and ultimately relied on their local leaders for salaries, welfare and future 
careers. The result, as extensive research has shown, was that PBoC branches 
underwent difanghua (‘localisation’, or more colloquially, they ‘went native’) 
and tended to support local investment policies rather than those of the central 
PBoC and State Council.179 From 1985, after which the policy of ‘replacing 
budgets with loans’ (bo gai dai) meant that budgetary funding for SOEs was 
reduced, local governments became interested in diversifying funding sources for 
their SOEs. Extra-budgetary funds, foreign investment, bank loans and equity 
issuance were the favoured responses. The problem was particularly acute when 
monetary policy at the Centre was loosened in 1987, and then again in 1992. In 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, as well as in numerous other locales, senior leaders
174 Baum (1994), 221-225.
175 Mehran, Quintyn, Nordman and Laurens (1996), 86; Kam (1997), 40-41.
176 SHGSE (1993), 39-42; Dong (1997), 124.
177 Zhang (1998), 130; Mao (1997), 241; SHGSE (1993), 40; Hu (1999a), 123.
178 SHGSE (1993), 417-420.
179 Girardin (1997), 71-73; Wu (1995), 101-102; Bowles (1993), 94-105; Lardy (1998), 207; Gao 
and Chi Fulin (1997), 90; Zhou (1987), 403-404.
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would meet informally to discuss investment and equity market issues, and the 
PBoC director would then be informally briefed on issuance policy.180 In 
practice, securities issuance approval was extended by PBoC branches: the 
central PBoC was sidelined. The central PBoC securities quota (which, until 
1993, covered both debt and equity securities) was thereby made irrelevant.
Reform China9s first equity markets
Initial policy statements on shareholding experiments had not envisioned the 
trading of shares. The experiment was rather supported for the capital it would 
raise and the improvements it would bring to enterprise management. However, 
once equity had been issued publicly and to employees, it was extremely difficult 
to prevent it from being traded. Black market trading in Treasury and other types 
of bonds had started in the early 1980s. From the Feile issue of November 1984, 
share (or rather debenture) trading began too.181 The first trading sites were 
probably on the factory floor and on the streets outside Feile.182 These ‘curb’, or 
‘black’, markets allowed shareholders to trade between themselves and also 
quickly gave rise to reform China’s first stockbrokers. The creation of these 
markets led to half-hearted attempts by local officials to crack down and to calls 
by local financiers to create formal trading facilities.
The Shanghai and Shenyang over-the-counter markets
The first formal share trading markets were set up in Shanghai and Shenyang by 
the trust and investment departments of local banks in 1986.183 An OTC market 
was established in Shenzhen later, in April 1988.184 Small and bureaucratic they 
may have been, but these OTCs were revolutionary and essential first steps in the 
institutionalisation of China’s equity market. Set up by enterprising financiers, 
they sparked public interest in shares, proved popular demand for share trading 
existed, and revealed securities to be a potential financing option for SOEs. They 
were highly local institutions; the zhongyang extended its broad approval to
180 For example, in November 1988 a securities small group (zhengquan lingdao xiaozu) was 
established in Shanghai. Shenzhen formed a similar group in April 1990, Cao (2000), 19.
181 Zhao (1987), 37; Liu (1997), 13; Hannan (1998), 158.
182 Hu (2000), 28.
183 On the OTC markets, Xia, Lin and Grub (1992), 103-112.
184 Caijing (2000b), 75.
84
financial reform and the PBoC took on board oversight duties, but all the policies 
and rules for their operations were developed by the managers of the branches 
themselves, with some oversight provided by the PBoC officials of their host 
cities.185
In July 1984, the Shanghai PBoC issued regulations allowing the transfer of 
shares through the trust departments of banks. A seller had to find a buyer and 
then go together to the trading post to make the transaction together.186 However, 
there is no evidence of this service being provided in Shanghai before August 
1986 when the Jingan counter was established. The Jingan OTC was set up as the 
result of lobbying efforts by a small number of financial officials working within 
a state bank. In the summer of 1986, Huang Guixian and Hu Ruiquan, managers 
at the Jingan branch of the Shanghai ICBC TIC securities business, prepared two 
reports for the Shanghai PBoC.187 The reports were proposals for establishing an 
OTC market. They received no reply. In August 1986, the Shanghai SCORES 
hosted a discussion meeting on shareholding reform, a meeting called by Jiang 
Zemin, then Shanghai mayor. Hu Ruiquan argued for the establishment of a 
secondary market in corporate equity to support the already established primary 
market. His argument was that ‘the life of shares is in their trading’: only by 
allowing share transfer, he claimed, would enough demand for shares be created 
to make a success of enterprise restructuring.188 Mayor Jiang gave his personal 
consent. Hu then re-applied to the PBoC and received permission two days later. 
A share trading counter (gupiao chutai jiaoyi) was then officially opened on 26th 
September 1986 at 1,806 West Nanjing Road at the Jingan ICBC TIC.189 This 
was not, however, an OTC in the usual sense of the term. Traders still needed to 
find a buyer or seller themselves and then go together to the bank to effect a 
trade, rather than the OTC itself acting as a market maker.190 The OTC had listed 
eight companies by the end of 1989, as Figure 20 shows. A fruit seller quoted in 
the official media at the time claimed that the difference between the old
185 Wen (1998), 86-90.
186 Shares issued to employees and to legal persons, however, could not be transferred this way, 
and required MoF authorisation, Hu (2000), 29-30.
187 Huang Guixian was the manager of the Jingan branch. The Jingan OTC was managed by Hu 
Ruiquan, Zheng (1994), 13-14, 32, 67.
188 Zhao (1985), 31.
189 Dong (1997), 246; SZB (1994g).
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Shanghai stock market and this new OTC was that ‘there is [now] no cheating or 
trickery. It is now impossible to speculate as state banks exercise effective 
control over the yield and transfer of shares’.191 While his optimistic view of 
corruption is contradicted by other sources, he was correct about the tightness of 
controls. Only two shares, Feile and Yanzhong, were initially listed, and the 
ICBC TIC management, under the direction of the PBoC, set their prices. 
Dividends were also determined administratively. Prices were kept artificially 
low and dividends small in order to limit movement of bank deposits into shares, 
a major concern of the PBoC leadership at the time, and an obvious conflict of
109interest for the central bank. In fact, Xu Xiaofeng complains that the PBoC 
actively sought to limit share issuance before 1990 by limiting approvals of 
issuance at the central level and by levying a high tax rate (20%) on dividends. 
There were few new listings, as Figure 22 shows, and since investors were 
generally sceptical about the advantages of trading shares, prices remained 
stable, as Figure 23 shows.
190 Hu (1999a), 89.
191 Dai (1986), 7.
192 Zhao (1993), 13; Xu (1990), 14; Hu (1999a), 89.
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Figure 21. The first eight listed companies in Shanghai
Company name 
(Year o f public issuance)
Type o f company Share capital Share capital breakdown
State Danwei Individual
Shanghai Feile Acoustics 
(1984)
Collective 5 0.7 4.3
Shanghai Yanzhong 
Industries (1985)
Collective 10 " 1.2 8.8
Shanghai Aishi Electronic 
(1987)
Collective 2.7 - 0.9 1.8
Shanghai Zhenkong 
Electronics (1987)
State-run 300 148.9 2.1 149
Shanghai Shenhua 
Electrical (1987)
Collective 5 - 0.2 0.4
Shanghai Feile 
(1987)
Collective and 
state run
21 12 6.5 2.1
Shanghai Xiangyuan 
(1988)
Collective and 
state run
6.5 1.7 3.6 1.2
Shanghai Xingye Real 
Estate (1989)
Newly
established
20 " 15 5
Rmb m
Note: The term danwei (work unit) refers to what were soon to be known as legal-person shareholders, i.e. state- 
owned companies or institutions. Also note that the issuance dates of Shenhua and Feile differ in Figure 21 and Figure
22 .
SZN (1993), 299; Li (1998b), 62.
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Figure 22. Listings on the OTCs in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 1986-90
Shanghai Shenzhen Number o f new listings Total number o f listed companies
1986 Feile Acoustics, Yanzhong Industries - 2 2
1987 Aishi Electronics, Zhenkong 
Electronics
Shenzhen Development Bank 3 5
1988 Xiangyuan, Feile Wanke 3 8
1989 - Jintian 1 9
1990 Shenhua Electronics Yuanye, Anda 3 12
Hu (2000), 31.
Figure 23. Securities trading in Shanghai, 1986-91
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Treasury bonds - - 11,980 8,120 7,000 3,048,620
Financial bonds - - - - - 318,090
Enterprise bonds 110 27,580 120 - - 209,960
Shares 575 2,620 3,400 2,360 37,290 1,182,590
Rmb ’000s
Note: Figures previous to 1988 appear to be a composite figure for all securities issued, bought, 
deposited and brokered. Figures between 1988-90 are for brokered securities only.
SZN (1993), 302.
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The Shanghai TIC was not the first site in reform China where formalised share 
trading had taken place. In January 1985, the State Council authorised the 
Shenyang leadership to experiment with financial system restructuring.193 On 5th 
August 1986 the Shenyang TIC opened its own OTC (known locally as 
chuangkou jiaoyi, literally ‘window hole trading’). It appears to have formally 
facilitated the trading of bonds, mainly financial enterprise bonds, but it also 
facilitated trading in local shares and debentures. By the 5th November 1987, the 
Shenyang OTC had a total trading turnover of Rmb900,000 and held Rmb38,000 
worth of securities on deposit. Mei Xia reports that the OTC’s trading volume 
was limited to Rmb17,000 a day.194 Zhao Haikuan suggests a far lower figure in 
the first year of only Rmb2,800 a day.195 Its services included:196
□ Fixed price trading: prices were published daily, with a 2% spread between 
buy and sell quotes.
□ Negotiated price trading: sellers of securities could set their own prices, and 
the OTC would take a 2% commission on trades.
□ Credit trading: the OTC lent funds to traders, who used securities as 
collateral. There was a two-month limit on loans and a 2% interest rate. This 
is likely to be the first systematic use of rongzi (credit financing) in reform 
China.
□ Authentication: the OTC offered securities authentication services for a 1.6% 
fee.
Both OTCs received a significant boost in November 1986, when the chairman 
of the New York Stock Exchange met with Deng Xiaoping. Deng presented his 
visitor with a Shanghai Feile share certificate, a powerful gesture that indicated 
the pre-eminent leader’s approval of the equity experiment.197 The State Council 
circular in March 1987 authorised the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments to 
experiment with stock markets (and banned them elsewhere, including 
Shenyang), a decision which would have huge consequences for the institutional
193 Cao (2000), 17.
194 Xia, Lin and Grub (1992), 106.
195 Zhao (1987), 38.
196 Ibid., 37-39; Karmel (1994), 1110.
197 Zhang (1998), 63; Wang (1985).
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development of the sector. In Shanghai, Hu and others had been continuing their 
lobbying efforts, this time in an effort to upgrade the Shanghai counter to a 
proper OTC. The circular allowed Mayor Jiang to authorise a standardised share- 
trading counter (gupiao jiaoyi chutai), which had the ability to act as a market 
maker, to begin operations.198
By the end of 1987, there were reports of securities trading taking place 
unofficially in over 44 cities across China. The majority of this was bond trading 
(about 90%, if Hu Haitong’s estimate is to be believed) based in bond trading 
centres, but there was also considerable informal trading in corporate debt, 
debentures and equity.199 As trading increased, more counters were established in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen. Between January 1987 and March 1988, eight more 
TICs established trading counters in Shanghai and by the beginning of 1990, the 
Shanghai PBoC had authorised 16 companies to do OTC business. They 
operated more than 40 counters.200 By the same time, Shenzhen had ten 
companies, the largest of which was run by the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone Securities Company (SSEZSC), established in September 1987, the first 
dedicated securities firm to be established in reform China. SSEZSC 
accounted for a turnover of Rmb648m in 1990, 39% of all share trading in the 
city. With the growth in the market, banks and TICs quickly began establishing 
securities businesses to trade shares as well as provide facilities to broker them. 
This was done with the active support of the PBoC: the bank put aside Rmb3 
billion for capitalising new firms.202 After limited Treasury bond trading was 
formally authorised at the bond trading centres in March 1988, provincial 
branches of the PBoC authorised the establishment of 33 securities companies 
across the country.203
198 Advocacy by Huang and Hu was also apparently influential in the creation of China’s 
Treasury bond markets too. In October 1987, Huang proposed the trading of bonds in order to 
eliminate black markets and to raise fiscal revenues. His report was sent to Chen Muhua, PBoC 
governor, who ordered further research. In February 1998, the State Council authorised 
experimental Treasury bond trading, Zheng (1994), 68.
199 Han (1989), 23.
200 Zhao (1987), 30.
201 The first institution to do securities business in the PRC was the Shenyang Trust and 
Investment Company when it began trading enterprise bonds in 1980, Li (1998b), 71-73.
202 Caijing (2000c), 70.
203 Li (1998b), 71-74.
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Problems in the new secondary markets
The new markets were, however, deeply flawed. The limited facilities of the 
OTCs could not cope with rapidly growing demand, prices were uncoordinated 
between counters, even those in the same city, and fees were high.204 In addition, 
the OTCs facilitated insider trading. Since the OTC managements set prices 
under PBoC guidance, brokered shares for clients and were able to trade on their 
own account, there were ample opportunities for arbitrage and manipulation. 
Moreover, because price limits did not allow prices to reflect real demand and 
provided no centralised registration for share certificates, curb trading 
continued. The problem was that these new markets were growing mto a 
largely unregulated space. The PBoC was not only failing to effectively govern 
the issuance market: while local branches of the PBoC were authorising the 
establishment of hundreds of trading sites, the bank was not creating the
AAr
institutions that were necessary to govern the new secondary market. By the 
end of 1991, PBoC branches had authorised the establishment of 66 specialised 
securities companies and 376 TICs to do securities business.207 Yet it 
promulgated no rules governing the establishment of these companies, their 
capital or asset requirements, or their legal status. Moreover, there was no quality 
control: all firms that applied gained PBoC authorisation. This phenomenon was 
especially exaggerated in Guangdong province where every district-level
AAO
administration established a securities firm. Moreover, there were no 
requirements for firewalls to be set up between the different activities of these 
firms. Numerous insurance and finance companies were also allowed to open 
securities operations during 1988-90.209
Clearly frustrated by the PBoC’s inability to implement regulation, during late 
1987 and early 1988 the State Council attempted to rectify unofficial securities 
trading. It closed the interbank market to PBoC branches and non-bank financial
204 Xia, Lin and Grub (1992), 106.
205 Hu (1999a), 93-97.
206 On PBoC regulation in Shanghai, Cao (2000), 17; SZB (1993p); SHGSE (1993), 416-417; Hu 
(1999a), 89; Li (1992b), 838-839.
207 Huang (1999d), 304.
208 Interview-26, Beijing, 2000.
209 Huang (1999d), 304-305.
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institutions (NBFIs), and attempted to close the informal trading centres that had 
been established at Shenyang, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Xian.210 These attempts 
had limited success.211 Yet despite their problems, the OTCs proved that public 
demand for share trading existed. While during 1986-89 they were too small for 
the municipal leaders to be much concerned with, their potential to become 
larger, better-governed and more economically significant was evident by early 
1990. Local leaders’ desire for an improved system of trading and a way of 
subordinating the market to their industrial and financing needs, led to a single 
idea: the stock exchange. Political events, however, were to intervene.
Post-Tiananmen economic policy
The year 1990 witnessed intense policy conflict between Deng Xiaoping and the 
so-called neo-conservatives (jtin baoshou zhuyizhe) led, in economic matters, by 
Chen Yun. According to Joseph Fewsmith, the Chen line had become Party 
orthodoxy by November 1989, when Zhao (and implicitly Deng) was critiqued 
for allowing aggregate demand to exceed supply, for allowing imbalances to 
develop between agriculture and industry, as well as between the inland areas 
and the coast. Premier Li Peng pushed for retrenchment at the March 1990 NPC 
plenary session, calling for an end to provincial autarky, or ‘feudal-lord 
economies’ (zhuhou jingji), centralisation and a re-emphasis on planning. Such 
sentiments were obviously hostile to the development of a share market. 
However, there were signs of hope. Local leaders, including Shanghai’s Zhu 
Rongji and Guangdong’s governor Ye Xuanping, successfully opposed the 
central government’s attempt to introduce the dual tax system in early 1990. This 
success, combined with forcing Premier Li Peng to place some emphasis on 
economic reform in his work report to the NPC, indicated that a powerful 
constituency, interested in continuing the shareholding experiment and equity 
markets, existed. Indeed, the lack of any substantial ‘rectification’ or closure of 
the OTCs in the wake of the Tiananmen crackdown signalled to many that 
securities markets were there to stay. Even the neo-conservatives wavered: Li
210 Zhang (1998), 124.
211 Karmel (1994), 1108.
212 Baum (1994), 313-329. The best review of this period is Fewsmith (2001), 22-83. Neo­
conservatism {xin baoshou zhuyi) was a development of the 1980s’ new authoritarianism {xin
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Peng spoke in support of joint-stock enterprises and capital market development 
in February 1990 at the National Work Meeting on the SEZs. Various other 
public announcements hinted at a pro-equity consensus forming within the 
zhongyang. An article by Huang Shaoan in the April edition of Economic 
Research (Jingji Yanjiu), an influential academic journal, subtly reasserted the 
shareholding agenda. ‘Reform of public ownership in China is not a readjustment
91 ^of the deep structure’, Huang argued, ‘rather a change in its style’. In June, the 
Renmin Ribao reported that economic conditions were now ‘paving the way for 
flourishing stock markets’.214 The economist Li Yiying, known as ‘Mr 
Shareholding’ to some, again received coverage in the Economic Daily (Jingji 
Ribao) later in the same month. He argued for wider experimentation in 
securities issuance and trading. In September Xinhua announced that ‘it is
91generally agreed that a securities market is indispensable for China’s reforms’.
tViAnd so, after months of debate, the seventh plenum of the 13 Congress of the
CCP convened in December 1990. It formally approved the:
...gradual enlargement o f bond and share issuance, and 
stern strengthening o f its management... the development 
o f financial markets, and giving encouragement to other 
capital raising methods. In big cities where conditions are 
right, stock markets should be established and perfected, 
and a standardised trading system should be set up.217
Deng had won out. Stock markets, one of the most radical of the economic 
reformists’ policies, survived in a Central Committee document otherwise empty 
of concrete measures and characterised by vague, and often contradictory
9 1 o
rhetoric, designed to offend neither reformists nor neo-conservatives. Of 
course, the issue was couched in the rhetoric of compromise; expansion would be 
‘gradual’ and any permanent markets would depend on certain unspecified 
‘conditions being right’. Nonetheless, the emphasis of the document was, 
crucially, on further development. This decision paved the way for stock 
exchanges to be established in late 1990.
quanwei zhuyi). As a broad ‘orientation’, rather than a coherent philosophy, it emphasised strong 
central government controls, planning and also contained elements of a resurgent nationalism.
213 Huang (1990a). Lu (1990) disagrees.
214 Xinhua (1990c); CD (1990).
215 Li (1990).
216 Tang (1990); Chen (1990).
217 Dong (1997), 133; Yao (1998), 26 fii. 9; Lam (1991).
93
Establishing the stock exchanges
The year 1990 was dominated by preparations to establish the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. Their initial institutional character was shaped by a 
competition between two groups of actors. One group, based in Beijing and 
operating outside of the formal government bureaucracy, envisioned a market 
based upon Western institutions: self-regulating stock exchanges operating 
independently of government. The other group, based within the local 
bureaucracy of Shanghai, and a similar group within Shenzhen, was interested in 
establishing exchanges within the sphere of influence of the local state: stock 
exchanges not only regulated but also administered by the local political 
leadership. The two groups co-operated and competed during the year in 
designing the exchanges and drafting their rules of business. Both the SHGSE 
and SHZSE were formally established as SROs and did indeed practice some of 
these powers. However, they were to operate in practice under the administration 
of the local government and Party leaderships.
Just as local leaders had an interest in maximising the issuance and trading of 
securities, they also had an interest in establishing stock exchanges. By 
institutionalising the share market, trading would become permanent and less 
susceptible to criticism and/or closure if the winds of ideology or economic 
policy from the zhongyang changed. Compared to an OTC, a stock exchange 
offered greater liquidity, lower transaction costs and provided a more convenient 
exit option for the holders of equity. Moreover, an exchange would provide a 
better framework in which a local government could manage, even control, share 
trading. Fake share certificates, as well as many other forms of corruption and 
wild price swings, all potential sources of social, as well as financial, instability, 
were common in the OTC and curb markets. With the centralised registration and 
settlement systems and the price limit mechanisms that could be instituted at a 
stock exchange, such problems could be greatly assuaged. Lastly, of course, a 
stock exchange would allow a local government to more easily extract tax 
revenues. With such institutions in place, local leaders could both stabilise and
218 Baum (1994), 322.
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profit from the new share market. Throughout China, therefore, they actively 
sought to establish exchanges.
The local government in Shanghai
Shortly after the Tiananmen protests, Zhu Rongji, Shanghai party secretary and 
mayor, presented Deng with the idea of establishing a stock exchange in the city. 
Deng gave his personal approval and in November 1989 preparations began.219 
On 2nd December 1989, Zhu opened the first Shanghai Financial Reform 
Meeting at which the idea was discussed. A three-person Stock Exchange 
Leadership Group (SELG) was formed, under which members of the Shanghai 
PBoC FAMD and Shanghai SCORES formed a six-person research group 220
Their initial findings suggested that a stock exchange would not be financially
001viable since the demand for stocks was too weak. That view soon changed. 
Between May and July 1990, the trading volume on the Shanghai OTC market 
grew rapidly. As Figure 24 shows, the year witnessed an enormous increase in 
the trading of all securities, especially in Shenzhen. Signs of zhongyang support 
and better economic conditions underpinned this surge.
Figure 24. Trading at the OTCs in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 1986-90
Shanghai Shenzhen Total
1986 0.58 - 0.58
1987 2.62 - 2.62
1988 4.45 4.00 8.45
1989 7.77 23.00 30.77
1990 49.63 1,760.00 1,809.63
Total 65.05 1,787.00 1,852.05
Rmb m
Hu (2000), 32.
At the same time, speculation, fuelled by brokerage and bank loans, triggered 
huge price movements; curb trading flourished. The Shanghai SELG attempted 
to clamp down. In July 1990, it ordered all trades to be settled in cash, in effect
219 Dong (1997), 243; Cao (2000), 19.
220 The group was comprised of three high-level Shanghai bureaucrats with financial experience: 
Li Xiangrui (Shanghai ICBC, chairman), Gong Haocheng (Shanghai PBoC, chairman) and He 
Haosheng (Shanghai SCORES, director). Zhu is reported to have supported the idea of a stock 
exchange, assuring his subordinates that he would take political responsibility for the policy, Mao 
(1997), 183. The research group: Wang Dingpu, Wang Huaqing, Chen Zehao, Jin Dajian, Yu 
Hang and Chen Yu, SHGSE (1993), 40.
221 Hu (1999a), 84-99.
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banning credit trading (rongzi) and introduced a daily 3% limit on price 
movements. In response, the curb-market, where no price limits could be applied, 
boomed. In August, the SELG ordered government bureaux and SOEs to stop 
trading, a restatement of a previous ban. It also ruled that all settlement should 
take place via authorised securities companies and should be completed within 
seven days of the trade (T+7).222 These measures only had a limited effect in 
diminishing black market activity.223 Then, on 21st November, the municipal 
government introduced a 5% fine (based on the previous day’s trading price) on 
black market purchases and reduced the official daily price movement to 1%. 
OTC trading picked up in response and black market activity subsided, but only 
to a degree. The local leadership was fire-fighting without the right institutions in 
place, and it increasingly became aware of the seriousness of the problem. The 
idea of a stock exchange became ever more attractive. Zhu strategically inserted 
the SHGSE project into the new Pudong development scheme, and when in late 
1990, Yao Yilin, a Politburo standing committee member, senior neo­
conservative, and close advisor to Chen Yun, visited Shanghai, Zhu presented 
him with the Pudong proposals.224 Yao authorised the scheme. In mid-1990, the 
SELG suggested establishing the Shanghai exchange in the first quarter of 1991. 
Zhu, however, ordered it to open in late 1990, perhaps fearing a change of heart 
from the zhongyang leadership.225
The local government in Shenzhen
Similar events were taking place in Shenzhen, although preparations for an 
exchange had begun earlier. Shenzhen’s OTC markets had grown quickly in 
1989, thanks in large part to the dividend plan announced by the Shenzhen 
Development Bank early in the year. The bank, directed by the municipal 
leadership, offered a generous Rmb7 cash dividend, a two-for-one stock dividend 
and a one-for-one stock split. This sparked enormous popular demand for 
shares and marked a major turning point in the Shenzhen’s public perception of 
stocks. While previously they had been treated as a fixed income security, it was
222 Xu (1990), 12.
223 Lee (1997).
224 Zheng (1994), 109; Yeh (1996), 274-276.
225 Dong (1997), 243.
226 Walter and Howie (2001), 7.
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suddenly obvious that the asset value of shares could actually increase. Trading 
volume in Shenzhen increased to Rmb23m in 1989 from Rmb4m in 1988, as 
Figure 24 shows.
In November 1988, the municipal government established a Securities Market 
Leadership Group (Shenzhen Zhengquan Shichang Lingdao Xiaozu, hereafter 
SMLG) made up of the mayor, deputy mayor and the leaders of several bureaux 
to develop policy for the new market. The initiative was led by Li Hao, 
Shenzhen party secretary, and a strong supporter of capital market development 
in the city. On 8th September 1989, the SMLG and Shenzhen PBoC completed a 
preparatory report on establishing a stock exchange and on 15th November 1989 
received the municipal leadership’s permission to proceed.228 The SMLG then 
established the Stock Exchange Preparation Group {Shenzhen Jiaoyisuo 
Choubeizu, hereafter SEPG) led by Yu Guogang and Wang Jian, later to be 
appointed the first leaders of the SHZSE. In early 1990, the Shenzhen leadership 
applied to the central PBoC and State Council for permission to establish a stock 
exchange. It is not clear whether their application was formally rejected or 
whether there was simply no response. Shanghai received formal zhongyang 
authorisation in April 1990; Shenzhen did not.229 Unperturbed, in March 1990, 
the SMLG presented a feasibility report to the municipal leadership. As in 
Shanghai, this report was pessimistic about costs and revenues, estimating that an 
exchange would require Rmb 1.3m of starting capital and would need seven years
90A
to break even. This dulled enthusiasm for the project among the municipal 
leadership. However, as 1990 progressed, trading volume and prices spiralled 
upwards. The share price of the Shenzhen Development Bank rose from Rmb 1.1 
in January to Rmb 19.7 in December; Jintian rose from Rmb 1.3 to Rmb24.3 over 
the same twelve months, increases of around 1,700%.231
Price limits for these stocks encouraged black market trading, usually at 
multiples several times higher than official prices. As the revenue calculations
227 Caijing (2000b), 75; Hu (1999a), 97.
228 Wang (1992b), 157-8.
229 Hu (1999a), 214; Dong (1997), 130.
230 Hu (1999a), 97.
231 Hu (2000), 36.
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were revised upwards, the municipal leadership became more enthusiastic about 
establishing an exchange.232 By May 1990, all preparations for the SHZSE were 
complete, well before those in Shanghai.233 On 22nd November 1990, Li Hao, 
Mayor Zheng Liangyu and other senior leaders visited the facilities of the yet-to- 
be-opened SHZSE and discussed a report prepared by the SEPG. The document 
emphasised the advantages of centralised trading and settlement and estimated 
that corruption in the sector could be reduced by 75% with a stock exchange. It 
further argued:
In our report to Beijing, we must make clear that [the 
application for a stock exchange] is [based on the 
advantages of] centralised trading and strengthened 
management. These are appropriate for Beijing’s 
cautious attitude.234
The Shenzhen leadership was anything but cautious. While still awaiting 
approval, Li ordered trading to begin and assured his colleagues that he would 
take political responsibility for the decision.235 On 1st December 1990 the 
SHZSE started business with one listed share, Shenzhen Anda.236 The SHGSE 
opened a few days later on 14th December 1990.237 Only on 11th April 1991 did 
the State Council finally direct the PBoC to authorise the establishment of the 
SHZSE. Its formal opening then took place on 3rd July 1991.238 Such is the basis 
upon which both exchanges claim to be reform China’s first stock exchange.
The Stock Exchange Executive Council
Establishing stock exchanges was, however, not an entirely local endeavour. In 
Beijing in late 1989 a group of experienced financiers was already advocating the 
need for stock markets, developing institutional designs for them and promoting 
the idea among the senior leadership.
232 ZTS (1990); Wang (1992b), 60-62; Liu (1997), 62; Xiao (2000a), 6.
233 Caijing (2000b), 75.
234 Quoted in Hu (1999a), 98.
235 Caijing (2000b), 76.
236 Funding for the SHZSE was arranged from two sources; the Shenzhen Investment 
Management Company provided Rmb200,000 as a interest-free loan, and the World Trade 
Building provided office facilities on the understanding that they would be assisted with a listing, 
Ibid., 75; Crothall (1991).
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In mid-1988, under the sponsorship of leaders within China’s TIC community, 
an informal stock market promotion group (SMPG) was formed in Beijing. It 
was made up of financiers recently returned from the United States, those 
working within the TIC sector, and high-ranking officials within the
'J ' lQ
government. Initially, the group appears to have had no formal direction or 
authorisation from any government or party organs. Indeed, one member of the 
group termed the whole initiative as ‘private’, though since both government- 
owned TICs were involved, as well as senior bureaucrats, perhaps the term quasi­
private is more appropriate, if more awkward. The important thing, however, is 
that the group operated outside the confines of the bureaucracy. Free of 
organisational or bureaucratic interests, they promoted a set of ideas, (which, if 
successful, they might, of course, have profited from personally in the future), 
apparently motivated by the desire to build a capital market in support of the 
country’s economic reforms. The SMPG produced a policy paper entitled ‘Policy 
suggestions on the standardisation and improvement of the legal system of 
China’s securities market’ that was circulated among senior officials in mid- 
1988. On September 8th 1988, Liu Hongru, deputy governor of the PBoC, and 
one of the leaders of the SMPG, organised a discussion meeting with the 
SCORES, chaired by Gong Zhuming, at the Wanshou Hotel in Beijing.240 
Representatives of the Central Committee General Office, the State Council 
General Office, the SPC, the SCORES, the MoF and several TICs were present. 
Most importantly, members of the secretariat of the Central Committee’s FELG, 
the party organ responsible for financial reform, were present.241 The meeting 
discussed China’s need for a capital market and provisionally agreed to establish 
a stock exchange in Beijing, though the question of the site was to spark dispute 
as preparations progressed.242 After the meeting a small group was designated to 
prepare a comprehensive report for the State Council and Central Committee, 
eventually producing a paper entitled ‘Ideas on the Creation and Management of 
China’s Securities Markets’ (Zhongguo Zhengquan Shichang Chuangban yu
239 The group included Wang Boming, Gao Xiqing, Wang Wei and Li Qingyuan, Liu (1997),
340.
240 Caijing (2000a), 91.
241 Zhao Ziyang’s absence at this November meeting perhaps signals his fall from influence after 
the price liberalisation debacle of mid-1988, Wang and Fewsmith (1995), 345-362.
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Guanli de Shexiang).243 On 9th November 1988, the group presented its white 
paper (baipishu) to the FELG at the Zhongnanhai leadership compound. 
Representatives of most of the major State Council bureaux were also present.244 
Again, the small group leaders argued that China needed a capital market to 
support SOE restructuring, bolster the public finances, relieve pressure on the 
banking system and improve the general efficiency of the economy.245 For such 
an end it proposed the establishment of stock exchanges, as well as a national 
trading system for securities. Yao Yilin, the most senior party figure present, 
agreed that although economic conditions were ‘not mature’ for such a market, 
preparations should nonetheless begin. Over PBoC objections he nominated the 
SCORES to lead these preparations.246 After the meeting, the FELG secretariat 
prepared its own report that extended Central Committee support to the 
establishment of the SHGSE and a national trading network.
On 15th March 1989, the SMPG founded and dissolved itself into the Stock 
Exchange Executive Council (Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Lianhe Sheji Bangongchu, 
hereafter SEEC).247 The SEEC, although non-governmental in the sense that it 
was administratively separate from the bureaucracy and was not funded through 
the national budget, was placed under the leadership of the SCORES 
Macroeconomic Management Office.248 The SEEC thus operated as a quasi- 
government organ. Writing in 1992, Li Yining listed the SEEC’s functions as the 
making of policy and regulation, the management of stock exchanges and the 
organisation of other securities experiments.249 However, these were only the 
original (and much unfulfilled) aspirations of the council. Based on their 
experience in America, SEEC members favoured creating equity institutions in
242 Dong (1997), 4; Interview-22, Beijing, 2000; TKP (1992a).
243 Caijing (2000a), 91.
244 Present was Yao Yilin as well as Zhang Jingfii, secretary to the group. Zhou Xiaochuan, then 
at SCORES and later CSRC chairman, was also present, Dong (1997), 4; Zhang (1997b), 54.
245 SIA (1993), 175.
246 Dong (1997), 4.
247 Interview-22, Beijing, 2000; Zhang (1997b), 54.
248 After January 1989, the SEEC was firnded by nine NBFIs, including CITIC and GITIC. Each 
NBFI contributed Rmb500,000 to the SEEC’s operational costs. These funds lasted for around 
three years, after which time the SEEC became self-financing. Gong Zhuming became chairman 
of the SEEC, Wang Boming deputy chairman, and Gao Xiqing became chief counsel. Other key 
leaders included Zhang Zhifang, who directed day-to-day operations (and later STAQs) and Li 
Qingyuan, Interview-22, Beijing, 2000; Dong (1997), 126; Li (1992b), 773.
249 Li (1992b), 773.
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the image of the NYSE and SEC. Most importantly, and radically, they wished to 
establish the market independently of government administration. To this end, 
the SEEC leadership formulated its own fangzhen (policy direction): ‘the people
•If  A f
lead, the government supports’ (minjian faqi, zhengfu zhichi). This fangzhen 
was apparently the basis of the proposal it made to the FELG, and which 
apparently subsequently received FELG approval. It implied the development of 
private securities companies, an independent industry association (like America’s 
NASD), stock exchanges operating as SROs, and a national and independent 
regulator modelled on the SEC. Stock markets were to be a private business, 
governed by non-governmental institutions. Organisations such as the SEEC 
would be active in designing regulation, providing the minimal management 
resources stock exchanges required, and providing a go-between between 
industry and government policy-makers. It was a radical plan and in 1988 it 
appeared realisable. In the words of Wang Boming, one of the SEEC’s senior 
members;
We were planning to...allow all parts o f the economic 
system onto the market...to eliminate issuance 
volumes, allow listed companies to bankrupt, investors 
themselves to freely chose companies to list, and to 
give foreign investors an opportunity to join...251
All work on establishing stock exchanges was halted with the Tiananmen 
protests of 1989, and the ensuing neo-conservative backlash.252 However, soon 
after, in late 1989, Zhu Rongji re-initiated Shanghai’s plans for an exchange and 
secured Deng’s approval. At this point, the Shanghai leadership appears to have 
captured control of the project: no more talk of the exchange being established in 
Beijing was heard, although the politics behind this decision remain vague. Three 
factors were probably critical. First, Shanghai, unlike Beijing, had a large stock 
of SOEs already restructured as shareholding enterprises which were ready to 
list. Second, with the neo-conservative lobby in the ascendancy in Beijing, 
Shanghai appeared to offer far more propitious circumstances for stock market 
development. Third, as a non-state organ, without any substantial backing, the
250 Wang (1996b); Hu (1999a), 77.
251 Caijing (2000a), 92.
252 Tiananmen also brought to a halt preparations for China’s first B-share share issue. A Sino- 
American joint venture, Squibb Pharmaceutical, was preparing to issue B-shares with Shenyin 
Securities, Zheng (1994), 129.
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SEEC’s backing of Beijing as its preferred site had no sponsor at State Council 
level; Zhu Rongji was better represented; his former boss in Shanghai was now 
the General Secretary.
The acting chairman of CITIC and senior SEEC member, Jing Shuping, visited 
Shanghai with Zhang Jingfu, FELG secretary, sometime in late 1989.253 Zheng 
Zhong claims that Zhu Rongji rebuffed their attempt to take over the leadership 
of the SHGSE project. However, the SEEC was apparently still invited by Zhu to 
work with the SELG. An interviewee suggested that most of the actual design 
work for the SHSGE rules and organisation was carried out by SEEC 
members.254 However, while the SEEC probably did make the dominant 
contribution to creating the institutional framework of the exchange, it had little 
success in propagating its vision of minimal government involvement, or, indeed, 
of instituting SEEC management over the exchange. Hu Jizhi reports that the 
Shanghai government wanted control for itself and therefore ended all co- 
operation with the SEEC after autumn 1990. An interviewee claimed that Zhu 
Rongji invited the core SEEC personnel to Shanghai to work at the exchange, 
and offered its members residence permits, an offer that the SEEC members 
declined.256 The offer was made, however, on the understanding that since the 
SHGSE would come under the administrative control of the Shanghai 
government, so too would SEEC personnel.
Whatever the politics of the divorce, the SEEC continued for a short while to 
play a significant, if marginal, formal role in China’s stock market development. 
SEEC ambitions to be active in the management of an equity trading system 
were given short-lease in December 1990 with the establishment of the STAQS, 
a national bond (and later legal-person share) trading system run under the 
leadership of the SCORES (see chapter seven).257 In addition, the MoF entrusted 
the SEEC with underwriting Treasury bonds in January 1991 and January 1992, 
and the SEEC was involved in the launch of Shandong province’s Zibo
253 Ibid., 108.
254 Interview-24, Shanghai, 2000.
255 Hu (1999a), 77.
256 Interview-22, Beijing, 2000.
257 Liu (1997), 341; Jin (1999), 25; Xinhua (1990a).
102
investment fund in November 1992, one of reform China’s first. However, the 
STAQS experiment soon suffered a serious setback, when the State Council
*y cq
prohibited the listing of legal person shares in May 1993. By late 1990s, the 
SEEC had transformed itself from a policy research group into a highly 
successful consultancy, publisher and investment company.
Concluding remarks
Three major institutional developments took place during 1984-90. One, local 
leaders captured the issuance process through their administrative control of 
PBoC branches. Two, central government leaders authorised development of the 
stock market and devolved down institution-building powers to local leaders. 
Three, non-state actors, so vital in initiating early developments, were excluded, 
leading to state capture of the institution-building process. Institutions are hard 
things to change, a fact that central government leaders discovered after August 
1992. When rioting in Shenzhen revealed PBoC regulation to be inadequate and 
local equity institutions to threaten zhongyang interests, senior leaders attempted 
to reorganise the institutional architecture, as chapter eight explains. They 
redesigned equity institutions with the aim of increasing the involvement of the 
central bureau sub-principals and diminishing the power of local leaders. It 
proved an extremely difficult task because the norms of operation and 
mechanisms of influence laid down during 1984-90 could not be easily altered. 
The competition for the institutions of the sector between local and central 
government leaders that ensued would define China’s stock market development 
for much of the 1990s.
258 Li (1992b), 773; SIA (1993), 173.
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4Institutional capture by local leaders: Share issuance and other 
problems, 1993-2000
The central government has entrusted us with this experiment and we must dare to take risks.
Li Youwei, Shenzhen Mayor, 1993261
This chapter presents evidence of how local leaders captured the equity 
institutions governing the issuance market during 1993-97. It shows how such 
capture enabled them to list SOEs under their administrative control with 
minimal oversight from the CSRC and limited regard for the formal rules 
governing the process. Key to this institutional capture was the creation of SMCs 
formed by senior provincial officials, and their SAOs. Their main role was to 
select and prepare local enterprises for issuance and public listing. Before 1996 
management (guanli) authority over the SMCs and SAOs was exercised by local 
leaders. The SCSC fangzhen (policy direction), issuance quota and national rules 
and regulations governed and circumscribed the actions of the SMCs and SAOs. 
However, these central government macro-institutions allowed extensive 
discretion for local leaders to pursue their own interests in the listing process and 
in secondary market regulation. The SCSC and CSRC had few means of 
overseeing the activities of the SAOs and even fewer means of enforcing their 
policies. The result was a fractured institutional framework: central bureaux 
developed policy and regulation but had limited means of implementing either. 
For their part, local yw-level bureaux leaders had the organisational means to 
monitor the activities of market participants and to implement regulation, but had 
a limited interest in doing so. Instead, local leaders in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
attempted to exploit these equity institutions for their municipalities’ own 
economic benefit by listing poor-quality firms, maximising revenues from 
secondary rights issues and creating a permissive regulatory environment in 
which securities companies and TICs could profit easily, and often fraudulently.
261 SCMP (1993b).
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The chapter is divided into two sections. The first examines the structure and 
functions of the SMCs and SAOs and looks at how they operated within 
Shanghai in detail. The second examines the institutions governing the issuance 
process during 1993-97 and presents evidence to support the claim that these 
institutions were manipulated to maximise economic resources for local 
government.
The Securities Management Commissions
The State Council’s December 1992 circular extended the right to list companies 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen to local governments throughout China. Each was 
required to nominate a ‘responsible comrade’ to take charge of the work of 
nommating and preparing enterprises for listing. In response, SMCs were 
established, groupings of local leaders normally chaired by the deputy provincial 
governor in charge of financial affairs. They were usually made up of the leaders 
of provincial bureau of the same state organs as comprised the SCSC. Each year 
from 1993 to 1997 each locality received an issuance quota from the 
SCSC/CSRC, and a list of industries that were to be promoted, discouraged or 
banned from listing. The quota system is explained in chapter nine. The chief 
tasks of the SMCs were to chose which SOEs could undergo restructuring, co­
ordinate the competition for listing spaces between these firms and their 
industrial bureaux, and, approve their public issuance.264 SMCs also became 
heavily involved in policy development and had the power to authorise securities 
companies’ and TICs’ operations within their jurisdictions. In Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, the SMCs were particularly active in developing policy for the local 
share markets.
The Shanghai Securities Management Commission
In March 1993, the Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress authorised the 
establishment of the Shanghai Securities Management Commission {Shanghai
262 This circular also established the SCSC and the CSRC, and is examined in chapters eight and 
nine.
263 RR (1993).
264 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
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Zhengquan Guanli Weiyuanhui, hereafter SHGSMC). Zhuang Xinfu, then 
deputy mayor responsible for finance, initially chaired the commission. The 
Shenzhen municipal government established a similar body on 1st April 1993, 
chaired by the city’s new mayor, Li Youwei. An informal leadership group, 
dominated by the local leaders of the SCORES, SPC, and PBoC had already 
been active in overseeing share issuance in Shanghai since July 1992. The 
establishment of the SHGSMC formalised this group and widened its 
membership to the directors of nineyw-level bureaux, as shown in Figure 25.
Figure 25. The membership of the Shanghai Securities Management 
Commission, 1992.269
□ Shanghai deputy mayor responsible for finance (chair)
□ Shanghai PBoC
□ Shanghai SPC
□ Shanghai SCORES
□ Shanghai MoF
□ Shanghai Audit Bureau
□ Shanghai Foreign Investment Bureau
□ Shanghai Justice Office
□ Shanghai Securities Administration Office
□ The Shanghai Office of the State Administration of State Assets
□ Shanghai Stock Exchange270
The SHGSMC met on an ad hoc basis about four times a year.271 It was 
dispersed in September 1998, six months after the winding up of the SCSC, on 
orders from the central government.272 The commission had no formal authority 
in areas where national regulations existed and had an obligation to follow the 
SCSC’s fangzhen. Nevertheless, its sphere of influence was wide and its relative 
autonomy was considerable (and larger than other local SMCs because of its 
oversight powers over the SHGSE). During 1993-96 the SHGSMC not only 
authorised issuance and chose appointees to key regulatory bureaux, but it also
265 SHGSE (1997b), 329.
266 Xu Kuangdi assumed the chair after Zhuang. In January 1995, deputy mayor Hua Jianming 
took on the chairmanship, handing over to deputy mayor Chen Liangyu in early 1997, Xinhua 
(1992d); Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
267 SZB (1993k); SCMP (1993e).
268 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
269 Kumar (1997b), 32; c.f. Mao (1997), 243.
270 Not a formal member, the SHGSE president attended all meetings, Interview-15, Shanghai, 
2000.
271 SZB (1996k); Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000. Hertz (1998), 62 claims it met weekly during
1992.
272 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
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exercised huge influence over policy development and market supervision. It 
authorised securities companies to do business within Shanghai and oversaw 
appointments to their senior managements. It had nominal powers to supervise 
the activities of listed Shanghai companies, securities companies and consultants. 
Most extraordinarily, the SHGSMC claimed the power to set not only detailed 
policy (zhengce) but to also establish the broader and more strategic ‘policy 
direction’ {fangzhen) for the Shanghai share market. This created, in effect, 
two sets of primary policy principals since the SCSC set a fangzhen for the 
national market.
In common with SMCs across the country, up until 1995 the SHGSMC enjoyed 
de facto authority over the issuance and listing of A-shares within the terms of 
the quota, as well as rights issuance. By the end of 1992, when the national quota 
system was introduced and other localities in addition to Shanghai and Shenzhen 
were allowed to issue shares, the two municipal governments had raised over 
RmblO billion in financing for their own firms, as Figure 26 shows. Even when 
the right to issue shares was distributed to other localities in 1993, Shanghai was 
allowed to list a disproportionately large number of companies, some 31 of the 
87 enterprises in that year in compensation for the ‘nationalisation’ of ‘its’ stock 
market (Figure 27). Thereafter the two cities’ dominance of the quota decreased, 
as the central government, apparently giving way to lobbying by other provincial 
leaders, gave listing places to the other locales. As a result issuance by Shanghai 
SOEs fell during 1994-95 to zero. Still, by the end of 1997, the two cities 
accounted for one third of China’s listed companies (Figure 28).
273 Wang (1992b), 180.
Figure 26. A-share issuance in Shanghai and Shenzhen, 1987-93
Year A-share issuance
1987 1.0
1988 2.5
1989 0.7
1990 0.4
1991 0.5
1992 5.0
1993 19.4
Rmb billion 
CSRC (1998), 27.
Figure 27. Money raised in IPOs by Shanghai companies on the SHGSE,
1984-99
Number o f companies Total money raised at IPO
1984 1 0.5
1985 2 5.3
1986 0 0
1987 3 24.1
1988 1 6.5
1989 0 0
1990 0 0
1991 2 136.6
1992 53 16,758.5
1993 31 11,559.7
1994 0 0
1995 0 0
1996 7 3,114.9
1997 6 11,078.6
1998 4 4,064.6
1999 2 4,666.4
Rmb m
Tongjiju (2000b), 147-149.
Figure 28. Regional distribution of listed companies in 1997
Number o f listed companies % o f total
Shanghai 112 16
Shenzhen 64 9
Shenzhen and Guangdong 107 14
Total 745 100
CSRC (1998), 66.
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Unlike other SMCs, the SHGSMC and SHZSMC also enjoyed extensive 
autonomy in the B-share market, enabling them to use the market as a means of 
financing their own enterprises. They oversaw the drafting of all regulations 
regarding the issuance, trading, listing and clearance of B-shares in their 
respective municipalities until 1997, and enjoyed sole authority over their 
issuance and listing, as well as over the issuance of American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs).274 Unlike A-shares, which required CSRC approval from 1993 
onwards, the two SMCs had only to inform the CSRC post hoc of their decision 
to allow a B-share issuance and listing during 1993-97. Over 70% of the B- 
shares traded in 2000 went through this entirely local authorisation process. The 
result? Before 1996, only Shanghai and Shenzhen firms issued B-shares and 
could access the precious foreign exchange this occasioned; thereafter only a 
sprinkling of other provinces’ firms were authorised. By the end of 1998, 
Shanghai companies made up 75% of the SHGSE B-share market, compared to 
14% of the A-share market.276 Figure 29 shows the funds Shanghai SOEs raised 
through the market, some US$1.62 billion during 1992-98. The suspicion is that 
without any kind of oversight, the majority of these companies were of doubtful 
quality.
Figure 29. B-shares issued by Shanghai companies, 1992-99
Number o f B-share IPOs Total funds raised at IPO, 
US$ m
1992 10 655.6
1993 13 384.6
1994 10 394.0
1995 1 22.2
1996 0 0.0
1997 2 63.5
1998 2 97.0
1999 0 0.0
Total 38 1,616.9
Note: these figures do not include rights offerings
Tongjiju (2000b), 150.
The SHGSMC also held a wide range of strategic powers over personnel 
appointments, and through these enjoyed effective control of secondary market
274 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000; SIA (1996a), 137.
275 Xinhua (1996c).
276 Huang (1999d), 373; CSRC (1999a), 67.
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regulation in the city. The commission nominated the president of the SHGSE 
and the director of the Shanghai SAO (SHGSAO).277 As a membership 
organisation, the SHGSE’s own board of directors had de jure power to appoint 
their president. But, in practice, before 1997 the municipal leadership chose the 
SHGSE president. In Shenzhen, in contrast, Zhuang Xinyi, appointed SHZSE 
president in 1995, was a CSRC nominee, as was Xia Bin in 1993. Appointments 
to the two cities SAOs also differed in this way, with the CSRC holding much 
greater sway in Shenzhen than in Shanghai. The main reason appears to be the 
ranking of the Shanghai and Shenzhen leaderships. The SHGSMC, led by the 
senior vice-mayor, and supported by the mayor and party secretary (both of 
whom had minister (zhengbu) ranking, the later, Huang Ju, being a Central 
Committee member) on important issues, which included these key personnel 
appointments, outranked the leadership of the CSRC before August 1997. This 
was in contrast to Shenzhen, where the local party secretary had deputy 
ministerial rank and was therefore on an equal footing with the CSRC leadership.
The SHGSMC and SHZSMC, unlike other SMCs, operated under the 
‘leadership, co-ordination and guidance’ of the SCSC. However, no 
administrative means of co-ordination or oversight existed between the 
SCSC/CSRC and any of the SMCs/SAOs during 1993-97. The CSRC was 
limited to issuing guidance notices: it could not issue orders to the SAOs. In 
addition, no regular reporting system existed between the two levels of 
government. Kumar reports that the SHGSMC was only required to report major
97Qproblems to the CSRC. However, only one instance of this taking place was 
identified by the author. In June 1994, with the Shanghai share index in free-fall, 
the SHGSMC reported its concerns to the SCSC and requested that the SCSC
9RHtake action to support the market. The report was a plea for assistance, rather 
than a disclosure of problems or a request for advice. Informal conversation on 
visits appears to have provided one of the few means for the two levels of 
government to communicate.281 The result was that the SHGSMC, like other
277 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
278 SZB (1993n); Mao (1997), 243.
279 Kumar (1997b), 57.
280 Wang (1994a); Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
281 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
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SMCs unconstrained by formal protestations of loyalty to the SCSC, worked 
within the broad parameters of the SCSC fangzhen to maximise local investment 
and local revenues. Its leaders did this through a network of local state bureaux 
centred around the SAOs.
The Securities Administration Offices
SAOs were established as the SMCs’ administrative offices. As a general rule, 
the more advanced shareholding reform was in an area the earlier the government 
established a SAO. Otherwise, the local SCORES bureau or, sometimes, the SPC 
bureau, would assume responsibility for issuance work under the direction of the 
SMC. When they were established, SAOs werey'w-level bureaux which tended 
to be closely associated with the other local bureaux involved in SOE 
restructuring. For example, in Shenzhen, the first SAO director, Wang Lin, was a 
senior Shenzhen SCORES official.284 The director of the Sichuan SAO, Zhang 
Yuren, was concurrently the director of the Sichuan SCORES.285 A similar 
situation existed at least in Yunnan as well with Guo Junqing concurrently 
managing the SAO and SCORES.286 The first director of the SHGSAO, Yang
7 8 7Xianghai, served concurrently as the deputy director of the Shanghai SPC. 
Obvious conflicts of interest were created through with dual appointments. 
Similarly, in other localities, the local bureau of the SCORES were involved in 
directing the work of the SAO.288
282 SAOs were established in Beijing (January 1995), Shanghai (March 1993), Tianjin (May 
1995), Liaoning (July 1993), Fujian (February 1993), Shandong (May 1995), Hainan (March 
1993), Hunan (August 1994), Shanxi (October 1993), Anhui (September 1994), Hebei 
(September 1993), Special Administrative Region of Inner Mongolia (September 1995), 
Shenzhen (April 1993), Wuhan (December 1993), Nanjing (May 1994), Harbin, Qingdao 
(November 1993), Ningbo (1994), Weihai (November 1993), and Dalian, SLA (1996a), 134-145; 
Ren (1996), 55.
283 Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
284 Interview-52, Shenzhen, 2001.
285 SZB (1995c).
286 SZB (1995e).
287 Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
288 The SHGSMC established an office, the Shanghai City Securities Management Office
(Shanghaishi Zhengquan Guanli Bangongshi, SHGSAO), as its administrative arm in March
1993. The office reported daily to the deputy mayor. The heads of the FAMD and Regulation 
division of the Shanghai PBoC were transferred to manage it. The SHGSAO initially employed 
about 15 people and by 2000 the office had expanded to a staff of 38, World Bank (1995a), 23; 
Hertz (1998), 60; Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
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While loosely governed by SCSC fangzhen and regulations, in their day-to-day 
operations the SAOs were wholly autonomous of central government direction 
and supervision. One interviewee stated that the SHZSAO only reported its ‘very
9 8 0important decisions’ to the CSRC. Local institutional capture of the SAOs was
assured by the rules governing appointments to their leadership posts and 
budgets. Local leaders nominated and appointed the SAO director: SAO staff 
were local bureaucrats, whose salaries, welfare and future careers depended on 
local leaders. Moreover, the SAOs enjoyed sources of income separate from the 
central government budget. Before 1995, the SAOs levied annual fees on local 
securities companies and TICs and also collected issuance application fees. In 
addition, the Shanghai and Shenzhen SAOs also appear to have levied a 0.001% 
‘supervision tax’ on share trading at the exchanges. At the end of 1995, the MoF 
ruled that the SAOs should be funded from the central budget and banned the 
collection of fees by local SAOs. However, at least the Shanghai government 
(and probably others too) resisted giving up their IPO fees and it was only in 
September 1998 that these fees were passed to the MoF and the SAOs became 
financially dependent upon the central government.290
Each SMC defined the official duties of its SAO. These typically included:291
□ Formulation of local regulations on securities supervision and administration.
□ Supervision and authorisation of local share issues and listing.
□ Supervision of local securities trading.
□ Supervision of information disclosure by local listed companies.
□ Formulation of detailed policy.
□ Training of local securities personnel.
Despite this plethora of official duties, in practice the key role of the SAOs was 
to prepare local enterprises to list. SAO directors had little incentive to 
implement their other duties. In the words of one interviewee: ‘the SAOs were 
not regulatory organs at all’.292 As chapter six will show, the SAOs had no 
jurisdiction over the stock exchanges and, in other locales, did not actively
289 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
290 Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
291 SLA. (1996a), 136-145; Bao (1999), 69.
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regulate informal share trading organised on the STCs and elsewhere.293 Only 
rarely would the SHGSMC issue informal and/or internal administrative 
warnings to brokers and listed companies in breach of regulations. Regulatory 
activity in general was limited. Take company disclosure, for instance. During 
1993-94 local SAOs were responsible for acquiring, and checking, the accounts 
filed by listed companies operating within their jurisdiction before passing them 
on to the CSRC. However, by July 1994, only 75 of the 169 annual reports for 
1993 submitted to the CSRC met the data requirements. Some companies did not 
submit reports at all. Some, like Shanghai United Textile Holdings and China 
First Pencil presented copies of the newspapers that had carried their reports 294 
Moreover, under SAO administration, the disclosure of forecast profits was 
unstandardised and frequently fraudulent, with numerous companies predicting 
hugely unrealistic figures.
The prize o f institutional capture: the issuance process
Administrative control of the SAOs and other local yw-level bureaux allowed 
local leaders throughout the country to capture control of the share issuance 
process. During 1992-97, for a company to issue publicly tradable shares, it 
would first have to gain sponsorship from its local industry department (hangye 
bumen) and win a place on its local government quota list. The distribution of 
places on this list would usually be determined at a meeting of the SMC, based 
on advice provided by the local SPC. If chosen, the SAO, SCORES and/or SPC 
and the company’s industry department would then sponsor the enterprise 
through the application process. If the company was not already a shareholding 
company, it would have to be restructured, a process usually overseen by the 
SCORES. Non-tradable equity was usually allocated to state organs with 
administrative control or business connections with the SOE. A formal 
provisional application would then be filed with the SMC. This contained an 
evaluation of the company’s assets, facilities, operations and land, three years of
9Q f\audited company accounts and a forecast of the next year’s profits. The SAO
292 Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
293 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
294 Wong (1994).
295 Wu (1999b), 44.
296 Huang (1999d), 128-134.
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prepared these documents, together with the SCORES and SPC, local securities 
companies, accountants and lawyers. Despite the participation of these firms, 
SAO staff still often took on many of the roles, most notably due diligence, that 
are usually undertaken by bankers, accountants and lawyers in more developed 
markets.297 After the provisional application had been considered and approved 
by the SMC, the enterprise could then formally apply to the SAO. The SAO 
would then check and evaluate the application materials (which it had itself 
prepared) and give an opinion on the application within 30 days. When approved 
(all SMC-authorised applications were) the application would be again reviewed 
briefly by the SMC. The enterprise would then apply to the CSRC, the SAO 
normally filing the necessary documents on its behalf. The CSRC then gave its 
decision within 20 days of the submission. After CSRC approval had been 
obtained (and previous to 1995, this was guaranteed) the company could apply to 
a stock exchange of its own choosing for a listing.
While the SAOs were in theory regulatory organs, the clear interest of their 
directors was to maximise their local government’s revenues from share 
issuance. This undermined their interest in the veracity of the application 
materials, not to mention the long-term viability, of the enterprises they 
authorised. The entire issuance process was run by administrative organs (local 
SAOs, SCORES, SPC etc.), allowing administrative interference in the choice of 
companies coming to market. The SMCs in each province decided which SOEs 
to list and which to reject. There was no opportunity for independent assessment: 
the SAOs themselves were responsible for the preparation of accounts and other 
materials and their verification. Even when firms of lawyers and accountants 
became involved, they were often owned or closely associated with the local 
government, and thus were similarly compromised. Moreover, before 1995 there 
was no effective oversight of the process by any central government bureau.
The process outlined above endured in more or less the same form until 1997, 
but the relative influence of the local SMC/SAO and CSRC shifted considerably 
over the period.298 During 1993-95 there was little effective CSRC oversight and
297 Margolis (1995), 28.
298 Kumar (1997a), 155; Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
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all local government-sponsored companies were listed, despite their variable 
quality. Before 1995 the CSRC did not reject a single issuance application.299 
However, during this period the CSRC did gain some influence, including a 
capacity to compel SAOs to supply additional information and correct problems. 
Most applications had problems that would cause the CSRC Issuance department 
to return the application, meaning that on average the application process took 
about two years. Yet even if the CSRC suspected an enterprise had falsified 
information it had no means of rejecting the application outright. Interviewees, 
and other sources, identify the main problem as the bureaucratic rank of the 
CSRC. Since the CSRC was only a non-government organ, without vice- 
ministerial status before 1995, it was impossible for its leadership to reject 
applications personally and visibly sponsored by ministry-ranking provincial 
governors and party secretaries. When the regulator did raise concerns it was not 
uncommon for these local leaders to make informal complaints to members of 
the zhongyang to exert pressure in support of the application.300 Local 
government leaders viewed their quota allocation as representing their right to 
list a certain number of shares in each year and did not appreciate CSRC attempts 
to undermine this ‘right’. The issuance market was clearly subject to complete 
local capture.
In 1995 the CSRC became able to reject applications outright, although the 
formal application process outlined above remained unchanged. To the author’s 
knowledge, no official notice exists outlining how exactly the weight of 
decision-making power shifted at this time, but it was most likely influenced by 
the CSRC’s promotion to vice-ministerial status in early 1995. However, three 
problems remained. First, the informal influence of local leaders remained strong 
and the quota system was still used as a lever to ensure that their provinces were 
allowed to issue a set amount of shares. Second, the preliminary preparation and 
approval of issuance applications was still carried out by the SAOs, who retained 
a monopoly on the collection of company information. The CSRC Issuance 
Division could not check the veracity and/or comprehensiveness of information 
supplied to it. Third, because SAOs fell under the administrative authority of
299 Interview-07, Shanghai, 2000.
300 Interview-20, Beijing, 2000.
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local leaders, there were no effective means by which the CSRC could punish, or 
even investigate, negligence or fraud within the SAOs.
Rights issues
As well as overseeing the IPO process, the SAOs authorised (shenhe) rights 
issues (peigu).301 A rights offering involves a company raising new capital 
through issuing new shares to its existing shareholders, usually at a discount to 
the market price. SAOs retained sole authorisation powers over rights issues and 
drafted all relevant regulations up until September 1994, well after the partial 
centralisation of IPO authorisation powers in late 1992. Since rights issues were 
not included in the annual quota, local leaders could use them to evade the 
central government’s attempt to limit their investment-raising activities. For 
listed companies, rights issues were, and continue to be, a cheap and 
uncomplicated source of financing. Figure 30 shows Shanghai Shenhua 
Industries’ options for raising funds in 1997: a rights issue was the cheapest 
option and a similar cost structure obtained throughout the 1990s for most 
companies. In addition, rights issues did not entail the many administrative 
difficulties involved in issuing a bond.304 SMC and SAO leaders were keenly 
supportive of rights issues since they raised investment funds for local industry. 
This support was especially pronounced in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1993. The 
Shanghai Securities News estimates that in each city companies raised around 
Rmb 1.4 billion in funds through rights offerings during the year, a huge amount 
compared to the year’s national issuance quota of Rmb5 billion.305 Local 
governments throughout the country took advantage of the loophole after 1993. 
In 1994, for instance, rights issuance accounted for 57% of the revenues raised in 
IPOs, making a total issuance volume of Rmb 13.7 billion. This was 149% more 
than the issuance quota for that year, a year in which the State Council had 
restricted IPOs as part of its monetary retrenchment policy. In 1995, as 
retrenchment continued and the CSRC attempted to enforce a go-slow policy for
301 EIU (2001c).
302 Interview-48, Shenzhen, 2001; SZB (1994k).
303 Hu (1999a), 152
304 Corporate bonds remain subject to a tightly controlled quota and proceeds, unlike those from
an IPO, are taxable, Liu (2000a), 26-28.
305 SZB (1994h); Hu (1999a), 150.
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the share market, rights issues raised Rmb6.8 billion, Rmb 1.2 billion more than 
the IPO market.
The CSRC had limited success in constraining rights issues. In 1993 it ruled that 
a year must lapse between issues (an indication of their frequency at the time) 
and that less than 30% of a company’s stock capital could be issued (an 
indication of their size).306 It attempted to intervene and prevent specific 
company issues authorised by SAOs in 1994, but again with limited success.307 
Rights offerings were still liberally authorised by SAOs despite the new rules. 
However, in late 1994 the CSRC tightened its grip by ruling that a listed 
company required three years 10% after-tax returns on assets to be able to make 
a rights issue. In addition, rights issues would require authorisation from both the 
SAO and the CSRC. Companies were also required to inform the CSRC about 
the use of funds raised in such issues. As Figure 31, shows these rules curbed 
rights issuance relative to IPO issuance after 1995. Rights issues as a proportion 
of initial issues fell from 121% in 1995 to 26% in 1996. However, companies 
without the required profit levels continued, with the complicity of their local 
SAOs, to make secondary issues. Wang Aijian invokes the aphorism youfa buyi, 
zhifa buyan (where a law exists, it is ignored; when implemented, it is not done 
seriously) to describe the situation during 1995-96 when widespread rights 
issuance by companies with few profits continued and that few, if any, of the 
required reports were ever delivered.309 An interviewee confirmed that many 
companies before 1997 registered fake profits to enable them to issue rights 
shares. The suspicion of many is that, as of 2000, this practice was still 
common.
306 SZB (1993i); Chen (1997a), 700-711; Wang (1996c), 90; SCMP (1993c).
307 Dong (1997), 154.
308 ZZPZ (1997), 335; SZB (1994j); Hu (1999a), 50..
309 Wang (1996a), 35-37.
310 The number of companies registering returns of 10-12% after the 1994 ruling raises many 
analysts’ suspicions, Interview-48, Shenzhen, 2001.
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Figure 30. The costs of raising funds for Shanghai Shenhua Industries, 1997
Fund raising 
method
Costs Annual cost per share based on raising 
Rmb 107m,
Rmb
Rights offering A one-off 1.376% underwriting fee 0.04
Convertible Annual interest payments of 11% and a one-off 0.07% 0.33
bonds administrative fee
Enterprise bond Annual interest payments of 10% and a one-off 1.5% 
administrative fee
0.35
Bank loan Annual interest payments of 8% and a one-off 1.5% 
administrative fee
0.21
Self-financing 10.35%* 0.31
* Opportunity cost calculated from loss of revenues from investing available funds. 
SHGSE (1997a) quoted in Dong (1997), 152.
Figure 31. Capital raised in initial, rights and secondary offering, 1993-2000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
A- and B-share initial offerings 23.2 8.7 5.6 27.1 73.5 46.8 57.7 102.1
A- and B-share rights issues (peigu) 8.2 5.0 6.8 7.0 19.8 33.5 32.1 51.9*
Secondary issues (zengfa) - - - - - 3.0 5.0 N/A
Rights issues as a proportion of initial offerings, % 35 57 121 26 27 72 62 51
* Includes secondary issues
Rmb billion, unless otherwise stated.
CSRC (1999a), 17; CSRC (2001), 33.
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The result o f  institutional capture: poor quality listed companies
The institutions governing share issuance during 1993-97, and particularly 
during the early years, were dysfunctional in at least two ways. First, they 
allowed the wrong types of company to be listed. Chen Gong argues that it was a 
mistake to allow so many processing, commercial and real estate firms to list; 
they wasted IPO revenues on unproductive and speculative ventures.311 This was 
especially a problem during 1991-92, and even in 1993 when, with the central 
government’s guidelines that banned such firms from listing in place, 16% of 
listing firms were commercial or real-estate companies. Local leaders, 
especially in the south and east of China, were keen backers of such firms 
because of their potential for making large profits quickly. Second, the quality of 
companies coming to market was not only poor but many firms faked their entire 
financial histories, presumably with the support of local officials. One 
interviewee estimated that around 50% of companies listed before 1997 ‘had 
problems’ in their applications.313 The implication was that they had falsified 
their profits or liabilities to some extent. His colleague demurred; he believed the 
figure was nearer 80%. Another interviewee agreed, estimating the figure to be 
70-80%.314 In late 2001, China’s National Audit Office, in a random check of 32 
listed firms, found 23 of their audited accounts to have ‘gravely inaccurate’ 
information. If this survey was representative, 72% of China’s 1,152 listed firms
c
had similarly problematic reports.
Of course, the seriousness of such fraud is difficult to assess. The financial 
results of listed companies over recent years, however, provide some clues. By 
early 1999, 72 of China’s 851 listed companies, some 8%, had announced they 
expected to make losses for the year. In April 2001, 118 of the 1,050 listed 
companies, some 11%, announced losses for the previous year. Many others had 
cooked their books to avoid having to make their losses public. An interviewee 
stated that by 2000 around three quarters of listed company accounts could be
311 Chen (1994).
312 Dong (1997), 145.
313 Interview-39, Shanghai, 2000.
314 Interview-05, Shanghai, 2000.
315 EIU (2002).
119
considered accurate but, as chapter eleven suggests, this claim was too 
optimistic. The total official numbers of loss-making companies is shown in 
Figure 32. The size of the Special Treatment (ST) and Particular Transfer (PT) 
categories on the SHGSE and SHZSE gives another indication of the extent of 
fraud in issuance applications. After 1998, firms with two years of continuous 
losses or other problems were placed in ST and were subject to 5% daily price 
limit movements.317 By the end of 1999 there were 54 ST companies, over two 
thirds of which had been listed before 1994.318 In July 1999, the two exchanges, 
under CSRC instructions, created the PT category, to which ST firms with three 
years losses were transferred.319 As of year end 2000 there were 61 ST 
companies (23 at the SHGSE and 38 at the SHZSE) and ten PT companies 
(seven at the SHGSE and three at the SHZSE).320 Of course, the appalling 
financial position of these companies can not solely be blamed on fraudulent 
initial financial accounts; inept management, poor sales, the burden of large 
welfare payments to staff and asset-stripping are all likely to have contributed to 
their problems. However, it is commonly accepted in the industry that such 
problems could not have appeared immediately after an IPO and that the present 
state of the companies indicates problems in their finances that were disguised at 
the time of issuance.
The quality of listing firms was particularly poor in the early 1990s. Figure 33 
shows the per share income of companies listed before 1994 falling by two thirds 
during the decade from an average of Rmb0.298 in 1994 to RmbO.114 in 1999. 
The average profitability of companies listed during 1992-94 also compares 
badly with those that listed later as shown in Figure 34. Companies that listed in 
1992 (Shanghai and Shenzhen companies only) had a per share income of 
RmbO.l in 1997, compared to Rmb0.3 for 1996 listees and Rmb0.4 for 1997 
listees. Net asset ratios show a similar decline. Such figures cast doubt not only 
on the quality of these companies (and their suitability for public issuance and
316 Shao (1999).
317 In April 1998, SHZSE-listed Liaowuzi became the first ST firm, Li (1998b), 110-111; Huang 
(2000b), 28.
318 Cao (2000), 125; Huang (2000b), 28.
319 The shares of PT firms traded only on Fridays and were also subject to a 5% limit.
320 Data supplied by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, December 2000; Green (2001), 35.
321 OECD (2000), 26-31.
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trading) but on the veracity of the accounts they submitted at listing. The likely 
explanation is that as the CSRC gained (and local SMCs/SAOs lost) influence 
over the institutions of issuance during the decade, the quality of listees 
improved. During 1992-99, according to research published by the SHZSE, 
only half distributed cash dividends, compared to 85% in the United States, and 
dividend payments were frequently small. An investment in the Hong Kong 
share market during 1999 brought a return from dividends of 2.8%; Shanghai’s 
A-share market only delivered 0.4%.323
322 The alternative is that companies listing in 1997 could have been similarly awful but that 
sufficient time had not elapsed to reveal their real situation.
323 EIU (2001c).
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Figure 32. Total number of loss-making companies, 1990-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total number of loss-making companies 2 17 31 47 86 81 118
Loss-making companies as proportion of total, % 0.7 5.3 5.9 6.3 10.0 8.0 12.0
Zhu (2001), 89.
Figure 33. The average per share income of 200 companies listed before 1994
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Average per share income, Rmb 0.298 0.219 0.162 0.140 0.077 0.114
Zhang (2000), 267.
Figure 34. The 1997 results of companies which listed in 1992-97
Listing year 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992
Profit to net asset ratio, % 13.0 12.1 1A 6.1 4.2 6.6
Per share income, Rmb 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Per share net assets, Rmb 3.1 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.4
Huang (1999d), 269.
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As well as evidence of widespread malpractice in preparation of company 
accounts, fraud on an enormous scale has also been a serious problem. The first 
major corruption scandal involved Shenzhen Yuanye, one of the city’s first Sino- 
foreign joint venture companies.324 On 7th July 1992, the SHZSE suspended 
trading in the shares of the company.325 Yuanye, it was discovered, had faked 
profits and investment capital and had falsely reported its short-term liabilities. 
During 1997-2000 numerous other cases of companies whose accounts had been 
attractively ‘packaged’ (baozhuang) have come to light. They have revealed how 
local capture of the issuance process up until 1997 resulted in, at the very least, 
regulatory negligence and, at worse, SAO/SMC complicity in sophisticated 
fraud.
The public report in early 2000 by the Central Discipline & Inspection 
Commission (CDIC), the party department charged with investigating breaches 
of discipline by CCP members, describes how Daqing Lianyi, a petroleum 
company from Daqing in Heilongjiang province, was supported by numerous 
local bureaux in its fraudulent efforts to secure a public listing. 
Extraordinarily, the report implicated 179 people in 79 different government 
bureaux and businesses in malpractice. Daqing Lianyi was only approved as a 
stock-holding company in late 1996. However, its business license was faked by 
the Heilongjiang SCORES to read late 1993. This allowed the company to claim 
that it had three years of operations and a 10% annual return on net assets, both 
requirements for a public listing. Together with false accounts submitted by its 
underwriter Shenyin Wangguo Securities, and false certificates provided by the 
Heilongjiang Securities Registration Company, all approved by the Heilongjiang 
SAO, the company successfully gained the CSRC’s approval to list in 1997. In 
another notorious case, Hongguang Industries, from Chengdu in Sichuan 
province, used similar methods to secure permission to issue Rmb410m worth of 
shares and list in Shanghai in May 1997. Hongguang faked profits of Rmb54m 
for 1996, when in fact the company had made losses of Rmb 103m. It then
324 Liu (1997), 125-128.
325 Dong (1997), 140.
326 Yuanye was later restructured, renamed and the suspension of its shares lifted, Fu (1998), 359- 
367; SZB (1995j); Gu (1993), 8.
327 NZ (1999); Chang (1998).
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submitted a fraudulent application to the Sichuan SAO to issue additional shares 
and was subsequently authorised. It made a secondary issue worth Rmb400m in 
mid-1998. It was only in late 1998 that the CSRC suspended Hongguang’s 
shares, after which the chairman and general manager received administrative 
punishments. Chengdu Shudu Accountant Ltd., Chengdu Asset Valuation Ltd., 
Sichuan Provincial Economic Lawyers Ltd. and the underwriters, Guotai 
Securities, Chengdu Securities and Zhongxing ITIC, were also fined and their 
directors banned from securities-related business for their involvement in their 
fraud. It appears inconceivable that members of the Sichuan SAO and SMC 
could not have been aware of the fraudulent state of Hongguang’s finances. 
Hongguang and Daqing Lianyi are not isolated cases. Susanshan, Lantian, 
Dongfang Guolu, Mengpian Guangda, Qiong Minyuan, to name only a few, have 
also been revealed as baozhuang companies. All created assets, falsified their 
registration dates, and/or hid debts during their issuance applications all overseen 
by their local SAOs.
Concluding remarks
Local capture of the equity institutions governing the primary market resulted in 
the issuance process being skewed to support local industrial and financial 
interests. In addition, the SMCs/SAOs, at least up until mid-1994, controlled the 
rights issuance process, providing localities with an additional route for raising 
funds. The SAOs were not ‘regulatory’ organs in any meaningful sense. Rather 
they were organs of industrial policy and worked in co-ordination with other 
local yw-level bureaux to maximise local revenues from share issuance. There 
was extensive administrative involvement in the choice of companies coming to 
market, little independent assessment of their quality and ample opportunities for 
fraud. Institutional capture allowed local officials to withhold and/or falsify 
information; the ability of the CSRC to discipline aberrant local actors was 
extremely limited. The institutional complex local leaders created effectively 
excluded the CSRC from any meaningful participation in the issuance process
328 Green (2000a); Zhen (1999); ZSZ (1999); Gao (2000).
329 AFX (1998c).
330 Pan (1999), 164-173; Chen (1999); Huang (1999b); Caijing (2001a).
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until 1996-97. It is probable that the majority of listed companies before 1997 
did not meet the formal listing requirements.
There are suggestions that the zhongyang leadership was aware of such problems 
early in the 1990s.331 However, the institutional structure, though dysfunctional, 
did not present an immediate or serious threat to them. Financial stability was 
guaranteed by the quota system, the rules on secondary rights issuance and the 
industry guidelines for issuance which were all, more or less, respected. 
Baozhuang behaviour was widely suspected, but it was invisible from the public 
eye and did not induce crisis. Without crisis, the CSRC could not gain the high- 
level support it needed in order for it to organise significant institutional change. 
It was only the demonstrable failure of local equity regulation during 1996-97, 
and the threat of financial instability it presented, which gave the senior 
zhongyang leadership the incentive to effect such a fundamental change. The 
following chapter examines this particular crisis in more detail and the 
involvement of the Shanghai and Shenzhen SMCs and SAOs in fostering it.
331 Ma (1993).
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5Equity developmentalism unbound: the capture o f secondary market 
institutions in Shenzhen and Shanghai, 1995-97
I f  we seek just bustle and excitement and ignore the consequences, this reform will come to a 
premature end.
Liu Hongru, deputy minister SCORES, 1991332
Before 1995, attempts by local leaders in Shenzhen and Shanghai to develop the 
secondary stock market were mostly ad hoc and opportunistic. They employed 
three main strategies. In policy areas where clear rules did not exist, local ju- 
level bureau leaders had a habit of pre-empting the central authorities by 
announcing their own policies, with the implicit support of their SMC. An 
example of this was the SHZSE’s decision in February 1994 to suspend all new 
listings in order to shore up prices.333 Alternatively, local organs would engage in 
‘implementation bias’ by delaying or amending a central government policy; in 
the SAOs’ de facto refusal to implement supervision over listed companies’ 
disclosures, for instance. Third, a SAO or stock exchange would sometimes 
secretly implement a change in the rules and attempt to hide the fact from the 
CSRC. An example of this was the ‘illegal’ listing of legal person rights shares 
during 1993-95, as chapter six explains. All three strategies relied upon the lack 
of effective supervision mechanisms enjoyed by central government over local 
bureau activities.
This chapter examines the period 1995-97 when local leaders turned to a more 
aggressive and strategic form of institutional development. Shenzhen and 
Shanghai leaders, fully exploiting their de facto powers as principals over their 
local share markets, implemented an aggressive and wide-ranging programme of 
policies aimed at swelling trading volume, attracting new listings and boosting 
the number of exchange members. They used the numerous micro-economic 
policy tools at their disposal to boost secondary market activity. Not only were 
the stock exchanges and SAOs fully enlisted in this effort but other bureaux with
332 Wang (1991).
333 Chan (1994d).
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jurisdiction over commercial bank and industrial policy were enlisted. The term 
‘equity developmental!sm’, understood as a program of policies aimed at the 
rapid development of the share market, is used to describe these activities. Equity 
developmentalism raised municipal tax revenues, nurtured the local securities 
industry and supported local industrial development. Rivalry between the two 
cities exacerbated their developmental ambitions. The central government in 
general, and the CSRC in particular, had limited means by which it could 
constrain the policies being rolled out by the local authorities. When they did 
attempt to intervene they could only do so with blunt administrative instruments: 
newspaper editorials, manipulation of the issuance quota and investigations. 
These proved ultimately ineffective and only served to highlight how fragile the 
zhongyang leaders’ control of their local agents was. By the beginning of 1997, 
zhongyang leaders, advised by the CSRC leadership, had realised that they 
required new institutional structures to ensure local actors’ loyalty and the 
orderly future development of their stock market.
The chapter is laid out as follows. The first section explains how tax revenues 
from the stock market were shared between central and local governments, and 
how such revenues provided local leaders with incentives to develop the market. 
The second section examines the SHZSE and municipal leadership’s aggressive 
efforts to develop their market during 1995-96. The third looks at Shanghai 
leaders’ response and the bank loans scandal that ensued. The fourth section 
shows how zhongyang leaders initially responded to local developmentalism.
Sharing the spoils: the stamp tax
In addition to the investment revenues raised in the primary market, local leaders 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen benefited from fiscal revenues generated via trading 
in the secondary market. Initially, the two municipal governments retained all 
revenues from the stamp tax, the tax levied on each A- and B-share transaction. 
However, by the end of 2000, the central government had gained control of 94%
127
of the revenues, the result of a gradual readjustment in the sharing arrangements 
in the central government’s favour as shown in Figure 35.334
334 COL (2000b); COL (2000c).
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Figure 35. The stamp tax and the Centre-Local revenue sharing regime, 1990-2002
Time period Rate o f stamp tax, % Ratio split between central and local government
1990-92 0.3-0.6 All to local government
1992- 1994 0.3 20:80
1994- 1996 0.3 50:50
l s< January 1997 - 9th May 1997 0.3 80:20
10th May 1997- 11th June 1998 0.5 88:12
12th June 1998 - September 2000 0.4 88:12
1st October 2000 - 2002* 0.4 91:9 moving to 97:3
Note: Stamp tax was levied on both sides of the transaction until March 1998, when the CSRC announced that it would only be levied on the 
purchase side, thus in effect halving the tax.
* This was the anticipated stamp tax regime at year end 2000. However, in October 2001, the stamp tax rate was revised to 0.3% in order to 
revive trading sentiment.
Fu (2000), 203.
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During the period examined in this chapter, 1995-97, the two localities received 
control of 50% of these revenues. These funds accrued to municipal budgets and 
provided local leaders with an incentive to nurture trading volume and to attract 
trading away from their rival. Figure 36 shows the author’s estimates of how 
revenues were split between central and local government during 1991-2000. 
Although the CSRC has made public data on total stamp tax income (columns 
one and four), no official data is available on how the revenues were split 
between the two levels of government. Columns two and three were generated by 
using the Centre-Local sharing ratios presented in Figure 35. Using data on the 
relative share of trading at the two exchanges, shown in Figure 37, a rough 
estimate of the amount of stamp tax collected by the Shanghai government can 
also be made, as Figure 38 shows. The estimate made here is subject to a number 
of unknown variables; when new rate regimes were actually implemented, for 
example. It is therefore only a rough guide to municipal stamp tax revenues. 
Figure 39 shows similar statistics for Shenzhen, but both total tax revenues and 
stamp tax are sourced from official sources.335
335 Adding the Shanghai (estimates) stamp tax revenues with those of Shenzhen (official) does 
not equal the total local stamp tax revenues (estimates) as shown in Figure 36. These 
inconsistencies are allowed to stand though, since the author believes they still offer the best 
approximation of these revenues.
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Figure 36. Stamp tax revenues for local and central government, 1991-2000
Total stamp tax revenue, Rmb 
billion
Shanghai and Shenzhen 
(combined) stamp tax revenue, 
Rmb billion
Central government stamp tax 
revenue, Rmb billion
Total stamp tax revenues as 
proportion o f total national 
tax revenues, %
1991 0.03 0.02 0.01 -
1992 0.40 0.32 0.08 -
1993 2.20 1.76 0.44 0.51
1994 4.88 2.45 2.45 0.93
1995 2.64 1.30 1.30 0.42
1996 12.80 6.40 6.40 1.73
1997 25.08 5.50 19.58 2.90
1998 22.58 2.70 19.88 2.29
1999 24.81 2.98 21.83 2.40
2000 48.59 5.48 43.11 3.63
Note: Total stamp tax revenues (column one) is provided by CSRC (2001), 16. Author’s calculations using CSRC (2001), 16; CSRC (1999a), 31; Hu (1999a), 237; COL 
(2000) and private correspondence with the SHGSE.
Figure 37. Share of national trading volume at the SHGSE and SHZSE, 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
SHGSE 36 65 71 77 43 45 53 54 52
SHZSE 64 35 29 23 57 55 47 46 48
%
Based on CSRC (2001), 45-46.
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Figure 38. Stamp tax revenues and financial revenues of the Shanghai municipal government, 1991-2000
Year Municipal financial revenues, Rmb billion Municipal stamp tax revenues (estimated), 
Rmb billion
Stamp tax revenues as a proportion o f total 
financial revenues, %
1991 16.12 - -
1992 18.26 0.115 0.65
1993 25.57 1.144 4.47
1994 18.00 1.740 9.66
1995 22.67 1.001 4.12
1996 27.13 2.752 10.14
1997 30.36 2.475 8.15
1998 39.22 1.431 3.04
1999 43.19 1.609 3.73
2000 - 2.850 -
Note: Financial revenues (column one) were provided by Tongjiju (2000s), 144. Local financial revenues plus central financial revenues transferred to the local government 
make up the local government’s total financial revenue. As well as taxes (estimated to be account for 60-70% of the total), local financial revenues include SOE profits, fines, 
municipal bond issues, etc. Stamp tax data (column two) is based on author’s estimates generated from Figure 36 and Figure 37.
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Figure 39. Stamp tax revenues and financial revenues of the Shenzhen municipal government, 1991-2000
Municipal financial revenues, Rmb billion Municipal stamp tax revenues (official), 
Rmb billion
Stamp tax revenues as a proportion o f total 
financial revenues, %
1991 2.73 - -
1992 4.30 - -
1993 6.72 - -
1994 7.44 0.17 2.28
1995 8.80 0.63 7.16
1996 13.17 3.77 28.63
1997 14.48 2.29 15.81
1998 16.49 1.62 9.82
1999 18.48 1.89 10.23
2000 22.19 - -
Note: Municipal financial and stamp tax revenues (columns one and two) were provided by official sources, Tongjiju (2000), 207; Tongjiju (1998), 205; Xinxiju (2000a), 234.
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Figure 38 and figure 39 show a significant rise in the level and relative 
importance of the stamp tax to the municipal governments during 1996-97 as the 
developmental policies examined below were rolled out. In 1996, the Shenzhen 
government received 28.6% of its entire revenues from the stamp tax, Shanghai 
10%. Both figures only dropped marginally in 1997. In addition to these 
revenues, tax income from securities companies and TICs was also significant 
for them. However, no public information on securities companies’ revenues is 
available before 1997.336 Figure 16 shows tax contributions of securities 
companies during 1999-2000, most of which went to local governments. Of 
course, local leaders were not solely interested in boosting their fiscal revenues: 
the stock markets also offered them the possibility of supporting local industry, 
attracting foreign investment, and building their cities into financial centres. 
However, the above discussion shows that the financial interest in equity 
developmentalism was considerable.
Equity developmentalism in Shenzhen, 1995-97
After 1993 the SHGSE dominated China’s stock market. Under the presidency of 
Xia Bin (from 1993 to mid-1995), the SHZSE had lost direction and trading 
volume to Shanghai. In 1995, the SHZSE only hosted some 23% of national A- 
share trading. The SHGSE’s daily trading volume was typically three times as 
great as that of the SHZSE and it listed around two thirds of China’s public 
companies.338 However, despite its pre-eminence, the SHGSE’s position was not 
all that secure. The February 1995 Treasury bond futures crisis had resulted in a 
clamp down by the CSRC and a messy change of leadership, as chapter six will 
explain. While the SHGSE was in limbo, the Shenzhen leadership initiated an 
aggressive programme of equity market development. Mayor Li Zibin and 
deputy mayor Wu Jiesi were keen advocates of capital market development. A 
municipal white paper in mid-1995 identified stock market development as one
336 Interview-46, Shenzhen, 2001.
337 Xinhua, however, reports that in 1993, local securities companies paid Rmb2.33 billion in 
taxes to the Shanghai government, about 9% of total municipal revenues. If this rate was 
sustained, and there is good reason to be believe it was, then securities companies, and the high 
trading volumes they profited from, had enormous fiscal significance for the two governments, 
Xinhua (1994d).
338 Xiao (2000b), 56-57; Zhang (1998), 84.
339 Chan (1995d).
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of the city’s policy priorities. It set out several goals: to attract more non- 
Shenzhen securities companies and listees; to nurture several large Shenzhen- 
based securities companies with registered capital in excess of Rmb100,000; and 
to aggressively push for the establishment of Sino-foreign joint investment funds 
and direct foreign entry into the Shenzhen A-share market.340 The paper set a 
target trading volume of Rmbl.5 trillion by the year 2000.341 On 17th August 
1995, a series of a ‘Shenzhen stock market development and strategy outline 
meetings’ began. Organised jointly by the SHZSAO and the Shenzhen SLA, the 
leaders of local securities companies were asked for their suggestions on policy 
development.342 This was the first formal instance of an administrative agency 
seeking the advice of stock market players.
Revival at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 1995-96
Zhuang Xinyi took over as SHZSE president on 20th October 1995.343 Although a 
CSRC appointee who had previously made his career entirely within the Beijing 
bureaucracy, Zhuang had a mandate from both the CSRC and the SHZSMC to 
revive the market.344 Reprised of his background in the central government, 
media analysts believed he would ‘bring the exchange into the central fold’ and 
ensure CSRC control.345 They were to be proved wrong. Zhuang moved 
aggressively to reorganise the exchange’s internal structure and the relations 
between the SHZSE and other local equity organs. He centralised decision­
making powers in his leadership team, took control of the previously 
autonomous registration and settlement company and established the SHZSE’s 
own Market Service Department. In late October 1995, the SHZSE announced its 
new ‘work policy direction’ (gongzuo fangzhen) as ‘market upwards, service as 
the basis’ (shichang daoshang, fuwu weiben). By bringing down costs,
340 ZXJ (1997), 91-93.
341 Share trading volume on the SHGSE and SHZSE totalled Rmb6.1 trillion in 2000, SZB 
(1995n).
342 At least one other meeting took place on 29th August 1995, ZXJ (1997), 62.
343 Zhuang’s team, including the new deputy SHZSE president, Zhang Yujun (another ex-CSRC 
staffer), was in place by September 1995. Zhuang had previously worked as the deputy director 
of the SCSC General Office and at the Construction Bank with Zhou Daojiong, the newly 
appointed CSRC chairman, Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000; Ibison (1995a); SCMP (1995b).
3 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
345 Ibison (1995b).
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streamlining decision-making and improving the exchange’s services, he set the 
Shenzhen share market up for rapid growth.
During 1991-95, the SHZSE had relied on a set of committees, a listings 
committee, an audit committee, and the members meeting, for many of its 
management and policy decisions.346 This governance structure undermined the 
efficiency and speed of the decision-making process. For example, while a listing 
application at the SHGSE before 1995 simply required the president’s say-so for 
an immediate listing, the same process at the SHZSE took three to six months. 
This, Zhuang considered, was unacceptable. He scrapped the listing committee, 
and downgraded the role of the other committees, absorbing powers into his own 
office. Under Zhuang, an informal working group made up of senior 
management and department heads met fortnightly to approve listings, 
shortening the process considerably.347 The new president also won permission 
from the municipal leadership to reorganise other institutions. The SHZSMC 
devolved significant policy-making powers down to his team, including the 
power to approve listings.348 The SHZSAO’s supervisory powers over the 
exchange were also reduced.349 Previously, the SHZSAO had sought to regulate 
non-Shenzhen companies and the SHZSE, apparently in contrast to the 
SHGSAO. Before 1995, for example, all SHZSE departments were required to 
report regularly to the SHZSAO and non-Shenzhen companies had to seek 
SHZSAO permission before making rights offerings.
The second major institutional change Zhuang organised was the SHZSE’s take­
over and absorption of the Shenzhen Securities Registration and Settlement 
Company (SSRASC). The SSRASC had operated independently from the 
exchange and had established a network of thirty offices nation-wide, 
maximising its own revenues through charging high fees for listing and other 
services. This, Zhuang determined, damaged the SHZSE: the equivalent 
Shanghai settlement company was fully owned by the SHGSE, operated under
346 Huang (1999c), 186.
347 Interview-43, Shenzhen, 2001.
348 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
349 Interview-30, Shenzhen, 2000. See also Huang (1999c), 200.
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its leadership and provided cheaper services.350 Zhuang brought the SSRASC 
under the control of his office and restructured it into, in effect, a department of 
the exchange. The result was that the SHZSE could roll out a national account 
card system and lower registration fees for listing companies during 1996. Third, 
Zhuang attempted to fulfil his ‘work policy direction’ by promoting ‘market 
service’ (shichang fuwu). In January 1996, the SHZSE set up a market service 
group (MSG) and began sending teams out into China.351 The SHZSAO and 
SHZSE jointly established a market service small group which co-ordinated their 
work. Market service is a term used to describe a wide range of activities used 
to attract listings and securities companies to the exchange. At its most mundane 
the MSG provided information, including hotline assistance, about 
administrative procedures. The teams also took on a public relations role. On 18th 
May 1996, the SHZSE held a ‘Shenzhen Securities Market Service Week’ in 
Beijing, explaining the listing policies and services the exchange could offer. 
Between May and November 1996, Shenzhen MSG teams held similar meetings 
in twenty-two provinces.353 They also visited companies that had applied to the 
CSRC to make public issues, seeking to persuade them of the advantages of a 
listing in Shenzhen. In addition, ‘market service’ extended to entertaining the 
senior management of prospective listees on their visits to Shenzhen. Before 
Zhuang’s move, both exchanges had been far more passive in their approach to 
listing companies. Zhuang also promoted changes in fees, trading facilities and 
technology.354 The listing fee was reduced in October 1995 from Rmb50,000 to 
Rmb30,000 for both A- and B-shares, while administration fees were also 
reduced.355 The results of these policies were impressive. In 1995, the SHZSE 
opened 500,000 new trading accounts, over half of them in the fourth quarter. 
Daily trading volume at the SHZSE increased dramatically from Rmb382m in 
1995 to Rmb4.9 billion in 1996.
Zhuang’s developmental policies soon brought him into conflict with the CSRC 
leadership. The SHZSE did undertake a number of measures (including a
350 Interview-53, Shenzhen, 2001.
351 Xiao (2000a), 45
352 ZXJ (1997), 274; Huang (1999d), 195.
353 Hu (1999a), 229; ZXJ (1997), 187-202.
354 Hu (1999a), fii. 1.
355 Ibid., 231; SZB (1995j).
137
crackdown on credit trading) that supported CSRC policy.357 However, there 
were a range of issues that caused tension: volatility of stock prices, listings and 
punishment for illegal behaviour. First, Zhuang defended price volatility as a 
natural phenomenon of a market; the CSRC leadership demanded intervention 
during 1994-95 to moderate it: Zhuang resisted. Second, Zhuang aimed to 
maximise listings and competed aggressively with the SHGSE for them. The 
case of Changchun’s Number One Automobile, one of China’s major car 
manufacturers, was representative of the problems this caused. The CSRC aimed 
for the company to list in Shanghai, but the SHZSE persuaded the firm’s 
management to list in Shenzhen much to the CSRC’s (and the SHGSE’s) 
frustration. It is unclear what inducements were proffered. For its part, the 
SHGSE ‘persuaded’ Guangdong Meiyan to list in Shanghai. An interviewee 
estimated that each exchange had successfully mounted such operations for at 
least 20 companies.358 Third, Zhuang’s team attempted to minimise the 
punishments meted out to member companies and listed firms, while the CSRC 
pushed for more severe fines. From 9th May 1995, the CSRC, SHZSAO and 
SHZSE began to organise quarterly ‘Examination and Investigation Work 
Consultation Meetings’ to discuss these differences. However, these co- 
ordinatory meetings were an ineffective way for the CSRC to implement its 
preferred policies.
The local institutional complex and equity development in Shenzhen, 1996-97
Whereas most of the impetus for equity development during 1995 came from, 
and was implemented by, the leadership of the SHZSE, in spring 1996 the 
Shenzhen municipal leadership became involved, at least publicly, just at the 
same time as the zhongyang leadership was revising its policy position vis-a-vis 
the stock market, as chapter eight explains. The Shenzhen government initially 
strained at the limits of its policy competence, pushing for foreign entry into the 
market, an area that the central government effectively guarded for itself. 
However, the Shenzhen leadership quickly learnt to exploit the policy-making 
tools they did have at their disposal, including industrial, fiscal and bank-lending
356 ZXJ (1997), 191-202.
357 Huang (1999c), 200.
358 Interview-43, Shenzhen, 2001.
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policy, to nurture ‘its’ stock market. Their ability to do this so effectively lay in 
their administrative control of a network ofyw-level bureaux, including the SAO, 
the PBoC, SPC and MoF. Local institutional capture delivered spectacular 
results.
By early 1996, macroeconomic conditions were improving. In April the PBoC 
ended its interest rate subsidy on bank deposits and began lowering interest 
rates.360 Based on a new consensus within the zhongyang, the CSRC leadership 
signalled its ambition to quicken development of the stock market to support 
SOE reform. However, the central government leadership was to be taken by 
surprise by the ferocity and efficacy with which two localities hijacked this new 
agenda. In March 1996, Li Youwei, Shenzhen party secretary, announced that 
the municipal government was considering expanding the B-share market and 
establishing one or two Sino-foreign funds. Both ideas had appeared 
previously on the municipal white paper and the Shenzhen government applied 
to the State Council for permission to implement them. Neither initiative 
received SCSC, CSRC or any form of central government approval. However, in 
April 1996, after a special work meeting of the SHZSAO, led by Li Zibin, 
Shenzhen mayor, the government announced a raft of ten less radical 
developmental policies, most of which fell within the competence of local 
government. The most important of the policies were:
1. Loans. The Shenzhen MoF would provide Rmb500m in loans to listed 
companies. Apparently in addition to this, on 25th May 1996 the Shenzhen 
TIC announced that it would raise several million renminbi and provide listed 
companies with low interest rate loans. In the second half of 1996, the 
government chose 20 companies to receive preferential loans.
2. Consultation. The formation of a Stock Market Development Small Group to 
be managed by the Shenzhen SLA was announced. This provided a permanent
359 Dong (1997), 171.
360 Hu (1999a), 227; Zou (1997), 73.
361 Dong (1997), 181; Li (1997b),40; SZB (1996p); Li (1996), 11.
362 Xinhua (1996b).
363 It is unclear if these companies received these loans; two interviewees claimed to have no 
knowledge of this, Interview-52, Shenzhen, 2001; Hu (1999a), 231.
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go-between for senior actors within securities companies and the municipal 
government.
3. B-share market promotion. A B-share Market Promotion Group was formed 
in June 1996 to operate under the SHZSE and SHZSAO. It aimed, at the very 
least, to resolve problems in settlement and operations and, at most, to 
expand the market and introduce convertible B-share bonds.364
4. Support local securities companies.365 Up until 1996, the Shanghai leadership 
had been more supportive than Shenzhen in boosting its securities 
companies’ registered capital and thus allowing them to underwrite larger 
IPOs. In July 1996, the Shenzhen government supported the expansion of 
Shenzhen International Trust and Investment Securities (SITIS).366 In 
September 1996, the Shenzhen Investment Management Company, a 
government investment vehicle, took a 30% stake in SITIS. The managing 
director of SITIS, Hu Guanjin, was concurrently the deputy director of the 
SHZSAO.367
5. Credit financing. The government announced its aim to promote bank 
financing (rongzi) for securities companies, a practice banned by the CSRC 
and PBoC.368
6. Internationalisation. Dual listings with the HKSE were proposed as well as 
and supportive policies for ‘1997 concept shares’, companies that would, it 
was claimed, benefit from Hong Kong’s return to the Mainland’s sovereign 
control.369
7. Convertible bond issues. In May 1996, Shenzhen-listed Guangdong Meidi 
and Dalian Refrigerator announced plans to issue convertible bonds (and 
were criticised by the CSRC for announcing their plans before the regulator 
had issued rules on the subject).370
On 8th July 1996, the SHZSAO issued a ‘second’ raft of developmental policies.
However, most of these simply repeated those announced earlier. Among the few
364 SZB (1996n).
365 Chan (1995c).
366 Zheng (1993), 55-56.
367 ZTS (1993).
368 Dong (1997), 186-187.
369 Chan (1996f).
370 Chan Ibid.
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original ideas was the establishment of a Treasury Bond Development Small 
Group, established in October 1996, and financial provisioning for loss-making 
listed companies.371 In September 1996, Li Zibin announced more plans to 
increase co-operation with the HKSE, including cross-listings, joint membership, 
information exchange and computer links.372 That was not all; in June 1996, the 
Shenzhen authorities unilaterally relaxed controls on the opening of B-share 
accounts. Previously limited to foreign passport holders, thousands of nationals 
with hard currency were now allowed to buy into the B-share market. The CSRC 
attempted to crackdown on this unauthorised move in July 1996, but Shenzhen 
securities companies ignored its newspaper notices.373
As Figure 40 shows, by year end 1996, the SHZSE had a market capitalisation of 
Rmbl45.8 billion, surpassing the Rmbl40.7 billion capitalisation of the SHGSE. 
Investors were enthralled by the Shenzhen leadership’s equity developmentalism. 
In the first half of 1996, the SHZSE opened 1.05m new trading accounts for 
investors. The daily average value of trading for this period was four times that 
of the same period in 1995 as Figure 41 shows.374 During 1995, Shanghai hosted 
75% of China’s trading volume and 65% of all listed companies. However, 
during 1996 the SHZSE hosted 58% of national trading volume, and then 56% in 
1997 (Figure 42).375 Average P/E ratios increased through 1996, from nine times 
earnings in January to 35 in December, signalling the development of huge 
demand.376
371 SZB (1996m).
372 Former SHZSE president Xia Bin had already lobbied the CSRC for permission to dual list 
enterprises trading on other Asian exchanges, but had been turned down, Caijing (2000b), 77; Wu 
(1997).
373 Peng (1996a).
374 Wong (1993).
375 Zhang (1998), 84.
376 SHZSE (1996).
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Figure 40. Market capitalisation of the Shenzhen and Shanghai exchanges,
1993-97
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Shanghai 42.4 58.7 58.7 140.7 251.3
Shenzhen 43.8 38.2 35.1 145.8 269.1
Rmb billion
CSRC (1998), 32-34.
Figure 41. Daily average trading volume in all securities at the SHZSE,
1991-2000
Trading volume
1991 11.7
1992 168.9
1993 496.8
1994 949.4
1995 382.4
1996 4,946.3
1997 6,978.9
1998 4,535.8
1999 6,005.8
2000 12,323.3
Rmb m
SHZSE (2001), 58.
Figure 42. Trading volumes in all securities at the Shanghai and Shenzhen
exchanges, 1992-98
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Shanghai 24.7 238.0 573.5 310.3 911.5 1,376.3 1,238.6
Shenzhen 43.4 128.7 239.3 93.3 1,221.7 1,695,9 1,115.8
Rmb billion
CSRC (1999a), 32-33.
Figure 43. SHZSE profit after taxes, 1991-99
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Net profits 0.46 23.37 69.6 133.3 61.3 565.0 891.8 147.6 463.1
Rmb m
Source: SHZSE annual reports, 1991-99
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Zhuang’s developmental drive was also profitable for the SHZSE itself. Figure 
43 shows the exchange’s annual net profits during 1991-99, profits that rose to 
Rmb565m in 1996, and peaked at Rmb892m the following year. To drive home 
the accomplishment, in September 1996 Zhuang Xinyi announced that the 
SHZSE was now China’s national stock exchange.377 Daily trading volume at the 
SHZSE was averaging about Rmb300m to only Rmb 150m at the SHGSE at the 
time.378 The first battle of the war of the exchanges had been won decisively by 
Shenzhen.
Equity developmentalism in Shanghai, 1995-97
Initial attempts by the Shanghai leadership to respond to a resurgent SHZSE in 
late 1995 were unsuccessful. They improved during 1996, but their strategy 
remained largely derivative of, and not as effective as, that of Shenzhen’s 
leaders. Part of the reason of the weakness of Shanghai’s response was that 
municipal leaders and the SHGSE management shied away from institutional 
reorganisation. In addition, after the 1995 Treasury bond crisis, the SHGSE 
leadership was constrained by intense scrutiny from the CSRC and other parts of 
central government and Party organs. To add to their problems, Yang Xianghai, 
the new SHGSE president lacked experience in finance and was even said, by 
some of his former employees, simply not ‘to understand stock markets’.379
At a meeting on 24th November 1995, Yang argued that ‘development and 
standardisation, service and regulation’ were the SHGSE’s priorities. The syntax
^ O A
implied a renewed emphasis on the former of each of the two pairs. In the 
same month, municipal leaders allegedly instructed local securities companies to 
buy into the share market on the understanding that supervision of trading would 
be relaxed to support these moves. However, this had little impact as the 
Shanghai index continued to slide from 760 on 25th October 1995 to 516 on 22nd
'lQ 'J
January 1996. The SHGSE began its own market service tour of the provinces
377 Zhang (1998), 84.
378 Xiao (2000b) 58.
379 Interview-02, Shanghai, 1999.
380 Yang (1995b).
381 Interview-08, Shanghai, 2000.
382 Xiao (2000b), 61-62.
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in March 1996, beginning in Shenyang, Liaoning province, seeking opinions 
from its members and publicising its services to potential listees. Back in 
Shanghai in April 1996 the SHGSAO and SHGSE began holding meetings to 
seek industry opinion. On 20th and 21st April 1996, the SHGSE held its fifth 
annual general meeting at which the leadership presented its new five-year 
plan.384 Yang announced his intention to increase the speed of listings, introduce 
convertible bonds, create a new index, promote the entry of insurance funds into 
the market and expand Shanghai’s Treasury bond market. It was at this AGM 
that CSRC deputy chairman Li Jiange signalled the central government’s 
willingness to expand share issuance. Trading volume at the SHGSE rose 
dramatically after April. In March 1996, daily volume averaged around 
Rmb400m; in the last week of April it regularly exceeded Rmb4 billion, and 
settling at around Rmb 1.5-2 billion during May.
Soon after the AGM, the SHGSE lowered its membership fee and administrative 
charges.387 Local media was enlisted in the promotional efforts, mixing news 
stories with flagrant publicity. On 21st May 1996, for instance, the Shanghai 
Securities News, a newspaper jointly owned by the SHGSE and the Shanghai 
bureau of Xinhua published, on its front-page, P/E ratios reportedly showing the 
SHGSE to be a cheaper place to invest than the SHZSE. Shenzhen’s Securities 
Times responded the following day with an editorial explaining that the 
discrepancy in P/Es was due to the smaller volume of tradable shares at the 
SHZSE, a fact which did not affect their relative value.388 Each cities’ media 
continued to proclaim the achievements and advantages of their own exchanges. 
At a special securities companies/government consultation meeting held on 6 
June 1996, the Shanghai deputy mayor responsible for finance and the SHGSMC 
chairman, Hua Jianming, promised additional support to securities companies. 
Industry representatives suggested that access to bank loans would be beneficial 
to their businesses. No official announcement was ever made of any initiative 
taken on the basis of this suggestion, although later events suggest that certain
383 SZB (1996b); SZB (1996o).
384 SCMP (1996c); SCMP (1996f).
385 SCMP (1996e).
386 Xiao (2000b), 17, 65-66.
387 Peng (1996b).
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municipal officials, in contravention of the Commercial Bank Law and State
Council regulations, responded positively to the request.389 On 16th June 1996,
the SHGSMC met to determine its zhidao fangzhen (guiding policy direction).
Daily trading volume by this time was regularly exceeding Rmb6 billion at the
SHGSE and Rmb4 billion at the SHZSE.390 Official reports of the meeting state
that members discussed the conclusions of the SCSC’s sixth meeting as well as
0^1the recent conservative fangzhen. However, other reports suggest that the
discussion soon turned to the question of nurturing local securities companies, 
supporting listed companies and invigorating the Shanghai share market.392 On 
20th August 1996, the municipal government announced that all listed companies 
were to come under the auspices of the Shanghai modem enterprise system 
experiment, and would thus enjoy preferential treatment, including:
□ Participation in government-sponsored investment projects.
□ Exemptions or help in paying medical and old-age insurance for employees.
□ Assistance in raising further capital from the capital markets via rights and 
secondary offerings.
□ Preferential loans from Shanghai’s banks.
□ Assistance in asset re-organisation and M&A from the SHGSAO and local 
banks.
□ Market research support from government institutes.
One month later, on 20th September 1996, Han Zheng, director of the SHGSAO 
and head of the Shanghai SPC, announced what was billed as a ‘second’ wave of 
preferential policies.393 Much of these built upon, detailed or simply repeated 
previously announced policies. They included:394
□ A lowering of the tax rate for listed companies from the standard material 
rate of 33% to 15%.
388 Hu (1999a), 225, 233; CER (1997b), 14.
389 Interview-25, Shanghai, 2000.
390 Xiao (2000b), 67.
391 SZB (1996k).
392 SZB (1996i); Hu (1999a), 233; Dong (1997), 188.
393 Chan (1995f).
394 SZB (1996j); Hu (1999a), 234; Xiao (2000a), 47
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□ Subsidised government loans to ‘pillar’, infrastructural and ‘high-quality’ 
listed companies.
□ Local banks to provide preferential financial services, including loans, to 
listed companies.
□ Asset-injections for ‘high-quality’ superior listed companies.
□ Promotion of asset reorganisation and M&A.
However, these announcements were more impressive on paper than in 
substance. They appear to have been largely a propaganda exercise to create the 
impression that Shanghai could match Shenzhen in preferential policies. For 
example, the ‘new’ tax band of 15% for Shanghai-listed companies was simply a 
continuation of a policy introduced in 1992.395 In late 1995, the MoF suggested 
raising corporate tax rates for listed companies to 33%, but the Shanghai 
leadership lobbied hard for it to be retained at 15% and won.396 In terms of bank 
loans, Shenzhen’s listed companies did not have the history of debt of 
Shanghai’s, an older industrial centre. Shenzhen banks could therefore afford to
OQ7
extend more loans, which they started to do in May 1995. In Shanghai most 
listed companies had already been extended large bank loans and were already 
experiencing problems meeting their interest payments. Some companies 
enlarged their loans after the announcement but these were limited in number and
i .L
in size. On 27 September, Liaoning Yuanyang Fishing Industries received a 
five-month Rmb50m loan from the Pudong Development Bank. It was the first
-3QO
non-Shanghai listed enterprise to receive such a loan. Three SHGSE-listed 
Shanghai companies had previously signed subsidised loan agreements: 
Lansheng, Lujian, and Shangcai.399 Apart from these companies, however, there 
is no evidence of any other SHGSE-listed companies, from the city or outside, 
receiving preferential loans based on Han’s announcement.
395 In 1994, tax reform removed localities’ rights to authorise preferential tax rates. The standard 
national corporate tax rate is 33%. SOEs and collective enterprises based in the Shenzhen SEZ 
enjoyed a preferential tax rate of 12%.
39<r Peng (1996f).
397 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
398 Dong (1997), 189
399 SZB (1996j).
146
On 3rd October 1996, the SHGSE introduced more concrete measures to attract 
traders, including lower fees.400 The SHGSE also announced that it would 
introduce ‘absent’ trading (wuxing chuli baopan jiaoyi). Up until that time, all 
orders had had to be phoned into the SHGSE to a securities company’s 
representative, who then inputted the order into the SHGSE’s trading system. 
Because of this the SHGSE’s system was limited to processing 2,000 orders 
(baopan) per day. The SHZSE ‘absent’ trading system in contrast allowed 
100,000 orders to be processed a day since orders could be communicated 
directly by computers at securities companies directly to the SHZSE’s trading 
system 401 By October 1996, funds were flooding in to both exchanges.402 Daily 
trading volume at the SHZSE was regularly exceeding Rmb 13 billion, Rmb9 
billion at the SHGSE.403 By 5th December 1996 the total daily turnover of shares 
in China was Rmb35 billion, more than three times the volume recorded at the 
HKSE on a strong trading day. This was especially impressive as China’s market 
capitalisation was only a tenth of that of the HKSE.404 Trading in the B-share 
market was particularly strong; the Shenzhen B-share index rose 180% from 
mid-November to mid-December 1996, with the Shanghai index following it up 
on the expectation of an imminent merger of the A and B-share markets.405 On 
20th November 1996, the SHZSE hit a record daily volume of Rmb 18.9 billion 
and trading at the SHGSE hit a record Rmb 19.2 billion on 3rd December.
Commercial bank and securities companies ’ repo borrowing
In late 1996 and early 1997, members of the Shanghai leadership allegedly 
instructed local banks to make large loans to local securities companies via the 
repo market. This would have contravened the Commercial Bank Law that 
banned banks from securities business. Although this has never been proven or 
officially acknowledged, the evidence is highly suggestive. That commercial 
banks in Shanghai could be so enlisted in their political leaders’ developmental 
ambitions illustrates the extent of their capture and the flimsiness of the PBoC 
and CSRC leaderships’ grip on their local bureaux.
400 SZB (19961); Xiao (2000b).
401 Hu (1999a), 235.
402 Chan (1996a); Chan (1996c).
403 Xiao (2000b), 71.
404 Zou (1997), 73.
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To take full advantage of the bull market, cash-strapped securities companies and 
TICs needed access to more funds. Regulations prevented them from borrowing 
directly from commercial banks. Although some banks made direct loans to 
securities companies in contravention of this rule, the practice was fairly easy to 
spot by the central PBoC.406 One solution was to utilise the market in Treasury 
bond repurchase contracts, the repo market that was hosted by the exchanges and 
STCs. By transferring funds on a short term basis, the repo market is meant to 
serve the short-term liquidity needs of financial institutions. However, during 
this period it was used to provide long-term loans for the express purpose of 
share trading. Securities companies ‘lent’ their Treasury bonds to local banks 
through repo agreements and received loans in return.407 Informal agreements 
allowed short-term contracts to be regularly renewed. Many of the contracts were 
faked or simply signed by the two parties for formal purposes, the bonds never 
actually being transferred to the banks or even deposited at the stock 
exchange.408 The practice occurred throughout the country; it was common at the 
STCs and was most concentrated at the SHGSE, the country’s largest bond 
market. During late 1996 and 1997 more than Rmb8 billion of savings deposits 
were transferred from banks to local securities companies and TICs via this 
market.409 Chinese media reported that securities companies borrowed Rmb480m 
on the market in March 1997 alone.410 Huayin Trust and Investment Company, 
for example, used Rmb2.2 billion in bank funds to trade shares.411 One source 
estimates that in the first half of 1997 roughly 25% of the trading capital of 
securities companies was supplied by banks via repo agreements. From October 
1996 the flow of bank funds into the market was the main engine behind rising 
share prices.
405 SCMP (1996a).
406 Interview-59, Shenzhen, 2001.
407 SZB (1997k).
408 Interview-25, Shanghai, 2000.
409 The US$1 billion figure widely quoted in media sources probably understates the extent of 
lending. Analysis o f the contraction in the repo market after the mid-1997 crackdown suggests it 
could have been up to six times this amount, IHT (1997c); IHT (1997d); Xinhua (1997a).
410 SZB (1997b).
411 CER (1997b), 13.
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Other financial institutions entered the share market too. Banks entered into 
informal agreements with their SOE customers who would use bank loans to 
speculate in shares, with a proportion of the profits being remitted back to the 
bank. Listed companies, many cash-rich with IPO revenues, speculated in shares, 
often their own. Insurance companies were also involved trading securities.412 
There are also unconfirmed reports that the SHGSE leadership established an in- 
house fund to speculate in and manipulate shares. It is alleged that the SHGSE 
sold off securities owned by Liaoning Guofa, one of the institutions involved in 
the February 1995 327 scandal, whose accounts had been frozen in May 1995. 
The proceeds, over Rmbl billion, were then allegedly used to trade securities. 
Speculation and illegal trading practices were rife. Securities companies in 
Shanghai used the funds to manipulate the share of a small number of stocks: 
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development, Shanghai 
Petrochemicals and Shenzhen Nanyou Property Development. Shenyin Wanguo 
Securities, for example, bought 3m shares in Lujiazui in September 1996, some 
80% of the company’s tradable shares, sold the majority in mid-October, and 
then bought into the stock again in late October, making a profit of some 
Rmb23.4m.413 The strategy was simple; manipulate prices to dizzy heights, 
encourage small investors to buy in, and then dump the stock. Figure 44, Figure 
45 and Figure 46 show the effect of these various policies on trading volume at 
the SHGSE and SHZSE. Volume rose spectacularly during 1996 at both 
exchanges, SHGSE peaking at Rmb400 billion in October, SHZSE at Rmb309 
billion in November.
412 Interview-17, Shanghai, 2000.
413 Cao (2000), 238-239.
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Figure 44. A-share and total trading turnover at the SHGSE, 1996
January February March April May June July August September October November December
A-share 10.0 4.5 13.9 44.1 43.8 89.3 101.0 62.6 74.4 144.2 106.1 199.2
turnover
Total turnover 47.0 27.3 57.8 125.5 142.2 202.2 337.4 378.9 295.6 400.0 325.2 427.0
Rmb billion
Note: total turnover includes A-shares, B-shares, Treasury bonds (spot and repos), funds, corporate bonds, warrants and rights. 
CSRC (1997), 26-27.
Figure 45. A-share and total trading volume at the SHZSE, 1996
January February March April May June July August September October November December
A-share turnover 2.1 1.3 5.5 31.5 51.9 74.8 139.8 93.4 101.2 239.0 264.7 197.9
Total turnover 4.8 2.2 8.8 41.3 69.6 90.6 157.8 104.9 111.0 260.3 309.0 234.7
Rmb billion
Note: total turnover includes A-shares, B-shares, Treasury bonds (spot and repos), funds, corporate bonds, warrants and rights. 
CSRC (1997), 34-35.
Figure 46. Total trading volumes at the SHGSE and SHZSE, January to October 1997
January February March April May June July August September October
SHGSE trading volume 59 67 196 250 207 133 104 84 78 68
SHZSE trading volume 117 78 219 252 241 170 132 95 78 134
Rmb billion
China (1999), 35.
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The zhongyang responds: from  fire-fighting to institutional change
Local leaders’ equity developmentalism was especially frustrating for the 
zhongyang leadership because of their new ambition to enlist the share market in 
support of SOE reform. While the secondary market was so volatile, 
manipulation so extensive, the risks of a market crash so high, the CSRC’s 
regulatory abilities so limited and local administrative influence so far-reaching, 
their programme could not be effectively rolled out. Institutional capture by local 
leaders over the regulatory bureaux and stock exchanges meant that the usual 
means for a regulator to intervene and enforce good practice, continual and close 
monitoring of trading activities, supervision of securities companies’ accounts, 
punishments for illegal practices, et al., were unavailable to the CSRC. The 
zhongyang leadership was therefore forced into taking ad hoc, and blunt, 
administrative actions to cool the market; newspaper editorials, limits on daily 
share price movements and large increases in the issuance quota. This fire 
fighting had an immediate and dramatic effect, but it did not last. Between April 
and May 1997, the zhongyang leadership, now informed of large and illegal fund 
movements from commercial banks into the market, introduced a further set of 
measures.
On 16th December 1996, a Renmin Ribao front-page special editorial entitled A 
correct understanding o f the current stock market (Zhenque renshi dangqian 
gupiao shichang) punctured the share bubble.414 Rumours named Vice Premier 
Zhu Rongji as the editor of the piece which identified ‘very abnormal and 
irrational trading’ conditions in the market and which made explicit comparisons 
with the American stock market just before its 1929 crash.415 It appears that the 
CSRC and the senior zhongyang leadership (including Zhu) suspected that the 
index hike in the second half of 1996 was the product of massive manipulation 
by several large securities companies and SOEs. According to industry sources, 
the editorial was an attempt to undercut this strategy and pre-empt the sell-off 
that would have occurred when the FIIs exited.416 While the editorial contained
414 RR (1996).
415 Xiao (2000b), 73.
416 Interview, Shanghai, February 2000
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rhetoric about the eight-word fangzhen and the SAOs’ role in supervision, its 
main impact lay in the new administrative measures it introduced:417
□ A new issuance quota of Rmb 10 billion was announced for 1996, twice the 
1995 quota. This quota would extend beyond year’s end and portended a 
massive increase in the supply of equity designed to exceed demand and 
bring prices down 418
□ The introduction of a 10% daily price limit for shares 419
□ A national investigation into share purchases by FIIs and SOEs by the CSRC, 
PBoC and State Audit Bureau.420
□ Public naming and shaming of listed companies using IPO revenues to 
speculate in shares.
□ Suspension of the licences of securities companies whose employees were 
caught engaging in illegal trading practices.
It also appears that a readjustment of the stamp tax sharing ratios was determined 
at this time. The 50:50 Centre-Local split was changed to 80:20, further reducing 
local leaders incentive for local developmentalism. The SHGSE A- and B-share 
indexes each dropped 10% on the day of the editorial and continued to fall in the 
days following. From a peak of 1,247.7 on 9th December, the SHGSE index 
slumped to 865.6 on 24th December and then continued to float around 950 
during January 1997.421 Trading volume dropped dramatically too, as Figure 46
tlishowed. On the 18 December, the CSRC published a second editorial under the 
pseudonym of Zhang Xinmin in the Renmin Ribao claiming to be satisfied
AO 0because the indexes had now ‘adjusted to reasonable levels’. But with 
confidence damaged, reports of social disturbances in central and western China 
triggered by small investors’ losses, and substantial criticism within the industry 
of the heavy-handed intervention, the government attempted to reassure investors 
about its basic policy line 423 38 firms waiting to issue H-shares in Hong Kong
417 Li (1997b), 41.
418 SZB (1996d); SCMP (1996a). On the share quota, see chapter nine.
419 Xiao (2000a), 57; Zhang (1998), 184.
420 Peng (1996g).
421 Xiao (2000b), 73-74.
422 SZB (1996c); Peng (1996e); SCMP (1996j).
423 Lam (1996a); SZB (1996s).
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were allowed to proceed, signalling the zhongyang's continued positive attitude 
to the share market. However, the rhetoric of zhongyang leaders remained 
conservative throughout 1997. Minimising risk became the new theme around 
which they all spoke. In January, Zhu Rongji ordered financial risk to be 
minimised at the National Finance Work Meeting.424 At the plenary NPC session 
in March 1997, Premier Li Peng ordered the PBoC and other state organs to 
‘sternly check and solve the illegal operations of financial organisations, ensure 
stability, standardise securities markets and increase risk awareness’ 425 The 
SCSC deputy chairman, Zhou Zhenqing, repeated calls for standardisation 
(guifanhua) in April.426 The Renmin Ribao and financial press continued carrying 
editorials that drove the theme home. 1997, they announced, was ‘risk prevention 
year’.427
Xinhua first announced an investigation into illegal bank funding of securities 
companies on 12th June 1997 428 Investigations had begun in November 1996 
when the National Audit Office discovered that a number of large SOEs were 
using bank loans for share speculation on a massive scale while CSRC 
supervisory personnel newly stationed at the two stock exchanges reported 
abnormal price and fund movements. The State Council organised two 
investigation groups. The first, led by the PBoC, was sent to Shanghai, the 
second, led by the CSRC, went to Shenzhen. An interviewee explained that this 
division in work was because the State Council leadership believed that the two 
agencies could not work effectively together 429 The CSRC initially suspected 
securities companies were diverting funds from customer accounts.430 Its 
investigators applied for and received State Council authority to enable them 
unrestricted access to bank account information. They did discover that customer 
funds were being diverted into proprietary trading, but also that securities 
companies were borrowing bank funds via the repo market on a huge scale.
424 Dong (1997), 194, 231-232.
425 SZB (1997g); Dong (1997), 194.
426 ZXJ (1997), 134-137.
427 SZB (1997f).
428 SZB (19971); RR (1997).
429 Interview-08, Shanghai, 2000.
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The CSRC team in Shenzhen was successful first: by February 1997 they had 
uncovered large-scale share price manipulation by Huatian Hotel and Shenzhen 
Motorways Ltd., two Shenzhen-listed SOEs.431 The team apparently failed to 
discover any evidence in Shenzhen of bank lending to securities companies; 
some interviewees claimed that this was because none had occurred; others 
suspected that it had simply been well hidden 432 In Shanghai by May, evidence 
of bank lending to securities companies had been obtained.
While the market remained subdued during January, by February trading activity 
was again intense, and the indexes were again rising rapidly. New daily trading 
records were set in May 1997, with Rmb21.6 billion recorded at the SHZSE on 
7th May, and Rmb 16.0 billion at the SHGSE on 12th May.433 Figure 46 shows the 
monthly trading volume growing again in April. Stamp tax revenues burgeoned. 
In April 1997, total revenues totalled Rmb2.54 billion, 55 times that of April
1996. The Shanghai and Shenzhen governments would together have taken 20%, 
some Rmb500m.434 Since their first wave of fire-fighting having only 
temporarily dampened the flames, and with most of the details of the 
PBoC/CSRC investigations known, zhongyang leaders resorted to another round 
of intervention between April and July 1997. The CSRC announced a new 
issuance quota of Rmb30 billion, three times that announced in December 
1996435 The SCSC ordered the stamp tax increased to 0.5% (from 0.3%), 
making trading more expensive and it also banned SOEs and listed firms from 
trading shares, formally removing an important source of speculation.436 In April
1997, SHZSE president Zhuang Xinyi and SHGSE president Yang Xianghai 
were informed that they would be replaced.437 Zhou Daojiong was replaced at the 
head of the CSRC by SCSC chairman Zhou Zhenqing.438 Then, in May 1997, the 
central government moved to further reduce the incentives for municipal
430 A suspicion bolstered by the discovery of extensive misuse of customer funds for proprietary 
trading in October 1996, SZB (1996r); Interview-19, Beijing, 2000.
431 Interview-08, Shanghai, 2000; Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
432 Interviews-55, 58, 59, Shenzhen 2001.
433 Xiao (2000b), 78.
434 SZB (1997m).
435 SZB (1997a).
436 Xiao (2000a), 58; IHT (1997a).
437 CER (1997c).
438 SCMP (1996b); SZB (1997h).
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governments to massage share-trading volume, lowering the share of stamp tax 
that they received to 12%. Trading calmed, and the indexes dropped from their 
peaks.
In June 1997, the State Council announced a further set of measures, based on 
the results of the investigations. The presidents of Shenyin Wanguo, Haitong, 
Guangfa and China Everbright securities companies were dismissed and their 
companies each fined Rmb5m and banned from proprietary trading for one 
year.439 The chairman of the Shanghai ICBC, the main bank involved in 
extending financing, Shen Roulei, was dismissed. The SHZDB was also 
‘severely punished’. It had reportedly used Rmb311m of its own funds to 
speculate in shares between March 1996 and April 1997, making Rmb90.3m in 
profit. The SHZDB president, He Yun, was dismissed in July 1997. 440 Several 
branches of the Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of China were also fined 
and forced to undergo ‘compulsory reorganisations’.441 By the end of June 1997, 
eight other senior financial executives had been dismissed, and at least six banks 
and securities companies had been fined. However, it is hard to credit that they 
had operated entirely upon their own initiative: the scale of the lending strongly 
suggested that senior leaders within the municipal governments had directed the 
lending.442 On 6th June 1997 the PBoC banned commercial banks from the 
Treasury bond spot and repo markets on the stock exchanges and STCs, a move 
designed to prevent bank funds leaking into shares.443 Commercial banks had an 
estimated Rmb 12 billion worth of funds in their Treasury bond trading accounts 
at the two exchanges.444 The combined total of bond trading on the stock 
exchanges and on the new inter-bank bond market in June 1997 was Rmb 102 
billion, a 53% decrease on the figure for the previous month 445
439 Pan (1999), 168-169; Interview-36, Shanghai, 2000.
440 CER (1997a).
441 CER (1997b), 13.
442 After details of SHGSE complicity in manipulation became known, Shanghai deputy mayor 
Hua Jianming is alleged to have flown to Beijing to personally intercede with the senior 
leadership on the behalf of Yang Xianghai. Yang later became president of a SHGSE-listed 
conglomerate. Hua Jianming, a protege of Jiang Zemin, moved to Beijing shortly afterwards, 
becoming the deputy chairman of the FELG and director of its administrative office, Interview- 
18, Shanghai, 2000.
443 SZB (1997e); SZB (19971); SZB (1997i).
444 Interview-17, Shanghai, 2000; Xiao (2000c), 220; Jin (1999), 118.
445 SZB (1997d).
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Initial attempts at central capture o f local institutions
In March 1996, apparently without the full backing of the State Council, the 
CSRC had attempted to assert its jurisdiction over some 25 SAOs by issuing a 
‘decision’.446 However, this did little to alter the allegiance of the SAOs’ 
directors to their SMCs (which continued to enjoy guanli authority over them), 
failed to produce any improvement in market regulation, and did nothing to 
forestall the equity developmentalism examined above. CSRC chairman Zhou 
Daojiong had first publicly suggested such a move in January 1995, and probably 
earlier privately, but local government leaders had successfully resisted 
encroachment on their regulatory powers. The decision laid out SAO duties and 
delegated the CSRC’s own authority to regulate securities matters to them. SAOs 
were authorised to carry out routine supervision of securities and futures 
companies, to ensure that local listed companies obeyed regulations and to 
investigate breaches of regulations, and were given powers to resolve minor 
administrative problems (serious cases had to be reported to the CSRC). SAOs 
were also instructed to make regular reports to the CSRC.447 In Shanghai, the 
decision brought only two changes to the day-to-day functioning of the 
SHGSAO. First, CSRC head office took charge of the investigation of cases 
involving alleged securities fraud of more than Rmb5m. Previously, cases had 
not even been formally investigated but rather ‘resolved’ through informal 
conciliation and administrative means.448 Second, the CSRC gained some 
authority in the issuance process governing B-shares.449 Yet even this was an old 
policy that had taken at least a year to implement: as early as the beginning of
1995 the CSRC had announced a US$1 billion quota for B-shares, US$800m of 
which was to go to non-Shanghai/Shenzhen areas. However, it was not until
1996 that the CSRC was able to roll out this policy in practice 450
With these two exceptions, the 1996 decision made little difference to the 
activities of the SAOs and certainly did not disrupt the influence of the SMCs.
446 SZB (1996u); Chen (1997a), 745-747.
447 Huang (1999d), 97.
448 Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000.
449 Chan (1995a); SCMP (1996h).
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The decision was only issued by the CSRC, a vice-ministry ranking organ at the 
time, although the document attempted to instigate a major reorganisation of the 
administrative relations between central and local levels. As chapter two 
explained, provincial governments were thus under little obligation to attend to 
notices issued by the CSRC. The fact that such an important document was not 
issued in the name of the State Council suggests that consensus at this higher 
level was unattainable. In November 1996, the CSRC issued ‘implementing 
regulations’ to the decision.451 These raised the limit of punishments that SAOs 
could implement, devolved greater powers of investigation to them, and 
authorised them to do preliminary work on futures brokerages’ licence 
applications. However, this notice also had little effect, a result over which a 
CSRC interviewee expressed little anxiety. According to him, the leadership of 
the CSRC realised that the administrative take-over of the SAOs would require 
both time and ‘the need to demonstrate that the CSRC deserved to manage the 
SAOs’.452
Impetus for high level support for such fundamental institutional change soon 
came. The Shanghai and Shenzhen SAOs were implicated in the bank loans 
scandal, both through their negligent supervision of financial institutions and 
through their active support of equity developmentalism during 1996-97. The 
CSRC chairman, Zhou Zhenqing, then began planning the CSRC’s full take-over 
and integration of the SAOs in early August 1997 under the direction of the vice 
premier, Zhu Rongji. He was now apparently convinced of the deleterious effects 
of SMC/S AO regulation and increasingly sensitive to the dangers of the financial 
instability induced by the actions of local leaders.453
Concluding remarks
This chapter has shown how local political leaders captured institutions 
governing the secondary equity markets and then oriented them to support their 
own economic interests. It has also shown how effective they were in excluding 
central government bureaux from playing an effective role in equity market
451 Huang (1999d), 98.
452 Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
453 Interview-13, Beijing, 2000.
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regulation and policy making. The administrative controls that stretched down 
from the municipal SMCs into the SAOs, the stock exchanges, local banks, and 
other yw-level bureaux created an institutional network that allowed a range of 
developmental policies to be implemented, regulation to be minimised and 
intervention by central bureaux leaders to be made extremely difficult. Local 
leaders had effective control over financial assistance to listed companies 
(including both fiscal subsidies and bank loans), over the tax regime at the stock 
exchanges, and over the style of de facto market regulation. The result was that 
significant revenues were derived for local government from the stamp tax, 
profits on securities companies’ and SOEs’ trading activities. A permissive 
regulatory environment not only allowed rampant price manipulation to be 
overlooked: local authorities, at least in Shanghai, also appear to have been 
complicit in encouraging funds to enter the market illegally.
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6The Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges: from local leadership 
and self-regulation to ‘sons of the CSRC’
The stock exchange serves the construction o f a socialist economy.
Li Peng, Shanghai, 1991454
This chapter examines the institutional development of the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. As SROs, the exchange leaderships initially enjoyed 
significant powers: authorisation powers over listings, regulatory responsibilities 
in the secondary market, the ability to punish exchange members, and some 
autonomy in policy development. The chapter shows how exchange presidents, 
with the support of municipal leaders, successfully excluded the CSRC from 
involvement in regulation, and in a whole range of policy areas, in order to 
dictate the exchanges’ institutional development during 1990-97. The CSRC 
leadership attempted to institute mechanisms of oversight and control but, 
although they had some successes before 1997, their efforts generally failed. The 
reasons for this failure are explained. However, the chapter also demonstrates 
that with zhongyang backing, since August 1997 the CSRC has used a portfolio 
of institutional means to capture the two exchanges. Despite the fact that they 
have retained their formal status as SROs they are now, in practice, micro- 
managed by the regulator. Central capture has provided a number of goods: 
institutional coherence, more effective implementation of policy and better 
quality regulation. However, it has come at a cost, as the dynamism and 
innovation that characterised development at the exchanges before 1997 has been 
lost. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that as of 2000 the SHGSE and SHZSE 
were operating as ‘the trading departments of the CSRC’, or, as another industry 
joke has it, as ‘the sons of the CSRC’. The change in the governance of the 
exchanges is striking and it has had important consequences for the trajectory of 
market development.
454 Zou (1991).
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The chapter is divided into three sections. They examine, in chronological order, 
the different institutional arrangements through which the exchanges have 
developed. The first section examines the stock exchanges as SROs operating 
under the leadership of the PBoC and local leaders during 1990-92. The next 
section examines the period from 1993 to 1997, when the exchanges operated 
under the management of the two sub-principals, local and central government 
leaders. The February 1995 bond futures crisis is examined in detail since it 
reveals the shortcomings of the SHGSE’s self-regulatory practices and the 
weaknesses of this dual management arrangement. The third section examines 
the institutional capture of the exchanges by the CSRC after August 1997 and its 
consequences.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange, the PBoC and self-regulation, 1990-92
The SHGSE opened for business on 19th December 1990 in the Pujiang Hotel, 
just north of the Bund.455 The exchange was established on a non-profit 
membership basis, with the status of a shiye faren (legal person) organisation, 
not a government bureau. It had registered capital of Rmb 10m (supplied by the 
municipal government), 49 member seats and 29 members and initially listed 22 
bonds and eight company shares 456 After a transitional period in which shares 
traded on the city’s OTCs were transferred, after February 1991 all share 
certificates were registered at the exchange by its wholly owned clearing and 
settlement company 457 As leaders of an SRO the leaders of the SHGSE were 
empowered to:
□ Authorise the listing and delisting of shares.
□ Set the rules of exchange membership.
□ Supervise the disclosures of listed companies and members.
455 On the pre-1949 SHGSE, see Li (1998b), 25-26,78; Cao (2000), 5-11.
456 Liu (1997), 50; Yao (1998), 38-40, 70; Zheng (1994), 111.
457 Lee (1997), 18.
458 Chen (1994c), 504-511; Li (1998b), 78.
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□ Investigate the illegal activities of members and determine disciplinary 
action. The members meeting, and board of directors, had the power to 
approve and cancel membership.459
□ Set settlement and trading rules, subject to the approval of the local PBoC.
However, neither of the SHGSE and SHZSE leaderships had the development of 
good regulatory practices as their priority, but rather market development. Thus 
the SHGSE did not conduct regular examinations of trading or perform 
inspections of members.460 At the time of its establishment, the SHGSE fell 
under the administrative authority and supervision of the PBoC, as chapter three 
explained. The bank had sole authority over exchange development and the 
power to set all rules governing their operations 461 The Shanghai PBoC was 
authorised to nominate (timing) the president and vice-presidents, appointments 
the central PBoC ratified (hezhun).462 The SHGSE’s own board of directors was 
left to formally appoint (pinreri) the senior management team. However, as 
chapter three also explained, before 1998 local branches of the PBoC operated 
under the guanli authority of local leaders. The central PBoC had limited 
influence over their activities. This meant that formal PBoC authority over the 
exchanges between during 1990-92 was more or less a proxy for control of the 
exchanges by local leaders. Policy development at the SHGSE was organised by 
the exchange leadership and the municipal stock market small group. SHGSE 
president Wei Wenyuan enjoyed direct access to the Shanghai deputy mayor in 
charge of financial work. Wei would suggest ideas and authorisation was usually 
extended informally; the removal of price controls was accomplished in this way, 
as was authorisation over the expansion of listings in March 1992.463 It was the 
small group, which later evolved into the SHGSMC, that controlled 
appointments to the SHGSE’s senior management and which resolved any
459 Huang (1999d), 164.
460 World Bank (1995a), 38.
461 SHGSE (1993), 431.
462 Zongjingli can be translated as ‘president’ or ‘general manager’. The CSRC did not assume 
significant supervisory control over the two exchanges in 1993, as Walter and Howie (2001), 104 
claim.
463 Interview-11, Shanghai, 2000; Hong (2000), 241.
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problems of illegal practice.464 The Shanghai PBoC had little role in regulation: it 
did not make a single site inspection of the SHGSE.
The SHZSE was opened only days before the SHGSE, but without State Council 
or PBoC authorisation. During 1991, it benefited from a developmentalist 
municipal leadership, in contrast to Shanghai, where leaders remained cautious. 
The SHZSE management developed new products, listed enterprises outside 
Shenzhen’s administrative boundaries, and developed institutions that supported 
rapid market growth. For example, in early 1991 the SHZSE authorised the 
issuance of US$8m worth of foreign currency bonds by Shenzhen United, a local 
conglomerate. At the time, the SHGSE announced it was still ‘considering’ its 
policy on foreign currency bonds.465 In March 1991, the SHZSE also beat 
Shanghai to list the first foreign joint venture, Shenzhen Yuanye.466 During 
1991-92, the Shenzhen leadership implemented a wide-ranging market stimulus 
program that involved significant institutional innovations:
□ In June 1991, the SHZSE is reported to have begun allowing the trading of 
legal person shares. This was contrary to State Council regulations and the 
extent of the trading is unclear.467
□ In July 1991, the Shenzhen leadership allowed legal persons (SOEs) to invest
AfLQin shares, a policy that Shanghai followed only in September 1993.
□ On 17th August 1991, the SHZSE lifted all limits on price movements, a 
policy the SHGSE followed only eight months later 469
□ In its search for more members, the SHZSE also appears to have unilaterally, 
and in contravention of a State Council notice of mid-1991, enlarged its 
membership to include securities firms from outside the city. In July 1992, 
the Shenzhen PBoC authorised SHZSE membership to be extended to 73 
securities companies from outside Shenzhen.
464 Wang (1992b), 180.
465 Crothall (1991).
466 Foster (1991). See also chapter four.
467 Wang (1992b), 142. .
468 Xiao (2000a), 8, 21.
469 Hu (1999a), 218-219.
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As these examples illustrate, local leaders enjoyed extensive authority in setting, 
and changing, the rules that governed their markets. Allowing SOEs to trade and 
liberalising price restrictions were of critical importance to nurturing trading 
volume and would be a power that the CSRC would later take for itself. In early 
1992, new Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, emboldened by Deng Xiaoping’s nanxun 
line, criticised the SHGSE for its slow speed of development and praised the 
SHZSE for its ‘entrepreneurial spirit’.470 As well as organising institutional 
change, Shenzhen leaders took direct action to invigorate their market. Party 
organs in the city proclaimed that shares supported the construction of China’s 
socialist economy and encouraged CCP members to participate in the market471 
They also encouraged several companies to offer generous dividend payments to 
attract investors.472 Municipal leaders were also ambitious to internationalise 
their market. During 1992, the Shenzhen leadership prioritised B-share 
development and selected companies to issue stocks in Singapore and Hong 
Kong, apparently without applying for central government approval.473 As a 
result of these developmental activities, average trading volume at the SHZSE 
was about double that of SHGSE throughout 1991 and 1992.474
The CSRC and the stock exchanges, 1993-95
After the Shenzhen riots in August 1992 revealed local equity institutions to be 
ineffective, the zhongyang leadership placed the two stock exchanges under the 
management (guanli) of the local leadership and the supervision (jiandu) of the 
newly established CSRC. Local leaders retained the primary (weizhu) 
authority.475 The causes of the riots and the wider institutional ramifications are 
dealt with in chapter eight. A SCSC notice in July 1993 further defined the 
relationship over the exchanges of the two sub-principals.476 It attempted to 
distribute powers between them evenly. Consider the SHGSE. According to the 
notice, the SHGSE president was to be jointly appointed by the local leadership
470 Holberton (1992)
471 There are wonderful tales of how loyal old Party members unwittingly became millionaires by 
responding to this call. Some, perhaps apocryphal, versions of the stories claim that they offered 
their fortunes back to the Party years later, after discovering what their shares were worth.
472 Wang (1992b), 62-67.
473 Reuter (1992); Nicoll (1992).
474 Hu (1999a), 212; Sito (1992).
475 Xinhua (1993c); Chen (1994c), 94-99.
476 Huang (1999d), 186; SZB (1993h).
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and CSRC, with the board of directors making the formal appointment. The 
exchange’s board of directors was to include non-executives nominated jointly 
by the municipal government and the CSRC, as well as some elected by 
exchange members. The board’s chairman, deputy chairmen and executive 
directors were to be nominated by the municipal government and the CSRC, and 
then elected by the board. A stock listing committee was to be established ‘to 
draft and formulate regulations governing the introduction and marketing of 
stocks’; one member of the committee was to be appointed by the CSRC, another 
by the municipal government. The SHGSE’s own rules of business would be 
subject to the approval of both. In terms of reporting, exchange departments were 
asked to provide both the SHGSE leadership and the CSRC with quarterly, mid­
term and annual reports; financial reports were to be sent to both the municipal 
government and the CSRC.
The new institutional arrangement, however, failed to establish a relationship of 
equals between the two sub-principals. Three factors remained in local leaders’ 
favour: the type of authority relations, the low ranking of the CSRC and the de 
facto mechanisms of oversight they enjoyed. Consider again the SHGSE. First, 
their guanli authority allowed local leaders to appoint the SHGSE president and 
vice presidents; the CSRC did not have a voice in these appointments. (The 
situation was slightly different in Shenzhen where the CSRC leadership appeared 
to enjoy more influence. Here, Xia Bin, director of the CSRC’s Trading 
Department, was appointed SHZSE president in 1993; Zhuang Xinyi, another 
CSRC appointee replaced him in 1995.477 Both were chosen by the CSRC 
leadership and were expected to facilitate central government control of the 
SHZSE.) It would not be until August 1997 that the CSRC leadership was 
allowed to choose the SHGSE president. Second, the regulator was a non­
governmental organ which occupied sub-ministerial ranks before August 1997. 
The SHGSE had ayw-level rank. More importantly, however, was the disparity in 
ranks between the CSRC and the Shanghai leadership, whose party secretary 
held the rank of minister (zhengbu). Moreover, throughout most the 1990s, 
Huang Ju was a member of the Politburo. Unless the State Council or Central
477 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
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Committee explicitly backed a CSRC policy therefore, Shanghai’s leaders could 
effectively veto it. (The Shenzhen city leadership had far less influence, a fact 
that partially explains their loss of appointment power over the SHZSE 
presidency. The Guangdong party secretary is reported to have acted at times to 
protect the SHZSE, although the extent of his involvement is unclear.) Third, the 
CSRC had no reliable sources of information about stock exchange activities, 
even at the SHZSE. The CSRC had no physical presence there, or in either city, 
until late 1997, and so had limited means to monitor developments. The 
reporting requirements laid out in the July 1993 SCSC notice were not respected 
by the exchanges and as a result the regulator had to rely on infrequent reports 
from the exchange leaderships which did not detail senous problems. CSRC 
appointees on the boards of directors and listing boards did little to oversee the 
exchanges on behalf of the regulator. Both boards took their direction from the 
cities’ SMCs and the exchange leaders.
The opposing interests of the two sub-principals was evident in the speeches 
given at the third AGM of the SHGSE in January 1993.479 Zhou Daojiong, 
deputy chairman of the SCSC, emphasised the need for supervision and macro­
controls, while Wei Wenyuan, SHGSE president, spoke to the importance of 
nurturing the market 480 Ad hoc policy disputes racked CSRC/SHGSE relations, 
but one issue in particular caused on-going tension: the listing of rights shares 
issued to legal persons.
Listing non-tradable shares
To understand the importance of this issue to both local and central leaders a 
little history is required. As chapter two explained, all SOEs converting into 
companies limited by shares divided their share capital into roughly three equal 
parts: individual, legal person and state shares. The later two types were non­
tradable and were held by representatives of the state, LP shares by profit-
478 Interview-06, Shanghai, 2000.
479 SZB (1993g); SZB (1993b).
480 Interview-11, Shanghai, 2000.Tensions between the exchanges and the regulator were not 
soothed by personalities. Wei’s cavalier style did not endear him to the CSRC leadership. He 
often refused to meet officials visiting from Beijing and resented the interference o f ‘those 
bureaucrats in Beijing’ in ‘his’ exchange’s activities.
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seeking SOEs, state shares by non-profit oriented administrative organs. 
Conversion between the three categories remains prohibited.
Despite the ban, the managements of listed firms, their LP shareholders and the 
leaders of the stock exchanges remained interested in listing non-tradable shares, 
especially when listed companies made rights issues or distributed ‘bonus’ shares
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as part of a dividend package. When a rights issue occurred all company 
shareholders would be offered the right to buy shares. The LP shareholder, an 
SOE, would typically not have enough cash to buy new shares.482 In any case, 
the normal rationale for buying rights issues, that they can be sold onto the 
market for a profit because of their discounted sale price, did not hold for LPs 
since their rights shares could not be legally sold. Rights shares offered to LP 
shareholders thus remained unsold. In the case of dividends, the LP preferred to 
receive cash rather than additional shares. In both cases, the listed enterprise and 
the LP shareholder would both benefit if the new shares could be publicly listed. 
This would provide funds to both. The LP could sell the shares on the open 
market and profit from the discount and for its part, the listed firm could raise 
additional funds since LPs would be more willing to purchase the shares. Since 
the stock exchanges were competing to attract customers, their leaders had an 
incentive to facilitate this. The problem was that the state’s stake in companies 
could decrease by as much as 10% through rights issues in which state and legal 
person shares were listed. Thus leaders within the zhongyang were unhappy 
with legal person rights being listed and banned the practice. During 1993-94, 
however, the Shanghai and Shenzhen SAOs and stock exchanges, with the 
backing of local leaders, worked to undermine the ban.
On 20th May 1993, the SHGSE authorised Guangzhou Zhujiang Industries to list 
30m of its LP dividend shares, but was forced to drop the plan after CSRC 
objections.484 On 4th March 1994, the SHZSAO ruled that state and LPs’ rights
481 SG (1999).
482 Peng (1995a).
483 Xinhua (1995a).
484 In two other reported incidents, in April 1993, SHGSE-listed Lujiazui Finance and Trade 
Development Company distributed 30m state shares to individuals with SHGSE backing and on 
24th July 1993, Harbin’s Yiyao, a SHGSE-listed medicine company, distributed 52m state shares 
to individual shareholders, Li (1998b), 175-179; Dong (1997), 15, 31-33.
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shares issued in 1993 could publicly list.485 The following day the CSRC 
announced that the SHZSAO was acting outside of its powers and re-asserted the 
ban. But the issue would not go away. By April 1994, four large SHGSE-listed 
companies had gone public with their plans for selling LP shares: Pudong 
Jinqiao, Hangzhou Zhujiang, Hangzhou Tianmu and Shaoxing Baida. In 
November 1994, the CSRC again banned the circulation of state and legal person 
shares. However, during 1994, a total of Rmb660m worth of state and legal 
person rights shares were reportedly sold to individual investors and to a variety 
of LPs including non-state companies.486 These shares could not be legally listed, 
although the investors believed it was only a matter of time before they would 
be.487 On 10th May 1995, the Shenzhen settlement company notified its members 
that the state and LP rights shares of Yuehua Electricity would soon become 
tradable. Apparently unable to stem the tide, between January and October 1995 
the CSRC allowed seven companies’ state and LP shareholders to sell their rights 
shares, while at least 24 other companies filed applications for similar treatment. 
Such problems were to continue into 1995.
The CSRC and exchange leaderships competed over other policy areas too. In 
February 1994, for instance, without informing the CSRC, the SHZSE 
announced it was indefinitely postponing all new listings. SHZSE president Xia 
Bin believed this would boost share prices, but his move was deeply unpopular at 
the CSRC (and among some of his staff). Shortly afterwards, the regulator 
grudgingly confirmed that he was acting within his rights but that the year’s 
Rmb5.5 billion issuance quota, for which the CSRC was responsible, would not 
be affected. This was obviously not true. Although public issuance and listing are 
different things, the issuance programme was badly disrupted by the inability to 
list newly issued shares: investors would not want to buy shares they could not 
sell. The CSRC’s inability to influence important developments at the SHZSE 
was again highlighted in August 1994 when the CSRC and PBoC issued 
criticisms of the exchange’s ‘illegal’ listing of two local investment funds, Tianji
485 Xiao (2000a), 25-37.
486 Peng (1995a).
487 They were, but only after many years: the final tranche o f these LP shares were listed in late 
2001.
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and Lantian. Both funds continued trading despite the lack of any authorisation
400
from any central government bureaux.
Such conflicts were symptomatic of a competition between the regulator and the 
exchange leaders to define the institutions of the new market. The former sought 
to stake their claims to competence by issuing rules; the later asserted their de 
facto ability to control institutional development by ignoring or mis- 
implementing them. Even when a central government policy was clear, as in the 
non-listing of legal person shares, the exchange leaderships were able to 
regularly defect (and disguise their defection), forcing the CSRC to fire-fight and 
negotiate. Only very gradually did the CSRC gain the authority to set rules and 
enforce them. It needed SCSC backing for this. At the end of 1994, for example, 
the SCSC asserted the central government’s authority over settlement, forcing 
the two exchanges to move to a T+l system.489 According to exchange rules, 
settlement was an area over which the exchanges themselves had authority and 
this was thus an infringement of the exchanges’ SRO status. The SHSGE had 
introduced T+0 in July 1991, and the SHZSE had followed in November 1993, in 
order to maximise trading volume.490 However, since T+0 allowed the buying 
and selling of shares on the same day it also increased volatility and the 
opportunities for fraud.491 Preventing the later was not a priority for the 
exchanges’ leaderships. The Market Supervision department at the SHZSE was 
staffed by only six people before 1997. Their energies, especially during 1994- 
96, were concentrated on monitoring member companies’ account balances. A 
number of TICs and finance companies traded shares in excess of their cash 
deposits at the exchanges and built up huge overdrafts, some even exceeding 
Rmbl billion.492 Occupied by this problem, active monitoring of secondary 
market activity by exchange staff only began to any significant extent after 1997.
488 SZB (1994o).
489 T+l stands for Trade+one day, meaning that settlement (the exchange o f shares and money) 
took place the day after the trade, Xinhua (1994e).
490 SZB (1993f); Hu (1999a), 225.
491 Li (1996), 15.
492 Interview-51, Shenzhen, 2001.
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327 and (mis)regulation at the SHGSE
The 327 Treasury bond futures (TBFs) crisis in February 1995 at the SHGSE 
highlighted the institutional problems that plagued the entire securities sector: 
deficient self-regulation on the part of the exchanges, competition between 
different bureaux within central government and an ineffectual CSRC.493 To 
understand the sources of the crisis, consider the mess that regulation of the 
futures market was in before 1995. No national-level regulations were issued on 
TBF trading before 327, and before April 1994 no bu-\eve\ bureau had taken 
responsibility for regulation of the sector. The only set of regulations governing 
TBF trading was promulgated by the SHGSE in October 1993, ten months after 
trading had begun 494 The SHGSE took responsibility for day-to-day supervision. 
Yet above the SHGSE there was a confused and ineffective structure of 
oversight. The SHGSAO did not supervise TBFs.495 The MoF was responsible 
for Treasury bond trading, but has no clear jurisdiction over TBFs. The SPC had 
an unspecified role in regulating commodity futures, but apparently had no role 
in TBF regulation. On the 9th April 1994, the State Council placed the 
supervision of all futures markets under the SCSC and day-to-day work under 
the CSRC, an arrangement designed to provide ‘unified regulation’.496 However, 
the new arrangement left three problems unresolved: the market was fragmented; 
the CSRC had few channels of information; and its regulatory responsibilities 
and powers were disputed. First, the Beijing Commodity Exchange, the Wuhan 
and Tianjin STCs and the STAQs, as well as the two stock exchanges, competed 
intensely for TBF business.497 The STCs, over which the CSRC did not have any 
jurisdiction, allowed lower margin requirements than those formally set by the 
SHGSE and allowed participants to set their own contract duration. Xia Tiantian 
alleges that this put pressure on the SHGSE to lower its margin requirements, 
which it did thereby breaching its own rules 498 Second, the stock exchanges had 
only minimal responsibilities to report to the CSRC (the STCs had none at all) 
and no CSRC personnel were stationed at any of the exchanges or STCs.
493 Yao (1998), 101-166.
494 SZB (1993j).
495 On the TBF market, Interviews 6, 7, 9, 24, Shanghai 2000.
496 SZB (19941); Zhang (1998), 179.
497 Li (1998b), 93.
498 Xia (1996).
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Securities firms made only minimal reports to the CSRC about their trading and 
positions. There are suggestions that even Wangguo, the company at the heart of 
the crisis, was unaware of the total extent of its branches’ exposure to the market. 
Third, the regulators, the PBoC, MoF and CSRC, remained uncoordinated. 
Interviewees argued that the CSRC Futures Department had a very limited role in 
regulating TBFs because of unspecified ‘interference from other government 
bureaux’. Rectification of futures firms that held illegally large positions or 
manipulated contract prices during 1994 was obstructed by disputes with the 
PBoC. The result, in the words of one interviewee, was that before February 
1995 the ‘TBF market operated in a regulatory vacuum’, despite its size, 
potential volatility and importance.
TBF contract 327 was a three-year contract expiring in June 1995.499 Analysts at 
Wanguo Securities expected inflation to slow, the coupons on Treasury bonds to 
fall, and bond issuance for 1995 to total around Rmb 150 billion, a 50% increase 
on 1994 and as a result sold 327 contracts short, expecting the price to fall.500 By 
23rd February 1995, Wanguo held a short position of three million contracts, six 
times the limit set by the SHGSE. Liaoning Guofa, an SOE, held a similar 
position. Taking the opposite long position on the 327 contract was MoF-owned 
China Economic Development Trust and Investment Company and there are 
suggestions that its leaders had knowledge of what was to happen next.501 On the 
evening of 22nd February 1995, the MoF announced its Treasury bond issuance 
volume for 1995, only a third of the volume, (and with higher interest rates), that 
Wanguo had been expecting. On the following day, the price of 327 rose from 
Rmbl48.50 to Rmbl51.98 and then dropped back to Rmbl51.0. Facing 
catastrophic losses, Wanguo sold 10.6m 327 contracts in the last eight minutes of 
trading, forcing the price back down to Rmb 147.50. Paper worth Rmb310 billion 
changed hands during this short time. TBF trading volume for the day totalled 
Rmb850 billion, twenty-three times that of the previous day.502 Such a sudden 
fall in the price proved catastrophic for other market players. With potential
499 On 327, Yao (1998), 103-109; Li (1998b), 95-96; Liu (1997), 257-263.
500 To ‘sell short’ is to sell securities one does not own for delivery at a future date. Wanguo’s 
official name in English was Shanghai International Securities.
501 HKS (1996).
502 Li (1998b), 95-96.
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losses in excess of Rmbl billion, around twenty FIIs faced bankruptcy as the 
market closed. However, that evening the SHGSE leadership announced that it 
was to cancel all trades in TBFs after 4.22pm, suspend the market for three days 
to allow the renegotiation of the contracts, and launch an investigation into price 
manipulation. The decision meant that Wanguo faced bankruptcy. Estimates of 
its losses ranged from Rmb660m-1.3 billion, at least four times its registered 
capital.504
The initial reaction from central government was mild: increased deposits were 
demanded, price limits were established and a SHGSE risk fund set up.505 The 
State Council announced that it would establish its own investigation team 
comprised of the CDIC, the CSRC, the PBoC, and the Supreme People’s Court. 
The SHGSE assisted but was not a formal member of the team.506 In the second 
week of March, TBF trading heated up again and on 14th April the CSRC again 
raised the deposit requirement.507 On 11th May 1995 Liaoning Guofa and several 
securities companies were discovered manipulating the prices of Contract 319. 
Guofa was attempting to win back some its losses from the 327 scandal; it, and 
others, were found to be using multiple accounts to manipulate prices. In
tViresponse, on 18 May, the CSRC, on orders from Vice Premier Zhu Rongji (and 
apparently against CSRC advice), banned TBF trading.508 An estimated Rmb 64 
billion was tied up in the TBF market and unwinding of the 2.4m contracts took 
the CSRC several months, a process complicated by the fact that the market was 
so fragmented.509 The State Council report into the 327 incident was issued on 
21st September 1995.510 The SHGSE was criticised for its ‘unsound 
management’, ‘an insufficient estimation of risk’, imperfect trading rules and
503 Liu (1997), 258.
504 SCMP (1995a); Cui (1996), 41; Caijing (2001b), 44.
505 SZB (19951); SZB (1995h).
506 Wang (1995); SZB (1995i).
507 Xia (1996), 286-299.
508 Guofa was also highly active in the repo market but had no bonds on deposit. Three leaders of 
Guofa disappeared soon after, presumably overseas, with several million Renminbi, leaving the 
SHGSE with more debt to add to the already huge liabilities that 327 had left it with. The 
sensitiveness of the issue, and the fact that they left the SHGSE with huge liabilities, meant that 
the details of these events were not reported in the national press.
509 Li (1998b), 193.
510 SZB (1995f).
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unsatisfactory supervision.511 The leadership of the SHGSE, it was found, had 
removed restrictions on price movements and had allowed illegally large 
positions to be built up.512 There was also the whiff of conspiracy: Guan 
Jinsheng, Wanguo CEO, was the vice-chairman of the SHGSE’s board of
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directors. Guan was arrested in July.
What is striking about the aftermath of 327 is the extent of institutional change 
that followed it. There was barely any. The TBF market was closed and Wanguo 
was merged with Shenyin Securities. SHGSE president Wei Wenyuan remained 
in place while CSRC Chairman Liu Hongru was scape-goated and sacked.514 No 
significant institutional change took place to resolve what were structural 
problems in the governance of the SHGSE. The CSRC was upgraded to the rank 
of vice-ministry (fubu) in early 1995, but its leaders remained inferior in rank to 
the Shanghai leadership and they gained no additional mechanisms of 
supervision. Plans submitted by the CSRC to the State Council proposing 
increased supervision of the exchange, and the appointment of a CSRC-nominee 
to its presidency, were vetoed by the Shanghai leadership, and were opposed by 
other central bureaux, including the PBoC.515 Instead, the State Council 
responded with administrative action; it cut the issuance quota and instructed the 
CSRC to slow down approvals for share issuance. During 1995, only 15 A- 
shares were listed raising only Rmb2.3 billion, compared to the 44 companies 
that had raised Rmb5 billion in the previous year.
It was not long before another scandal highlighted the SHGSE’s liberal attitude 
to enforcing the central government’s rules. On the 23rd August 1995, the China 
Securities News received a letter concerning Sichuan Changhong Electronic 
Appliances, a SHGSE listed company.516 The letter alleged that Changhong had 
illegally listed bonus shares allocated as part of a dividend package to legal
511 Zhang (1998), 182.
512 Xia (1996), 300, 393.
513 On 3rd February 1997 Guan was found guilty of abusing pubbc funds and taking bribes and 
sentenced to 17 years imprisonment. His infringements o f securities regulations, although 
serious, would not have warranted criminal prosecution. By late 2000, however, he had, 
reportedly, been released, Li (1998b), 191; Interview-07, Shanghai, 2000.
51* Peng (1994b); Peng (1999); Peng (1995d).
515 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
516 Li (1998b), 97, 200; Dong (1997), 174-177; Peng (1995b).
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persons. After a two-month investigation the CSRC found that 31.1m 
Changhong LP shares had indeed been listed on 15th August 1995.517 The CSRC 
also discovered that four other companies had done the same, all with SHGSE 
assistance.518 The exchange leadership claimed that it had operated within the 
law since the bonus shares had been issued to the individual investors who had 
subscribed to the earlier legal person shares’ rights offering.519 The zhongyang 
leadership was not convinced. The new CSRC leadership, already pushing for 
Wei Wenyuan’s dismissal, had new ammunition and in late August the SHGSE 
president was removed.520 Yet it was the municipal government that nominated 
and appointed the new president on 18th August 1995. Yang Xianghai was the 
director of the SHGSAO, and deputy director of the Shanghai SPC.521 The CSRC 
leadership opposed his nomination, but his appointment confirmed that the 
Shanghai leadership’s capture of the SHGSE was still secure.
Central institutional capture: The CSRC takes control
On 8th April 1996 the SCSC met and, while upholding Zhu Rongji’s eight word 
conservative fangzhen (policy direction), called for the stock market to ‘better 
serve the socialist market economy’ (genghao wei shehui zhuyi shichang jingji 
fuwu) 522 On 21st April, Li Jiange, deputy chairman of the CSRC, addressed the 
SHGSE AGM and announced a fundamental shift in policy: the State Council 
intended to link stock market and industrial policy and was ready to allow an 
expansion of listings.523 This facilitated the passage of a CSRC-backed plan for 
the institutional capture of the stock exchanges.
On 21st August 1996 the SCSC passed the Measures for the Administration of 
Securities Exchanges.524 These superseded the July 1993 Provisional Measures 
and gave the CSRC authority to both manage (guanli) and supervise (jiandu) the 
two stock exchanges, although the new measures also reserved the exchanges’
517 SZB (1995b).
518 Dong (1997), 34, 171; Xinhua (1996a); Zhang (1998), 183.
519 Li (1998b), 97.
520 Peng (1995c).
521 HKEE (1995).
522 Dong (1997), 185.
523 SCMP (1996c); Hu (1999a), 247; Li (1997b), 40. This shift in policy and its effects on the 
stock market are further discussed in chapter eight.
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status as SROs and granted them qualified rule-making powers. The CSRC 
now had de jure authority over the appointment of the exchanges’ senior 
management. It could request the exchanges to punish their members and listed 
companies; suspend trading; and sanction the exchanges for failure to enforce 
regulation. The measures also eliminated any administrative jurisdiction over 
the exchanges by local leaders. At least, that was the theory: actual institutional 
change was harder to implement as local leaders successfully resisted the central 
government take-over of their exchanges for another twelve months. CSRC 
chairman Zhou Daojiong visited both Shanghai and Shenzhen soon after the 
measures were passed to negotiate a change of presidents. The Shanghai
leadership refused to negotiate. The Shenzhen leadership also appears to have put 
up opposition, and Zhou returned to Beijing almost empty-handed. The only 
thing he could report was that the two administrations had agreed to the 
stationing of CSRC representatives at the exchanges, an idea the CSRC had 
originally proposed in April 1996. Officially, on 25th October 1996 the CSRC 
placed a permanent supervision ‘team’ at the SHGSE, as well as at the SHZSE 
and several futures exchanges. In practice, only one supervisor was stationed 
at each exchange and they only arrived in January 1997.530 The supervisors’ 
official duties were to track market operations, follow policy trends and
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supervise exchange business. They made two daily reports to the CSRC 
Trading (later Supervision) Department. The first report covered market trends, 
while the second concentrated on policy developments. For important matters, 
the supervisors could also report directly to a CSRC vice chairman. Stock 
exchange departments provided ad hoc reports about developments and monthly 
reports on trading activities to the CSRC supervisors. In theory, the CSRC 
supervisors could access any information they required, and even attended 
official meetings of the exchanges’ senior managements.532 But there was, of 
course, still ample room for exchange staff to withhold information.
524 ZZPZ (1997), 597.
525 Yao (1998), 70.
526 Nicoll (1998), 263.
527 Interview-57, Shenzhen, 2001.
528 Interview-13, Beijing, 2000.
529 SZB (1996q); Bao (1999), 66.
530 Interview-08, Shanghai, 2000; Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
531 SCMP (1996i).
532 Interview-08, Shanghai, 2000.
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The stock exchanges lay at the centre of the two municipalities’ equity 
developmentalism during 1995-97, as the previous chapter has shown. It was 
appropriate therefore that the zhongyang’s assault on local capture of equity 
institutions began with them. On the 14th August 1997 the SCSC’s August 1996 
measures were finally implemented when the State Council ordered the 
exchanges to come under the management (guanli) control of the CSRC. Tu 
Guangshao, general secretary of the CSRC, was immediately appointed SHGSE 
president on 17th August 1997, replacing Yang Xianghai.534 Two other CSRC- 
staffers, Zhu Congjiu and Liu Huimin, were then transferred to the SHGSE as
C ' l C  , ,
vice-presidents, the former as a prospective successor to Tu. Gui Minjie, 
director of the International Department at the CSRC, took up the post of SHZSE 
president on 3rd September 1997, replacing Zhuang Xinyi.536 On the 10th 
December 1997, the SCSC promulgated its final important set of regulations, the 
Stock Exchange Management Rules. These confirmed that supervision and 
management of the exchanges, as well as management of the registration and 
settlement companies, fell completely under the CSRC.537 These powers were 
guaranteed in the 1998 Securities Law.
However, the appointment of senior personnel from the central government was 
not itself sufficient to deliver institutional capture to the CSRC. The tenure of 
Zhuang Xinyi, as recounted in chapter five, a CSRC appointee who had then 
supported local economic interests, had shown this. As a Beijing-based official, 
with his patrons, guanxi networks, not to mention family and friends in Beijing, 
Zhuang should have been interested in returning to the CSRC. However, he 
pursued policies that brought him into frequent conflict with the CSRC 
leadership. The problem for the CSRC was that after he was appointed Zhuang 
fulfilled his initial mandate, to revive the Shenzhen market, too effectively and 
with enormous support from the Shenzhen government. He pursued a
533 Zhang (1998), 186.
534 Tu had previously served as the general manager of the PBoC’s NETS and director of the 
CSRC’s Trading Department, CD (1997).
535 Liu Huimin had worked as the director of the CSRC Chairman’s Office; Zhu Congjiu had 
been the former CSRC chairman Liu Hongru’s secretary (mishu).
536 SZB (1997j).
537 Huang (1999d), 98.
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developmental agenda, and the CSRC had no institutionalised means of stopping 
him, with the exception of dismissal, which was extremely hard to effect without
• *  538just cause.
In 1997, therefore, CSRC leaders, now with full zhongyang backing, launched a
C ' l Q
wide-ranging assault on the institutions of local capture at the exchanges. They 
created numerous mechanisms of supervision and oversight; so many, in fact, 
that by 2000 they were judged by some CSRC leaders to be excessive. 
According to the October 1997 Management Rules, the ‘front-line’ regulatory 
responsibilities of the SHSGE were to:540
□ Supervise trading: make rules on securities types and time limits, ensure 
order and stop illegal behaviour.
□ Supervise members: check on qualifications and reports of members, 
supervise all issued information.
□ Supervise listed companies: produce detailed listing rules, ensure order and 
approve the listing brochure.
These vastly reduced responsibilities reflected the fact the exchanges were now 
micro-managed organs of a single sub-principal, the CSRC. The regulator 
implemented a range of mechanisms of oversight and controls that remained in 
place until the end o f2000.
Senior appointments
Stock exchange presidents and vice presidents are now appointed, and managed, 
by the CSRC leadership, to whom they report regularly. The CSRC also appoints 
the directors of the exchanges’ Finance and Personnel departments. The 
exchanges must report the appointment (and dismissal) of middle-level 
managers, and often such actions will be taken in informal negotiation with 
CSRC officials.
538 After co-leading the CSRC investigation into Junan Securities in 1997, Zhuang Xinyi returned 
to Shenzhen in mid-1998, taking up the post of Shenzhen deputy mayor with responsibilities for 
education and finance, including the stock exchange, Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000; HKS (1998).
539 This section uses interviews 5, 29 at Shanghai, 2000 and 43,44, 51 at Shenzhen, 2001, as well 
as informal conversations at both exchanges.
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Management o f  department activities
Each stock exchange department is directly and closely managed by a 
corresponding CSRC department. Contact is on a daily basis and is not mediated 
by any particular exchange personnel. Mid-level stock exchange staff 
complained of being micro-managed by their ‘superiors’ in the CSRC. Some 
noted that they were treated as the CSRC’s administrative arm, were used as 
‘messengers’ between the CSRC and the exchanges’ listed and member firms, 
and were often not consulted or, simply left uninformed, about important policy 
decisions that affected their work.
The Securities Regulation Expert Offices
The CSRC teams stationed at the SHGSE and SHZSE were institutionalised and 
enlarged in February 1998 as Securities Regulation Expert Offices {Zhengquan 
Jianguan Zhuanyuan Banshichu, hereafter SREOs), otherwise known as 
Commissioner’s Offices.541 The SHZSE’s SREO was originally staffed by six 
CSRC personnel. Its main focus was to oversee the exchange’s trading system 
and investigate the finances of member firms. All SHGSE departments prepare 
fortnightly reports for the SREO, which are then passed to the CSRC. Since 
1998, however, the role of the SREOs at both exchanges has changed. 
Investigations have been increasingly managed by the local SAOs, SREO staff 
numbers have decreased (as of 2000, there were only five CSRC personnel 
stationed at the SHGSE and three at the SHZSE), and their work has moved 
away from supervision. The SREOs now only prepare two reports a year for the 
CSRC. During 2000, members of the SHGSE SREO were involved in 
researching index futures, while those at the SHZSE assisted in the planning for 
the GEM, Shenzhen’s proposed second board. This change reflected the fact that 
the SREOs are now surplus to the monitoring requirements of the CSRC. Since 
each exchange department’s activities is directly governed by a CSRC 
department, and the exchanges’ leaders report directly to the CSRC leadership, 
its oversight functions are redundant. Moreover, the fact that the SREOs are now
540 Zhou (1998), 437.
541 Hu (1999a), 249.
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involved in researching new instruments and markets, rather than carrying out 
regulatory or oversight duties, reflects the extent to which the CSRC has not only 
assumed control of regulation but also of the developmental trajectory of the 
market.
Disciplinary powers
One of the most serious infringements of the exchanges’ SRO status is that they 
may not punish their members for infractions of rules. Instead, any suspected 
infraction must be reported to the CSRC Institutions Department, which 
investigates and determines the action to be taken. If an investigation is to be 
carried out it is managed by the SAO; only SAO staff may call investors in for 
questioning. The CSRC may discipline an offending firm directly, or instruct the 
SHGSE Membership Department to issue a criticism or a fine.
Listing
The exchanges have also lost all authority over listings. Between 1997 to mid- 
2000, once the CSRC had authorised a firm for issuance it allocated it to either 
the SHGSE or SHZSE for listing. Neither the company nor exchange 
management had competence to oppose this choice, although the former could 
express a preference as to where it was listed. In autumn 2000, against the 
opposition of SHZSE, Shenzhen and Guangdong provincial leaders, the central 
government determined that the SHZSE should stop all new listings, in 
anticipation of the SHZSE establishing the GEM, and the planned transfer of 
Shenzhen’s A-shares to Shanghai.542
Since late 1997 the exchanges have operated, as Bao Jingxuan and others have 
noted, more as divisions of the CSRC than as independent businesses.543 Both 
began regular CCP activities after August 1997, beginning with Jiang Zemin’s 
san jiang (three stresses) campaign, organised by newly active Party committees. 
Their members’ meeting, formally at least, remains their highest authority, but in 
practice authority lies elsewhere. This loss of SRO powers is neatly expressed in
542 Since then all new A-shares have been listed at the SHGSE, a fact that probably augurs the 
eventual closure of the SHZSE.
543 Bao (1999), 66-71; Li (1998b), 61; Huang (1999d), 193.
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an industry joke: the exchanges have become ‘the sons of the CSRC’. However, 
in another variation of the joke, and one heard less frequently on the lips of 
CSRC officials, the stock exchanges are the ‘housemaids’ of the CSRC. In this 
variation, it is the investment funds that are the ‘sons’ of the CSRC since they are 
prized and nurtured by the regulator; the exchanges have been, in contrast, 
downgraded to the status of servants. This said, while institutional capture by the 
CSRC has meant that the stock exchanges have lost their autonomy and can not 
innovate in a way that an exchange should ideally be allowed to, central capture 
has also facilitated more stable market growth since 1998 and has enabled policy 
development and implementation to be better co-ordinated. Considering the 
extent of defection before 1997, and the threats that equity developmentalism 
presented to the wider financial system, it appears that micro management of the 
exchanges by the CSRC is, at least for the moment, beneficial to the 
development of the stock market in China.
Concluding remarks
From starting life as SROs operating under local leadership, by the end of 2000 
China’s two stock exchanges had lost all their de facto SRO powers and were 
being micro-managed by the CSRC. Their style of development shifted 
accordingly, from one dominated by rapid growth, aggressive development of 
new instruments and deficient regulation, to one of more stable growth, limited 
local policy development, and regulation that prevented the kind of crises 
witnessed in 1995 and 1996-97. Local leaders were strong advocates of exchange 
development, using them to maximise investment and tax revenues. After 
assuming control, central government leaders have also been strong supporters of 
stock market development, but they have also valued stability and implemented 
controls on the speed and direction of development. They used a broad portfolio 
of institutional techniques to deliver this capture, including changes to the 
exchanges’ nomenklatura systems, but also centralising powers, creating new 
oversight offices and boosting Party structures.
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7Local institution-making and the securities trading centres
China is a large country. Two stock exchanges are not adequate. Beijing should open more 
exchanges immediately.
Liu Jipeng, consultant to the Stock Exchange Executive Council, 1993544
The central government authorised the establishment of stock exchanges in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen in April 1990 and July 1991 respectively. They were, 
and remain, the official faces of China’s equity market. However, during 1991- 
97 provincial and some sub-provincial administrations throughout China, 
operating without central government authorisation, established at least 42 sites 
for the listing and trading of securities, including corporate equity.545 These were 
referred to by the CSRC as ‘off-exchange share trading places’ (changwai 
gupiao jiaoyi changsuo) and by others as China’s OTC markets (jutai jiaoyi 
changsuo).546 Official CSRC statistics claim that the shares of around 512 
companies were traded here; another, unofficial, estimate puts the figure at closer 
to 1,000.547 According to CSRC statistics, the total stock capital of these 
companies was Rmb38 billion, of which Rmbl2 billion circulated on these 
markets. Over half of these changsuo were housed in dedicated facilities with 
trading floors and centralised computer trading systems, connected to the stock 
exchanges by fibre-optic and satellite links. These high-tech facilities were 
known as the securities trading centres (zhengquan jiaoyi zhongxin, hereafter 
STCs), of which there were 27 operating at the end of 1997. They were stock 
exchanges in all but name: the only things they lacked were a proper regulatory 
framework and political legitimacy. Apart from a small number that did not
544 Chu (1993a).
545 Huang (1999d), 97.
546 Some of the information in this chapter is based on an internal (neibu) 1999 CSRC report. 
Although the author believes that the information provided in this report is reliable, it should be 
borne in mind that corroborating sources for much of the material are unavailable. Since the 
CSRC was mandated to close down STCs in 1997-99, it would not be expected to emphasise 
their positive aspects.
547 The standard Chinese term for listing is shangshi, but shares listed on the STCs were termed 
guapai (registered), in deference to their semi-legal status, Interview-27, Shanghai, 2000; CSRC 
(1999b), 78-80.
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establish links with the SHGSE and SHZSE, the STCs were primarily a site for 
the trading of exchange-listed securities. The larger ones also listed Treasury and 
corporate bonds, corporate equities and investment funds. The STCs and the 
other changsuo were closed en masse during 1998-99 on orders from the 
zhongyang leadership.
Like other developing countries, a large amount of financing activity has taken 
place informally in reform China. Kellee Tsai provides an extensive account of 
informal lending practices through a wide variety of informal institutions that 
were usually set up by private entrepreneurs and were supported by city, county, 
township and village-level officials.548 Andrew Wedeman has shown how local 
governments nurtured huge extra-budgetary funds (xiaojinku) to finance their 
activities.549 Cheng Enjiang examines how rural credit funds, operating with the 
support of village leaders throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, raised 
significant funds for farmers and small-scale entrepreneurs.550 Many of these 
activities were organised by actors outside the state; if public officials were 
involved, they worked at levels of government well below the provincial level. 
The STCs provide an example of a different type of activity. They were 
organised by officials at the provincial government level and received support 
from provincial governors and Party secretaries. By providing dispersed local 
securities companies and investors facilities through which to communicate and 
trade with the stock exchanges, they provided a crucial catalyst for stock market 
growth. They also allowed local administrations to list their own securities, 
mostly local debt and investment funds, but also corporate equity. While the 
numerous instances of ‘implementation bias’ presented throughout this thesis 
illustrate the autonomy of local leaders in executing policy, the creation of the 27 
STCs, an instance of long-term institution building rather than ad hoc defection, 
reveals an entirely different degree of autonomy.551
The chapter is set out as follows. The first section examines the emergence of 
informal share markets and the bond transaction centres in the late 1980s. The
548 Tsai (1999).
549 Tsai (2000); Wedeman (2000).
550 Cheng (2000b); EIU (2001h).
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next explains how these evolved into STCs and the SHGSE’s role in supporting 
their development. A number of the STCs are considered in detail. The chapter 
then moves to an examination of the regulatory institutions (or lack thereof) 
involved in governing the STCs and the sector’s rectification during 1998-99. 
The fourth section examines local investment funds, another means by which 
local governments raised investment capital during the early 1990s.
The bond trading centres and informal share trading
During 1985-86, Treasury bonds had only been officially sold (and not traded) in 
selected urban areas.552 Yet by the end of 1987, before formal authorisation from 
the central government had been given, informal trading of bonds was taking 
place in at least 41 cities.553 The World Bank reports that black market bonds 
commonly traded at a discount of over 50% to market prices.554 On 21st April 
1988, the State Council designated seven ‘experimental’ cities to open centres to 
trade Treasury and other financial bonds issued by local (including sub­
provincial) governments.555 These ‘bond transaction centres’ were formally 
established during April and May 1988, and, initially, trading was limited to each 
locality, cross-provincial border trading only being allowed in October 1990.556 
In June 1998, 54 more cities were authorised to follow and by the end of the year 
more than 100 cities were hosting Treasury bond trading. While trading suffered 
in 1989 from monetary retrenchment, in 1990 it picked up again with more 
issues and a relaxation of trading rules.557 Trading volume totalled Rmbll.6 
billion and continued to grow, totalling Rmbl05 billion in 1992.558 As well as 
bonds, as chapter three showed, unofficial equity issuance took place on a large 
scale during 1987-88, and then again in 1991-92. Informal markets for these 
instruments also developed, markets which received a massive boost in early 
1992 from Deng Xiaoping’s pro-stock market nanxun comments. While OTC 
and informal markets in shares and enterprise bonds had existed in numerous
551 Lampton (1987a); McCormick (1987); Bachman (1987).
552 On China’s bond markets, Li (2000a), 93-102; World Bank (1995a), 55-81.
553 Zhang (1997b), 55.
554 World Bank (1995a), 57.
555 The cities were Shenyang, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Chongqing, Wuhan, Beijing and Guangzhou, 
Xia (1996), 285, & 29.
556 SZB (1994c).
557 Xinhua (1990d).
558 Li (1998b), 34-48; Dong (1997), 133.
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locales since 1986, it was in 1992 that they boomed.559 Many developed on the 
streets and factory floors. The most infamous, the Red Temple market {Hong 
Miaozi), sprang up in April 1992 in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan 
province, whose leaders were at the forefront of promoting the shareholding 
reform experiment.560 Before its official closure more than a year later, the share 
certificates of 42 Sichuan companies were ‘listed’ and traded here.561 These 
shares were mostly dingxiang (fixed placement) legal persons that could not 
legally be traded by individuals. Without any government involvement, however, 
a set of informal rules soon developed to govern the trading of these shares 
between private individuals. Hu Jizhi reports that little cheating occurred. 
Trading initially developed around the Red Temple and at the North-End 
stadium, but was soon active at numerous sites throughout Chengdu. By March 
1993, over 10,000 people were actively involved. Reports of the daily transaction 
volumes vary enormously. Hu reports RmblO million, while Richard Margolis 
reports that by early 1993 daily turnover had reached Rmb8 billion.562 In a 1993 
study, the Sichuan SCORES argued that the black market in shares was 
irrepressible and that closing it down would simply result in it opening again at a 
different site. It recommended the registration and public trading of shares at the 
local bond-trading centre.563 City and provincial leaders supported this position. 
In July 1993, however, the State Council explicitly ordered Chengdu’s curb 
markets closed and the Sichuan authorities are reported to have ‘disabled’ the 
market. According to press reports, Rmb400 million worth of shares were then 
duly re-registered and the 42 companies were forced to withdraw their negotiable 
share certificates and issue non-negotiable stock-right cards instead (the official 
method for dingxiang shares).564 However, one interviewee claimed that trading 
continued and that the market was only finally closed down during the 
rectification programme of 1997-98.565 Innumerable other curb markets operated 
throughout China in the early 1990s, concentrated in the areas where the 
shareholding reforms were most advanced, including Hainan, Jiangsu, Hunan
559 Interview-24, Shanghai, 2000.
560 Interview-27, Shanghai, 2000; Hu (1999a), 88.
561 SCMP (1993h).
562 Margolis (1994).
563 SCORES (1993), 18.
564 AFP (1993).
565 Interview-27, Shanghai, 2000.
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and Liaoning provinces.566 Figure 47 illustrates the phenomenon. To note: all 
share trading outside of Shanghai and Shenzhen was illegal after a State Council 
notice on 28th April 1992.567
566 Zhang (1998), 127.
567 Xiao (2000a), 14.
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Figure 47. Trading volume of shares and other securities in locales across China, 1993
Shares 
Rmb m
All securities, 
Rmb billion
Anhui 569 2.1
Beijing - 13.7
Changchun 459 0.8
Chengdu - 0.7
Chongqing - 0.3
Dalian 434 3.2
Fujian 7,491 8.6
Gansu 245 0.7
Guangdong 5,409 6.5
Guangxi - 0.2
Guangzhou 4,486 6.3
Jilin - 0.7
Guizhou - 0.0
Hainan 19,850 19.9
Harbin - 0.3
Hebei 2 0.3
Heilongjiang - 1.3
Henan 4,674 5.6
Hubei - 1.6
Hunan 8,553 10.0
Inner Mongolia 25 0.2
Jiangsu 11,208 19.9
Jiangxi 1,639 3.0
Liaoning 30 5.9
Nanjing - 9.7
Ningbo 4838 6.4
Ningxia 55 0.2
Qingdao - 0.3
Qinghai - 0.1
Shaanxi 4,425 6.0
Shandong - 0.1
Shanghai 476,072 516.3
Shanxi 1,689 2.2
Liaoning - 1.1
Shenzhen 90,550 90.6
Sichuan 1,370 1.6
Tianjin - 4.7
Wuhan 817 7.7
Xiamen 2331 2.6
Xian 1,374 2.4
Xizang (Tibet) - 0
Yunnan 2,023 3.6
Total 677,041 791.0
Includes Treasury bonds, State Investment bonds, State investment enterprise bonds, bank 
financial bonds, local enterprise bonds, shares and short-term enterprise financial securities. 
SIA (1994), 451.
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Local leaders outside Shanghai and Shenzhen were keen to find ways to list the 
securities of SOEs under their administration that had already undergone 
restructuring into shareholding companies. By the end of 1993, around 9,500 
SOEs had restructured, of which 1,776 were reported to have issued stock 
internally to employees.568 However because of the quota system the vast 
majority could not gain a listing place at the exchanges. By the end of 1993, only 
97 of the country’s 6,791 shareholding companies, some 1.4%, had been granted 
public listings, as Figure 48 illustrates.
Figure 48. Share-holding enterprises by locality, end 1993
Province Number o f share­
holding companies
Total stock capital, 
Rmb billion
Number o f listed 
companies at the 
SHGSE and SHZSE
Anhui 416 8.5 2
Beijing 176 9.9 2
Fujian 343 5.1 8
Gansu 125 1.6 0
Hainan 125 20.6 1
Hebei 306 5.6 0
Heilongjiang 461 6.9 1
Hubei 653 9.7 4
Inner 120 2.0 0
Mongolia
Jiangsu 645 9.2 4
Jiangxi 89 1.2 1
Shandong 1,101 11.7 4
Shanghai 92 23.3 39
Shenzhen 171 8.4 9
Sichuan 827 - 13
Tianjin 54 5.1 2
Xinjiang 111 1.4 0
Yunnan 106 3.3 1
Zhejiang 870 8.0 6
Total 6,791 176 97
SIA (1994), 493.
Guangdong province alone had 300 enterprises that had issued shares by the end 
of 1994, but an annual issuance quota of only Rmb 100m, enough for only two to 
three enterprises to list a year.569 Pent-up demand led to calls for additional stock
^  Wu (1994).
569 Lin (1995), 21.
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exchanges to be opened during 1991-92. More stock exchanges, official reports 
suggested in 1992-93, were probable, with many groups lobbying openly. One of 
the SCORES top officials, Li Zhangzhe, stated in early 1993 that China required 
at least five more exchanges.570 Leaders of the SEEC supported this call.571 
Economists complained that it was inconvenient for inland firms to list at the 
SHGSE and SHZSE (especially considering the difficulties involved in 
settlement across provincial boundaries) and that the two existing exchanges 
were contributing to the flow of capital to the east and south of the country.572 In 
1992, economist Li Yining suggested the immediate opening of new exchanges 
in Guangzhou, Xiamen and Haikou, and their future opening in Tianjin, 
Chengdu, Wuhan and Shenyang.573 There are reports that the CSRC under the 
leadership of Liu Hongru was supportive of the idea of establishing a third 
exchange in the north of China, probably in Tianjin.574 There is also some 
evidence that senior leaders within the PBoC supported a similar policy. But 
despite these efforts official State Council policy remained unchanged; share 
trading was to be confined to Shanghai and Shenzhen.576
The securities trading centres
Local governments, however, had other ideas and the bond trading centres 
provided a convenient site for them to pursue their ambitions. During 1992-94 a 
large number of these centres were transformed into ‘securities trading centres’, 
with the eventual aim to establish formal stock exchanges. The first STC was 
established in Chengdu in September 1991.577 During 1992, Hainan, Wuhan, 
Shenyang, Tianjin and Chongqing all upgraded their Treasury bond trading 
counters into STCs, listing enterprise and local government debt as well as
MO
equities and investment funds. In April of the same year there were reports of 
Chen Yuan, son of Chen Yun, and Wang Qishan, vice governor of the China 
Bank of Construction, lobbying for an exchange to be established in Beijing; an
570 SCMP (1993g); CD (1993a).
571 Chu (1993a).
572 CD (1992).
573 Li (1999), 215; TKP (1992b).
574 Chu (1994); SCMP (1994a); Xinhua (1995c).
575 Chu (1993a); Dong (1997), 235.
576 Hu (1999a), 122; Xinhua (1992b); TKP (1992a).
577 SZB (1994b); Jiangsu (1995); Wen (1998), 132-133.
578 SIA (1998), 529; Hu (1999a), 111; SIA (1996a), 151.
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STC was later set up in the city, although it is unclear if Yun and Wang were 
involved.579 In 1993, at least Qingdao also converted its bond centre into a STC
SROand in 1994 Xinjiang, Shandong, Jiangsu, Guangzhou, and Xian followed. The 
majority of China’s STCs were established in 1994; the year’s large expansion of 
Treasury bond issuance appears to have raised incentives for upgrading trading 
facilities.581 By the end of the year, the country had 19 STCs. By the time of their 
rectification in 1998, 27 STCs were active: 25 regional centres, plus the two 
computer-based trading systems run out of Beijing, the SCORES/SEEC STAQs 
and the PBoC’s National Equities Trading System (NETS). Most allowed trading 
in securities listed on the two stock exchanges, as well as their own local bonds 
and equity, while two, Wuhan and Tianjin, only listed their own securities, the 
majority of which were Treasury bonds.582 Since the State Council’s April 1993 
Provisional Regulations forbade the establishment of stock exchanges without 
State Council permission local leaders claimed that these markets were not 
‘exchanges’ (jiaoyisuo), but rather ‘trading centres’ {jiaoyi zhongxin). However, 
with centralised registration and settlement of securities and competitive auction- 
based trading systems, the difference with the official stock exchanges was in
CO"!
name only. In addition to the STCs, many cities established ‘property rights 
markets’ (PRMs). According to the SIA, at least 23 PRMs were in operation as 
of 1997.584 Wang Guogang claims that there were over 100.585 The PRMs were 
trading centres where legal person and state shares could be transferred between 
legal persons. In effect, they were stock exchanges for SOEs and other state 
organs and proved useful for local administrations interested in nurturing markets 
for state assets. Although details of their operations and regulation are scant it 
appears that the PRMs, like the STCs, were never formally authorised by the 
State Council and were run autonomously of central government.
The STCs were authorised by local authorities: STC general managers and the 
majority of senior staff were transferred from, and appointed by, PBoC
579 Cheung (1992).
580 SIA (1996a), 149-152; Zhang (1998), 179.
581 Interview-16, Shanghai, 2000.
582 Their leaderships hoped to be being authorised as independent stock exchanges and believed 
that linking with the SHGSE would undermine their autonomy, SHGSE (1997b), 529.
583 [World-Bank, 1995 #1474], 77.
584 SIA (1998), 244-249.
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branches. Money for establishing the STCs came from a variety of sources: four 
were loaned capital from their local governments, three from local PBoC 
branches, and two from local PBoC and MoF bureaux. Six STCs received money
ro/r
from local securities companies and seven relied solely on membership fees. 
Once established, the STCs became financially independent. Their largest 
business was ‘network trading’, facilitating the trading of exchange-listed 
securities, on which they charged commissions. In 1997 their income from 
commissions on network business totalled Rmb700m, an average of Rmb25m 
each. They also earned commissions and charged administrative fees for the 
trading of Treasury, local government and corporate bonds, corporate debt and 
equity and investment funds that they listed themselves (guapai). By June 1996, 
STCs had listed 38 funds of China’s 75 local investment funds, an unknown 
number of local bonds and at least 500 company shares. They also hosted their 
own Treasury bond repo business and engaged in proprietary trading. Business 
for them was especially good during 1996-97, as they benefited from the equity 
development of Shenzhen and Shanghai. The total trading volume of the STCs in 
1996 was Rmb497 billion, more than five times the figure for 1995.587 By the 
end of 1997, the 27 STCs (including STAQS and NET) had combined assets of 
Rmb3.8 billion, an average of Rmb 140m each. They made a combined profit of 
Rmb200m, though the CSRC report that many made losses through their 
proprietary trading and other speculative investments in, for example, real 
estate.588 At the time of their closure, the STCs employed a total of 1,259 people.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and the securities trading centres
The SHGSE was strongly supportive of the development of the STCs since it 
benefited from their growth. With the expansion of stock trading throughout the 
country in 1992-93, and facing limits on its own technical capabilities, the 
SHGSE looked for partners to provide it with additional trading facilities. 
Informal agreements between the STCs and the SHGSE allowed the exchange to 
use the regional centres as ‘external trading floors’ throughout China.589 The
585 Wang (1997a).
586 CSRC (1999b), 79; Interview-16, Shanghai, 2000.
587 Jiangsu (1995).
588 CSRC (1999b), 79.
589 Interview-16, Shanghai, 2000.
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SHGSE operated a ‘visible seat system’ that required securities companies to 
telephone in orders to their representatives at the exchange as chapter five 
explained. This was an extremely arduous process, but if orders were inputted at 
the STCs and communicated with the SHGSE trading system directly through 
the fibre-optic and satellite links, the number of trades could be vastly 
increased.590 In contrast, the SHZSE had introduced an ‘invisible seat system’ in 
August 1995 which allowed orders to be inputted into the SHZSE system 
directly from securities companies, and so lessened the need for STCs.591 The 
other major benefit of co-operation for the SHGSE and SHZSE was that the 
STCs helped solve clearing and settlement problems. After every trade, both 
shares and the money had to be transferred between the transacting parties. 
However, since banks in China were poorly co-ordinated across provinces, 
trading outside of Shanghai and Shenzhen was difficult since settlement could 
take weeks. The STCs provided clearing and settlement services themselves: 
they would settle with the exchanges on a wholesale basis and then settle with 
their retail customers, greatly lowering the transactions costs involved for
592investors.
The SHGSE provided start-up and on-going development funds and IT hardware 
to a number of the STCs.593 When the STC members bought membership seats at 
the SHSGE, for example, half of the normal fee of Rmb600,000 was contracted 
back to the STCs to allow them funds for development. Large STCs such as 
Beijing, Shenyang, and Chengdu each held over 150 seats at the SHGSE by the 
end of 1997. The smallest, including Ningbo, Taiyuan and Jilin, bought between 
20-30 seats each.594 By June 1998, the STCs had 1,897 member seats on the 
SHGSE, making up 33% of the exchange’s membership.595 By 1998, Rmbl.16 
billion had been paid to the two stock exchanges in membership fees and half of 
this had been returned to the STCs.596 One report suggests that the Xian STC in 
Shaanxi province started trading SHGSE and SHZSE shares in September
590 Heath (1994).
591 Walter and Howie (2001), 85, 88-89.
592 Thanks to David Wall for pointing this out.
593 Interview-27, Shanghai, 2000.
594 SHGSE (1997b), 529.
595 Jin (1999), 301.
596 CSRC (1999b), 79.
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1992.597 However, it appears that the first STC to formally establish a permanent 
telecommunications link to the SHSGE was the Xiamen STC in Fujian province 
in August 1993. By 1996, all but the Wuhan and Tianjin STCs had connected to 
the SHGSE.598 During 1995-97, the STCs became increasingly important in 
terms of trading volume to the SHGSE, as Figure 49 shows. By June 1996, 
twenty-two STCs accounted for 26.25% of the SHGSE’s share trading volume, 
28.12% of its investment fund trading volume and 11% of its Treasury bond 
business.599 During 1997, STC trading accounted for 30% of the total trading 
volume at the SHGSE and 10% of that at the SHZSE.600 Up until at least 1996, 
the STCs remitted all stamp tax revenues to the SHGSE, and thus to the 
Shanghai municipal government.601
597 SZB (1993q).
598 CSRC (1999b), 79.
599 SZB (1996g).
600 CSRC (1999b), 80.
601 After this time, a small proportion may have been remitted back to the STCs’ local authorities, 
Interview-16, Shanghai, 2000; SZB (1996g); SZB (1997c).
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Figure 49. Network trading volume by the STCs on the SHGSE, 1996-97
Year Total number o f 
network seats on 
SHGSE
Total volume o f network 
trades
Corporate
equity
Investment
fund
Treasury
bonds
Treasury bond buy-back 
contracts
1996 1,655 0.90 0.49 0.02 0.16 0.22
1997 2,012 1.80 1.20 0.16 0.12 0.28
All figures in Rmb trillion, apart from column one.
Author’s calculations based on data from SHGSE (1996), 425; SHGSE (1997b), 529.
Note: Data has been compiled from 24 STCs in 1996, and 26 STCs in 1997. In 1996, in approximate order of size (large to small), the STCs were; Beijing, Fujian, 
Nanfang, Jiangsu, Sichuan, Shenyang, Qingdao, Shandong, Zhejiang, Anhui, Harbin, STAQs, Henan, Xian, Hainan, Hunan, Guangxi, Chongqing, Ningbo, 
Xinjiang, Yunan, Jilin, Shanxi, Jiangxi. Dalian and Shantou appear additionally in the 1997 data.
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Individual securities trading centres
This section details the establishment, development and trading activities of three 
of the important STCs.
The Hainan Securities Trading Centre
In keeping with the Hainan leadership’s reputation as aggressive reformers, the 
Hainan STC was one of China’s most innovative and bold. In September 1991, 
there were reports of 13 ‘securities exchanges’ in operation in Hainan, trading
(\(Y)bonds with a combined face value of Rmb490m. These were over-the-counter 
trading posts, which were merged on 20th January 1992 into what was, basically, 
a stock exchange. The new exchange was founded with Rmb200m of 
registered capital, 29 members and a computerised system of centralised trading. 
This was done despite the lack of a response from the central PBoC to the 
Hainan PBoC’s application to establish an exchange.604 Three companies were 
immediately listed (guapai); four more were prepared to list within three months. 
One listed company, Minyuan Keji, had only just been established. Even though 
it had no profits and had issued no financial statements it was soon trading at a 
price of Rmb 10, after an IPO price of Rmbl.605 The central PBoC immediately 
ordered the exchange closed but the Hainan leadership did not comply. After 
four weeks of trading, Zhu Rongji reportedly flew to Haikou personally to 
demand the exchange closed. It appears that whatever the immediate effect of the 
vice premier’s visit, trading soon resumed and the ‘exchange’ simply assumed a 
new name: The Hainan Securities Trading Centre. By 1995, the centre was 
trading Treasury bonds, corporate debentures, short-term corporate financial 
bonds, convertible bonds, investment funds (many of which were real estate and 
property funds), and warrants.606 In 1995, the transaction volume for its 19 listed 
securities totalled Rmb38.4 billion and Rmb4.3 billion of SHGSE-listed 
securities were also traded. These figures suggest that Hainan was more a local 
stock exchange rather than a remote trading post for SHGSE-listed securities.
602 Xinhua (1991b).
603 Beijing (1995).
604 Chu (1993a); Wang (1992a).
605 Cao (2000), 29.
606 SIA (1996a), 149.
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There was certainly no shortage of companies wanting to list: by list 1997, 111 
companies had publicly issued shares in Hainan, raising Rmb 23 billion.607 
Another interesting characteristic of the Hainan STC was that as well as 
providing ‘illegal’ trading facilities for legal instruments, it also introduced 
financial products which had not received approval from the PBoC or CSRC, and 
which did not even trade on the official stock exchanges. For example, 
convertible bonds were only formally issued on the SHGSE in 1998 but were 
actively traded in Hainan starting in 1993.608 Moreover, on 10th March 1993 the 
Hainan STC started trading SHZSE-index futures. There was at least one 
contract for sale, a four month contract based on Shenzhen’s A-share index.609 
This is the only documented instance of such an instrument being traded in China 
during the 1990s.
The Wuhan Securities Trading Centre
The Wuhan STC was established on 17thApril 1992 with a registered capital of 
Rmb20m by the Hubei province PBoC and Wuhan city leadership.610 Wuhan 
leaders actively lobbied Beijing to set up China’s third exchange throughout 
1992 and by November 1993 were anticipating approval.611 It was never given, 
but this did not hold them back. The leadership invested Rmb40m setting up a 
second trading hall for 253 dealers and connected with other STCs around the 
country, although not with the two stock exchanges.612 In 1994, the STC was the 
country’s largest site for the trading of Treasury bonds, and many members of 
the other STCs traded Wuhan-listed bonds via their links with the STC.613 Daily 
trading volume of bonds and repos rose to Rmb 1-2 billion in early 1995, two to 
three times the volume traded at the SHGSE. By the end of the same year, the 
province had issued a total of Rmb 14 billion in local bonds and other securities 
many of which were listed in Wuhan.614 Despite being dominated by bonds, the 
Wuhan STC also listed other instruments. On 23rd June 1993, for instance, it
607 Xinhua (1997b).
608 Li (1998b), 117, 170.
609 Xiao (2000a), 19.
610 SIA (1993), 166.
611 SCMP (1993i).
612 Chan (1995e).
613 Li (1998b).
614 Xinhua (1994f).
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started listing local investment funds and by the end of 1995, had listed 12 of 
them, including three from Guangdong, four from Jiangsu and one from Anhui. 
In addition, over twenty companies’ shares were listed (guapai). Investment 
funds and shares accounted for a trading volume of Rmb345m in 1995.615 On 
12th April 1994, the Wuhan STC started Treasury bond futures trading, 
apparently without any authorisation from the central PBoC.616
The Securities Trading Automated Quotation System
In November 1990, the STAQS, a national bond-trading network, was 
established in Beijing by the SEEC, as chapter three noted.617 Although classified 
as a changwai jiaoyisuo by the CSRC in 1998, the STAQS was different in 
origin and design from the regional STCs. It was classified as a ‘non-enterprise 
government institution’ rather than as a financial institution, and could therefore 
operate under the administrative jurisdiction of the SCORES rather than the 
PBoC. It had greater political legitimacy than the local STCs but still no State 
Council regulations were ever issued and no senior Chinese leaders attended the 
opening ceremony.618 Nevertheless, the STAQS leaders’ ambition was to link up 
with the stock exchanges and the other STCs to form one unified Nasdaq-like 
national trading system.619 In July 1992, with State Council authorisation, the 
STAQS began listing legal person shares, including those of Guangxi Yuchai 
Machinery, Hainan Huakai Industries, Zhuhai Hengtong Real Estate and Sichuan 
Shudou Mansion.620 Over 1,300 institutional investors were reported to have 
taken part in the trading of these shares; a volume of Rmb450m was recorded by 
the end of the year.621 In 1993, the STAQS facilitated trading volume of 
Rmb400m, around 0.6% of all securities traded in China.622 However, owing to 
zhongyang leaders’ concerns over the diminution of state shareholding in May 
1993, the CSRC banned new legal person share listings, scuttling the STAQS
6,5 SIA (1996a), 69.
616 Li (1998b), 173.
617 SIA (1993), 173-175; Yao (1998), 85; Xinhua (1990b); Elliot (1990).
618 SIA (1994), 36.
619 SIA (1993), 175; Lai (1994).
620 Chu (1993b).
621 SIA (1993), 174.
622 Hainan (1995b), 1.
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leaders’ ambitions.623 By that time the system had listed eight legal person shares 
and had registered 30,000 investors. The STAQS remained open until 2000, 
although little trading took place after 1994.
Regulation o f the Securities Trading Centres
The STCs had, at best, an unclear legal and policy status.624 No central 
government bureau ever assumed regulatory responsibility for them. Indeed, only 
a small handful of central regulations even mentioned the STCs.625 It was only in 
1998 that the State Council recognised their existence, labelled them ‘illegal’ and 
ordered their closure. As financial institutions, the STCs should have been
C S)(L
authorised by the central PBoC. Sixteen were authorised by provincial PBoC 
branches; ten were authorised directly by provincial governors; and three
fS)*7received joint local PBoC and local government authorisation. In terms of day- 
to-day management responsibilities, fourteen STCs fell under PBoC jurisdiction, 
ten under local SMCs and SAOs and one under a TIC. However, neither local 
PBoC branches nor local SAOs actively supervised their activities. One 
interviewee implied that while the central PBoC was keen to protect its formal 
authority over the sector, it was delinquent in its practice of actual regulation. For 
their part, the SHGSE and SHZSE had regulatory responsibilities as far as 
trading in their secondary markets were concerned, but they lacked means of 
checking on non-local members. The CSRC remained excluded from the sector, 
although it is unclear what the CSRC leadership’s position on this was. The 
World Bank reports that since STCs remained under the formal jurisdiction of 
the PBoC, the CSRC leadership was unwilling (or unable) to ‘interfere’.628 
However, there are also suggestions that the CSRC leadership had little interest 
in extending its regulatory mandate to the STCs because of the debts and chaotic 
financial operations that they would then have had to cope with. Another 
interviewee claimed that during 1995-96 the CSRC proposed plans to the SCSC
623 Xiao (2000a), 20.
624 Interviews 14,16, 29, Shanghai, 2000, provided information on STC regulation.
625 There are suggestions that this was because even censorious or disciplinary circulars would 
imply central government recognition of the sector.
626 This was required by the PBoC’s Regulations on Financial Institutions (1994), Yao (1998), 
41-44.
627 CSRC (1999b), 79.
628 Kumar (1997b), 32.
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that involved the ‘standardisation’ and cleaning up the sector. Indeed, in August 
1996, the CSRC did make a public call to restrict off-exchange trading 
(ichangwai jiaoyi) and to rectify the STCs. ‘Rectify’, however, did not here 
mean closure: in this case it meant allowing the STCs to be officially recognised, 
their problems resolved and then integrated with the stock exchanges to form a 
multi-level national trading system under the CSRC’s sole jurisdiction. However, 
the PBoC leadership reportedly vetoed the proposal.
The STCs and the Treasury bond repo market
The STCs’ biggest problem was Treasury bond repo trading.630 This was popular 
at the STCs, especially during 1995-96 and particularly in Wuhan and Tianjin 
and on the STAQS. The STCs tended to allow securities companies and TICs to 
engage in repo trading with very low collateral. Tianjin and Wuhan allowed 
deposits of bonds worth only 10% of funds borrowed, while the SHGSE had a 
100% requirement.631 Such highly-leveraged lending became problematic when 
the borrowing institution defaulted on the contract and the lending institution was 
forced to assume the liability. Repo trades would often take place without the 
bond certificates being deposited at the STCs.632 There was no central depository 
for Treasury bonds in China during 1993-96. Instead, the World Bank reports 
that the SHGSE used over 60 regional depositories in August 1995.633 The 
problem was that this fragmented system of depositories facilitated the de facto 
(and illegal) short selling of bond certificates. Regional depositories would issue 
receipts for non-existent bonds, and these were then traded on the STCs and the 
two stock exchanges. However, if the bonds did not exist, these were in effect 
short sales. Such practice is thought to have been very common, although no 
statistics are available. Local PBoC regulation in this area was particularly 
deficient. No other regulator, least of all the CSRC, had access to information 
about the scale of the repo loans, the lack of bond-deposits, the uses to which 
securities companies were putting these short term funds or the extent of the debt 
they, the STCs or the banks were building up. There is also the suggestion of
629 Hu (1999a), 249; Tsang (1995a).
630 Xiao (2000c), 215-222.
631 Chan (1995e).
632 Interview-14, Shanghai, 2000.
633 World Bank (1995a), 76.
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administrative interference in the repo market by local leaders. As chapter five 
explained, bank funds often found their way, via repo loans, to securities 
companies and TICs, who used the funds for speculative share trading and real 
estate investment. These were all sectors local leaders were interested in 
supporting and for which bank loans were not permitted to be extended. Again, 
statistics on the scale of this practice are unavailable.
Local securities companies, and many of the STCs, soon became heavily 
indebted. In November 1995, the Shanghai Securities News estimated that 
securities firms had lost ‘several million Renminbi’ through their repo 
business.634 This was probably a conservative estimate. The central government
tlimade several attempts to correct the problem. On 9 August 1995, the PBoC, 
MoF and CSRC issued a joint-circular banning ‘non-authorised exchanges’ from 
repo trading.635 In October 1995, under the direction of the PBoC, CSRC and 
MoF, the Wuhan STC was forced to re-register all of its repo contracts (in an 
effort to match depository receipts with actual bond certificates) and to clear up 
all its associated debt.636 The PBoC also increased the margin deposits required 
for repo trading and limited the repo trading of certain securities companies. But 
all to little effect: the volume of STC repo trading expanded, benefiting in late 
1996 and early 1997 from the stimulus provided by the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
leaderships’ equity developmentalism. After hitting a record daily volume of 
Rmb 1.9 billion on 11th April 1996, repo trading volume at the SHGSE continued 
to increase as shown in Figure 50.637 Around half of this was traded through the 
STCs.
634 SZB (1995n).
635 Li (1998b), 199; RR (1995).
636 SIA (1996b), 45-46.
637 SZB (1996h).
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Figure 50. Trading of Treasury bond repos at the SHGSE, 1996
January February March April May June July August September October November December
Repo trading 
volume
18.3 10.7 19.4 37.6 61.2 80.6 138.0 157.1 167.9 190.8 178.0 182.3
Rmb billion
Note: Includes repo traded facilitated by the STCs. 
CSRC (1997), 26-27, 34-35.
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There were other regulatory problems.638 Since securities companies could join 
STCs outside of their own locales, strong incentives existed for STCs to compete 
to create the most attractive regulatory environments for their members. The 
result was a ‘race down to the bottom’ as STCs competed to reduce fees and 
margin requirements, and relax enforcement of what rules did exist. STCs also 
extended finance to their members to encourage trading and, as their members 
became indebted, so did they. Second, there was little monitoring of the financial 
health of STC members. Many were the securities arms of local TICs. In theory, 
they operated within the PBoC’s regulatory jurisdiction, but due to weak PBoC 
capacity, they were extremely poorly regulated. Third, illegal activities were 
widespread. STC management would trade themselves using inside information; 
some also traded in false Treasury bond certificates and set up fake repo 
accounts. STCs also co-operated with listed companies in illegal activities. In 
January 1997, for instance, the CSRC fined the Hunan STC Rmb75,000 for 
having lent Rmbl5m to Zhangjiajie Travel Development for speculation in its 
own shares. Fourth, the STCs had unclear business scopes. Some directly 
invested in commercial enterprise and real estate. Losses were concentrated at 
Wuhan and Tianjin, where repo trading was most active; several other STCs 
claimed to be profitable.640
Rectification o f the securities trading centres
A decision to rectify the STCs was taken by the senior leadership in mid 1996. 
The October 1996 SCSC meeting extended support to the PBoC’s ‘rectification’ 
of the sector, but implementation was delayed.641 Based on the FELG’s sanding 
fangan (‘three decisions plan’) on 22nd June 1997 the State Council Office issued 
a circular that ordered the sector closed.642 On 15th October 1998, the CSRC 
presented its plans to the STCs and FIIs. First, the asset situation of each STC 
was to be assessed by CSRC investigators, STC managers and independent 
accountants. Second, management of their accounts, network trading and 
membership matters was to be passed to the two stock exchanges. Actual
638 CSRC (1999b), 80.
639 SZB (1997n).
640 Interview-16, Shanghai, 2000.
641 SZB (1996e).
642 CSRC (1999b), 80.
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resolution of the sector would then involve a selection of solutions. The CSRC 
would allow some STCs to be acquired by securities companies, some to be 
restructured and merged to form securities companies, and some to be closed 
down. The most heavily indebted were to take the later path and in December 
1998 the Wuhan STC was closed.643 The other major problem, of course, was 
what to do with the companies whose shares had been listed (guapai) on the 
STCs. The CSRC used six methods to resolve this issue: 644
□ Many quality guapai enterprises bought back their own shares.
□ Non-listed enterprises were encouraged to buy the shares of guapai 
companies.
□ Other non-listed enterprises in similar industries were encouraged to buy 
shares in guapai companies and merge with them. Some were offered listing 
places on the stock exchanges in return for their co-operation.
□ Some guapai companies converted their shares into enterprise bonds.
□ Some large guapai companies were recommended for listing on the two 
stock exchanges.
□ Many poor quality guapai companies were instructed to encourage their 
shareholders to continue to hold their shares, even though trading in these 
shares was now restricted.
Most guapai companies took the first and last options, although a sizeable 
number of firms who converted their equity into debt.645 By mid-2000, about 20 
guapai companies had been authorised to list on the stock exchanges. De-listing 
of guapai companies was largely completed by 30th June 1999.646 However, 
rectification of the heavily-indebted investment fund sector took longer, and was 
still ongoing at the end of 2000.
643 CER (1998b), 13.
644 CSRC (1999b), 73.
645 Interview-16, Shanghai, 2000.
646 CSRC (1999b), 81.
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Local investment funds
During 1990-93, provincial and sub-provincial governments throughout China 
established small-scale local investment funds (LIFs).647 These were nearly all 
closed-end funds that invested in securities, real estate and local industry, 
providing an important vehicle for local government fund raising. The only open- 
ended LIF was the Sichuan Treasury Bond Investment Fund.648 LIFs were owned 
and managed by local banks, insurance companies, TICs and some private 
companies.649 According to the SIA, the first were established in Shenzhen and 
Wuhan in October 1991.650 The Shenzhen fund, the Southern Mountain Risk 
Investment Fund, raised Rmb80m and invested 70% of its capital in fixed assets, 
with 26% going to equity and 4% to debt investments. The Wuhan Securities 
Investment Fund (Phase one) raised only RmblOm (the smallest of all the LIFs), 
investing 30% of this in bonds and the rest in undisclosed assets.651 Companies 
in Shenzhen, Shenyang, Dalian, Heilongjiang and Guangdong provinces issued 
at least four funds.652 Most issued units worth between Rmb60-100m.653 On 
average about 60% of their capital went into fixed assets, with the rest mostly 
going into securities.654 In addition to the investment funds, localities issued a 
variety of other unstandardised instruments such as beneficiary and portfolio 
certificates. These were popular in Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Henan provinces.655 By
1995, local governments had raised about Rmb 1.5 billion through such 
unstandardised issues.
By the end of 1993, 21 different local administrations (mostly provinces and 
cities) had issued fifty-six LIFs with a face value of Rmb4.8 billion.656 By mid-
1996, the STCs listed 38 of the 75 LIFs and the two stock exchanges also listed a
647 Statistics on this sector are scare and often inconsistent, see SIA (1996a), 106-110; Tao 
(1999). For an introduction, Wall (1995).
SIA (1996a), 109.
649 Kumar (1997a), 46-47.
650 Although this is open to some dispute, Tao (1999), 208; Xinhua (1993f); Xinhua (1993e).
651 SIA (1996a), 106.
652 This statement is based on data on only 45 LIFs.
653 SZB (1995k).
654 SZB (1994f).
655 SIA (1996a), 106.
656 SZB (1994d).
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number: SHZSE ten and SHGSE 15.657 The Shantou Boshi Township and 
Village Enterprise Investment Fund, for example, traded on the SHGSE, and the 
Tianjin Enterprise Fund traded on the Tianjin STC.658 Anjali Kumar cites reports 
that as of year end 1995 12 funds were listed at the Guangzhou STC, eight at the 
Shenyang STC, seven at the Dalian STC and four in Hainan.659 Other funds 
found even more informal means to trade: the Jiangsu Construction Investment 
Fund appears to have been traded informally on an OTC basis at branches of the 
Construction Bank of China’s Jiangsu TIC.660
Regulation o f the funds
Like the STCs, LIFs were a local initiative; only four received authorisation from 
the central PBoC as was legally required. In November 1992, the Zibo Township 
Fund in Shandong province was the first to receive authorisation from the central 
PBoC; it later listed on the SHGSE in August 1993.661 Other LIFs were 
authorised by PBoC branches or local leaders. On 19th May 1993, on orders from 
the State Council, the PBoC banned the establishment of new funds.662 However, 
a few local administrations ignored this notice: the number of LIFs rose from 
around 60 at the end of 1993 to 75 by 1995. In contravention of the ban on new 
LEF listings, the SHZSE listed the Tianji and Lantian funds in April 1994.663 In 
the main, however, although none were closed, the notice was effective: no new 
LIFs were established after 1995.664 Regulation of the LIF sector was deficient. 
While the funds, and many of the companies that owned them, fell under the 
regulatory jurisdiction of the PBoC, local branches did not supervise their 
activities. LIFs engaged in highly irregular investment practices: many built up 
losses through real estate, hotel and speculative share dealing. They were 
frequently used to invest in local government-sponsored projects. Many of them 
refused to issue dividends.665 The LIFs’ internal management structures were 
also flawed. Standard practice in the West is for the fund manager and custodian
657 Feng (1997), 38.
658 SIA (1994), 481.
659 Kumar (1997a), 47.
660 SIA (1994), 480.
661 SZB (1994m).
662 ZZPZ (1997), 496.
663 SZB (1994o); Power (1993).
664 SIA (1996a), 106.
665 Tao (1999), 209-211.
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to be distinct legal persons, each with legal liability. However, the manager and 
custodian for 23 LIFs were the same legal person; nine funds had no custodian. 
34 LIFs were managed by TICs, where LIF assets could easily moved around 
their different businesses.
Rectification o f the funds
The CSRC gained regulatory powers over the new investment fund sector on 14th 
November 1997, when the SCSC issued the first national rules for the sector.666 
The PBoC’s role was reduced to regulating the trustee banks. All new funds 
would require CSRC approval, paid-up capital of at least Rmb300m and would 
have a minimum term of five years. Planners within the CSRC also introduced 
administrative rules to ensure good practice. For example, 80% of investment 
funds assets had be held in securities (to prevent real estate investment et al.) and 
90% of the funds’ returns had to be distributed as dividends. CSRC-authorised 
securities companies set up fund management companies that remain tied to their 
parents through majority shareholdings. In March 1998, the Jintai and Kaiyuan 
funds, the first batch of standardised investment funds issued Rmb2 billion of 
units each. As of the end of 2000, there were eleven such companies managing 
thirty-four funds which had issued Rmb56 billion, as Figure 51 shows. Around 
half of these funds were entirely new funds with initial issuance of Rmb2 or 3 
billion; the rest were small, only Rmb200-300m in size, the end product of 
restructured LIFs. Figure 52 shows trading of the entire fund sector, including 
standardised and old, unstandardised funds, during 1994-2000.
Figure 51. New standardised investment funds, 1998-2000
1998 1999 2000
Total number 6 23 34
Amount issued, Rmb billion 12 51 56
Turnover, Rmb billion 55.53 162.3 246.6
CSRC (2001), 6-7.
666 Chen (1997a), 423-425.
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Figure 52. Trading summary of all listed investment funds, 1994-2000
Number o f funds Trading volume 
Rmb billion
1994 20 35.8
1995 22 51.0
1996 25 156.7
1997 25 80.7
1998 29 101.7
1999 42 248.5
2000 36 280.2
CSRC (2001), 121.
In spring 1998, LIFs were officially determined to have been established 
‘without authorisation’ (yuequan), and the CSRC was mandated to rectify the 
sector. The CSRC estimated that the funds, as of end 1998, were capitalised at 
Rmb9.6 billion.668 Only three had already reached term by 1999. Rectification 
entailed restructuring and merging LIFs with more than Rmb200m in assets into 
standardised investment funds with the assistance of the investment fund 
companies established in 1997, and closing others. For example, six LIFs in 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces were merged to form the Jinyue (later Yuhua) 
Securities Investment Fund in April 2000 managed by Boshi Fund 
Management.669
Concluding remarks
The STC sector reveals the extent of autonomy enjoyed by local leaders, and the 
marked inability of the central government to dictate institutional development in 
the equity sector before 1997. During the early 1990s, provincial leaders used 
STCs and LIFs to raise capital for local industry. Although they varied in size 
and in the instruments they traded, all STCs facilitated investment in their local 
economies and boosted fiscal revenues. Such was the significance of the larger 
STCs that according to a common phrase of the early 1990s China had ‘two 
exchanges, one network (STAQs), and three trading centres (Tianjin, Wuhan and 
Shenyang)’ (liangsuo, yiwang, sanzhongxin).610 The thesis has shown numerous 
instance of implementation bias, the alteration, manipulation and delay of policy
667 Green (2001), 22.
668 CSRC (1999b), 87-88.
669 COL (2000a).
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during implementation by local leaders. However, the creation and maintenance 
of what were, in effect, stock exchanges, in opposition to central government 
policy, was of an entirely different degree of defection. However, after 1997 the 
zhongyang leadership spoke with clarity and acted with force, and organised the 
central government in such a way as to ensure the closure of the STCs. This was 
no doubt made easier by the SHGSE’s new technological capabilities, which 
meant that it was no longer dependent on the STCs for providing external trading 
and settlement facilitates. Nevertheless, the move entailed the loss of an 
important avenue for capital raising and profits for local governments, and its 
successful implementation is surprising considering the PRC state’s tendency for 
compromise and gradualism. Rectification required substantial co-ordination 
within the state, something that was obviously lacking during the 1993-96 
period.
670 Hainan (1995b), 1.
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Part III
Institution building at the centre
8Institutional creation and development: The China Securities 
Regulatory Commission
The CSRC is a coveted organisation in China. It represents influence and money.
Anonymous securities analyst, 1994671
Everyone knows we are a tiger without teeth.
Anonymous CSRC official, 1995672
The CSRC began life in late 1992 as an agency without any of the powers it 
needed to fulfil its mandate. It was charged with supervising securities firms, the 
stock exchanges, and the issuance and transactions of all listed securities. It was 
to operate under the supervision of the SCSC, the central government co­
ordinating committee for the sector. Despite these extensive responsibilities, the 
CSRC was given non-governmental status, a low bureaucratic rank, no local 
offices and no powers of enforcement. It had to co-operate with numerous other 
government bureaux in order to implement its mandate and its rulings and 
actions were frequently resisted and ignored. However, by the start of 2000 the 
CSRC had been transformed: it had achieved ministerial rank, had gained sole 
managerial (guanli) authority over the stock exchanges and SAOs, and had 
absorbed a wide range of policy and regulation-making powers from the 
dissolved SCSC. The zhongyang leadership supported the rise of the CSRC in 
order to solve two basic institutional problems. Within central government 
frequent disputes between bureau leaders undermined the authority and clarity of 
SCSC policy, a situation that local leaders were happy to exploit. Such disputes 
could only be resolved by concentrating policy-making powers into a single 
organisation and allowing the CSRC to exclusively represent ‘the centre’ in its 
dealings with the local bureaux. Second, it was only by gaining guanli 
administrative control over the SAOs and stock exchanges (and thereby 
sidelining the competing local sub-principals) that the central government was
671 Tong (1994).
672 Engardio (1995).
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able to achieve institutional capture of the sector and thereby ensure that the 
zhongyang leadership’s interests were defended.
The institutional architecture of equity regulation is complex and it is, of course, 
impossible to separate the rise of the CSRC from other areas covered in this 
thesis: its relationship with the local SAOs (chapter four), the stock exchanges 
(chapter six), and, most critically, the SCSC (chapter nine). This chapter attempts 
to provide an overview of the CSRC’s development not covered in these chapters 
during 1992-2000. It also aims to identify the factors behind the major 
institutional changes that took place in the sector in 1992 and after 1997. It is laid 
out as follows. The first section explains events leading up to the CSRC’s 
creation in 1992. The second examines developments at the CSRC during 1993- 
95. The third section shows how the stock market was linked to industrial policy 
by the State Council in 1996, preparing the way for an upgrading in CSRC rank 
and powers after the crisis during 1996-97. The fourth examines how 
institutional capture over the SAOs took place during 1998-99.
Deng Xiaoping*s nanxun, the 8.10 Shenzhen crisis and the creation o f the 
CSRC
In spring 1992, China’s stock market took a great leap forward. The problem was 
that its institutions did not keep up. In August 1992, the sector’s first major crisis 
ended the period of institutional tinkering and piecemeal regulation described in 
chapter three. Crisis induced the zhongyang leadership to create two new 
organisations, the SCSC and the CSRC, the aim of which was to improve the 
zhongyang leaders’ ability to control equity development through beefing up 
central government oversight and constraining the powers of local sub-principals. 
Unfortunately, the institutional framework that was used to accomplish this task 
was flawed.
An editorial in the Renmin Ribao in December 1991 strongly backed the 
development of the stock market. It stated that the State Council and Central 
Committee were both ‘very clear about developing a socialist securities 
market...they will support its development...[it] must be done actively and in a
209
stable and sound fashion’.673 This was positive news: since the establishment of
the two stock exchanges in late 1990, the zhongyang leadership had been silent
on the equity issue and both exchanges had only witnessed limited growth. Only
four companies had been listed during 1991.674 During his nanxun (southern
tour) in January-February 1992, Deng Xiaoping publicly backed experimentation
with the share market as part of his reform agenda, famously stating that;
As for securities and the stock market, are they finally good or 
bad? Are they dangerous? Are they things that only capitalism 
has or can socialism also make use o f them? To decide 
whether they can be used, we must experiment first. I f  we think 
they work, i f  after a year or two we think they are good, then 
we can expand them. I f  problems arise, we can close them 
down, immediately and completely. And even i f  we close them 
down, we can do so quickly or slowly, or we could even leave 
a little tail.675
It was classic Deng: a radical proposal was couched in sufficient caution and 
qualification that neo-conservatives had little room to object. In March 1992 the 
Politburo met to back Deng’s nanxun line.676 Economic growth was prioritised 
and calls for companies to issue ‘as many securities as possible’ were heard from 
central government officials.677 As in 1987-88, but to a much larger extent, under 
the sponsorship of local leaders PBoC branches around the country authorised 
the issuance of securities.678 Tens of thousands of SOEs sought permission to 
restructure into shareholding companies. There are no reliable statistics for how 
many succeeded, but a variety of sources make clear that the amount of shares 
issued far exceeded the PBoC’s national securities quota of Rmb4 billion.679 
According to Jin Jiandong, at least 865 enterprises in 34 cities and provinces
Z O A
requested permission to issue Rmb27.7 billion worth of securities during 1992.
In Shenzhen and Shanghai alone, one report states that Rmb 13 billion worth of 
securities were issued.681 Another report by a research institute in Hainan reached
673 Yuan (1992),37.
674 CSRC (2001), 134.
675 YW (1992); WWP (1992).
676 Deng had stepped down from the Politburo in September 1989, but a secret resolution at the 
13th Party Congress in 1987 had directed that all major decisions be authorised by him, Baum 
(1994), 340-372, 356. On the fights over reform in 1992, Fewsmith (2001), 56-65.
677 Interview-24, Shanghai, 2000.
678 Xinhua (1992c).
679 CCTP (1992b); SCMP (1994a).
680 Jin (1992), 27.
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a more conservative conclusion, claiming that nation-wide only Rmb 10 billion 
worth of shares were issued by 53 companies. The huge scale of issuance 
inevitably raised concerns in central government. Chen Jinhua, minister at the 
SCORES worried publicly about localities’ ‘excessive zeal’ in issuing 
securities. He no doubt realised that excess issuance would undermine
shareholding reform just as much as too little issuance. Despite these concerns, 
the SCORES pushed the shareholding agenda forward with a policy document in 
early summer 1992. The Important Points for Economic System Reform 
recommended enlarging the scope of share issuance and allowing localities 
outside of Shanghai and Shenzhen to issue ‘a few basic and high-technology 
industry shares’. State Council members supported the policy, allowing 
Guangdong, Fujian and Hainan provinces to experiment with share issuance, but 
not public trading.684 For its part, the SPC announced that some large SOEs
/ O f
would be encouraged to list publicly. As these policies were rolled out and 
Deng’s nanxun comments were publicised, tens of thousands of small investors 
bought shares. Reform China was experiencing its first flush of gupiao re (share 
fever).686
By August 1992, the Shenzhen stock market was indeed feverish. An estimated 
Rmb 10m was entering the market each day and, despite a government 
crackdown, a curb market in real and forged share certificates was active outside 
the exchange.687 The SHZSE could not list securities as fast as they were issued.
t liAs prices soared, demand for IPO shares swelled. On 9 August 1992, an 
estimated one million people, half of them from outside of Shenzhen, queued on 
the city’s streets to buy 5m IPO application forms (rengouzheng) at 303 sales
/OQ
points around the city. According to the original PBoC/municipal government 
plan, 10% of these forms were to be chosen by lottery and their ‘owners’ allowed 
to subscribe to IPO shares. It would have normally required three days for all the 
rengouzheng to sell out, but at 9.00pm, after delays in sales throughout the day,
682 Hainan (1995a), 50.683 CCTp (1992a)
684 Dong (1997), 137-138.
685 CCTP (1992c).
686 Xinhua (1992e).
687 Liu (1997), 121-124; ZTS (1990); HKATV (1992); Kohut (1992); Ren (1992); CM (1992);
Jen (1992); Jen (1992); SCMP (1992a).
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officials announced that all of the forms had been sold.689 The crowds suspected, 
correctly as it transpired, that most of the forms had been sold onto the black 
market and stolen by police, bank staff and the other government officials 
involved in the sale. On the following day, 10th August (thus the signifier ‘8.10’), 
this dissatisfaction spilled over into rioting, the most serious social disturbance in 
China since the 1989 Tianamen Square protests. Police met placards reading 
‘fight corruption’ with tear gas.690 The Shenzhen stock market small group, 
headed by the deputy mayor, called in the army and closed the SHZSE. It also 
quickly issued a second batch of 5m rengouzheng.691 Official media sources 
reported that 200 to 300 protestors, led by ‘hooligans’, had caused the 
disturbance.692 Western media sources put the figure of those involved at over 
10,000, most of whom were simply frustrated investors.
The central government reacts
Zhongyang leaders reacted with extreme concern. There had already been several 
small IPO-related disturbances in Shanghai in late 1991.693 Premier Li Peng 
immediately announced the temporary suspension of all share issuance and 
listing.694 An investigative group from Beijing arrived in Shenzhen on 20th 
August, led by the neo-conservative vice-premier Zou Jiahua. Vice premier Zhu 
Rongji was also reported to have flown in on 24th September 1992. Their senior 
rankings indicated the seriousness with which the leadership took the 
disturbance, and how the riot had fed into battles within Beijing over the 
direction of reform.695 The official State Council report released on 10th 
December 1992 was highly critical of local officials.696 It stated that 4,180 
officials had been involved in stealing and reselling rengouzheng and that
688 Wang (1992b), 80; Huang (1999d), 120.
689 Gu (1993), 8.
690 Chu (1992); TKP (1992c).
691 SHZSE (1993).
692 SCMP (1992b).
693 Xinhua (1991d).
694 Liu (1997), 130.
695 SZB (1992b); SHZSE (1993); SCMP (1992d).
696 Shenzhen Party Secretary Li Hao and Zheng Liangyu were forced to make public self- 
criticisms; Zheng was transferred to be vice governor of Jiangxi, while Li was replaced later in 
1993. Zhang Hongyi, Shenzhen’s vice mayor responsible for finance, was demoted to vice mayor 
of nearby Dongyuan City, SCMP (1993d), CCJP (1992); Jen (1992); SCMP (1992c).
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100,000 forms had been illegally diverted.697 (Hong Kong media estimated that 
70% of the IPO forms, some 3.5m, were stolen and privately sold.698) As well as 
uncovering extensive corruption, the report found the choice of issuance method 
to have been flawed. Mayor Zheng Liangyu and Vice Mayor Zhang Hongyi had 
chosen to limit the number of rengouzheng available rather than allowing a 
limitless number to be sold, as some officials had advised, and as had been 
standard practice in Shanghai since the beginning of 1992.6"  The suspicion was 
that by restricting the supply of forms officials could divert them and maximise 
revenues from their sale on the black-market where forms sold at five to ten 
times their face value.
Within the zhongyang leadership there was considerable disagreement about how 
to react to the crisis. Many in the nascent securities industry feared that neo­
conservatives would force the complete closure of the sector. Deng’s words 
about closing the market suddenly appeared prescient. The secretary to leading 
neo-conservative Chen Yun, and Chen Yuan, his son, had inspected the SHZSE 
days before the rioting and were reported to have disapproved.700 After the riot, 
Chen Yun publicly called for the need to ‘summarise’ the experiences of the 
special economic zones, conservative euphemism for closing them, and the stock 
exchange, down.701 Zhu Rongji, who was associated with the stock market 
because of his personal support for the SHGSE, became vulnerable to personal 
attack. At a meeting of senior leaders on 19th August, another conservative Chen 
Xitong, Beijing mayor, claimed that ‘the State Council was responsible for the 
[8.10] incident’, implying that the crisis was Zhu’s fault.702 PBoC governor Li 
Guixian and the recently removed finance minister Wang Bingqian, pointedly 
accused another comrade of ‘acting on his own’. Stock market policy at this 
juncture became wrapped up with factional struggles within the senior leadership 
and thus opaque to detailed analysis. The suspicion must be, however, that the 
pivotal player in resolving the dispute was Deng. It was his nanxun speeches that
697 Liu (1997), 124; Gu (1993), 8. SZB (19931).
698 SCMP (1992a).
699 SCMP (1992c); Wang (1992b), 126-132; Huang (1999c), 120.
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had triggered China’s trading fever, and two of his recent appointees, Zhu and 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin, had both supported share market development.704 
In addition to the personnel issue for Deng, defence of the stock market was 
defence of the nanxun line. Confirmation that the senior leadership remained pro­
equity soon came. In September 1992 the first national securities companies, 
Huaxia Securities, Guotai Securities and Nanfang Securities, were established 
with commercial bank and MoF funds.705 At the 14th Party Congress in October 
1992 Jiang used his political report to speak in favour of ‘nurturing securities, 
shares and financial markets’. It was an important sign of continued zhongyang 
support; attentive listeners noted that Jiang did not use the word ‘experiment’ to 
describe the market.706 The message was clear: China’s stock market was here to 
stay. What had still to be decided was how to regulate it.
A special State Council meeting was held to discuss the Shenzhen report and 
equity regulation in October 1992.707 Li Guixian lobbied for an expansion of the 
responsibilities and powers of the PBoC’s State Council Securities Management 
Meeting System (SCSMMS), a committee which he chaired established earlier 
that year. He argued that the ‘technical problems’ involved in the Shenzhen IPO 
could be resolved and that with more resources the PBoC could deliver effective 
regulation. As Figure 53 shows, and chapter three explained, the PBoC, at least 
in theory, was the part of the xitong mandated to develop and enforce equity 
regulation before the riots. However, many senior figures believed that the 
PBoC, a shareholder in numerous securities companies and TICs, was ill-suited 
to act as the market’s regulator. The evident capture of its local branches by local 
leaders, its failure to constrain issuance, and the involvement of the PBoC 
Shenzhen branch in the 8.10 incident, made it vulnerable to criticism. Moreover, 
other State Council markets were dissatisfied with their lack of voice and wanted 
direct mechanisms of influence over equity policy. The MoF, for instance, 
proposed that a dedicated regulatory organ should be established under its own 
management.708 Others proposed the setting up of a dedicated stock market
704 Ren (1992).
705 Tong (1992); Chen (1997c), 3.
706 Dong (1997), 136.
707 Interview-20, Beijing, 2000.
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regulator. The SCORES, and a number of NPC deputies, had been lobbying for 
one to be established since at least 1991. In July 1991, the SCORES had drafted 
A Suggestion on Establishing a State Council Securities Management 
Commission; deputies within the NPC had produced a similar document.709
709 Guo (1999a), 131; Dong (1997), 135.
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Figure 53. China’s equity institutions, December 1990 to October 1992
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Figure 54. China’s equity institutions, December 1992 to July 1997
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The December 1992 circular: the creation o f the CSRC
These plans were dusted off and under the guidance of Vice Premier Zhu, two 
new organs were established with the aim of eliminating the two problems 
zhongyang leaders had determined were responsible for 8.10: unsupervised local
7 1 0government management of the share market and ineffective PBoC regulation. 
After a series of consultation meetings between the SPC, MoF, SCORES, PBoC 
and the senior leadership, State Council document No. 68, the Circular on 
Furthering Strengthening Macro-regulation of the Securities Market, was issued 
on 17th December 1992.711 With Central Committee backing, this established the 
SCSC and the CSRC and mapped out a new division of regulatory work. The 
official vision was for an institutional order ‘characterised by multi-tiered units 
with independent functions and responsibilities that work in conjunction with 
each other under the leadership of the SCSC’.712 This is shown in Figure 54.713
The CSRC was established as a shiye danwei, a non-governmental organ. There 
is some dispute about the bureaucratic rank it was critically assigned. A number 
of sources suggest that it was given a deputy ministry (fubu) rank; other sources 
imply that it received a y'w-level rank and was then upgraded to a fubu rank in 
early 1995. (Yet other sources suggest this promotion took place earlier, in 
January 1994).714 Yet, even if the CSRC did initially attain deputy ministry rank, 
its non-governmental status weakened it. As such it not only lacked standing 
among State Council members and ministry-ranking organs such as the PBoC, 
but it also lacked funds and administrative authority. The regulator was not
71 Slegally authorised to promulgate administrative regulations (xingzheng guize). 
Most of the CSRC’s rules had therefore to be promulgated by the SCSC or the 
State Council (and therefore needed to acquire the consensus of leaders at this 
senior level). Finance was also a problem: the CSRC was not included in the 
government budget and neither was it mandated to levy fees on the market. An
710 Caijing (2000c), 71.
711 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
712 Xinhua (1993b); Xinhua (1993e).
713 SIA (1996a), 128; Zhou (1998), 3; Xinhua (1993b).
7.4 Interview-59, Shenzhen, 2001; Ren (1996), 55; Dong (1997), 261.
7.5 Jiang (1999a), 23.
initial loan from the MoF for the CSRC’s staff and administration was quickly 
spent and the commission had then to borrow funds from the SEEC and other
71 f\organs. Because of its non-governmental status, moreover, the CSRC had no 
powers to punish illegal behaviour. The only apparent factor in the CSRC’s 
favour was that Liu Hongru, its first chairman, had previously held the rank of 
deputy minister at both the PBoC and SCORES, a personal ranking he would 
have retained, giving the CSRC more influence than its bureaucratic ranking 
probably warranted.717
The CSRC was mandated to formulate rules and exercise regulatory powers over 
the issuance and trading of all listed securities, with the exception of futures 
instruments. It was also responsible for the day-to-day administration of 
securities companies. However, in all of these areas it had to share powers with 
other, more senior, bureaux. Policy-making powers were given to the SPC and 
the SCORES. The SPC was to make development plans for the securities 
industry and calculate the national issuance quota, as chapter nine explains. The 
SCORES was to formulate rules for shareholding reforms. In addition, regulatory 
duties were given to the PBoC and MoF. The PBoC retained its role of 
examining, approving, and administering securities organs, a designation that 
included securities companies, TICs and other intermediaries, although it 
excluded the stock exchanges. The CSRC/PBoC division of work is also 
examined in chapter nine. Supervision of accountants was the responsibility of 
the MoF, though their securities work came under sole CSRC jurisdiction. The
71 RMoF also retained management of the primary Treasury bond market. In 
addition, the CSRC shared management of the SAOs and stock exchanges with 
the two municipal governments, as chapters four to six explained. This 
arrangement, in which regulatory powers were fragmented and the exact 
boundaries of responsibility were unclear fostered debilitating tensions between 
central bureaux and created gaps in regulation.
716 Caijing (2000c), 72-73.
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Development o f  the CSRC, 1993-1996
Like other new regulatory agencies, the new team at the CSRC was full of zeal. 
However, as Guo Feng notes, the new regulator resembled an organisation 
overseeing a self-regulatory system.719 It lacked legal and administrative 
authority and its attempts to expand its mandate and accumulate powers were 
kept in check by other bureaux.
Fire-fighting, 1993-94
During 1993-94, institutional development proceeded rapidly, the details of the 
December 1992 settlement were fleshed out and several problems resolved. The 
most important institutional development during this period were the Provisional 
Regulations on Stock Issuance and Exchange (April 1993) and on the 
Provisional Measures on the Regulation o f Securities Exchanges (July 1993). 
Drafted by the CSRC’s legal counsel Gao Xiqing, the first of these regulations 
contained, among other things, detailed provisions on the issuance application 
process, provisions which endured until 1999, as chapter four explained. The 
later set out the relationship between the stock exchanges and the CSRC as 
outlined in chapter six. However, despite the CSRC being formally empowered 
to authorise such applications, it was local governments that chose the firms to 
list and members of the SCSC, primarily the SPC, who controlled the issuance
no ivolume. The CSRC’s power were considerably enhanced when it gained the 
right to draft implementing rules to State Council and SCSC promulgations in 
the middle of the year and in August 1993, it also received the authority to 
punish illegal behaviour. Both rulings allowed the CSRC to transcend its non­
governmental status and broaden the scope of its activities. However, 
disciplinary decisions were complicated by the fact that they usually impinged 
upon the jurisdictions of either local government and/or the PBoC.723 In addition, 
the CSRC was over-burdened, under-staffed and, on the whole, ineffective in 
curbing widespread bad practice.724 It suffered administrative constraints; not
719 Guo (1999a), 186,197-201.
720 Li (1998b), 166; Interview-06, Shanghai, 2000.
721 Chen (1997a), 492-505; Li (1998b), 163.
722 Zhang (1998), 133.
723 Jin (1999), 329; SZB (1994e); SZB (1993e).
724 Shi (1993).
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least a staff of only 79 as of October 1994. Malpractice was widespread and the 
regulator was ill-equipped to deal with it. The disclosure requirements that the 
CSRC issued during 1994 were widely ignored: only 75 of the 169 listed 
companies’ annual reports issued in April 1994 met with then* requirements. 
Local securities offices, as chapter four showed, were uninterested in supporting 
the CSRC line. Disclosures were not just incomplete: many were deliberately 
misleading. On 6th November 1993, for example, a company called Behai 
Zhengda Real Estate announced in a Hainan newspaper that it had purchased 5% 
of the shares of SHZSE-listed Kunshan Sanshan.726 The CSRC’s April 1993 
regulations had mandated such an announcement to protect shareholders in the 
event of an prospective take-over. Kunshan’s share price rose 40% the next day 
in response to the news. The day after, however, the CSRC announced that Behai 
Zhengda did not actually exist and that there were no records of any such trade. 
Similar, if less outrageous, scams occurred regularly, and the CSRC could do 
little to stop them. The take-over of SHGSE-listed Yanzhong Industries by 
SHZSE-listed Baoan was cause for more embarrassment. On 30th September 
1993, Baoan gained a 17.1% stake in Yanzhong but had neglected to both report 
its position and stop buying shares after it had gained a 5% stake, as mandated by 
the SCSC’s April 1993 regulations.727 After an investigation and Rmblm fine for 
Baoan, the CSRC had to allow the take-over to go ahead.
While many rules were ignored, many more had not yet been written. The 
institutional vacuum created incentives for firms, and their local government 
backers, to create institutions by setting precedents themselves. As chapter six 
showed, stock exchange leaders were particular adept at this; listed firms were 
too. In February 1994, Dazhong Taxi, a SHGSE-listed firm, announced plans to
7  7Rconvert its legal person shares into B-shares. The proposals were announced 
before CSRC approval had been extended, before Dazhong had gained a B-share 
quota allotment and even after the CSRC had made clear that such share 
conversions were still only ‘under consideration’. The CSRC suspended the plan, 
stating that ‘a grassroots company has no right to make such a decision without
725 Xinhua (1994c).
726 SCMP (1993f).
727 Zheng (1993); Xinhua (1993a); Chan (1994a); SZB (1993a); Li (1998b), 171.
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state permission’.729 Its assertion of jurisdiction, however, did not discourage 
local leaders from continuing to attempt to set rules themselves. Indeed, it was 
not at all clear which bureau or level of government had the right to represent 
‘the state’.
Standardisation, 1995
In the aftermath of 327 Treasury bond futures crisis, radical ideas, including the 
transfer of regulatory powers from the SAOs and PBoC to the CSRC, were 
discussed at a senior level, but were not implemented. Instead, the zhongyang 
leadership opted for a change of leadership at the CSRC and SHGSE, a go-slow 
approach to market development and institutional tinkering.730 In May 1995, Bei 
Duguang, the deputy director of the CSRC’s International Department, stated 
that all securities organs, including the STCs, should and would soon come under 
the CSRC’s supervision.731 Then, in July 1995, the State Council issued its 
‘suggestions’ on securities work for 1995.732 For the first time the senior 
leadership stated it was aiming to ‘straighten out the relationship between the 
multiple bureau’ involved in equity regulation. According to Jin Dehuai, the 
circular recognised the importance of ‘gradually clarifying’ the relationships of 
the SCSC, CSRC, State Council bureaux, SAOs, and local futures regulatory 
offices. It argued for the gradual concentration of powers at the central level of 
government and for the definition of the authority of the SAOs. However, these 
proposals were left unimplemented, and it would take another crisis to revive 
them. Instead, the State Council promoted the CSRC to the status of ‘an organ 
operating directly under the State Council’ (Guowuyuan zhixia shiye) and, 
apparently, a rank of deputy-ministry (fubu), (although the CSRC’s previous 
rank is a matter of dispute).733 In March 1995, the SCSC approved a CSRC 
reorganisation plan that involved the establishment of enforcement, accountants 
and drafting departments.734 The Futures Department was expanded. CSRC 
chairman Liu Hongru was dismissed by the SCSC in mid-1995, scapegoated for
728 Jing (1994); SCMP (1994b); Dong (1997), 34.
729 Chan (1994c); Xinhua (1994b).
730 ZXS (1995).
731 Tsang (1995b).
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the 327 scandal and internally criticised over his perceived over-emphasis on 
overseas listings. The new leadership team at the CSRC was led by Zhou 
Daojiong, SCSC deputy chairman since 1993.735 Deputy CSRC chairmen Fu 
Fengxiang, Tong Zengyin and Zhu Li were replaced by Li Jiange, Wang Yi and 
Geng Liang. The CSRC’s legal counsel Gao Xiqing resigned soon after Zhou’s 
arrival, amidst reports of an increasingly bureaucratic environment at the 
regulator.
The new team at the CSRC was conservative in orientation and had a mandate 
from the senior leadership to put ‘standardisation’ (guifanhua) before 
development. Zhou Daojiong’s first public statement on 28th April 1995 set the 
tone: he spoke of controlling the market (zhishi), a market he said that was still 
‘experimental’.736 Preventing further crisis was not the only aim; the new team 
needed to improve public confidence too. A survey by the SCORES and China 
Securities, a securities company, in May 1995, showed that only 7.9% of 
individual investors believed the share market was ‘effectively supervised’; only 
6.6% believed that market operations were ‘fair’.737 The response of the CSRC 
leadership was to put all progressive equity policy on hold and to concentrate on 
raising regulatory standards.738 On 18th April 1995 the CSRC established a 
mandatory system of examination, qualification, and certification for all 
securities professionals.739 In September, it ordered prospective listed companies 
to take on ‘guidance underwriters’ to advise them before and after listing.740 
Underwriters were expected to help reorganise enterprise assets, ensure good 
accounting standards, draft articles of association and produce annual financial 
statements. The new guifanhua policy was most forcefully rolled out in the 
futures market where the CSRC immediately banned the authorisation of new 
futures brokers and exchanges and a clean-up programme began in August 
1994.741 The CSRC’s mandate was to reduce the thirty-three futures exchanges, 
the number of futures brokerages (only some 300 of the 500 had been formally
735 SZB (1995p); Chan (1996e).
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740 Chan (1995b).
741 Chen (1993c); SZB (1995q); Dong (1997), 15; SZB (19941).
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approved by the central government) and the 50-plus contract types.742 
Rectification involved revoking licences for futures brokerages, closing down 
and merging futures exchanges, levying fines and other disciplinary actions, all 
which would have all involved considerable disputes with local leaders.743 1995 
also saw some joint action with the PBoC and MoF in clearing up the repo 
market.744
Policy linkage: SOE reform and the stock market, 1996
The empowerment of the CSRC and the reorganisation of equity institutions that 
was to come during 1997-98 was rooted in developments in industrial policy that 
took place in late 1995 and 1996. While before 1996 the stock market had been a 
local affair, peripheral to the main thrust of the central government’s economic 
reforms, after 1996 it was subordinated to the most important part of the 
zhongyang’s industrial policy: SOE reform.
An article written by Li Jiange, a CSRC vice chairman and close advisor to Zhu 
Rongji, in Gaige (Reform) magazine set out the new thinking.745 The financing 
problems facing the government, he argued, were threefold. First, the failure of 
commercial bank reform and the continued lack of discipline in lending meant 
that capital was not being efficiently allocated, causing investment hunger and 
bottlenecks in growth. The evidence supports this diagnosis. Albert Park shows 
that there was no change in the state banks lending practices to the loss-making 
SOE sector between 1991 and 1998.746 This was a problem since the SOE sector 
was, despite shareholding reform, not improving: 1996 was the first year that 
subsidies to the sector exceeded its contributions to the state budget. This 
encouraged the State Council into adopting a more aggressive policy stance: 
‘grasp the large, let go of the small’ (zhuada, fangxiao) in 1995-96. Small and 
medium sized SOEs would be sold off, contracted out or simply closed, and large 
SOEs would be financed and built into chaebol-like conglomerates. With the 
banks already heavily exposed to NPLs, the State Council required a new source
742 SZB (1994n); Chen (1994b).
743 SIA (1996a), 65.
744 Li (1998b), 208.
745 Li (1996).
746 Park and Sehrt (2001), 636-637.
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of financing. Second, Li noted the precipitous fall in government revenues: only 
10.7% of GDP was collected in taxes in 1995, down from 28.4% in 1979. The 
central government’s take of total tax revenue had also fallen, from 46.8% to 
29.3%, over the same period.747 Concern over these ‘two ratios’, promoted by 
Wang Shaoguang, Hu Angang and other ‘neo-statists’ in government, had been 
an important factor informing policy since the early 1990s, and was behind the 
1994 tax reforms. Declining fiscal revenues created incentives for securing 
funding sources for the SOEs from outside the budget and also from outside the 
state banking system, for which the government had an implicit liability. Third, 
Li noted that personal income and savings had risen dramatically to become an 
important but under-utilised source of investment capital. By June 1996, China’s 
banks were holding Rmb3.5 trillion in private savings, five times the figure five 
years earlier. ‘How can we put together an [capital] accumulation mechanism 
that promotes social development now that the old mechanism [administrative 
funding through the budget]...has been broken?’ Li asked. His answer was the 
stock market. Direct capital allocation was more efficient than the plan, he 
argued, since information costs were lower. The stock market could link 
accumulated bank savings with the SOEs’ demand for financing. Large SOEs 
should now be restructured into shareholding companies and listed, Li argued, a
• • 740 #process that would improve corporate governance as well as raise capital. Vice 
premier Zhu Rongji appears to have been won round to the new thinking by early 
1996.749 After intense debates throughout 1997 about the direction of economic 
policy, Jiang Zemin threw his weight behind this reform agenda at the 15th 
Congress in October 1997, reviving Zhao Ziyang’s ‘primary stage of socialism’ 
theory to justify shareholding, zhuada fangxiao and increased private sector 
activity.750 The Congress recognised the share market as ‘as an important
• j c  1
component of the national economy’.
747 On fiscal revenues, Ahmad, Li and Richardson (2000); Fewsmith (2001), 132-140.
748 Li’s article was also extremely frank about the market’s problems: the lack of effective 
regulation, misuse of IPO funds, the deleterious effects of state-shareholding and administrative 
interference. However, this critique was not to be addressed as it would have undermined the 
market’s ability to act as a crude financing mechanism for SOEs.
749 Lam (1996b).
750 Fewsmith (2001), 193.
751 Preface to Zhou (1998); BR (2001), 22.
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In March 1996, the plenary session of the NPC passed the ninth Five Year Plan 
which formally established the stock market as a part of the socialist market
nc'y
economy and an end to the market’s experimental status. Public issuance was 
accelerated. Between January and the middle of March 1996, 12 companies 
made A-share IPOs, compared to 15 in the whole of 1995, as the CSRC sped up 
its approvals of issues.753 Then, at the April 1996 SHGSE AGM, Li Jiange 
announced the zhongyang’s new stance vis-a-vis the stock market: ‘appropriate 
expansion’ in support of SOE restructuring.754 Share issuance was expanded and 
the average size of A-share issues also increased, as Figure 55 shows. While in 
1995 an average company raised Rmb96m from an IPO, by 1997 larger 
companies were coming to market and raising three times as much capital. An 
average IPO in 2000 brought in Rmb730m.755 CSRC authorisation of rights 
shares issues also increased dramatically. While in 1996 listed companies only 
raised Rmb7 billion through rights, that figure rose to Rmbl9.8 billion in 1997, 
Rmb33.8 billion in 1998 and stabilised at this level thereafter. By early 1997, the 
State Council was preparing its 1,000 key SOEs, 120 conglomerates and 100 
‘pilot enterprises experimenting with the modem enterprise system’ for public 
listing.756
Figure 55. Size of an average IPO, 1991-97
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Average A-share issue 36 125 160 45 96 234 318
Rmb m
Author’s calculations based on CSRC (1999a), 31.
Proposals for institutional change remained alive but were still not implemented.
The State Council’s ‘Securities and Futures Work Outline’ for 1996 stated that
the CSRC should;
...practice systematic regulation o f securities organisations' 
underwriting and proprietary trading...carry out fixed date 
investigations into securities organisations, give appropriate 
punishments for illegal behaviour, up to rescinding licence... and
752 Li (1997b),40; SZB (1996p); Dong (1997), 181.
753 Chan (1996d).
754 Peng (1999).
755 EIU (2001c).
756 Si (1996).
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gradually implement a unified approval and management
757system.
The document suggested the need for the CSRC to assume ‘unified’ powers over 
the equity sector, euphemism for the elimination of local government and PBoC 
influence. Although fundamental institutional reorganisation did not come, the 
CSRC did gain in capacity. Some progress was made in empowering the 
regulator in February 1996, when it gained permanent access to fee-based 
revenues from the market.758 The State Council allowed the regulator to levy fees 
on trading, as well as on securities companies, TICs, and listing applicants to 
fund its activities. The fee structure is outlined in Figure 56 and has endured, the 
only significant change being the trading turnover rate rising to 0.003% on the 
regulator’s assumption of control of the SHGSAO and SHZSAO in 1999.759
Figure 56. The CSRC’s sources of funding, 1996-present
Source Annual payment to the CSRC
Stock exchanges
Securities companies
Trust and investment 
companies 
Listing company
0.0025% of annual share and bond turnover (plus 
0.0004% of futures turnover)
0.1% of registered capital, annually (min.
Rmb 10,000 - max. Rmb 100,000)
0.05% of registered capital, annually (min.
Rmb 10,000 - max. Rmb100,000)
A one off Rmb30,000 application fee
SZB (1996t)
As a non-government organ, the CSRC’s annual budget is approved, but not 
funded, by the MoF. In the event of its annual revenues exceeding the budget, 
revenues may be put aside for future use but the CSRC may not spend more than 
its budget without special dispensation from the State Council. In this way the 
CSRC’s leadership is not endowed with an organisational interest in nurturing 
trading volume, (unlike the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments were with the 
stamp tax). Interviewees suggested that this funding structure had by 2000 
created a comparatively rich organisation, able to pay its staff salaries roughly
757 Yuan (1997), 26.
758 Media reports imply that this was the first time the CSRC had levied such fees. However, an 
interviewee suggested that the CSRC had previously levied fees informally, on a much smaller 
scale, SZB (1996t); Interview-46, Shenzhen, 2001.
759 Interview-38, Beijing, 2000.
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50% more than the standard rate for central government employees, combined 
with far superior housing and welfare provision.760 Figure 57 shows the author’s 
estimates of the fees that the CSRC would have collected from A-share trading, 
the dominant but not exclusive part of its revenues, during 1996-2000. Adding in 
the other fees, total revenues would probably have exceeded Rmb200m in 2000.
Figure 57. Estimates of the CSRC’s fee from A-share trading, 1996-2000
Total A-share trading volume, 
Rmb billion
CSRC revenues from A-share, 
Rmb m
1996 2,105.2 52.7
1997 3,029.5 75.7
1998 2,341.8 58.5
1999 3,132.0 78.3
2000 6,082.7 182.5
Author’s estimates based on CSRC data and a 0.0025% fee levied on A-share trading 
volume 1996-99, 0.003% in 2000.
CSRC (1999a), 30-31; CSRC (2001), 6-7.
Moreover, the CSRC’s investigations and disciplinary actions during 1996 
suggested a growing capacity for enforcing the law. In October 1996, after a four 
month investigation, the CSRC imposed a Rmb500,000 fine on the Bohai Group 
for inflating assets in its mid-term report.761 While previously the CSRC had 
usually taken 12 to 24 months to investigate allegations, the speed of this 
response signalled a new efficiency in investigative work and perhaps even a 
willingness to come down hard on malpractice. During November and December 
1996, the CSRC carried out investigations and enforcement actions on illegal 
purchases of IPO shares by FIIs. With 42 institutions named and punished, 
including large securities companies such as Huaxia, Shenyin Wanguo and 
Guotai, it was the by far the largest and most significant crackdown in the 
CSRC’s four-year history.762 In addition, it was during 1996 that the CSRC made 
valiant, if unsuccessful, attempts to extend its influence over the SAOs and over 
the two stock exchanges, as outlined in chapters four, five and six. Despite this 
failure things were looking up for the CSRC: the regulatory and policy goods it
760 Interview-59, Shenzhen, 2001.
761 Peng (1996d).
762 Peng (1996c).
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was uniquely positioned to deliver were, with stock market expansion planned, 
going to be increasingly valuable to the zhongyang leadership.
The empowerment o f the CSRC, 1997-98
Detailed planning for a fundamental restructuring of China’s equity institutions 
began in spring 1997 after the equity developmentalism and bank loan scandals 
of 1996 and 1997 examined in chapter five. This crisis had persuaded the FELG 
to implement institutional change that had been discussed and successfully 
resisted since at least 1995.763 Under orders from Zhu Rongji, SCSC chairman 
Zhou Zhenqing, together with the FELG secretariat, drafted the Sanding fangan 
(the ‘three decisions’ plan), a document officially authorised by the State Council 
on 19th October 1998, but whose content appears to have been determined as 
early as mid-1997.764 The fangan was a simple document with three parts. First, 
it backed the need for a ‘unified and vertically regulated stock market’.765 While 
its explicit objective was to ‘nationalise’ the entire regulatory structure its 
implicit aim was to replace local capture of equity institutions with central 
capture. Steps to achieve this began on 1st July 1997 when the CSRC assumed 
guanli administration of the two stock exchanges; the SAOs soon followed. 
Second, the fangan stated that the CSRC should have ministerial (zhengbu) rank 
and should act exclusively on behalf of the State Council in regulating and 
developing the stock market. The SCSC would be dispersed and other State 
Council bureaux, principally the PBoC, excluded from formal involvement in the 
equity sector. Negotiations between CSRC and PBoC leaders for a transfer of the 
bank’s regulatory functions over securities companies began, as chapter nine will 
explain. The CSRC was also given its most senior leader yet: Zhou Zhenqing, 
the minister-ranking SCSC chairman was appointed to replace Zhou Daojiong in 
mid-1997.767 Third, the fangan stated that the CSRC should have sufficient
763 It also coincided with Zhu Rongji’s March 1998 administrative reforms which reduced 40 
State Council ministries to 29 and made a 50% cut in staffing levels within the central 
government, Yang (2001b), 34-40.
764 Xiao (2000a), 69.
765 Jun( 1998).
766 Huang (1999d), 72.
767 SCMP (1996b); IHT (1997b); COL (1999a); Kwan (1998).
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staff.768 With the absorption of the SAOs, by January 2000 the regulator had a 
Beijing-based staff of over 300, a local staff of over 700 and had expanded to 15
76Qdepartments.
During 17-19th November 1997, the Central Committee and State Council 
organised the first joint Party/government National Financial Work Meeting 
since 1949, a signal of the importance the zhongyang leadership now attached to 
financial reform and regulation. The restructuring laid out in the sanding fangan 
was announced as well as that of the PBoC branch structure. The National 
Securities Supervision Work meeting was then brought forward from its usual 
summer-time slot to January 1998 to allow work associated with the 
restructuring to progress more quickly. With a broad enabling document in place, 
more detailed plans were required. The CSRC’s Securities Regulation Structure 
Reform Plan and the Functional Design, Internal Organisation and Rules for 
Personnel were both passed by the State Council in early 1998. These brought 
the SAOs under the CSRC’s administration. Not only was this a challenging 
political task which required considerable zhongyang clarity, it was also an 
enormous logistical project; by the end of 1997 there were at least 45 SAOs 
operating throughout China. Staff and assets all had to be transferred, a process 
which took over two years to complete. Preparations began in April 1998 when 
the CSRC began investigating the resources, operations and personnel of the 
SAOs.770 At the end of June 1998, the CSRC authorised the SAOs to approve the 
establishment and operations of securities companies, previously the task of 
PBoC branches, and a sign that the SAOs were now operating under the de facto 
control of the CSRC.771 Then, from September 1998 onwards, senior members of 
the CSRC visited local governments to negotiate the transfer of property and 
personnel to the CSRC. During 19th - 27th September 1998, for example, Zhou 
Zhenqing visited Jiangxi, Shanghai, and Anhui and signed transfer agreements 
with senior local officials. Local governments were reportedly keen to transfer 
able staff out of the SAOs and to maximise income from the sale of their offices
768 Interview-13, Beijing, 2000.
769 Interview-10, Shanghai, 2000.
770 CSRC (1999b), 3.
771 Huang (1999d), 72, 97.
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779to the CSRC. Once these agreements were signed, administrative work on the 
transfer began in January 1999 and ended in June of that year. It was only in July 
1999 that the SAOs formally underwent guapai and came under full CSRC
7 7 9management and supervision. Powers of appointment of semor management 
and funding and control of the SAOs’ budgets passed to the CSRC. At the same 
time, with PBoC branches giving up their regulatory powers over securities 
companies, many PBoC staff transferred, leading to the CSRC’s expansion from 
around 300 to over 1,300 staff.774 According to one source, most SAO directors 
were re-appointed by the CSRC and only a few retired or moved to other 
bureau.775
Institutional capture of the SAOs by the CSRC did not just involve a change in 
the nomenklatura system. Rather, like the stock exchanges, it involved a range of 
institutional measures that served to centralise decision-making, create effective 
oversight mechanisms and transform SAOs staff into agents of the CSRC with 
minimal room for defection. As of July 1999, the official duties of SAOs have 
been to:776
□ Implement national laws and policies.
□ Use CSRC authority to supervise and manage all local securities activity.
□ Investigate problems.
□ Other functions authorised by the CSRC.
The institutional transformation was startling. First, SAOs now have only a 
minor role to play in the issuance process. They make a provisional assessment 
of IPO and secondary applications and then pass them to the CSRC Issuance 
Department for authorisation. According to one interviewee, provincial
772 Interview-13, Beijing, 2000.
773 Guapai means literally ‘to hang or post up a nameplate’, in this case on the entrance to an
office, and indicates the formal assumption of administrative control, Bao (1999), 69. The
SHGSAO changed its name to the Shanghai Securities and Futures Administration Commission
(-Shanghai Zhengquan Qihuo Guanli Weiyuanhui) in October 1997. Of note is the loss of the city 
(shi) label, Interview-15, Shanghai, 2000; SHGSE (1997b), 447.
774 On the post-1997 CSRC, interviews 34 (Shenzhen, 2000) 43, 52 (Shenzhen, 2001) and 10, 15, 
36 (Shanghai, 2000) were extremely useful.
775 Interview-10, Shanghai, 2000.
776 CSRC (1999b), 31.
231
governments do not now need to support an enterprise’s issuance application:
7 7 7they are simply notified after the CSRC has finished the authorisation process. 
Other sources, however, claim that provincial government support is still crucial 
in allowing a company to gain a public listing, in terms of authorising its
7 7 0
restructuring and providing other administrative and fiscal supports. Second, 
since 1998 all investigations have been managed by the CSRC Investigation 
Bureau (including those involving sums below Rmb5m). Third, SAOs have lost 
the ability to punish listed companies and securities companies (though, of 
course, they were not active practitioners of these powers while they had them 
before 1997). As of 1999, the decision as to whether to issue administrative 
warnings, fines or pursue criminal prosecution rested solely with the CSRC 
Investigation Bureau, Market Supervision Department and senior CSRC 
leadership, a change that eliminated the discretionary powers of local leaders 
over disciplinary procedures. The fourth major change in regulatory practice at 
the local level has been the increase in on-site visits of SAO staff to listed 
companies, undertaken on instructions from the CSRC Companies Department. 
In 1999, for example, SAO staff were instructed to visit a third of the listed 
companies in their locales and make more detailed examination of all companies’ 
annual, mid-term and special events reports.
As well as absorbing the SAOs into its administrative ambit, the CSRC created a 
new three-tier structure for administering its local offices. This restructuring 
paralleled the PBoC’s restructuring, also announced in October 1997, whereby 
provincial PBoC branches, previously operating in each province, were 
consolidated to form ‘supra-provincial’ offices.779 The directors of these regional 
offices would oversee branches across a number of provinces and would thereby 
not come under the authority of provincial leaders. This reorganisation of the 
banking and securities regulatory structures was aimed at severing the formal 
administrative ties, and at least some of the channels of informal influence, that 
existed between local government leaders and these yw-level bureaux. ‘The 
power,’ said Zhu Rongji, ‘of provincial governors and mayors to command local
777 Interview-43, Shenzhen, 2001.
778 Interview-53, Shenzhen, 2001.
779 Lardy (1998), 207.
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bank presidents is abolished as of 1998.’780 The same could, apparently, now be 
said of local leaders’ ability to have their favoured companies issue shares 
without any effective oversight. By 2000, the CSRC had established nine 
regional offices which each in turn managed the work of two to three special 
team offices (tepaiyuan banshichu) in their vicinity. The two SAOs m 
Hangzhou (Jiangsu Province) and Nanjing (Zhejiang Province) were, for 
example, converted into representative offices and brought under the authority of 
the CSRC office in Shanghai. Two offices (zhixia banshichu) were set up in 
Beijing and Chongqing to be governed directly by CSRC headquarters. In 
addition, there were moves in 2000 to establish dedicated investigation bureau at 
the local level to work alongside the CSRC’s offices. One report claimed that 
these bureau, to be led and staffed jointly by the CSRC and PSB, would 
eventually have a total staff of 1,400.782
The final major institutional change that took place after October 1997 was the 
creation of CCP committees within the CSRC at each of the three levels (centre, 
regional and branch). Previously, many of the SAOs did not operate formal 
Party committees (dangwei) or branches (dang zongzhi or dang zhibu) 
themselves, though their directors were often members of the CCP committees of 
other government agencies.784 A CCP committee structure was established 
during 1998-99 and in 1999 CSRC staff at all levels underwent training in the 
sanjiang (three stresses), a political campaign designed to instil Party values and
780 MP (1998) quoted in Lardy (1998), 227.
781 Regional offices were set up in Tianjin, Shenyang, Shanghai, Jinan, Wuhan, Guangzhou, 
Shenzhen, Chengdu and Xian, CSRC (1999b), 30-32.
782 BR (2001), 4; Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
783 CSRC (1999b), 3.
784 As a general rule, state organs with over 50 members establish party committees, while those 
with less than 50 form party branches, Yang (1995a), 183.
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allegiance to the ‘CCP leadership with General Secretary Jiang Zemin at the
785 Lam (1999), 36.
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Figure 58. China’s equity institutions, year end 2000.
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These four institutional changes to the SAOs, in their integration into a xitong 
structure, in their reduced regulatory powers, in a new administrative structure 
which reduced local political influence, and in their establishment of Party 
committees, facilitated central capture. The result, shown in Figure 58, was an 
institutional arrangement based on clear lines of authority flowing from the 
centre to the periphery of the state, and extensive mechanisms available to the 
newly dominant sub-principal, the CSRC, to ensure the compliance of its agents.
One of the most debilitating problems in China’s equity institutions, the Centre- 
Local split, had been fused. But to what effect? The reorganisation circumscribed 
the damaging influence that local leaders exerted over issuance and the 
secondary market and allowed better co-ordination between policy makers in the 
Centre and those mandated to implement policy. However, even after this 
reorganisation co-ordination problems between the two levels of government 
remained. Questions have been raised as to the ability of the CSRC leadership 
even now to rely on local staff for full and honest provision of information and 
complete co-operation. Most SAO personnel have worked within their local 
bureaucracies for many years and enjoy close relations with other local 
government organs, securities companies, listed firms and shareholders, state and 
otherwise. Despite CSRC guanli authority over their offices, these old 
allegiances are hard to break. One interviewee claimed that since their integration 
with the CSRC that SHZSAO staff find bureaux in Shenzhen less willing to
'T O Z
assist in their investigations, although another interviewee denied this. A 
second problem, of course, is that informal mechanisms of influence, although 
limited compared to before 1997, are still available to local leaders. A third issue 
is that local leaders still retain control of industrial and fiscal policy, and this 
allows them to offer considerable discretionary supports to their listed 
companies. They are aggressively defensive of their listed firms and use a variety 
of means to keep them profitable (at least in terms of their balance sheets) and 
prevent their delisting.787 Tax rates are manipulated, subsidies extended, debts 
forgiven or restructured and assets imported.788 Such practices undoubtedly
786 Interview-51, Shenzhen, 2001; Interview-52, Shenzhen, 2001.
787 Hu (1999b), 23.
788 Cao (2000), 128, 140.
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undermine the efficiency of regulation and the transparency of the stock market. 
Chapter eleven attempts to evaluate the post-1997 settlement in terms of the 
quality of regulation it delivers, even if a detailed examination of these practices 
is outside the bounds of the present study.
Concluding remarks
The institutional development of the CSRC solved two critical issues facing the 
zhongyang leadership: how best to control local agents and how best to organise 
central government. The CSRC was empowered after 1997 as the sole sub­
principal, absorbing powers and responsibilities from competing sub-principals 
at both the local and central levels. While this chapter has examined the former, 
the following chapter examines the later. The importance to the zhongyang of 
solving this problem was not constant through the decade, but was enhanced by 
both the financial crises that the previous institutional arrangements fostered 
during 1995-97 and by the decision in 1996 to link stock market and industrial 
policy. Only when these incentives were present did zhongyang leaders act to 
achieve central capture of equity institutions.
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9Incoherence at the Centre: The State Council Securities Commission 
and CSRC/PBoC relations
Fazhi.jianguan, zilu, guifan.
(The rule o f law, supervision, self-discipline and standardisation).
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, 1995
This chapter examines how equity institutions were organised at the most senior 
level of government during 1990-98 and evaluates the performance of the SCSC 
in co-ordinating policy, governing regulation and constraining equity
iL
developmentalism at the local level. The SCSC was established on 25 October 
1992 to institute controls over local leaders and to co-ordinate the relevant 
policies of its member bureaux, things that the pre-1992 PBoC meeting system
<70Q
had failed to achieve. Although the SCSC did go some way to constrain local 
developmentalism and improve central government co-ordination its failures in 
both these areas were stark. Its institutional design, and the dispersal of powers 
among State Council bureaux that it entrenched, was wholly unsuitable for its 
mandate. Rather than serving as a co-ordinary mechanism, the SCSC tended to 
act as the point at which competing bureaux leaders exercised their veto, thus 
holding up the rational development of policy and the resolution of important 
regulatory issues. As a result the central government lacked a clear voice and 
effective means of supervision and control over local activities during 1993-97. 
Such institutional incoherence at the Centre enabled local sub-principals to defect 
and to, often, effectively hide their defection.
The chapter is laid out as follows. In the first section, early institutional attempts 
at co-ordinating equity policy within the PBoC are examined. The next section 
explores the structure and function of the SCSC and its office. Particular 
attention is paid to its work in formulating the government’s ‘policy direction’ 
(fangzhen) and arranging the issuance quota. In the third section, the 
CSRC/PBoC relationship is explored.
789 On the SCSC, see Kumar (1997b); Cao (1995), 126; Bao (1999), 68; He (1998), 17-18; Jiang 
(1999a), 23.
Early attempts at co-ordination within central government
The earliest attempts within central government to produce a co-ordinated 
approach to stock market policy occurred in late 1990, as growth in OTC trading 
and planning for the stock exchanges took place in Shanghai and Shenzhen. In 
November 1990, just before the official opening of the SHGSE, the State 
Council held the first of a series of special meetings of eleven of its member 
bureaux.790 Then, in April 1991 the PBoC, the organ with regulatory 
responsibility for the securities market, established the Share Market Staff 
Meeting System (Gupiao Shichang Bangong Huiyi Zhidu, hereafter SMSMS), a
701Commission initially made up of eight State Council bureaux. Its formal 
functions were:792
□ To set the stock market policy direction (fangzhen) and detailed policy 
(zhengce).
□ Following the state plan, to approve (shending) the scale of issuance. 
SMSMS members also formed a ‘share issuance approval small group’ to 
oversee issuance applications.
□ To approve {shending) equity market regulations.
□ To co-ordinate State Council members’ policies.
Its first meeting was held in May 1991 and the Commission met once or twice a 
month thereafter. There is some dispute over its leadership; official documentary 
sources claim that it was chaired by PBoC governor Li Guixian. An interviewee, 
however, claimed that it was jointly chaired by Li and Vice Premier Zhu 
Rongji.793 Administrative services to the SMSMS were provided by the PBoC’s 
FAMD. Little public information is available on its activities or discussions. The 
Commission is known, however, to have approved the decision to ‘nationalise’ 
the share-market and introduce public listings for companies from Guangdong, 
Hainan and Fujian provinces.
790 Chen (1990).
791 The initial members included the PBoC, SPC, MoF, SCORES, SASAM and the Tax Bureau. 
The SETC joined later, SIA (1993), 309; Zhang (1998), 131.
792 Dong (1997), 258.
793 SIA (1993), 309; Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
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On 1st July 1992, after a fourteen-month existence, the SMSMS was wound up 
and replaced by a State Council-level meeting system, the State Council 
Securities Management Office Meeting {Guowuyuan Zhengquan Guanli 
Bangong Huiyi, hereafter SCSMOM). The new Commission was officially 
mandated to strengthen market management and ‘nationalise* the market.794 This 
mild institutional reorganisation appears to have occurred in reaction to the rapid 
expansion in share trading that occurred after Deng’s nanxun in early 1992. 
However, there appears to have been no difference between the SMSMS and the 
SCSMOM in terms of membership, powers or rank. The chairman was still the 
PBoC governor and/or Zhu, depending on the same sources. Another 
interviewee claimed that the new group did not have a formal chairman and that 
administrative responsibilities were left to Jin Jiandong, director of the PBoC’s 
new Securities Management Office {Zhengquan Guanli Bangongshi, hereafter 
SMO), an office established under the PBoC’s FAMD in May 1992.796 Another 
interviewee stated that the only difference this meeting system had with the 
SCSMOM was that it was ‘more formal’ and met more frequently.797 The SMO, 
staffed by around 24 people, was formally responsible for drafting securities 
regulations, implementing State Council decisions, organising the daily work of 
the share issuance small group, preliminarily approving stock exchange listing
7QQrules and developing policy proposals. It also worked with the SPC’s 
Comprehensive Finance Planning Department to determine the annual securities
7 9 9issuance quota.
The State Council Securities Commission
In October 1992, having determined that the PBoC had failed in its mandate to 
regulate the sector and that local leaders required better supervision, the 
zhongyang leadership transferred the SCSMOM out of the PBoC, expanded its
794 Dong (1997), 259.
795 HKAFP (1992).
796 Interview-20, Beijing, 2000; Dong (1997), 258; Zhang (1998), 131; Xinhua (1992f).
797 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
798 Dong (1997), 259.
799 According to one interviewee the majority of their time was spent researching overseas 
securities markets and drafting rules. They did not take an active part in approving issuance or in
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powers, endowed it with its own administrative bureau, as well as its own office, 
and changed its name to the State Council Securities Commission. As chapter 
eight explained, the CSRC was created at the same time. While the State Council 
December 1992 Circular affirmed the ‘positive role’ of stock markets in raising 
funds and allocating resources, it also noted that ‘disorder’ had been caused by a 
‘lack of laws, regulations, and supervision systems’ and ‘a lack of experience in 
operating such mechanisms’.800 The SCSC was created to solve these problems 
by energising, providing guidance to and overseeing the policy making activities 
of central bureaux. It was meant to bring ‘unity’ (tongyi) and ‘standardisation’ 
(guifanhua) as well as provide ‘guidance, co-ordination, supervision, and 
inspection over the work of the various localities and bureaux relating to 
securities markets’. Vice Premier Zhu Rongji took up the post of SCSC 
chairman; Liu Hongru, CSRC chairman, and Zhou Daojiong, took up the deputy 
chairs. Having already assumed the governorship of the PBoC earlier in the year, 
Zhu had now successfully concentrated all financial policy-making powers in his 
own hands.801 He was only to abdicate his formal leadership of the SCSC in 
1995, when he handed the chairmanship to Zhou Zhenqing, a State Council 
deputy secretary general. However, despite their disenfranchisement, PBoC 
leaders retained mechanisms of influence. In fact, one interviewee suggested that 
the PBoC leadership only agreed to the reorganisation of equity institutions 
because its former deputy governors, Zhou and Liu, were placed in positions of 
authority.802 The SCSC was made up of at least 12 State Council bureaux, 
although there is some confusion over its exact membership, shown in Figure 
59.803
the regulation of trading, activities that were predominantly handled by PBoC branches, Li 
(1998b), 84; Wang and Fewsmith (1995); Interview-20, Beijing, 2000.
800 Xinhua (1993c).
801 SZB (1992a); Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000; Interview-21, Beijing, 2000.
802 Interview-23, Beijing, 2000.
803 SIA (1996a), 128.
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Figure 59. The membership of the SCSC in 1996804
People’s Bank of China 
State Planning Commission
State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System
Ministry of Finance
State Economic and Trade Commission
Ministry of Supervision
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-operation
State Administration of Taxation
State Administration for Industry and Commerce
State Administration of State Property
State Administration for Foreign Exchange
State Council Legislative Affairs Bureau
Supreme People’s Procuratorate
Supreme People’s Court
State Development Bank
Domestic Trade Bureau
Chinese press reports misrepresent the frequency of SCSC meetings. The press 
only reports three SCSC meetings taking place on 10th May 1994, 22nd May 
1995, and 8th April 1996.805 These meetings were dubbed by the press the 
SCSC’s fourth, fifth and sixth meetings or ‘plenary sessions’. There is no 
mention of the SCSC meeting during 1993 or 1997 in any source seen by the 
author. Yet several interview sources stated that in fact the SCSC met about five 
times each year from 1993 to 1997 inclusively.806 Meetings were held roughly 
every quarter, as well as on an ad hoc basis when requested by the CSRC 
leadership. The press-reported meetings were used to announce the year’s policy 
direction (fangzheri) and the issuance quota. The deputy minister or vice- 
chairman responsible for securities work within each member bureau attended
RfY7meetings, usually accompanied by a secretary. As well as the CSRC, the 
commission was supported by a dedicated office.
804 It appears that both the State Development Bank and the Domestic Trade Bureau joined 
between 1993 and 1996. The Procuratorate and Supreme Court are not State Council members 
but joined in 1993-94 at the request of the CSRC leadership to help in investigations, Interview- 
29, Shanghai, 2000; Yuan (1997); CSRC (1997), 201.
805 SZB (1995a).
806 Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000; Interview-38, Beijing, 2000.
807 Interview-23, Beijing, 2000.
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The SCSC Office
The SCSC Office was initially located within Zhongnanhai, the
QAO
Party/government leadership compound in central Beijing. Initially headed up 
by Ma Zhongzhi, formally a director of the PBoC FAMD, the office was 
comprised of about 15 people working in three divisions.809 The National Market 
Division researched the economy, negotiated the issuance quota with the SPC, 
drafted one- and five-year plans for the stock market, proposed regulations and 
prepared all the documents for SCSC meetings. The International Market 
Division conducted research on developed Western markets and the Policy and 
Research Division was, in theory at least, responsible for making policy 
proposals to the SCSC. The SCSC office occupied a strategic position in the 
central government bureaucracy because it provided policy guidance and 
information to the SCSC. When the Commission met, it usually only reviewed 
reports prepared by the SCSC Office and the CSRC. These would include reports 
of the securities work of the previous year, reports on the quota discussions with 
the SPC and recommendations for future policy. Thus control of the activities of 
the SCSC Office was an important means of shaping the SCSC’s agenda.
It appears the CSRC leadership gained early influence over the SCSC Office. An 
interviewee stated that while there was some ambiguity over the administrative 
allegiance of the SCSC office, that ‘to some extent it was a part of the CSRC’.810 
Consider the lines of leadership. The SCSC Office director was directly 
responsible to the SCSC chairman and his deputies. However, given that the 
vice-premier had numerous other responsibilities, the weight of this work fell to 
Liu Hongru, CSRC chairman, and Zhou Daojiong. Wang Yi, CSRC vice 
chairman during 1996-98, was acting director of the SCSC Office after Ma 
Zhongzhi left.811 Thus it seems likely that the CSRC leadership had day-to-day 
operational control of the SCSC office. Consider the physical location of the 
SCSC office. Dong Shaoping claims that the SCSC Office and CSRC merged
808 This section is based on Interview-21, Beijing, 2000.
809 Dong (1997), 260.
810 Interview-10, Shanghai, 2000.
811 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
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their offices in June 1993. An interviewee supported this claim, statmg that the 
SCSC Office moved to join the CSRC in the Fengzhuan area of Beijing 
sometime before 1995. Also consider the administration of the SCSC office: by
1997 the CSRC was paying all the salaries of SCSC Office staff.813 In practice, 
with only two to three people working in each division of the SCSC Office the 
majority of the policy and law-drafting work was at any rate carried out within 
the CSRC. Finally, consider the movement of personnel. Many members of the 
SCSC Office moved to the CSRC during the 1990s and at the SCSC office’s 
closure in 1998, again suggestive of close administrative relations.
The powers and functions o f the SCSC
Formally, the SCSC took on three specific powers, all transferred from the PBoC 
and its meeting system:
□ Promulgation of equity market fangzhen (policy direction).
□ Approval of the issuance quota.
□ Authorisation of overseas issuance.
These three core powers were an attempt to give the SCSC ultimate control over 
the direction of market development (through the fangzhen); the aggregate 
supply of equity and the speed of market growth (through the issuance quota); 
and over sensitive policy issues (through control over foreign listings and the 
development of new financial instruments). In addition the commission had a 
broad remit to organise drafting activities, co-ordinate bond and share issuance, 
supervise all securities work, administer the CSRC and authorise the 
establishment of new stock exchanges. The SCSC was to be the sector’s sub­
principal under the close supervision of the zhongyang leadership. It did achieve 
some successes: issuance was constrained by the quota (and market sentiment 
manipulated by it); issuance overseas was more or less controlled; and important 
regulations that underpinned governance of the market until the passage of the
1998 Securities Law were issued under its auspices. Moreover, it is claimed that
812 Dong (1997), 259.
813 At the beginning of its operations, salary, welfare and other administrative functions had been 
the responsibility of the State Council General Office, SIA (1996a), 128.
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a range of issues were negotiated and resolved at SCSC meetings, although there 
are few publicly available details.814 One apparent success, for example, was 
when the SCSC co-ordinated bond and equity policy in 1993. After MoF 
warnings, the SCSC used its May meeting to inform provincial leaders that until 
they purchased their quota of domestic Treasury bonds their SOEs would not be 
allowed to issue shares.815 Faced with such a threat, provincial leaders responded 
positively by buying their complement of bonds. However, the SCSC 
achievements in guiding equity market development were limited: in each of the 
three core areas its powers were too macro in orientation to be effective and even 
then in practice they were frequently assumed by other organs or senior leaders.
Fangzhen
One of the most visible of institutions in the equity sector, at least until 1998, 
was the fangzhen (‘policy direction’). Fangzhen are a curious, crucial and not 
well understood convention of policy making and bureaucratic communication in 
the PRC. As short strings of abstract nouns or qualified verbal phrases, they are 
usually frustratingly vague. They do, however, receive an inordinate amount of 
coverage in the Chinese media, policy debates and academic studies. The reason 
appears to be that by emphasising key themes fangzhen signal the priorities of 
senior policy makers, thereby providing guidance for sub-principals formulating 
specific policy (zhengce) throughout a large and dispersed bureaucracy. They 
work, or at least attempt to, through creating an atmosphere and thus supplement 
more traditional administrative mechanisms of monitoring and control. Stock 
market fangzhen were derived from the more general financial sector fangzhen, 
which were themselves derived from the general economic fangzhen set by the 
FELG each year.816 Once formulated, fangzhen are communicated throughout the 
bureaucracy and financial industry through speeches, training sessions and by 
CCP classes. For example, the sixth meeting of the SCSC on 8th April 1996 
issued a new stock market fangzhen: wenbu fazhan, shidong jiahuai (stable 
development, appropriate speed). By introducing the concept of development, the 
fangzhen signalled a crucial shift in senior leaders’ priorities and the expansion
814 Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
815 Chen (1993d).
816 Interview-10, Shanghai, 2000.
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of issuance, as outlined in chapter eight.817 The most important stock market 
fangzhen, the bazi (‘the eight words’): fazhi, jiangguan, zilu, guifan (legal 
system, supervision, self-discipline and standardisation) was reportedly
Q 1 O
formulated by Vice Premier Zhu himself in late 1995. This phrase was used as 
a centrepiece of the central government’s efforts to crack down on corruption and 
volatility after the 327 crisis. Other fangzhen in the sector have less clear origins. 
The SCSC was officially mandated to formulate them, but neither the 
commission nor its office appears to have been involved in their actual
£1 Q
formulation. It seems likely that a small group of senior CSRC staff, together 
with senior zhongyang leaders, formulated stock market fangzhen during 1994- 
1997.
However, the crises of 1992, 1995 and 1996-97 suggested that fangzhen were an 
inefficient means of ensuring co-ordination between government actors. They 
were easily ignored by local leaders, and those in Shanghai and Shenzhen wrote 
their own fangzhen for their own markets, ones which often subtly readjusted the 
original emphasis. Since 1997, fangzhen have not been used by the CSRC 
leadership very much. They now appear happier formulating more concrete aims 
and relying on administrative mechanisms to ensure compliance. In 1998, for 
example, Zhou Zhenqing announced the CSRC’s aim to implement the spirit of
tlithe 15 Party Congress, to continue implementing the bazi fangzhen, support
OlA
SOE reform, deepen structural reform and rectify the securities market. No 
shortened slogan was promulgated.
The issuance quota
The share issuance quota system operated from 1993 to 1998. It was the most 
important macro-economic tool that the central government had for influencing 
stock market growth and trading sentiment. Moreover, it allowed the benefits of 
issuance to be spread throughout the country, although not evenly, and for 
investment to be channelled towards the State Council’s favoured industries.
8,7 Li (1997b), 40.
818 SZB (1996a); RR (1994), 163; Zhang (1998), 181; SZB (1995a).
819 Interview-23, Beijing, 2000. Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000 disagreed.
820 CSRC (1999b), 1.
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Local leaders equity developmentalism, at least for the most part, had to take 
place within the bounds of the quota.
The quota has been criticised by some analysts as being a dysfunctional legacy of 
the plan economy.821 Certainly it had its problems, but it should be noted that 
many other developing countries limit access to the share market. Since demand 
for capital investment remained strong in an economy still marked by investment 
hunger throughout the 1990s, controlling access to public issuance through 
administrative means was the only viable means of maintaining market 
stability.822 By the end of 1997, China had over 32,000 shareholding companies, 
but only 745 of them had been allowed to publicly issue shares.823 Moreover, in 
practice, the quota was not a traditional plan tool. A comparison of the official 
quota with actual issuance for each year shows that despite the extensive research 
and negotiation that went into setting the quota, the two figures were rarely the 
same.
Figure 60 shows the official quota during 1993-97, the publicly announced 
readjustments made to it and actual issuance. Only in 1994 and 1995 did the 
official quota provide a more or less accurate guide to actual issuance. The quota 
was never actually fulfilled in full but was frequently altered by zhongyang 
leaders in order to stimulate or cool trading sentiment. Announcing a large 
volume of soon-to-be-issued equity caused loss of confidence in an irrationally 
exuberant market; a small volume, in contrast, fostered confidence about future 
prices. For example, the SCSC set an issuance quota of Rmb5 billion for 1993.824 
In July 1993, a national austerity plan was implemented to restrain inflation and 
stock prices fell as money supply tightened and unauthorised issuance 
continued. In May 1994, the SCSC ordered the postponement of a senes of
821 E.g. Wu (1999b), 34.
822 Investment hunger, a concept developed by Janos Komai, describes systematic under­
investment in a planning system. Firms are thought to invest excessively in the absence of 
penalties for wrong decisions (the soft-budget constraint), and expand capacity and stocks as a 
hedge against uncertainties about the supply of financial resources, Girardin (1997), 67-83; 
Komai (1980); Lin (1989), 114; Cohen (1997), 504. For a critical discussion of the concept, 
Schaffer (1998).
823 Su (1997).
824 Li (1998b), 172.
825 SCMP (1994d); Chu (1993c).
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IPOs in response to further falls, and in July 1994 issuance was stopped 
altogether and the quota was suspended.826 This had the effect of temporarily 
rallying prices. In another infamous instance, outlined in chapter five, in 
December 1996 the zhongyang leaders’ response to high share prices, volatility 
and financial instability was to upwardly revise the issuance quota to Rmb 10 
billion. When this failed to curb the bull market the quota was raised to Rmb 15 
billion in March 1997, and then to Rmb30 billion in May 1997, all of which
0^7
triggered price falls. The quota may well have been a tool of intervention, but 
it had little to do with the plan economy and everything to do with ad hoc 
intervention. Moreover, the issuance quota had little to do with the SCSC. The 
vice premier approved all issuance quotas before they went to the SCSC for 
authorisation. On no occasion did the SCSC attempt to change the quota and 
when the issuance volume was altered on an ad hoc basis by the vice premier the
070
revised figure was not re-authorised by the SCSC.
After the headline issuance figure was approved the quota was divided up into 
local quotas for provinces and central government bureaux. This work was 
initially carried out by the SPC Comprehensive Finance Department, but after 
1994 the CSRC appears to have assumed responsibility. Information regarding 
each localities’ annual quota is not publicly available and little is known about 
how the quota was divided up. However, some issuance data is available. Figure 
61 shows the capital raised through share issuance by each provincial 
government during 1993-2000. The way the quota was shared favoured the south 
and east of China. Economically and politically powerful localities such as 
Shanghai (which received 10.5% of all A-share capital raised up to the end of 
2000) and Beijing (9.75%) benefited the most. The central provinces of Henan, 
Hunan and Hubei were also important beneficiaries. One obvious anomaly is the 
small volume received by Guangdong province. Excluding Shenzhen, it only 
received some 2.6% of issuance volume during this period. Provinces in western 
China such as Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, received the quota scraps, although 
Figure 62 shows how western provinces slowly gained a greater share of
826 Xinhua (1994a).
827 SZB (1996d); Dong (1997), 69.
828 Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
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issuance volume during 1995-98, as the east’s dominance of the market was 
slightly diminished.
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Figure 60. The A-share share issuance quota, 1993-99
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Initial quota 5 5.5 None 5.5 10 30 Formal quota system 
abolished
Revised quota 5.5 No
issuance
5.5 10 15, then 
30
Time of quota revision - July 1994 Early
1995
Dec
1996
May 1997 - -
Actual capital raised through A-share 
IPOs
19.4 5.0 2.3 22.4 65.5 44.3 57.3
Rmb billion
Note: The quota did not include capital raised through rights and secondary issues.
Author’s calculations based on assorted press and secondary sources; row four CSRC (2001), 33.
Figure 61. Regional distribution of raised capital, end 2000
Locale Capital raised, Rmb Proportion o f total capital
m raised, %
Shanghai 9,017 10.50
Beijing 8,370 9.75
Henan 6,204 7.23
Jiangsu 5,181 6.03
Hunan 5,044 5.87
Shandong 4,990 5.81
Hubei 4,434 5.16
Shenzhen 3,534 4.12
Sichuan 3,496 4.07
Jilin 3,466 4.04
Inner Mongolia 3,010 3.51
Zhejiang 2,644 3.08
Fujian 2,636 3.07
Hainan 2,368 2.76
Guangdong (exc. 2,265 2.64
Shenzhen)
Heilongjiang 2,238 2.61
Tianjin 2,150 2.50
Hebei 2,005 2.34
Xinjiang 1,912 2.23
Liaoning 1,870 2.18
Guizhou 1,452 1.69
Shaanxi 1,292 1.50
Chongqing 1,242 1.45
Guangxi 964 1.12
Yunan 823 0.96
Gansu 813 0.95
Ningxia 606 0.71
Jiangxi 570 0.66
Anhui 588 0.64
Qinghai 297 0.35
Xizang (Tibet) 270 0.31
Shanxi 154 0.18
CSRC (2000), 42-43.
Figure 62. The regional distribution of listed companies, 1995-98
1995 1996 1997 1998
Eastern China 75.9 66.1 62.9 62.2
Central China 10.3 17.9 19.6 19.5
Western China 13.8 16.0 17.5 18.3
%
Zhao (1998), 47-48.
In addition to provinces, around 30 State Council bureaux and associated organs 
succeeded in securing listings for about 100 affiliated companies during the 
1990s. As well as heavy industry SOEs run by the coal, steel and energy 
ministries et al., this included the Public Security Bureau, whose leaders 
sponsored a Hainan clothing manufacturer’s bid to list on the SHZSE. The 
National Woman’s Association lobbied the SPC and SCSC to allow an affiliated 
condom manufacturer to issue shares, but failed in its bid.829 In 1996, State 
Council bureaux formally lost the right to receive quota allotments, although 
there is evidence to suggest this ban was not fully or quickly implemented. The 
SCSC also attempted to influence the type of enterprises coming to market. Each 
year the SCSC would issue guidelines for local SMCs to guide them in their 
work. In 1995, for instance, as in most other years, priority was given to 
enterprises in the energy, communications, raw/processed materials and high-
OIA
tech sectors, sectors which generally benefited the national economy. 
Financial, real estate firms and light industry, favourites of local leaders because 
of their fast growth potential, immediate fiscal contributions and beneficial 
effects on local economies, were banned from listing by the SCSC in 1993. A 
number still got through, however, notably in real estate. Figure 63 shows how 
the quota system engineered a massive increase in the number of industrial firms 
and SOE conglomerates coming to market, especially after 1996. Figure 64 
shows how these firms were concentrated in the manufacturing, petroleum and 
metals industries.
829 Interview-53, Shenzhen, 2001.
830 ZXS (1995).
Figure 63. Industrial sector of companies listed on the SHGSE and SHZSE,
1992-97
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Heavy and light industry 32 106 160 176 305 445
Finance 1 1 3 3 3 3
Commerce 4 21 44 44 68 86
Utilities 2 13 25 25 37 53
Real estate 6 18 24 26 28 27
Conglomerate 7 17 37 37 75 117
Total 52 176 311 311 516 731
Huang (1999d), 265.
Figure 64. Industrial breakdown of listed firms, end of 2000
Total number o f listed 
companies
Proportion o f 
total, %
Manufacturing 664 61.03
Machinery and industrial 178 16.36
equipment
Petroleum and chemicals 153 14.06
Metal and non-metallic mineral 110 10.11
products
Wholesale and retail trade 106 9.74
Conglomerate groups 78 7.17
Communication and electronics 60 5.51
Textiles 59 5.42
Food and drink 52 4.78
Social services 51 4.69
Transport and storage 42 3.86
Electricity, gas and water 40 3.68
Real estate 31 2.85
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 27 2.48
Construction 21 1.93
Paper, printing 20 1.84
Other manufacturing 16 1.47
Mining 14 1.29
Plastics and rubber 13 1.19
Finance and insurance 7 0.64
Information, culture 7 0.64
Wood 3 0.28
Total 1,088 100
CSRC (2001), 134.
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In October 1996, the SCSC altered the quota system to support its industrial 
policy objective of using the stock market as a key support for SOE reform. First, 
the size of the quota increased dramatically. During 1996-98, the quota grew 
from Rmb5.5 billion to Rmb30 billion, as Figure 60 showed. Second, from this 
time on, the SCSC set a quota for the number of shares to be issued, rather than a 
renminbi value for the issue. The CSRC would then determine the number of 
companies in each locale that would be allowed to list.831 Previously, local 
governments had chosen to distribute a renminbi quota among a large number of 
small companies. The change was designed to encourage local government to 
merge small and medium-sized SOEs, thus helping to consolidate the SOE 
sector. However, this change took time to implement, as companies moved 
through the issuance process. In 1996, over 57% of new listees still had stock 
capital less than of RmblOOm.833 Figure 65 and Figure 66 show how the size of 
companies grew during 1996-2000 as a result of the policy being implemented. 
Whereas by the end of 1996 72% of listed companies had stock capital of 
Rmb200m or less, by the end of 2000 the figure was only 42%.
Figure 65. The stock capital of listed companies, end 1996
Rmb Number o f listed companies Proportion o f listed companies, %
<100m 198 37
100-200m 184 35
200-300m 58 11
300-400m 34 6
>400m 56 11
Total 530 100
CSRC (1997), 57.
Figure 66. The stock capital of listed companies, end 2000
Rmb Number o f listed companies Proportion o f listed companies, %
<100m 11 1
100-200m 380 35
200-300m 262 24
300-400m 149 14
>400m 220 20
Total 1,088 100
CSRC (2001), 136.
831 SCMP (1996g).
832 Wong (1998), 62.
833 Wu (1999b), 30; Pan (1999), 73.
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Overseas issuance
The SCSC also reserved the right to authorise all enterprises issuing shares 
abroad. The December 1992 circular banned ‘localities or bureaux arbitrarily 
organising enterprises to issue and list stocks on offshore exchanges’. This 
was a particularly sensitive issue. Not only did it involve foreign exchange 
considerations, and China’s image abroad, but foreign listings allowed 
companies access to far deeper capital markets. On its establishment, the SCSC 
faced a wave of pending PBoC-sponsored overseas listings, mostly in New York 
and Vancouver. The SCSC delayed the plans of the Brilliance Group, a PBoC- 
linked group, to list nine subsidiaries abroad.835 In March 1994, the SCSC then 
authorised its first batch of 22 companies to list abroad, including some of the 
Brilliance Group.836 After 1992, the application procedure for overseas issuance 
involved a firm obtaining sponsorship from its local government (or State 
Council bureaux), approval from the CSRC and SPC, approval from the vice­
premier himself and then the SCSC.837 Of course, extensive bargaining went on 
between State Council bureaux over which firms could issue abroad. Some 
companies, with local government support, simply bypassed the system. 
Between December 1992 and May 1993,13 Mainland companies made backdoor 
H-share listings in Hong Kong by buying controlling stakes in HKSE-listed 
companies.838 In May 1993 the central government moved against this practice, 
when the CSRC and the HKSEC prevented Guangdong ITIC buying a 
controlling stake in Hong Kong-listed ASEAN Resources. Subsequent 
regulations issued by the CSRC, however, did not completely solve the 
problem. By 1997, about seven more Mainland companies had taken over 
HKSE vehicles.840 However, apart from this, the system of SCSC authorisation 
worked well and gave the central government effective control over overseas 
issuance. Figure 67 shows the size and number of foreign listings between 1993 
and 1998.
834 Xinhua (1993b).
835 Tong (1993a); CD (1994); Tong (1993c).
836 Brilliance Automotive was the first Mainland company to issue shares outside the PRC, 
Studwell (2002), 76-79; Zhang (1998), 179.
837 Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
838 Tong (1993b); Peng (1994a).
839 Chen (1997a), 502.
840 Kumar (1997a), 120.
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Figure 67. Overseas issuance, 1993-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Number of companies 6 11 2 6 17 1
Initial issues 1.0 2.2 0.3 0.9 4.2 0.2
Secondary issues 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Convertible bonds 0 0 0 0.2 0.3 N/A
Total issuance 1.0 2.2 3.8 1.2 4.7 4.6
US$ billion
CSRC (1999b), 20.
Regulatory competition within the central government: the PBoC and the 
CSRC
The SCSC was mandated to co-ordinate State Council bureaux policies towards 
the stock market. To a large degree, a full and proper evaluation of its 
achievements and failures in this regard is impossible to make because of the 
lack of available information about the commission, its discussions and 
decisions. However, one important problem within the SCSC that can be studied 
to some extent is the difficult relationship between the PBoC and CSRC. Under 
the December 1992 institutional settlement, the two organs shared 
responsibilities over securities companies and TICs. The PBoC retained a role as 
the ‘supervising administration over securities businesses’ while its other 
responsibilities were distributed to other bureaux, mainly the CSRC. The bank 
was left with powers to examine, approve and administer securities companies 
and TICs and, as such, it was the only bureaux authorised to extend a financial 
licence, or retract one, to a firm dealing in securities. The bank was also 
responsible for the ‘overall financial soundness’ of these companies and had 
power to appoint their senior managements.841 For its part, the CSRC took on 
day-to-day supervision of firms’ underwriting, proprietary trading and brokerage 
businesses.
As well as the stock exchanges, the large majority of China’s securities 
companies were established by banks and TICs during 1988-91, and initially fell
841 Interview-58, Shenzhen, 2001.
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under the regulatory umbrella of the PBoC.842 During most of the 1990s China 
had around 90 dedicated securities companies and 220-390 TICs involved in the 
securities business.843 However, as chapter three explained for the period before 
1992, the PBoC’s regulatory capabilities were deficient. Securities companies 
operated until the end of 1990 without any national regulations governing their 
organisation, scope of business, qualifications or capital requirements. In October 
1990, the PBoC established a licensing system, but this did not include any 
regulations (or even guidance) on underwriting, proprietary trading, investment 
funds or portfolio management.844 In theory, PBoC branches engaged in off-site 
surveillance, mainly through quarterly examinations of companies’ financial 
reports; on-site surveillance; verification of the qualifications of senior 
personnel; and the collection of statistics.845 However, the bank was ill equipped 
to cope with such demands. In Beijing, the PBoC SMO had a staff of only seven 
during 1994-96 and had the capacity to carry out on-site surveillance at only 16 
firms in any one year. While company reports were sent both to local PBoC 
branches and to the PBoC headquarters, they were often unstandardised and 
sometimes simply unreadable. No in-depth examination of them occurred at 
either central and local level. Large TICs and those companies known to be at 
greatest risk received the regulators’ greatest attention, but even then only key 
statistics were examined and the details glossed. Staff faced weak incentives to 
actively regulate companies owned by, or affiliated with their own local 
government.
Disputes between the CSRC and PBoC were common.846 For example, although 
in August 1993 the CSRC was granted powers to punish offenders of the April 
1993 measures, the CSRC could not cancel the licence of a securities firm 
without the PBoC’s agreement.847 One interviewee claimed the CSRC’s inability 
to unilaterally withdraw a licence led to some securities companies’ managers 
questioning its authority. In practice, CSRC staff had to negotiate any fines they 
wanted to levy with the PBoC. Serious problems, especially those involving
842 Li (1992b), 853.
843 Huang (1999d), 304
844 Kumar (1997a), 42.
845 Interview-26, Beijing, 2000.
846 Interview-06, Shanghai, 2000.
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significant illegal activities, were normally were discussed at the SCSC. 
However, many cases were left unresolved because of disagreements over the 
degree of punishment. The result, as the World Bank reports, was that ‘little [de 
facto] monitoring and regulation of securities dealers’ took place during 1993-
QJQ
97. However, it was not just enforcement that was undermined; key policy 
issues were disputed and delayed. For example, as financial institutions the STCs 
fell within the jurisdiction of the PBoC, but were left unregulated as chapter 
seven explained. When CSRC leaders proposed to restructure the STCs, bringing 
the matter up at a number of SCSC meetings during 1994-95, the PBoC 
leadership reportedly refused to co-operate. With the PBoC veto in place, the 
STC issue remained unresolved until after 1997.849 This was not the only area in 
which PBoC leaders used their de facto veto powers to derail a CSRC initiative. 
In mid-1994 share prices were in free-fall, the result of a national credit crunch, 
an excess of new issues and rising interest rates.850 Both the Shanghai and CSRC 
leaderships were concerned. A meeting of the SCSC took place in late July 
where the CSRC proposed a series of market boosting measures. The PBoC 
reportedly consented and the SCSC authorised the CSRC to announce a rescue
til QC1package known as the sanda zhengce (the three big policies) on 28 July 1994. 
First, new issuance was halted. Second, the CSRC announced the start of 
research on allowing bank loans to be extended to securities companies (rongzi) 
and a figure of Rmb 10 billion was floated.852 Third, the CSRC announced it was 
considering allowing Sino-foreign investment funds to be established, as well as
OM
allowing direct foreign investment in the A-share market. The implication was 
that these proposals would all soon be implemented and in the first week of 
August the SHGSE index rose 113% and the Shenzhen index by 73%.854 It is 
unclear what then happened. There are reports that the PBoC leadership, opposed 
to the later two policies, sought support from within the zhongyang leadership 
and other State Council bureau leaders for non-implementation.855 One
847 Chen (1997a); Jin (1999), 329.
848 World Bank (1995a), 34-37.
849 Interview-42, Shanghai, 2000.
850 Wang (1994a).
851 RR (1994); Kumar (1997b), 53; Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
852 Wang (1994b).
853 Chan (1994b),
854 Hu (1999a), 127; Wang (1996c); Ibison (1994); SZB (1994i).
855 BT (1994).
258
interviewee claimed that the MoF, SPC and SCORES all preferred ‘a gradual 
approach’ to the financing of securities companies and foreign entry. PBoC 
leaders apparently opposed the former initiative on the grounds that it would 
undermine the banking sector’s stability, and the SAFE, a bureau operating under 
the PBoC, is known to have opposed opening up to foreign portfolio investment 
because of concerns about currency stability.857 By October, the sanda zhengce 
were dead in the water, and investors knew it: share prices were again falling.
The PBoC leadership consistently resisted attempts by the CSRC to assume more 
responsibility over the sector. In August 1994, the bank issued measures that 
staked its claim to being the ‘primary manager of all financial institutions’, with 
no mention of the CSRC.858 Indeed, the measures warned other government 
bureaux not to ‘interfere’ in the PBoC’s activities.859 The CSRC was further 
marginalised by the Law of the People’s Bank of China, passed in March 1995, 
which gave the PBoC statutory authority over the entire financial industry. 
Although the claim is only speculative, it is reasonable to assume that the 
CSRC’s delay in promulgating rules on detailed business in the securities sector 
(such as on underwriting and proprietary trading) was due to obstruction by the 
PBoC. Extraordinarily, such rules were not promulgated until 1996.860 These 
regulations introduced higher capital requirements and, for the first time, several 
basic regulatory norms: capital asset ratios, limits to the amount of capital that 
could be traded, and separation of proprietary and customer funds. The CSRC 
required firms that wished to engage in these businesses to apply for CSRC 
licences in addition to the PBoC’s Financial Institution licence.861
The illegal bank lending to securities companies in Shanghai during 1996-97 
reflected particularly badly on the PBoC. Not only was the bank responsible for
856 Interview-34, Shenzhen, 2000.
857 SZB (1994a).
858 Chen (1997a), 586-590; Yao (1998), 61-62.
859 Li (1998b), 176; SZB (1995o).
860 Chen (1997a), 168-172, 201-209.
861 Chengxi Yao notes that these licensing regulations contradicted the Law of the PBoC. If 
securities companies were financial institutions, then the CSRC had no statutory right to 
supervise their activities; if  they were not, then the PBoC had no legal authority to supervise them 
in the first place, Yao (1998), 63-65, 85; Kumar (1997a), 42; SZB (1995d); SZB (1996f); Li 
(1998b), 202.
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monitoring funds in the banking system; it was also supposed to be monitoring 
the activities of the securities companies that received the loans. On the basis of 
the ‘three decisions plan’ {sanding fangan), the PBoC was forced to surrender its 
powers over securities companies in April 1998 when all licensing and
Q f / J
supervision powers over securities companies were passed to the CSRC. 
Concluding remarks
This chapter has demonstrated how the zhongyang leadership initially attempted 
to organise the institutions of central government to lead, oversee and constrain 
the activities of local leaders. The SCSC/CSRC split may have initially appeared 
a rational division of work. Indeed, the World Bank argued that the ‘two-tier 
approach’ to regulation embodied in the SCSC/CSRC arrangement, with its
Q f / l
inherent checks and balances, could be advantageous to a young stock market. 
The SCSC did provide some useful goods: some issues were negotiated and 
resolved at SCSC meetings and, by formalising inter-bureau negotiations, the 
SCSC also reduced the dispute-arbitration workload of the State Council. It also 
constrained the developmental activities of local leaders and ensured that their 
worse abuses were curbed.
However the SCSC was flawed, unable to deliver the goods demanded by the 
zhongyang leadership: co-ordination of State Council bureaux, constraining local 
developmentalism and delivering better quality regulation. While the central 
government acquired authority over the fangzhen, the issuance quota and access 
to foreign markets, extensive space was left for local leaders to pursue their own 
agendas. While the central government oversaw the overall size of total issuance 
and guided the types of firms that could list, it had no means to supervise the 
quality of these companies and had manifold difficulties constraining their rights 
issues. While it could attempt to set the policy mood through the fangzhen, it had 
few direct means to oversee implementation at the stock exchanges and SAOs. 
Equity developmentalism, as chapter five revealed, was still eminently possible. 
The SCSC’s problems were fourfold. First, its structure was unsuited to its 
duties. Unlike the SPC and SETC, which both co-ordinate the activities of
862 Huang (1999d), 98; Interview-10, Shanghai, 2000.
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multiple central government bureaux, the SCSC was not a bureau in its own right 
with a permanent leadership able to negotiate and enforce compromise on an on­
going basis. The SCSC’s infrequent, ad hoc meeting schedule, its lack of 
independent research facilities and its lack of authority over any specific policy 
area all prevented it from playing an effective role.864 Second, its three specific 
powers, setting the fangzhen, setting the issuance quota and authorising overseas 
issuance, were all macro in orientation: neither the SCSC or its office or its 
administrative agent had powers of oversight and control to ensure that their 
policies were implemented. Moreover, even these powers were not practised by 
the SCSC but by a small number of senior leaders including the vice premier and 
the SPC leadership. Third, by dispersing responsibility and powers among its 
member bureaux, the existence of the SCSC prevented the CSRC from gaining a 
clear mandate to develop policy and regulation. The commission operated 
instead as a veto point in the central government and thus weakened the central 
government’s influence over the sector. With critical issues such as the STCs left 
unresolved local leaders were free to defect from official, but not actively 
implemented, central government policy. The SCSC clouded the zhongyang’s 
leadership’s voice. Fourth, the SCSC did not contain a single representative of 
local government, meaning that there was no institutionalised forum for the two 
levels of leaders to settle disputes, reach consensus or even have regular 
opportunities for information sharing or discussion.
These weaknesses were, however, recognised and largely resolved after 1997. 
The dispersal of the SCSC in early 1998 revealed that senior leaders were 
capable of learning from institutional failure, of overcoming bureaucratic 
resistance, and of organising institutional change to improve their controls over 
local agents given the right incentives. The transfer of the PBoC’s regulatory 
rights over securities companies to the CSRC was an unmitigated loss for the 
bank whose leadership had resisted such a move since 1992. Indeed, the SCSC’s 
dispersal contradicts a central finding of other studies of reform China’s policy­
making process: that zhongyang leaders do not allow important bureau leaders to
863 World Bank (1995b), 22.
864 He (1998), 17.
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sustain significant losses, and that the logic of compromise always ensures that 
all interests are ‘balanced’ and ‘satisficed’.
262
10
Drafting the Securities Law: the role o f the National People’s 
Congress in creating institutions
Passing the law was far from an easy task.
Li Yining, vice chairman of the Finance and Economics Committee, 1998865
The Securities Law (SL) of the People’s Republic of China is arguably the most 
important institution that governs China’s equity market. Until its 
implementation on 1st July 1999, the sector was regulated through State Council 
directives, SCSC measures, regulations promulgated by the CSRC, municipal 
rules and stock exchange ordinances. These had varying degrees of legitimacy
Q/'i'
and effectiveness. The SL raised the level of the institutional architecture 
governing the equity market to statutory law, adding permanence and providing 
legitimacy to the sector and to the CSRC. It laid out extensive rules governing 
the issuance, trading, settlement and regulation of securities, as well as liabilities 
for breaches of the law. CSRC chairman Zhou Zhenqing, the media and 
numerous publishing houses used it as an opportunity to celebrate a new epoch 
for the protection of investors and ‘standardisation’ (guifanhua) of the market. 
This chapter examines how such an apparently critical part of the institutional 
architecture was created and the role China’s legislature, the NPC, had in the 
process.
Despite the media furore, however, at the time of its promulgation the SL had a 
very modest impact on the sector and actually had little to offer in terms of
oro
institutional change. It contained few new rules to govern issuance or trading, 
it created no regulatory organs that did not already exist and it extended few new 
powers to, or constraints upon, the organs already in existence. In contrast to the 
Securities and Exchange Act (1934) in the United States or the Financial 
Services Act (1998) in the United Kingdom, both of which created new
865 Xinhua (1998e).
866 Li (1993), 84-85.
867 COL (1999b); Xinhua (1998b); AFX (1998b); BR (2001), 3; Huang (1999a); Liu (1999a).
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institutional structures and empowered new regulatory organs, China’s SL 
appeared largely ceremonial. Rather, as previous chapters have highlighted, it 
was the hundreds of administrative regulations (xingzheng guize) previously 
issued by executive organs that had done the real institutional work.869 Given this 
lack of legislative impact, the NPC could be assumed to have been an 
insignificant actor in terms of defining and designing reform China’s equity 
institutions. This is a serious accusation, especially after two decades of 
development that have seen the legislature return from the margins of the 
political system to regain some of its powers.870 Kevin O’Brien, Murray Scot 
Tanner and Michael Dowdle all argue that through its setting of legislative 
priorities, by regaining a lead role in drafting legislation, and by overseeing the 
redrafting process, the NPC has, at least partially, asserted its constitutional role 
as China’s chief legislative body. There have even been some moves to enhance 
its role in supervising the State Council, a role that the PRC’s 1982 Constitution
O 'J  1
extended to it. Moreover, recent studies suggest that the Congress has become 
an actor in the policy-making process in its own right, able to ‘think’ 
independently of both the Party and the executive, and even able to act in 
opposition to them at times.872 This chapter provides additional evidence to 
support many of these claims. It shows how actors within the NPC sponsored 
radical policies, opposed several important proposals originating from within the 
zhongyang, and attempted to establish mechanisms to constrain the powers of the 
CSRC. While most of the proposals were not implemented, the NPC did have a 
significant, if marginal, impact on the final shape of equity institutions. While 
this chapter provides evidence of a resurgent NPC able to influence important 
policy debates, it also reveals a legislature with serious internal co-ordination 
problems. It was the fragility of the NPC’s own institutions, the rules and 
procedures that governed its drafting activities, rather than its sidelining by Party 
or State Council leaders, that undermined its ability to fulfil its full constitutional 
role.
868 C.f. Xinhua (1998f).
869 In the UK parliamentary system, legislative powers can be delegated to ministers or other 
public officials. However, these powers are constrained, bill-specific and detailed, Adonis (1993), 
112.
870 For background on the NPC, Dowdle (1997); Tanner (1999); O'Brien (1990).
871 CD (1999a).
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The chapter is divided into three sections. The first discusses the role of 
legislatures in institutional change, and how such a role might be assessed in the 
case of China. The second section considers in detail the SL drafting process 
during 1992-98, including the activities of the NPC committees and the 
interaction between them and State Council bureaux. The third section considers 
what the SL drafting process tells us about the role of the NPC in creating 
institutions in reform China.
Legislative institutions and the revival o f the National People’s Congress
The PRC state formally operates on the basis of parliamentary sovereignty. The 
NPC thus resembles the UK’s Westminster parliament.873 In this system, 
parliament nominates an executive, the cabinet, to govern on its behalf while the 
parliament retains all legislative competence. Parliament executes law, approves 
government finances, examines the activities of the executive and is (absent the 
monarchy in the UK case) sovereign. However, in states with strong party 
systems (or with one party), parliament tends to be completely controlled by the 
leadership of the majority party.874 Thus while the NPC formally nominates and 
votes for the executive branch of government, the State Council, in practice the 
NPC operates in a subordinate agency relationship to it and the Central 
Committee above it. Similarly, the UK parliament tends to operate in a 
subordinate relationship to the cabinet and prime minister, although it retains its 
sovereign status more than China’s.875 Because of this, one expects legislative
872 For examples, O'Brien (1990), 4-11, 175-177; Tanner (1999), 1-15, 161; Dowdle (1997), 1-23, 
123.
873 China’s 1954 Constitution decreed the NPC’s plenary session to be the highest organ of state 
authority, a formal status that has been retained, Dowdle (1997), 53. In the Westminster model, 
the concept of the ‘Queen in parliament’ embraces the three estates of the Monarch, Lords and 
Commons, which, acting together, constitute the state’s supreme legal authority, Punnett (1994), 
245-255.
874 In contrast to the American system where legislative and executive powers are shared between 
the president and congress, Punnett (1994), 206-207; Horn (1995), 8; Neustadt (1960), 3.
875 Historically of course, the NPC has been more constrained. During the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-76) the NPC ceased to function. During the 1980s it became active again in executing law, 
but the State Council Legislative Affairs Office (SCLAO) determined the legislative agenda and 
State Council bureau drafted all legislation. They then simply handed laws to the NPC to pass 
onto the statute books. Thus during 1978-92, the NPC had neither initiated legislation itself nor 
drafted law in house. The arena of dispute over the content of law, and therefore all decisions 
relating to what institutional structures the state used to regulate its emergent markets, was 
confined to the executive and the senior levels of the Party.
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proposals in both countries to come directly from cabinet, to be drafted within 
the executive, and to be micro-managed by the relevant minister through 
parliament, (assuming, of course, that the party in government enjoys a stable 
majority).876 Thus, in practice, despite the formal relationship of principal and 
agent between the parliament and executive, few proposals for law, or significant 
changes to the content of drafts, from the floor of the parliament will succeed, 
and none will proceed without explicit ministerial approval and support. In terms 
of drafting and executing law, we expect parliament to be the agent of the cabinet 
and the executor of institutions designed within the executive.
There are, of course, important differences between the UK and PRC 
parliamentary systems. First, the State Council has competence to execute law, 
unlike the UK cabinet. The 1982 PRC Constitution re-divided legislative 
authority between the executive and the legislative branches of government. The 
NPC plenary session was mandated to enact ‘basic* law, (those laws mostly 
associated with civil and criminal affairs); the NPC Standing Committee 
(Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui, hereafter NPCSC) 
became ‘a legislature within a legislature’ mandated to promulgate ‘ordinary’ 
law (laws in other areas); and the State Council could adopt ‘administrative 
measures, administrative law and regulations’ (xingzheng fagui) with full legal 
effect. The legislative competence of the State Council was further extended in 
the same year when the NPC authorised the State Council to promulgate 
‘temporary rules’ (zhanxing tiaoli and guiding) concerned with economic reform. 
The result has been a fluid legal environment in which the State Council and its 
member bureaux have far more discretionary power over institutional 
development than the UK cabinet. Such is the extent to which these powers have 
been used that there is rarely little practical use for statutory legislation at all. 
Equipped with this legislative capacity the State Council is able to bypass the 
NPC at will, and this ability has further undermined the status of both statutory 
law and the NPC itself during reform.877 Second, the PRC’s one-party system has 
undermined the NPC’s claim to be the state’s sovereign authority. The chairman 
of the NPCSC is appointed by the Politburo (and is usually a member of the
876 Cowhey (1995), 4.
877 Tanner (1999), 45-46; NPCFEC (1993a), 3; Tanner (1999), 44; O'Brien (1990), 148, 158.
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Politburo). The Party committee within the NPCSC, appointed by the CCOD, 
controls the legislative agenda and many of the activities of the Congress. NPC 
deputies are selected by electoral colleges made up of local people’s congresses 
which themselves remain subordinate to local Party committees.878 In practice 
then, ultimate authority is held by senior Party officials and not by the NPC.
Li Yining claims that the SL marked a breakthrough in the NPC’s development 
and its role in China’s political system. He has argued that since it was reform 
China’s first economic law to be drafted by the legislature rather than an 
executive organ, it provides evidence of ‘China’s alignment with international
R7Qlegislative norms’. Li has pointed to the fact that the law had a NPC special 
standing committee as its lead drafter (caoan touzu) and to the extensive role 
‘social forces’ (legislators, academics and business-people) played in the drafting 
process.880 Li’s claim is simple: NPC organs drafted and therefore influenced, if 
not determined, the content of the SL and the institutions contained therein. Such 
a claim has enormous implications for how one understands not only the drafting 
process, but also how institutions are created in reform China. Recent research on 
the resurgent NPC suggests that Li’s claim is worth investigating. To evaluate 
the NPC’s role, one must step back and consider two questions. First, what 
institutions co-ordinate the legislature and the executive? Second, how is the 
drafting process within the NPC organised?
First, consider the institutions that govern the relationships between the 
legislature, the executive and the Party. The classic communist model views the 
Party’s mechanisms of supervision and coercion over its legislature to be
878 The NPCSC is made up of around 150 members and meets for a two-week session every two 
months. Both itself and the plenary session (the full session of 3,000-odd deputies which meets 
yearly in the spring) have independent legal competence and, in theory, powers to investigate and 
supervise executive activities. The two groups have equal legal status though the NPCSC’s main 
duties are to oversee the NPC’s constitutional responsibilities, administer the NPC bureaucracy 
and set the legislative agenda. The NPCSC is headed by a 20-25 member Chairman’s Group that 
sets and oversees its agenda. This group is led by the NPCSC Chairman and is comprised o f die 
NPCSC vice chairmen, the chairman of the NPC’s special committees and other NPC organs, 
including the CLA, Dowdle (1997), 26-27; Zheng (1997), 174; O'Brien (1990),149.
879 Wang (1998a); Qin (1994).
880 The NPC has eight special standing committees whose main responsibility is to research and 
draft law. Their agenda is set by the NPCSC and the Chairman’s Group, and their role is similar 
to Westminster’s standing committees, which consider bills, rather than select committees, which 
oversee government activities, Dowdle (1997), 45,47-48; Punnett (1994), 268-269.
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extensive, intricate and effective, allowing the drafting process to be minutely 
managed. The Party can either do this directly, or through its other loyal agent, 
the executive. Drafts would be prepared within the Party and/or executive, and 
then given to the legislature to rubber stamp. Even if the NPC did take on a 
nominal role in drafting, few significant policy proposals would have been made 
by NPC delegates. Certainly, no opposition to the Party/executive’s proposals 
would be brooked. This chapter, in contrast, contributes to the growing body of 
work that shows that the NPC no longer operates in this fashion. Instead, the 
legislature operated with surprising autonomy, free from active Party supervision 
and even from those executive organs, like the CSRC and PBoC, with a 
legitimate interest in the legislation. The institutions linking the legislative with 
the executive are shown to be extremely fragile. The second set of institutions 
examined here are those internal to the NPC, most notably those that define the 
roles, responsibilities and powers of the NPCSC and the drafting groups. The 
rubber stamp model does not consider the internal dynamics of the legislature: it 
does not need to since the traditional communist parliament model did not have 
any internal dynamics. However, as soon as the zhongyang leadership 
enfranchised the NPC to draft law in 1992, and extended a measure of autonomy 
over the drafting process to it, the NPC’s internal institutions became critical. 
This was a problem since after years of inactivity these institutions were ill- 
defined, weak and failed to effectively manage the process or resolve the 
disputes that arose between different actors and organs within the NPC 
bureaucracy.
Drafting the Securities Law, August 1992 - August 1993: the Finance and 
Economic Committee’s radical first draft
tViOn 8 August 1992, Wan Li, chairman of the seventh plenum NPCSC, made a 
formal proposal to the NPCSC to draft a Securities Transaction Law (Zhengquan 
Jiaoyifa).m  Members of the NPC’s Finance and Economics Committee (Caijing 
Weiyuanhui, hereafter FEC), as well as several supporters of stock market reform 
within the State Council, had proposed the idea while the NPC General Office’s 
Research Department (Bangongting Yanjiushi, hereafter GORD) was soliciting
881 Wang (2000a), 18.
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legislative proposals earlier in 1992.882 The originator of the idea appears to have 
been Zhang Zhongli.883 As president of the Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences and an NPC delegate, Zhang is reported to have had submitted a draft 
Securities Transactions bill to the NPC in 1991.884 Other reports indicate that 
several FEC members, including Li Yining, had already prepared a similar
OOf ^
(possibly even the same) draft, without any official direction. Li was then vice 
chairman of the FEC, and was appointed head of the FEC’s Securities 
Transaction Law drafting group on 11th July 1992.886 The group, chosen by Li, 
was initially made up of seven economists without formal government 
affiliation.887 They began work on 12th August 1992 and by 27th October had
o o o
completed a first draft containing ten chapters and 237 articles. At the start of 
the NPC’s eighth plenum in March 1993 the plenary session formally appointed 
the FEC as the lead drafter (quantou qicaoren) and on 8th January 1993, a 
national conference agreed to the FEC’s proposal to change the name of the law 
to the Securities Law (Zhengquanfa) to allow the law to cover a wider range of 
issues.
However, the FEC was not the only group involved in drafting securities law. 
The State Council’s December 1992 circular mandated the SCORES to organise 
drafting work for all securities legislation.889 The CSRC soon took over this 
mandate and presented its own draft of the SL to the NPC informally in mid- 
1993, a draft largely based on the CSRC’s own April 1993 Provisional
882 The FEC is one of the NPC’s special standing committees. The GORD operates under the 
NPCSC, collects legislative proposals from government organs, and has been ‘the major 
intellectual force behind the institutional development’ of the NPC, O'Brien (1990), 150.
883 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000.
884 ZTS (1992a).
885 SZB (1993p); ZTS (1992b).
886 Li was initially given Rmb30,000 (US$3,600) for the drafting group’s expenses. Drafters are 
not paid but have their expenses met, Li (1990); Wang (2000a), 18; Wang (1998b).
887 Tanner reports that special committees are usually made up of senior Party cadres or, in more 
recent years, retired government officials. In comparison, the FEC drafting group was young, 
independent, professional and expert. Initially the group was made up of Li Yining, Guo Chengde 
(Beijing University, Professor of Economics), Wang Lianzhou (Director of the FEC Office), Cao 
Fengqi, (Beijing University, Professor of Economics), and two PhD research students. Yang 
Zhihua joined in December 1992, initially as a securities law expert associated with the CASS 
and then as a CSRC staff member. In March 1993, at the eighth plenum, Li Yining was 
transferred from the FEC to the LC and formally left the drafting group, Wang (2000a), 18, 34; 
Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Tanner (1996), 57-58.
888 Guo (1999a), 184,197-201; SZB (1993m); Cao (1999), 9; SZB (1993p); Wang (2000a), 19- 
20, 28-29.
889 Xinhua (1993c).
269
Regulations on Stock Issuance and Exchange.890 Faced with this attempt by a 
non-government organ to hijack the drafting process, the NPCSC leadership 
suggested that the CSRC should ‘co-ordinate’ with the appointed lead drafter, the 
FEC, in effect killing the CSRC draft.891 In response the CSRC withdrew its 
draft.892 This appears to be the first successful attempt by the NPC to reject a
tfilegislative draft prepared by an executive organ. On the 18 August 1993, the 
FEC approved the initial draft, the caoan.*93 It contained 13 chapters and 178 
articles.894 The caoan, reportedly the drafting group’s seventh draft, had its first 
reading at the third meeting of the eighth plenum of the NPCSC on 25th 
August.895 Both the FEC and Commission for Legal Affairs (Fazhi Gongzuo
OQiT
Weiyuanhui (Fagongwei), hereafter CLA) presented reports. Members of the 
NPCSC did not reportedly make any substantive comments on the caoan and the 
expectation was that the draft would pass on the second reading, scheduled for 
December 1993 or in early 1994.897
The FEC’s caoan was a radical document, bearing more resemblance to a policy 
white paper than a set of rules designed to govern an existing market. It 
contained a radical restructuring plan for the institutions of equity regulation as
890 Interview-13, Beijing, 2000.
891 Although the NPCSC can not reject a draft forwarded by an executive organ, it can effectively 
kill any draft by referring it between committees indefinitely.
892 Dowdle claims that the CSRC draft was rejected in 1994. He also claims that the CSRC had 
started drafting this draft before the NPC. This claim, however, appears to be contradicted by the 
fact that the CSRC was only established in December 1992, while the FEC drafting group was 
established in August 1992. According to one interviewee, much of the content o f the CSRC draft 
was incorporated into the FEC draft, Dowdle (1997), 62; Interview-10, Shanghai, 2000; 
Interview-13, Beijing, 2000.
893 The generic term in Chinese for ‘draft’ is caoan. However, caoan is also the formal term used 
within the legislative process to describe the first draft that is formally presented to the NPCSC. 
Subsequent drafts are then termed caoan (xiugai), ‘revised draft’, and then numbered as caoan 
(dier xuigaigao) ‘second revised draft’ etc. While it would be preferable to refer to each draft as a 
numbered revised draft, this is not feasible since there were so many revised drafts that the 
drafters themselves lost count.
894 NPCFEC (1993a), 2.
895 Guo (1999a), 218; Wang (2000a), 42.
896 The CLA is the NPC organ responsible for legislative drafting. It has competence to draft 
itself, but its main duties are to evaluate the drafts o f other bureau (NPC or executive organs), 
report its opinions to the NPCSC and summarise the views of NPCSC delegates when they 
considers drafts. The CLA has around 200 permanent staff, is made up of five specialised 
research offices and an administrative office. It operates under the management o f the NPCSC 
and the Chairman’s Group. One interviewee claimed that the CLA operates as the Chairman’s 
own office, Interview-12, Beijing, 2000; O'Brien (1990), 152.
897 Wang reports that the draft was generally expected to pass in late 1993, while the report on the 
draft presented to the NPCSC appears to suggest that the FEC expected passage in June 1994, 
Wang (2000a), 42; Interview-12, Beijing, 2000.
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well as a series of market-oriented policy proposals. It was a clear challenge to 
State Council policy across a range of issues.898 Here the focus is on its vision for 
regulatory institutions. Liu Suinian, vice chairman of the FEC, criticised the 
initial status given to the CSRC. Since it was only a shiye danwei (non­
government unit), he argued, it was not legally entitled to promulgate 
administrative regulations or issue fines. Liu also criticised the inadequacy of the 
powers given to the SCSC. In response, the FEC drafted into the SL a system of 
regulation modelled on America’s SEC. The FEC draft proposed the 
establishment of a State Securities Management Commission (Guojia Zhengquan 
Guanli Weiyuanhui, hereafter SSMC), a State Council bureau with sole 
responsibility for policy-making and regulation of the equity market.899 The 
SCSC was to be dispersed, only months after the State Council had designed the 
SCSC/CSRC system of split regulation900 This was not, however, new thinking 
for NPC delegates. In March 1991, at the fourth plenum of the seventh NPC, 
fifty-one delegates, including Li Yining, had sponsored a motion entitled 
Suggestion on Establishing a National Securities Management Commission.901 
The FEC caoan also attempted to undermine the institutions of local capture. 
Local governments were to be prohibited from establishing securities offices (i.e. 
SAOs) while the SSMC was to be allowed to set up its own local offices 
(zhineng bumeri).902 Moreover, local government was to be given no role in the 
issuance process.903 However, the caoan differed from the final SL in the role it 
extended to self-regulation and market mechanisms. Take the SSMC’s proposed 
relations with the stock exchanges for instance. The caoan allowed the SSMC to 
send supervisory personnel to the exchanges and to dismiss senior personnel in 
certain circumstances, including illegal behaviour. In these respects, the FEC’s 
caoan closely resembled the final version of the SL and actual shape and powers 
of the post-1997 CSRC. However, in contrast to the final version of the SL, the 
caoan also guaranteed key aspects of the exchanges* SRO status. For instance, 
the stock exchanges had only to report, rather than seek approval for, disciplinary
898 NPCFEC (1993b).
899 Ibid, 393-394.
900 Chen (1993a).
901 Dong (1997), 135; Guo (1999a), 188.
902 NPCFEC (1993b), 394.
903 However, at a July 1993 meeting of NPC and State Council organs, delegates accused the 
caoan of being ‘too market-oriented’, Wang (2000a), 34; SZB (1993m).
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measures and changes to its board of directors and supervisory committee. 
Moreover, in the caoan, the exchanges also retained the right to decide when to 
list, suspend and delist shares, powers assumed by the CSRC after 1997. In 
addition, the power of appointment of senior management was not ceded to the 
regulator in the caoan, as it was in the SL. The caoan also reserved an important 
place for the SIA, empowering it to set the rules of off-exchange trading (at the 
STCs), authorise the establishment of STCs, investigate their members’ 
behaviour and to provide arbitration facilities. The final SL, in contrast, 
established the SIA as an organ directly managed by the CSRC.904
This regulatory design was part of the FEC members’ wider aim to limit the 
state’s institutional capture of the equity market and promote market 
mechanisms. Towards this aim they avoided institutionalising administrative 
controls over the stock market.905 For instance, they left out all mention in their 
draft of the issuance quota system, one of the central government’s most 
important mechanisms of administrative control.906 The draft also avoided all 
mention of individual, state and legal person shares, shortly after the State 
Council had created the categories.907 These conspicuous silences were aimed at 
encouraging the discontinuation of plan mechanisms that the FEC members 
considered dysfunctional. The FEC drafters also supported the development of 
OTC trading {changwai jiaoyi), especially for bonds, and the development of the 
STCs.908 They believed that this was the only way to eliminate black markets in 
shares, provide investment for smaller firms and guarantee fair treatment for 
investors outside Shanghai and Shenzhen.909 They also intended to foster more 
listings by private companies and allow banks to extend financing (rongzi) to 
securities companies.910All this was in opposition to State Council policy.911 Yet 
there were also limits to the FEC members’ advocacy of market mechanisms.
904 NPCSC (1993), 364.
905 SZB (1993c); SCMP (1993a).
906 NPCFEC (1993a); Chen (1993a).
907 HKEE (1994); Qin (1994), 39; Wang (2000a), 35.
908 There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the FEC responded to lobbying or other 
pressures from local governments, NPCFEC (1993a), 4; Chan (1996b).
909 NPCFEC (1993b), 391-392; Chen (1993b).
910 Credit financing (irongzi) can refer to both the extension of bank finance to securities 
companies and other intermediaries, and from brokers to their customers, Ren (1993); Xinhua 
(1993d); Peng (1998b).
911 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000.
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They did not, for instance, attempt to legislate an SEC-style registration system
Q1 9for share issuance. More importantly, the FEC resisted fully adopting the SEC 
model. Some FEC delegates suggested that the SSMC should come under the
supervision of the NPC but the drafting group instead placed the SSMC under
011the direction of the State Council.
What motivated the FEC drafters to create such a radical document? They had 
few obvious material or organisational interests to guide them in their work. 
Their committee was an ad hoc grouping of economists: they were not paid, they 
had little evident personal interest in institutional designs, and few relations with 
any State Council bureau. Moreover, unlike members of an elected chamber, 
they had no interest in re-election or delivering goods to their constituents.914 
Instead, they appear to have been motivated by a desire to reduce administrative 
interference in the equity sector, to introduce more market mechanisms and 
create effective protections for investors.
Redrafting the Securities Law, August 1993 - December 1993: the Commission 
for Legislative Affairs
After the first NPCSC reading in August 1993, the NPCSC sent the caoan to the 
NPC Law Committee (Falu Weiyuanhui, hereafter LC) and then onto the 
CLA.915 From August 1993 onwards, the LC and CLA took formal responsibility 
for all redrafting work. The FEC drafting group was formally dissolved at this 
point but did continue to meet and lobby for its ideas and its draft. However, the 
rules of the NPC state that it could not take part in redrafting work or present its 
criticisms of the CLA/CL redrafting work to the NPCSC (although this rule was 
not enforced rigidly as is explained below).916
912 As long as all relevant information is disclosed to its satisfaction, the SEC is bound to register 
all securities for public issuance and can not judge their quality.
913 Guo (1999a), 189.
914 Horn (1995), 8-13.
915 According to NPC rules, all legislation has to be reviewed by the NPCSC at least twice before 
it can become statutory law. Before 1992, however, one reading o f a State Council-authorised 
draft was often sufficient, Dowdle (1997), 74-76; Wang (2000a), 42-45.
916 Interviews 12 and 28, Beijing 2000.
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The formal role of the LC is to summarise the comments of NPCSC delegates 
during their consideration of drafts and then to redraft legislation 
appropriately.917 However, the LC is only an ad hoc group of around 18 
members that meets irregularly; it lacks both a secretariat and a research staff. 
The CLA therefore works with the LC to provide legal expertise and redraft the 
caoan in line with the directions of the NPCSC. Once the LC has sent the draft 
out to relevant bureau under its own name for consultation, the CLA then takes 
over all substantive redrafting work. Dowdle states that the LC and CLA’s 
leaderships are distinct and that the two organs thus ‘evince distinct institutional
01 o
personalities’. However, an interviewee claimed that the LC and the CLA 
form parts of the same danwei (government organ) within the NPC and share 
the same leadership. The implication was that, at least in the SL drafting 
process, the CLA leadership had considerable autonomy to redraft the law. 
Moreover, because the Chairman’s Group relies heavily on the CLA for advice 
on the status and quality of drafts, the CLA has de facto veto powers over the 
content of drafts. Because of its access to the NPC’s leaders, and its autonomy 
in redrafting work, the commission is often targeted by interest groups. For their 
part the CLA leadership reportedly encourages such lobbying, believing that the 
expression of different groups’ views improves legislation. However, Dowdle 
notes the danger this involves since the CLA could easily lose its role as an 
impartial technical advisor to the NPCSC and become involved in the 
substantive drafting of law.919
It was just after the August 1993 meeting of the NPCSC that FEC leaders 
discovered that the Company Law, then being drafted by the CLA, contained 
chapters concerning the issuance, trading and listing of corporate equities.920 In
O'} 1
general, it is rare for company law to contain such articles. This was 
problematic for the FEC since its own caoan contained several chapters devoted 
to the same issues. The incident was the first indication of a lack of co-ordination 
between the NPC organs. In October, the FEC drafting group held an emergency
917 Dowdle (1997), 47; NPCSC (1993), 360; Wang (2000a), 45.
918 Dowdle (1997), 42,51.
919 Ibid., 41-44.
920 Wang (2000a), 43.
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meeting as more details of the Company Law draft leaked out. However, there 
were no means by which FEC members could intervene or formally lodge a 
complaint against the CLA. On 20th December 1993, the LC presented the 
Company Law and revised SL drafts to the fifth meeting of the eighth plenum of 
the NPCSC, although only the former was discussed. The Company Law was 
passed, replete with the disputed articles. The Chairman’s Group, on the 
suggestion of the CLA representative, recommended that the SL draft be sent
Q99down again for further revision by the CLA.
It was at this point that the CLA’s wider ambitions to gain a substantive role in
Q9^the drafting of the SL were fulfilled. The commission established its own 
‘redrafting small group’, led by Bian Yaowu, deputy CLA director, and 
organised its own research agenda, including a visit to Shanghai in January 
1994.924 The group went on not to revise the FEC’s caoan but, as one
09  ^interviewee succinctly put it: ‘to completely rewrite it’. Most significantly for 
our purposes, the new draft completely restructured the institutions of equity 
regulation. Arguing that the stock market was not yet mature enough to warrant a 
dedicated State Council-level regulator, the CLA removed all the articles relating 
to the SSMC. Second, it proposed dual governance of the local securities offices: 
the central government would co-ordinate policy and approve share listings, but 
the local offices, under joint central and local government control, would have 
powers to investigate illegal behaviour, check information disclosure, punish 
illegal behaviour and to settle disputes.926 This was in stark contrast to the FEC 
caoan that had explicitly banned local involvement in equity regulation but in 
keeping with reality on the ground at the time.
In many other respects the CLA draft attempted to reflect the current institutional 
situation in the market rather than advocate change as the FEC did. It removed 
many of the market-oriented institutions in the FEC’s caoan. For example, the
921 World Bank (1995a), 21-22. Much of these sections of the Company Law had been taken from 
the CSRC’s April 1993 regulations.
922 SZB (1993o).
923 Dowdle (1997), 43-44.
924 NPCCLA (1994a).
925 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000.
926 NPCLC (1994a), 456; NPCSC (1993), 360; NPCCLA (1994a), 480.
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CLA draft restricted the scope of the securities covered by the law to only 
corporate equity and debt, excluding investment funds, futures and options (all 
instruments that the State Council did not support).927 The CLA draft also banned 
credit financing (rongzi), a practice that had been explicitly endorsed in the FEC 
draft and which, again, the State Council was then opposed to. However, the 
commission draft did other things too, including defending the turf of its own 
Company Law. The re-draft did not include any rules on share issuance, and was 
renamed the Securities Trading Law (.Zhengquan Jiaoyifa) to reflect this 
change.928 Arguments over the scope of the law would continue until 1998. One 
of the few areas of agreement between the FEC and CLA was their mutual 
support for equity development outside Shanghai and Shenzhen: the CLA draft 
also promoted STC development. However, in sum, if the FEC caoan was a 
radical document unlikely ever to be implemented, the CLA redraft was 
conservative and practical.
To justify these enormous revisions, the CLA argued that the FEC draft was 
‘idealistic* and out of touch with the current policy situation.929 It did this 
without an explicit mandate from the NPCSC, although from the point of view of 
its broader mandate, the CLA’s radical redraft was justified. The commission is 
charged with the management of China’s legislative framework, ‘...to help 
maintain the uniformity of the legal system and [to] avoid contradictions...’ 
(NPC Organic Law, art. 37).930 This involves the CLA in guaranteeing the order, 
coherence and flexibility of statutory law, as well as managing the interface 
between State Council administrative law and NPC statutory law. If the CLA 
was to fulfil these duties, then it had to take issue with the FEC’s caoan and to 
rewrite it so as to ensure that the law was practical, and in harmony with State 
Council policy. Related to this was the fact that by legislating on the powers and 
duties of the SCMC in the caoan, the FEC had impinged on the State Council’s 
ability to organise itself through administrative decisions. The CLA has an 
additional informal mandate to preserve the ability of the State Council to define 
the duties and powers of its member bureaux itself and to ensure that NPC
927 NPCSC (1993), 366.
928 Interviews 12 and 28, Beijing, 2000; Guo (1999a), 217; World Bank (1995a), 28.
929 Wang (2000a), 47, 52, 158.
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legislation remains sufficiently open-ended in this respect. There is also some 
suggestion that the CLA was open to lobbying from several executive organs. 
The CLA draft banned credit financing of customers (rongzi), bank loans to 
securities companies and proprietary trading by securities companies, all policies 
favoured by the PBoC leadership at the time.931
Redrafting the Securities Law, again, March 1994 - December 1994: the 
search for compromise
The new draft triggered an intense and protracted period of competition within 
the NPC. In late March 1994, Wang Lianzhou, one of the leaders of the FEC 
drafting group, succeeded in obtaining a copy of the CLA revised draft. Two 
days later, on 28th March the LC, FEC and CLA held a discussion meeting with 
State Council bureaux, local government and experts at the Yabaolu Hotel in 
Beijing. The meeting discussed the two different drafts, apparently the first 
time this had occurred in NPC history: the CLA’s caoan (xuigaigao) and the 
FEC caoan,933 The FEC produced a point-by-point rebuttal of the CLA draft. Its 
conclusion:
We have read in detail your draft o f the 18th March 1994 
and are o f the opinion that it does not fulfil the original 
draft *s basic framework. It has many problems and is an 
obvious retreat from the original draft.934
The Yabaolu meeting witnessed a heated discussion on a number of topics, 
including the regulatory structure. The SCLAO, taking its lead from the State 
Council leadership, criticised the FEC proposal to empower the CSRC and 
suggested instead the principle of ‘unified leadership, two-level 
management’. Several members of local government spoke against the 
concentration of regulatory powers within a State Council bureau. Some 
delegates disagreed. Yang Zhihua, a FEC drafting group member and CSRC 
staffer, argued for the CSRC to be made the prime management bureau for
930 O'Brien (1990), 151.
931 Dowdle’s sources, however, state that as far the SL went the CLA was not subject to external 
lobbying, Dowdle (1997), 43.
932 NPCLC (1994a), 453.
933 Guo (1999a), 217-218; O'Brien (1990), 135.
934 Quoted in Wang (2000a), 53.
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securities.936 Others supported him, noting the failures of local government in 
regulation.937 Another aspect of the debate on regulation was stock exchange 
governance. The CLA draft eliminated many of the SRO powers of the stock 
exchanges, ceding all power over the authorisation of listings to the government 
regulator, and gave the state power to set fees and to authorise all changes to the
Q 'i Q
business rules of the exchange. Unsurprisingly, stock exchange 
representatives lobbied for constraints on these powers. Another issue was 
supervision of the regulatory organ itself. One apparently undisputed suggestion 
was that detailed rules of what the responsibilities (as opposed to powers) of the 
SSMC should be included in the legislation, and that SSMC expenditures should 
be carefully controlled. Apart from this, however, the Yabaolu meeting ended 
without resolution. Many voices had been heard; few decisions had been taken; 
no consensus had been reached.
On 7th April 1994, NPCSC deputy chairman Wang Hanbin held a co-ordination 
meeting for the FEC and CLA. Wang was the NPCSC deputy chairman 
responsible for the CLA, while Tian Jiyun, another NPCSC deputy chairman, 
supervised the FEC. Wang appointed Li Yining as chief co-ordinator of the two 
committees’ work, and Xu Ju, CLA director, to represent the commission and 
ordered a compromise draft to be drawn up.939 Thereafter, leaders of the CLA 
and FEC met with the aim of submitting a final draft for approval by the next 
meeting of the NPCSC, scheduled for June 1994. However, these meetings were 
tense and proper compromise was impossible to achieve on the major issues. 
This, however, did not prevent a revised draft, with eleven chapters and 220 
articles, being produced.940 Unsurprisingly, the new draft was, in the words of 
one interviewee, ‘a mess’.941 On the major issues, the CLA’s agenda still 
dominated: the draft retained the CLA’s positions on the empowerment of local 
regulatory bureaux; the ban on credit financing; the limited scope of the law; 
and did not include articles on the powers of the SSMC. On the subject of
935 NPCLC (1994a), 456-457; SZB (1994p).
936 NPCLC (1994b), 469, 472.
937 NPCLC (1994a), 457.
938 SHGSE (1994).
939 Wang (2000a), 68-71; Interviews 28 and 37, Beijing 2000.
940 NPC (1994); NPCLC (1994c), 401.
941 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000.
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issuance, the draft claimed to cover only ‘securities trading-related issuance 
behaviour’, a messy attempt to avoid repeating issues legislated for in the 
Company Law.942 The merged draft was presented by the LC to the eighth 
meeting of the eight plenum of the NPCSC in June 1994.943 Despite its formal 
exclusion from the reporting process to the NPCSC, it is almost certain that FEC 
members were able to express their dissatisfaction. An interviewee claimed that 
either Liu Suinian or Dong Fureng, senior representatives of the FEC, attended 
and made reports at all the NPCSC sessions that considered drafts of the SL.944 
In addition, another interviewee stated that NPCSC delegates were fully aware 
of the controversies associated with the draft.945 The FEC apparently published 
informal reports opinions and distributed these among NPCSC members. The 
CLA therefore did not enjoy as much a monopoly on the flow of information to 
the Chairman’s Group and NPCSC as the NPC’s formal rules implied. This was 
the second formal consideration of the draft by the NPCSC and the draft was 
then sent down for redrafting and a second round of external consultation.946 
FEC and CLA leaders were informally instructed by the NPCSC leadership to 
resolve their differences.947
However, no progress in resolving the FEC/CLA deadlock was made between 
June 1994 and October 1995.948 By 2nd November 1995, the CLA had produced a 
new draft that contained all its usual positions. This draft was passed to Wang 
Hanbin, and then onto the State Council deputy secretary generals Zhou 
Zhenqing (concurrently chairman of the SCSC) and Zhou Daojiong, SCLAO 
director Yang Jingyu and FEC director Liu Suinian. On 4th December 1995, the 
State Council standing committee heard reports on the draft from Zhou Zhenqing 
and Yang Jingyu.949 These reports argued that the CLA draft was still 
problematic and should not be allowed to pass. In response, Premier Li Peng 
ordered the postponement of work on the law. On 6th December the CLA hosted
942 Interview-12, Beijing, 2000
943 NPCFEC (1993b)
944 Interview-12, Beijing, 2000.
945 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000.
946 SZB (1994q).
947 Interview-12, Beijing, 2000.
948 Wang (2000a), 73-78.
949 Cao (1999), 11.
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a meeting for the FEC, CSRC and SCLAC.950 The CLA reportedly wanted to 
gain support for its draft, which it intended to place again onto the NPCSC 
docket. In the middle of the meeting, Wang Hanbin, apprised of the State 
Council’s decision by Yang, phoned to inform the delegates that work on the law 
was to be suspended.951
Drafting paralysis at the NPC, December 1995 - March 1998: the turn o f the 
CSRC
One of the FEC drafters, Cao Fengqi, terms the period from the beginning of 
1996 to August 1998 as the ‘investigation and research phase’ of the SL.952 This 
is a rather generous description for impasse and inactivity at the NPC. During the 
period, NPC organs did no drafting work and no substantive research, although a 
number of seminars were organised at which the familiar arguments were 
rehearsed.953 Faced with the intransigence of the NPC drafting organs and an 
immediate need to bolster the regulatory framework in the wake of the 327 TBF 
crisis, the State Council relied on administrative regulation. It also entrusted 
drafting responsibilities for the SL to the CSRC. While the NPC remained 
largely inactive, the CSRC went on to produce a complete draft each year from 
1996 to 1998.954 Each year the regulator organised an drafting conference, to 
which members of the CSRC, Shanghai and Shenzhen SAOs and two exchanges 
were invited.955 The CSRC also organised consultation meetings in October 
1993, May 1995 and August - September 1998.956 In March 1998, the informal 
group within the CSRC involved in this work was formalised by Zhou Zhenqing 
into the ‘Securities Law Working Group’.
The CSRC leadership used this opportunity to redraft key sections of the law in 
accordance with its own policy preferences. It completely redrafted and enlarged
950 Wang (2000a), 78-81.
951 Interview-37, Beijing, 2000.
952 Cao (1999), 9.
953 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Wang (2000a), 94-95; ZZB (1994).
954 In 1996, the group spent one month in Beijing, in 1997 the group met in Zhuhai for ten days, 
and in 1998, the group met in Beijing for one week. Outside these meetings, the draft received 
continued CSRC attention, Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Interview-14, Shanghai, 2000.
955 Each revised draft was passed to the CLA and the group also had frequent contacts with the 
SCLAO, Interview-14, Shanghai, 2000.
956 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Wang (2000a), 122.
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the section on issuance, following the FEC rather than the CLA line, and drafted 
new chapters on registration and settlement, and on the powers of the SSMC, 
including articles on its powers of investigation. Dowdle suggests that 
disagreements between the FEC and the CLA crippled the SL drafting process 
during 1996-98.957 Such an insight is important since it underlines the fact that 
micro-management by the State Council and Central Committee is not the only 
factor that undermines the NPC’s ability to draft legislation and operate as a 
sovereign parliament. Rather, internal disputes and a lack of institutions to 
mediate these disputes, appeared to be the critical problem. However, there are 
problems with Dowdle’s claim all the same. First, it appears to incorrectly 
identify the issues of dispute between the FEC and CLA. Dowdle reports that the 
CLA objected to the FEC’s support for the STCs, as well as its proposed rules 
for M&A, trading and settlement. Although there was indeed a complex dispute 
over the articles on M&A, the key disputes between the two committees were 
rather the scope of the law, credit financing and the regulatory structure. Second, 
the claim implies that drafting worked stopped altogether. Rather, disagreements 
within the NPC only served to sideline the legislature from a continuing drafting 
process, considerably complicating Li Yining’s claim that the SL was wholly 
drafted by the NPC.
Drafting revival, March 1998 - October 1998: the rush to compromise within 
the NPCSC
The NPC drafting process was revived in September 1998, and after a frantic 
period of re-drafting and decision making, the SL was placed on the statute 
books by the NPCSC at the end of the year. The successful resolution of 
extensive policy disputes within the NPC during this period had its roots in three 
factors: the arrival of a new, influential NPCSC Chairman; the prioritisation by 
the zhongyang leadership of financial stability; and crucial decisions made by the 
zhongyang leaders on the issues that had plagued the law and divided the FEC 
and CLA.
957 Dowdle (1997), 44.
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On becoming chairman of the ninth plenum NPCSC in March 1998, Li Peng 
prioritised the passage of the SL and Contract Law, setting a deadline of
QCO
December 1998 for passage of the former. Li, however, did not at first involve 
himself in the detail of the FEC/CLA disputes, and simply ordered the groups to 
speedily devise a compromise draft in line with State Council policy. As a senior 
party member, and member of the FELG, Li exercised considerably more 
influence than his predecessor, Qiao Shi, did.959 Several interviewees emphasised 
the importance of Li’s arrival, his refusal to delay and the extraordinary pressure 
experienced by those involved in SL drafting to meet the new deadline. His 
arrival triggered a scramble to consensus. Related to this is the second factor. As 
the previous chapters have demonstrated, the October 1997 National Finance 
Work Meeting had revealed the zhongyang to be determined to reorganise and 
improve the institutions of securities regulation. The SL was seen as crucial to 
this effort, if only for what it represented, consensus and policy clarity, rather 
than for what it did in terms of institution building. The third factor underlying 
the NPC’s burst of legislative energy was the zhongyang leaders’ resolution of 
the major issues that had plagued the law since 1993. In late September 1998 the 
FELG met and is reported to have discussed all the key issues of the law: its 
scope, issuance procedures, the regulatory structure, whether securities 
companies should be allowed to engage in proprietary trading, credit financing, 
M&A rules, governance of the stock exchanges and futures.960 The result was 
that crucial sections of the SL could be re-drafted with clarity and without 
credible opposition from either the CLA or the FEC.961 After the lengthy 
discussions within the NPC, it was a consensus worked out within the zhongyang 
that was eventually imposed upon the law.
958 The passage of the SL from the eighth to ninth plenums was a simple formality, Interview-28, 
Beijing, 2000; Wang (2000a), 129.
959 After his arrival in the NPCSC in 1993, Qiao Shi began to agitate for the development of the 
NPC itself and speak in support of the primacy of law. Senior State Council officials were quoted 
as the NPCSC was ‘abusing its power of legislation and obstructing economic structural reform’ 
in 1998. However, there is no evidence that Qiao used the SL to obstruct economic reform or 
undermine Jiang Zemin or his other rivals, Xinhua (1988) quoted in Li (1998a), 20.
960 CSRC (1999b), 92.
961 NPC (1998b), arts. 174-181.
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The Chairman’s Group met on 22nd September 1998 and heard reports from the 
CLA, LC and FEC.962 It was an extraordinary meeting for two reasons. First, Li 
Peng mediated personally on several disputes between the two committees by 
ruling on unresolved issues one by one. He determined, for instance, that 
issuance articles should be included and that credit financing should not be 
explicitly permitted, although this issue remained problematic.963 Second, it was 
again significant that the FEC had formal access to the Chairman’s Group and 
could voice its concerns directly.964 With the way unblocked, the CLA accepted 
without significant revision the sections of the law drafted by the CSRC on 
issuance, the regulatory structure and registration. In terms of regulatory 
structure, the CSRC draft laid out the duties and powers of the ‘State Council 
Securities Supervision and Management Organisation’ (Guowuyuan Zhengquan 
Jiandu Guanli Jigou, hereafter SCSSMO), the CSRC itself never being formally 
named (in order, apparently, to preserve the State Council’s ability to rename 
and reorganise the CSRC). The SCSSMO was given exclusive regulatory 
responsibilities over the sector and the right to establish local offices under its 
sole administrative control. It enjoyed enhanced powers to investigate illegal 
actions, the ability to freeze bank accounts and to organise pre-trial questioning 
and administrative trials of suspects (juquan and tingzhengquan). The new draft 
also ensured that the SCSSMO was given formal rights to access 
documentation, including records of transactions, bank and securities accounts, 
that could be useful in investigations.965 Yet, there were also limits to the ability 
of the CSRC to introduce its own proposals to the draft. For instance, the CSRC 
attempted to insert a clause to allow it to set detailed regulations concerning 
issuance procedures and this was rejected by the NPCSC.966 The CSRC 
attempted to reduce the maximum fines that could be levied for a securities 
offence but the NPCSC supported higher fines and ordered the CSRC’s draft 
rewritten to reflect this.967 The CSRC also supported the opening of legitimate 
financing routes for securities companies and pushed for credit financing
962 Wang Hanbin had been replaced by this time by Zhang Chunyun, Bian (1999), 5; Cao 
(1999), 11-12.
963 Interview-37, Beijing, 2000; Interview-12, Beijing, 2000
964 Dowdle (1997), 44, 69.
965 Interviews 28 and 37, Beijing 2000 and 14, Shanghai 2000; NPCLC (1998a), 411.
966 SCLAO (1999), 544.
967 ZXS (1996).
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(rongzi) for retail customers.968 The PBoC leadership resisted this in the State 
Council and at the SCSC.969 Both failed to win outright victories on the issue: 
the October 1998 draft did not mention credit financing and Chairman Li Peng 
took the issue with him to Shenzhen in November 1998.970
On 7th, 8th and 21st October 1998, the CL/CLA organised redrafting meetings 
between themselves and the FEC.971 Outside these formal meetings, Bian Yaowu 
and Li Yining met at least ten times during October. The CLA retained the chief 
drafting role, with Yao doing most of the detailed rewriting work during this 
period. On 28th and 29th October, the NPCSC met for its fifth meeting of the 
ninth plenum, and considered the draft for the fourth time.972 The draft was then 
sent out to the CSRC and other bureaux for a third and final round of 
consultation.
The end game, November 1998 - December 1998: the NPCSC constrains the 
CSRC
There were two major issues to be resolved in the end game of the SL: the 
powers of the SCSSMO and whether or not to allow banks to extend loans to 
securities companies, as well as a number of more minor issues. The standing 
committee’s energies were focused on circumscribing the powers of the 
SCSSMO, and its relative success revealed it to be capable of affecting the 
institutional design of the equity sector, at least at the margins. In this way, this 
final stage of the drafting of the SL can be seen as part of the NPCSC’s efforts to 
create rules of procedure for State Council bureaux, construct institutions which 
would constrain the autonomy of the executive and promote the rule of law.
On 16th and 17th November 1998, the NPCSC Chairman Li Peng held two 
consultation meetings in Shenzhen.974 The securities companies explained their
968 SCLAO (1999), 546.
969 NPC (1994), art. 8.
970 NPC (1998b).
971 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Guo (1999a), 28; NPCLC (1998a), 408; Wang (2000a), 144.
972 NPCLC (1998a).
973 Xinhua (1998c).
974 The NPC group to Shenzhen included Li Peng, Qiao Xiayang (NPCSC, deputy chair), Chao 
Shaoyang (CLA), Bian Yaowu, Zhou Zhenqing and Zhou Daojiong, NPC (1998a).
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financial difficulties and in response Li Peng appears to have relaxed his personal 
opposition to banks lending to them.975 A compromise clause was drafted which 
banned the ‘illegal’ entry of bank funds into the stock market, and mandated 
securities companies to use only their own funds and those ‘raised in accordance 
with the law’, leaving the issue of what was legal to State Council administrative 
regulation. After Shenzhen, the FEC and CLA continued their drafting meetings
076during November and December 1998. The most pressing issue now facing 
the standing committee was de-limiting the SCSSMO’s powers in terms of
Q77authorisation over securities issuance, audit and investigation. The NPCSC’s 
most significant achievement in this area was the creation of the Public Offering 
and Listing Review Committee (Faxing Shenhe Weiyuanhui, hereafter POLRC). 
This committee was, after all technical requirements and disclosures had been 
checked by the CSRC Issuance Department, to determine whether or not an 
applicant enterprise should be allowed to issue shares. It thus served to reduce 
administrative interference in the issuance process.978 While there had been no 
mention of such a committee in the SL draft before November 1998, a semi­
independent listing committee had existed within the CSRC since 1993, but it 
had been small and had lacked any real power over issuance.979 It was the leaders 
of State Council bureaux and local leaders who had in practice determined which 
enterprises could list, as chapter nine explained. Several NPCSC delegates 
proposed that the POLRC be made independent of the regulator, and that it be 
made up of non-CSRC experts.980 The CSRC leadership opposed absolute 
independence of the committee and a compromise was reached: the committee 
was to be set up by and within the CSRC but most of its members would be 
experts from industry and academia.981 The rules governing its operating 
procedures and membership system would be left to the CSRC to draft, but were 
to be authorised by the State Council.982 Even though the POLRC limited the
975 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Wang (2000a), 135.
976 Wang (2000a), 144-150.
977 NPCLC (1998c), 423; Xinhua (1998a); AFX (1998a).
978 NPCLC (1998d), 416. The suggestion apparently came from Ruan Chongwu, an NPCSC 
delegate, CD (1998).
979 NPC (1998b); Interview-13, Beijing, 2000; SZB (1995m).
980 NPCLC (1999), 550; Interview-14, Shanghai, 2000.
981 Interview-37, Beijing, 2000.
982 In 2000, the POLRC was comprised of about 80 members who rotated between eight 
committees, Interview-43, Shenzhen, 2001.
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powers of the CSRC one interviewee suggested that the CSRC leadership 
welcomed the committee since it served as an effective means of deflecting 
political pressure. With the POLRC in operation, the CSRC leadership became 
more insulated from local and central bureaux leaders when they lobbied in 
support of their SOEs’ issuance applications. Since the POLRC itself was to have 
the power of final authorisation over issuance, the language of the draft was 
changed. Previously the SCSSMO would pizhun (authorise) issuance. Post- 
November 1998 drafts, however, allowed it only to hezhun (approve) an issuance 
decision made by the POLRC.983
The NPCSC determined additional measures to constrain and monitor the 
activities of the regulator. For example, the draft was revised to extend to the 
National Audit Bureau powers to supervise the finances of all securities 
companies, stock exchanges and the SCSSMO itself.984 The NPCSC removed the 
regulator’s ability to carry out pre-trial questioning and administrative trial of 
suspects, powers that the CSRC had itself drafted in during 1996-97. The 
NPCSC determined that only the Public Security Bureau and the Supreme 
People’s Procuratorate should administer such procedures. There is also some 
evidence that the NPCSC, perhaps on the suggestion of the FEC, supported the 
extension of limited self-regulatory mechanisms. For example, several NPCSC 
delegates lobbied for the devolution of listing authorisation powers back to the 
stock exchanges. They partially succeeded: the SL draft was adjusted to allow 
the SCSSMO to devolve powers to approve the listings of shares and bonds, as 
well as powers to suspend and delist shares and bonds, to the exchanges. 
However, the timing of the devolution of powers was left to the SCSSMO to 
determine. Other deputies argued for the need to further limit the powers of the
983 A related issue was the concern among several NPCSC members that the government was 
distanced from blame in the event o f a listed company failing. However, the wording for this 
escape clause was hard to work out. For example, the October 1998 draft stated that the 
SCSSMO’s pizhun ‘does not express a guarantee of a share’s quality’. The SCORES leadership 
criticised this wording, however, arguing that it made SCSSMO authorisation meaningless. 
Article 17 of the SL finally stated that the issuer ‘shall be responsible for changes in the 
operations and profits: and investors shall be responsible for investment risks arising from these 
changes’, NPC (1998b).
984 NPCLC (1998d), 419.
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SCSSMO, suggesting the establishment of an NPC committee to oversee its 
activities.985 This suggestion was rejected.986
Finally, much to the frustration of the CSRC leaders, the NPCSC did
Q07 # 9
successfully assert its view in one other important area, that of M&A. This is
one of the most complex areas of regulation and one of the weakest parts of the 
SL 988 The NPCSC succeeded in legislating its demand that all shares be traded 
via the centralised market system, despite CSRC lobbying for off-exchange (or 
off-market) transactions to be allowed. CSRC regulations issued in April 1993 
had required that once 30% of a company had been purchased by an investor, a 
purchase offer for all the remaining shares had to be made, the so-called 
‘mandatory-offer’ system {shougou yaoyue). Moreover, at every 5% change in 
the ownership stake of the potential buyer, a further announcement had to be 
made. However, the cost of buying up sufficient shares on the open market with 
these regulations in place was prohibitive: the announcements alerted others to 
the potential take-over and attracted buyers, pushing up prices. Moreover, the 
purchased firm would often require an injection of capital from its new owner to 
rescue its business. As a result, in practice the CSRC always waived the need to 
make a purchase offer and authorised the transfer of a majority stake through an 
off-exchange transfer of non-tradable shares (xieyi shougou). NPCSC delegates 
took the view that this was unfair and open to corruption. However, they were 
tom between legislating a ‘partial bid* system or a ‘full mandatory-offer’ system. 
After much debate, the NPCSC allowed both partial and full bids, but, against 
CSRC opposition, prohibited the transfer of shares off the trading system of the 
stock exchanges. The CSRC requested the power of exemption, which it was 
granted, and which it has since used frequently to authorise block sales of shares 
between legal persons.
985 Xinhua (1998a).
986 Interview-37, Beijing, 2000.
987 Dongfanggaosheng (2000).
988 SHGSE (1999), 720; Interview-28, Beijing, 2000; Interview-13, Beijing, 2000; Neoh (2000); 
Chun (1998).
287
On 14th December 1998, the Chairman’s Group met and authorised the passage 
of the SL.989 On 23rd and 24th December 1998, the sixth meeting of the ninth 
plenum NPCSC considered the draft.990 On 25th and 26th December, the LC held 
a meeting with the FEC and other government bureaux to fill out details about 
the POLRC and transparency in the approval process. This meeting also decided 
that a company should have the right to choose its own underwriter, rather than 
one being chosen for it by the SCSSMO. 991 On 29th December, the NPCSC 
continued its consideration of the draft. When NPCSC chairman Li Peng moved 
for a vote, 135 deputies approved, three abstained and none objected, a 
considerable achievement of consensus compared with other legislation.992 
President Jiang Zemin later signed a declaration making the Securities Law 
effective law as of 1st July 1999.
Concluding remarks
To what extent did the NPC influence the development of China’s equity 
institutions? The NPC plainly did not fulfil either the rubber-stamp role of a 
traditional Communist parliament nor the institution creating and supervising 
role of the UK parliament. Its role lay somewhere in between. To evaluate the 
NPC’s role, consider three means by which its members affected the institutions 
of the sector: by writing the SL; by designing the institutions laid out within the 
SL; and through overseeing the implementation of the SL.
Writing the law
To what extent did the NPC retain competence to draft the SL and to what extent 
was the legislature subject to interference from the Party and management by the 
executive? The answer is surprising since NPC organs enjoyed enormous 
autonomy in drafting, more autonomy than is usually enjoyed by parliaments in 
democratic systems. Drafting and redrafting of the SL took place within the FEC 
and CLA, largely independently of State Council and Party involvement, at least 
until 1996. Only one member of the CSRC was on the FEC drafting team, and 
none participated in the CLA’s redrafting work. It was only in 1996 that CSRC
989 Wang (2000a), 150.
990 Wang (1999).
991 NPCLC (1998c), 423-424; NPCLC (1998c).
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drafters assumed partial control of the draft, and modified crucial parts of it, 
although even after this, the NPCSC was able to rewrite the CSRC draft.
O’Brien notes that the Central Committee tends only to be involved at the 
beginning of the legislative process and at the end. This observation broadly 
holds true for the SL, with two qualifications.993 First, the Party became involved 
at those points where the draft could become law but did not: in December 1995, 
for instance, the Party leadership determined to postpone policy decisions for the 
equity sector and the drafting process was stopped. The NPCSC played a crucial 
gate-keeping role here: while the NPC’s committees were able to prepare 
impractical drafts, the zhongyang leadership was able to use the NPCSC to 
ensure that none of these drafts ever made it onto the statute books. Second, the 
role of Li Peng is significant. As a senior member of the Politburo, his 
chairmanship of the NPCSC linked the zhongyang and the legislature in a way 
that Qiao Shi had never achieved. After his arrival in 1998, the drafting of the SL 
can be said to have taken place under close Party supervision simply by virtue of 
his personal management of the process.
Designing institutions
In parliamentary systems, the policy-making component of statutory law is 
usually the responsibility of the executive: the parliament ‘cloaks legislation 
agreed elsewhere with the form and force of law’.994 Thus while members of the 
British cabinet may bargain, at the margins, with members of the parliament, 
they would certainly not tolerate having policies in opposition to their own being 
written into draft legislation. Yet this is exactly what happened in the case of the 
SL, such was lack of co-ordination between the State Council and the NPC. A 
twin-track policy process developed: the NPC’s FEC designed one set of 
regulatory institutions while the State Council instituted another through 
administrative regulation. The zhongyang leadership could cope with such a 
dysfunctional arrangement for as long as legislation was not required, but in the 
wake of the 1997 bank loans scandal, and the Asian financial crisis, they were
992 Xinhua (1998e).
993 O'Brien (1990), 151. Cf. Guo (1999b), 112.
994 Adonis (1993), 103.
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motivated into action. To then ensure that the draft SL designed institutions that 
were acceptable to the executive, two things had to happen. First, the zhongyang 
leadership needed to provide clear direction, clarity on key issues and to speak 
with a strong voice. Second, personal leadership was critical. Under the 
chairmanship of Peng Zhen (1983-88) and Qiao Shi (1993-1998) the NPC was 
used as a platform to oppose, within the constraints of acceptable behaviour, the 
executive. Under Li’s leadership, however, the NPC was reoriented to actively 
support the zhongyang and the State Council, which is, in fact, its normal 
function as a parliament led by a Party leadership.995 However at the same time, 
the NPCSC also provided space in which compromise on more minor, but still 
significant, issues, such as the CSRC’s powers of investigation, could be 
brokered. In this the NPC operated as both the agent of the zhongyang leadership 
and a facilitator of the less radical demands of NPC delegates interested in 
constraining executive powers. This supports O’Brien’s contention that the NPC 
is ‘only granted [legislative influence] when it is broadly supportive [of State 
Council and Central Committee policy]...the NPC [exists] to provide informal 
consultation rather than formal restraint’, even if in the SL at least the NPCSC 
was allowed to constrain some of an executive agency’s powers.996 Even under 
Li Peng, the NPC did not revert to a rubber stamp role.
One thing that did undermine NPC efforts to assert itself, sponsor market- 
oriented institutions and nurture the rule of law was confusion over the 
competence and duties of the CLA and the drafting committee. This was a 
structural problem with the potential to affect other laws.997 However, there is 
evidence to suggest that lessons have been learned from the SL and that Li Peng 
has successfully institutionalised closer relations between the NPC and the 
executive, as well as means to resolve, or simply avoid, inter-committee disputes. 
For instance, drafting responsibilities for the Investment Fund Law since March 
1999 have been divided between three groups: a leading group (including 
members from the FEC, the SCLAO and a number of State Council bureaux) 
which oversees drafting, a consultancy group (academics and industry
995 O'Brien (1990), 164; Lam (1999), 111-122. Guo (1999b), 114-115.
996 O'Brien (1990), 6.
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specialists) which advises, and the drafting group itself.998 This last group 
includes both FEC and CSRC members. While SL drafting groups were made up 
of independent economists and NPC staffers (with the exception of Yang 
Zhihua), and operated independently of all direction from executive organs, here 
the independent economists have been relegated to the role of consultants, and 
members of the State Council bureaux themselves manage the drafting process. 
This arrangement is clearly designed to combine the advantages of having access 
to independent expertise while at the same time keeping the draft law in keeping 
with policy reality.999 It should also ensure that the CLA will not be able to make 
significant substantive revisions.
Of course, putting to one side the extent of their contribution to the SL itself, the 
basic problem faced by the NPC is that the primary means of executing 
institutions in reform China remains administrative regulation, not statutory 
legislation. The CSRC’s powers, not to mention the entire institutional 
architecture of the equity sector, had full legal effect before the passage of the 
SL. Until the discretion of the State Council to design and execute institutions is 
constrained, the NPC will always play a secondary role in institution building in 
China. This raises an interesting question: why did the zhongyang leadership 
accord the law such importance when it had such a limited substantive impact? 
There are two possible reasons. First, statutory law served to bring intra- 
govemmental disputes to resolution. By setting a tight deadline for final passage, 
Li Peng forced critical decisions to be taken and disputes to be resolved. Of 
course, many of the fundamental issues, including the structure of the regulatory 
system, had been previously determined within the zhongyang, and a few other 
issues, credit financing (rongzi) for example, were simply fudged. But for other 
issues, including the issuance process, the rules governing M&A and the detailed 
powers and responsibilities of the CSRC, the need to pass statutory law acted as 
a catalyst for consensus building among policy makers. Second, statutory law 
served to bolster the political legitimacy of equity institutions, something the
997 One area that would repay more research would be policy disputes within the NPC, and how 
the legislature’s own internal institutions have developed since Li Peng’s arrival.
998 Interview-40, Beijing, 2000.
999 State Council bureau continue to draft law. The Individually-Owned Enterprises Law, first 
considered by the NPCSC in April 1999, was drafted by the SDPC, CD (1999b).
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zhongyang leadership evidently considered to be important as they faced the 
heightened threat of financial crisis during 1997-98. Leaders of the CSRC 
concurred; they believed that the law would provide an added cloak of legitimacy 
that would enhance their ability to fulfil their regulatory mandate.
Institutional supervision
The third means by which the NPC could affect equity institutions is through 
overseeing implementation. The 1982 Constitution expanded the mandate of the 
NPCSC to supervision of State Council work.1000 The NPCSC also has the power 
to repeal regulations and decisions by the State Council and its bureaux which 
are in contravention of the constitution and legislation. In general, however, the 
NPC has failed to establish institutions like control over appointments, budgets 
and permanent oversight committees which could serve to supervise and 
constrain the action of the executive.1001 Having successfully captured China’s 
equity institutions, the CSRC leadership and their zhongyang backers were in no 
mood to allow NPC organs mechanisms of oversight and control. The fear was 
that this would have diluted CSRC authority and re-introduced the problem of 
fragmented authority. Yet NPC delegates continue to supervise the equity market 
on an ad hoc basis.1002 In July 2001, for instance, the NPCSC published a report 
on the quality of CSRC regulation, on the basis of an investigation led by the 
FEC. It was highly critical. However, there are no signs that the zhongyang 
leadership is willing to accept NPC oversight on a permanent basis. At least for 
the moment, ad hoc critique from the sidelines of the political system is the best 
that can be expected from the NPC.
1000 Potter (1999), 675.
1001 Horn (1995), 19-21.
1002 In March 2001, for example, NPC deputies Yang Fan, Zuo Dapei and Han Deqiang called for 
the FEC to set up a committee which would regularly call government officials, including CSRC 
officials, to answer on matters of policy, COL (2001c).
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Part IV 
Conclusions
11
Socialist market regulation and the enforcement problem
We have frauds that most mature Western markets haven't seen for one hundred years.
CSRC official, 19941003
This chapter examines the institutions of equity regulation that have been 
constructed since 1997, explains how the central government has effected 
institutional capture, and shows how this capture has supported the goals of the 
zhongyang leadership. It also examines the question of why, as of year end 2000, 
central capture had failed to deliver better quality regulation. As chapter one 
explained, equity institutions can be organised in different ways. One critical 
variable is the degree of independence the regulatory agency has from 
government.1004 China’s post-1997 equity institutions are built around a non­
government organ, the CSRC. However, the regulator is directly administered by 
the executive branch of government, the State Council, and is overseen by the 
leadership of a political party: it is to all extents and purposes a government 
agency. However, unlike the SEC, the CSRC is not accountable to the 
legislature, and the judiciary has limited means to supervise its activities. In 
addition, China’s stock exchanges and industry association are directly 
administered by the regulator. A second important characteristic of equity 
regulation, especially in a state such as China, is to what extent the regulators’ 
powers are centralised or devolved to local actors. After 1997, the CSRC gained 
administrative control of local securities offices and the policy-making process 
became highly centralised. Certainly, in terms of delivering the twin goods 
prized by the zhongyang leadership of financial stability and market 
development, the post-1997 institutional order has proved remarkably successful.
As of 2000, similar institutions, highly centralised Party-managed institutions 
have governed China’s banking and insurance industries. This arrangement is 
therefore termed ‘socialist market regulation’, in deference to the stated aim of
1003 SCMP (1994c).
1004 Horn (1995), 43.
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the 14th Party Congress in 1992 to build a socialist market economy. There are 
obvious advantages to this arrangement. For instance, centralised decision­
making ensures that stock market development is dovetailed with macro- 
economic and industrial policy. Given the huge incentives and evident capacity 
of local leaders to act in opposition to zhongyang interests, extensive 
mechanisms of control and supervision over their actions appears justified. Chen 
Jianxian correctly argues that self-regulatory organs and structures are not yet 
strong enough.1005 One other result has been that there have been significant 
improvements in the quality of regulation during the late 1990s as socialist 
market regulation was implemented. The quality of companies coming to market 
improved, for example. However, as this chapter shows, this system of regulation 
also has significant weaknesses, most obviously in its lack of effective 
enforcement practices. Market socialist market regulation appears primarily 
oriented towards providing support to the SOE sector. It does this through a wide 
range of means: by guaranteeing the supply of funds to SOEs (and preventing 
competition for these funds from non-state enterprises); providing SOEs with 
regulatory protection from market disciplines (such as delisting and hostile take­
overs); limiting public disclosure of SOEs’ performance (through, for example, 
censorship of the media); and constraining the ability of investors to hold SOE 
managements to account (by, for example, preventing the judicial system from 
playing a regulatory role).
The chapter is laid out as follows. After a broad comparative framework for 
understanding equity institutions is provided, the versions in China and the 
United States are compared. The second half of the chapter examines the 
enforcement problem and explains the factors that constrain the effective 
implementation of regulation in China’s post-1997 stock market.
Equity institutions: a comparative perspective
One of the critical issues for any set of equity institutions is the relationship the 
regulatory organ has with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government. As chapter one outlined, there are three basic frameworks for such a
1005 Chen (1997b), 29-31.
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set of relations: the regulator as government bureau; the regulator as SRO; and 
the regulator as independent commission. In Europe, government ministries, the 
courts and SROs have traditionally administered regulation.1006 The third model, 
the independent regulatory agency, is a relatively recent American invention and 
attempts to combine the advantages of the previous two models. It has five key 
characteristics. First, the regulatory agency is independent of government and 
business, reducing the likelihood of both administrative interference and 
regulatory capture.1007 Second, the agency enjoys extensive powers of 
investigation, prosecution, legislation and adjudication. However, crucially, these 
powers are powers of governance not of direct administration. Following Judge 
Louis Brandeis’s injunction that sunlight is ‘the best of disinfectants; electric 
light the most efficient policeman’, the SEC, for instance, has directed its 
energies towards ensuring that full disclosure is made by companies issuing 
securities, rather than judging the type and quality of securities.1008 Third, SROs 
like the NYSE and the NASD play a substantial role in regulation, developing 
their own rules, supervising and disciplining their own members and arbitrating 
in disputes between them and their customers.1009 Each is run on a commercial 
basis independently of the government. Fourth, the regulatory agency is usually 
sector specific, although it does co-operate and have some overlap with other 
regulatory organs. Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, despite its extensive 
powers and its independence from government, the agency is held accountable. 
SEC commissioners, for instance, are answerable to Congress, while SEC rulings 
and administrative punishments can be challenged in the civil courts. Legislative 
and executive oversight, strict procedural requirements and substantive judicial 
review all guarantee that the regulator’s powers are supervised and 
constrained.1010
Numerous Chinese analysts, including former CSRC chairman Zhou Zhenqing 
have compared the reorganisation of the CSRC after 1997 with the creation of
1006 Majone (1994), 78-79.
1007 Karmel (1982); Kripke (1979).
1008 Brandeis (1932), 92 quoted in Karmel (1982), 41.
1009 Karmel (1982), 55-78.
10,0 Majone (1994), 93.
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the SEC in 1934.1011 Hong Weilu makes the comparison explicit: according to 
him both the post-1997 CSRC and SEC are ‘centralised and unified regulators, 
having independent law-making powers and national branch networks’.1012 
Indeed, while attempting to explain why China’s regulatory structure has evolved 
as it has, a number of interviewees remarked that Zhu Rongji had a personal 
preference for the ‘American model’.1013 There are a number of grounds to this 
comparison. First, in both instances, the national government became involved in 
a sector previously governed by local authorities. Previous to the Securities and 
Exchange Act, stock exchange ordinances and state criminal and civil law had 
governed securities transactions in the United States. The federal government 
had no jurisdiction over the sector.1014 Similarly, in China most of the rules 
before 1993 were set by the Shanghai and Shenzhen governments, although the 
State Council and PBoC were involved in defining macro-policy for the sector. 
Second, both regulators, the CSRC and the SEC, had their origins in the 
government’s response to a financial crisis triggered by corruption and deficient 
self-regulation. Their creation was accompanied by the government enhancing its 
administrative influence and downgrading the institutions of self-regulation. In 
addition, both organs had national branch networks and extensive powers. There 
are indeed similarities between the CSRC and the SEC and these are detailed 
below. However, the differences between the two organisations, and the 
institutional frameworks they operate within, are various, more significant and 
throw the key characteristics of socialist market regulation into relief.
The CSRC and the SEC compared
This section considers the institutions that define the relationships between the 
regulator and government, including its executive, legislative and judicial arms, 
political parties, SROs and FIIs in China and in the United States.
1011 Zhou (1998), 428.
1012 Hong (2000), 251.
1013 Interview-09, Shanghai, 2000.
10,4 Teweles (1998), 349.
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The regulator and the executive
The US Congress wanted to create an agency that was insulated from 
administrative interference by the Executive.1015 Thus, although the SEC’s five 
commissioners are nominated by the president, their appointments are confirmed 
by Congress, they are all appointed for staggered five year terms and they can 
not be removed without due cause. There are no means by which the president 
can direct the day-to-day work of the SEC. In contrast, the CSRC, although 
formally a non-governmental organ, operates directly under the State Council. Its 
policies are subordinate to State Council directives and the premier, and the vice 
premier responsible for finance, oversee its work.1016 This ensures that 
government officials direct all aspects of equity market development and 
regulation, including the listing and delisting of stocks, the types of company that 
come to market, investigations, disciplinary proceedings and personnel 
appointments. Institutional changes since 1997 have enhanced the powers of the 
executive over the sector.
The regulator and the legislature
In the United States, the legislature both writes law and oversees the 
implementation of that law. Consider the oversight function first. The SEC is 
overseen by the Senate and must operate within the bounds of statuary law laid 
down in acts of Congress and amendments thereto. The SEC must submit itself 
to regular inspection and oversight by congressional committees. Cai Wenhai 
comments that, in contrast, China’s Securities Law empowered the central 
government to govern the equity market ‘with tightened administrative and 
criminal penalties, coupled with unbridled powers to the regulator’.1017 As He 
Xiaoyong notes, no organ regulates the CSRC.1018 The NPC certainly has no 
mandate to supervise CSRC activities.1019 Suggestions during the drafting of the 
SL that the NPC should form a committee to oversee the CSRC were rejected,
1015 Karmel (1982), 87-89.
1016 In September 1999, Vice Premier Wen Jiabao took over day-to-day supervision of the 
securities industry, AFX (1999).
1017 Cai (1999), 151.
1018 He (1999), 47.
1019 Interview-58, Shenzhen, 2001.
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even by some of the NPC’s most market-oriented delegates. However, one 
pointer towards the future was the NPC’s investigation into the implementation 
of the SL in late 2000. Their report was highly critical of the quality of CSRC 
regulation.1020 This type of oversight is undoubtedly a positive development, 
even if it is not institutionalised or effectively enforced. However, it is not clear 
whether a NPC ‘progress report’ will become a regular occurrence, nor what 
impact the 2000 report had within the executive.
Consider the second function of the legislature: to write the laws that govern the 
sector. The SEC does have some capacity to issue rules in its own name, but 
these are usually limited to technical issues and interpretations of legislation. The 
CSRC is able to issue administrative regulations that range far more widely 
leaving the NPC to play a supplementary role. One interviewee suggested that 
the CSRC would issue regulations on M&A during 2001 that would significantly 
‘re-interpret’ (the implication was this meant ‘alter’) the relevant articles in the 
SL in order to favour the CSRC’s original policy preference.1021 Although the 
CSRC’s authority to issue such regulations is generally unquestioned, it is not 
clear if the practice is legal. The question is whether its status as a non­
governmental organ with ministry-ranking confers upon it the right to issue 
administrative regulations. The 1982 Constitution allows only the State Council 
and its member bureaux to promulgate administrative laws. However, the 
CSRC is neither a government organ nor a member of the State Council. Zhang 
Yuren and Zhou Zongan suggest that this means it actually has no legal right to 
issue administrative regulations.1023
The regulator and the judiciary
The judiciary can play two roles in equity regulation. First, it can adjudicate on 
cases brought against the regulator by market participants. This is important 
because it helps prevent the regulator abusing its powers. Second, it can accept 
cases brought by market participants against companies which have allegedly
1020 Though a follow up report in late 2001 appeared to have been less critical.
1021 Interview-28, Beijing, 2000
1022 Tanner (1999), 45.
1023 Zhang (1999c), 34; Zhou (2000), 14; Interview-29, Shanghai, 2000.
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committed crimes, and thereby play a regulatory role itself. This is also important 
since allowing private civil suits to be pursued against fraudulent behaviour, and 
allowing damages to be awarded, creates incentives for regulatory enforcement 
by private citizens and disincentives for fraudulent behaviour. It also reduces the 
administrative burden on the regulator.
First, consider the courts’ ability to supervise the regulator. Any administrative 
action or regulation issued by the SEC can be tested against legislation, and 
overturned by the courts if found to be illegal. Judicial oversight of the SEC 
provides a critical check on abuse of power, not only gross abuses, but also the 
subtle ‘creep’ of regulation when the SEC attempts to act outside of its legislated 
powers, even with the worthy aim of protecting investors. Two companies who 
had their IPO applications rejected brought the CSRC to court in 2000; they won 
their cases, the CSRC being found not to have abided by its own administrative 
rules for assessing the applications. However, with the exception of these cases, 
as of 2000 the courts exerted little oversight over the CSRC’s regulations and 
administrative decisions. There have been no reported incidents of companies 
bringing the regulator to court to question its regulations or enforcement 
actions.1024 Second, the regulatory role of the courts is also underdeveloped in 
China. Civil suits have not been encouraged and courts do not recognise class 
actions, making civil suits expensive to pursue.1025 In addition, the legal 
framework as of 2000 was vague about the liabilities of those involved in 
fraudulent securities activities.1026 Although the SL appears to make the 
underwriter, firm management and accountants personally liable for losses 
resulting from false disclosures at an IPO, such a liability has not been enforced
1 0 9 7in practice. Consider the case of a civil suit brought against Hongguang 
Industries, a notorious baozhuang (‘packaged’) company, and the underwriters, 
accountants and lawyers involved in its IPO. In December 1998, Ms. Jiang Mou 
sued the board of Hongguang (and associated parties) in a Shanghai Pudong
1024 In late 2001 Lantian, a listed company, sued Liu Shuwei, a researcher at the Central 
University of Finance and Economics, for publishing alleged false claims about its financial 
accounts. It was unclear at the time of writing whether the courts were to be used on a large scale 
to intimidate equity analysts, COL (2002b).
1025 Cai (1999), 136-138.
1026 Zhou (2000).
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People’s Court for the Rmb3,137 of losses that she sustained on her purchase of 
shares in the company. Even though the management of Hongguang had 
knowingly falsified their accounts and disclosures, the Shanghai court dismissed 
Ms. Jiang’s case, judging that no proof of a causal link between false statements 
given by Hongguang and her losses had been made. In the United States, a 
rebuttal presumption operates: unless proven to the contrary by the defendant, the 
purchaser of securities is assumed to have relied on the defendant’s disclosures, 
thus making liability easier to prove. Cai Wenhai recommends such a
1 0 9 8presumption should be introduced into China. However, proof was not the 
only issue in the Hongguang case. The Shanghai court also ruled that the CSRC 
had sole authority to determine such matters and to receive any fines levied for 
securities crimes.1029 This decision was troubling for at least three reasons. First, 
it removed the financial incentive for investors to bring private suits and thereby 
reduced the likelihood of small investors playing a regulatory role. Second, by 
apparently eliminating any role for the courts in regulation the decision placed an 
enormous administrative burden on the CSRC. Third, the court gave the CSRC 
considerable discretion to determine disciplinary actions apparently without the 
possibility of judicial review.1030
The regulator and political parties
Direct political interference in the work of the SEC is rare. While the President 
appoints the five commissioners, only three of the five commissioners may 
belong to the same political party and congressional confirmation tends to 
prevent overtly ‘political’ appointees from being nominated. Once appointed, 
commissioners are insulated from administrative interference in their day-to-day 
work: they serve for fixed five-year terms. In contrast, the CSRC operates under 
the leadership of the Communist Party. Up until 1997, the CSRC leadership was 
appointed by the CCOD, under guidance from the FELG. Since 1998, a new 
Central Committee organ, the Financial Work Committee (Jinrong Gongwei,
1027 The managements of listed firms in the US have personal civil liability for their disclosures to 
investors, Hillman (2000).
1028 Cai (1999), 143-145.
1029 ZZQZ (1999), 13.
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hereafter FWC), chaired by Wen Jiabao, has overseen appointments to the senior 
positions of the CSRC, as well as to the PBoC and CIRC, in co-ordination with 
the CCOD and under the oversight of the FELG. Until the appointment of Gao 
Xiqing, a non-party member, as a CSRC vice chairman in 2000, the members of 
the senior leadership of the CSRC had all been CCP members.1031 There are no 
fixed terms for CSRC chairmen or their deputies: they tend to be appointed for 
implementing particular policy programmes. Zhou Daojiong, for instance, was 
appointed in 1995 with a mandate to institute standardisation {guifanhua) and 
crackdown on corruption. In 2001, Zhou Xiaochuan, a Western-trained 
economist, was appointed to deliver more market-oriented development.
Party oversight of the CSRC has been considerably strengthened since 1997. 
This had been achieved through three sets of institutions:
□ The FWC. The FWC’s chief role is to co-ordinate Party management of the 
financial sector. It receives reports from the Party secretary (i.e. chairman) of 
the CSRC on a regular basis, monitors general policy developments in the 
financial sector, and its leaders often also participate in government 
meetings.1032 However, rather than becoming involved in policy 
development, the work of the FWC is focused on personnel matters and 
general staff conduct. It oversees the appointment of senior management, 
including department heads at the regulator, and the preparation of political 
programmes and codes of behaviour. For instance, it prepared the ‘Eight 
Wants and Eight Don’t Wants’, an ethical code that was issued not only to 
the staff of the CSRC, CIRC and PBoC but also to employees at all the major 
FIIs. It is also involved in overseeing the appointment of senior management 
at the major securities companies and stock exchanges.
□ The CSRC Party committee. This is made up of the CSRC chairman (Party 
secretary), deputy chairmen, secretary general and director of the CSRC’s 
Discipline and Inspection Bureau (DIB). The committee ensures that Party 
policies are implemented and that its education programmes are properly
1030 A related issue is that fines levied on the company, as opposed to the board of directors, 
punishes shareholders. The Company Law (art. 118) implies personal liability in the event o f any 
illegal activities, but this has not been enforced, Zhang (1999a), 21-22.
1031 Laura Cha, formerly with the Hong Kong SFC and a non-Party member was appointed as a 
CSRC vice chairperson in February 2001.
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managed throughout the CSRC. It governs personnel appointments within the 
organisation and accords significant weight to political reports, as well as a 
candidate’s expertise and competence in determining positions.
□ The DIB. This department was established in 1997 to supervise CSRC staff 
members’ behaviour. It operates under the dual leadership of the CSRC’s 
senior leadership and the CDIC, the Party organ charged with ensuring 
discipline.1033 It manages investigations into allegations of corruption by 
CSRC staff.
The regulator and the industry association
In 1938, Congress amended the SEA, adding Section 15A (the Maloney Act), 
which mandated the creation of a regulatory body to govern ‘off-exchange’ OTC 
trading. The NASD was established soon after to fulfil this task. Its mandate was 
to draw up and enforce rules to prevent fraud, protect investors and discipline its 
own members. By law all companies engaged in trading OTC securities in the 
United States must be members of the NASD.1034 As a SRO, the association 
operates independently of government, supervises its members’ trading 
behaviour and is empowered to fine and expel its members. During the early 
stages of stock market development in China there was considerable support for 
a system of self-regulation, as chapter three explained. The SEEC was well 
positioned to evolve into a NASD-like organisation managing the STAQs trading 
system independently of government. However, the SEEC was sidelined and 
China’s SLA, founded on 28th August 1991, failed to live up to these hopes.1035 
Its formal mandate is to support the securities industry, establish a plan for equity 
development, design a self-regulatory order and strengthen market 
management.1036 Ma Zhongzhi claims that the association is active in 
representing the interests of the securities industry to the government.1037 
However, in practice there are reasons to question this claim. Zhou Zongan notes 
that while the SL defines the SLA as an SRO (zilu zuzhi), its representatives have
1032 Interview-58, Shenzhen, 2001.
1033 Chang (1998).
1034 Teweles (1998), 207-208.
1035 Xinhua (1991c); Yao (1998), 72-80.
1036 Dong (1997), 135.
1037 Ma (1995).
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neither been actively involved in rule-making nor in significant lobbying on 
behalf of the industry. Instead, the CSRC closely delimits the SIA’s role, powers 
and rule-making capabilities. The association now operates under the 
administrative control of the CSRC, (before July 1995 it operated under the 
PBoC). All SAO senior members are government officials and their work is 
focused on organising educational programmes.1039
The regulator and the FIIs
The SEC is a regulator of private firms. In contrast, the CSRC is both the 
regulator and administrator of a publicly owned sector. All FIIs are structured as 
shareholding companies and are owned by organs of the state, most shareholders 
being local government bureaux or locally administered SOEs. Only a handful, 
including Galaxy Securities, are owned by central government bureaux. The 
government is highly protectionist of its securities industry: privatisation is not 
permitted, as the Junan scandal illustrated.1040 In 1996, Junan Securities’ CEO, 
Zhang Guoqing, used Rmb520m worth of funds of unclear origin to register and 
capitalise two companies, Xinzhang Ying and Taidong. These companies, both 
under his control, then secretly bought 77% of Junan’s Rmb700m shares. Shares 
were also distributed to Junan’s employees. In July 1998, the CSRC was tipped 
off about Junan’s de facto privatisation and launched an investigation. Zhang was 
arrested and the firm was forcibly re-nationalised and merged with Guotai 
Securities. The CSRC appointed a CSRC-staffer, Yao Gang, to represent Junan 
in the merger talks.1041 The government’s monopolistic ambitions in this sector 
are also well illustrated by the extremely limited concessions won by foreign 
investment banks in China’s accession to the WTO.1042 According to the trade 
and investment agreement China signed with the United States in November 
1999, foreign commercial banks will receive national treatment five years after 
China’s WTO entry, whereas foreign investment banks would by this time still 
be limited to holding minority stakes in joint venture securities and fund 
management firms. The CSRC also retains administrative mechanisms of
1038 Zhou (2000), 16.
1039 Dong (1997), 135; ZTS (1995); Kumar (1997b), 53; Cai (1999), 138.
1040 Caijing (1999); Green (2000b).
1041 Yao became deputy president of the merged entity, Guotai Junan, in March 1999.
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influence over senior management at most FIIs. Practice at each firm varies, 
depending on the shareholders, but the leaders of most securities companies and 
investment funds are appointed by, or at least have their appointments authorised 
by, the CSRC and FWC. Heads of securities companies’ trading departments and 
investment fund managers also require the authorisation of the local CSRC office 
to be appointed.1043 The autonomy of FIIs has increased in recent years, and the 
CSRC now only tends to intervene in a firm’s affairs when illegal activities are 
suspected. However, these appointment powers allow the government a strategic 
influence over FII activities that is absent in Western markets. In addition, Party 
committees overseen by the FWC operate within all major FIIs.
Like many other emerging market regulators, the CSRC is mandated to promote 
the development of the securities market as well as regulate it. Since 1997, it has 
led the research and planning work for market development, something that in 
the United States would be the preserve of FIIs, stock exchanges and other 
SROs. Such CSRC-led initiatives have included the proposed Shenzhen Growth 
Enterprise Market (Chuangye ban, hereafter GEM), index futures and investment 
funds.1044 As well as controlling the strategic direction of the industry, the CSRC 
has worked to support individual FIIs, especially in the area of financing. In July 
1994, it attempted to allow bank loans to be extended, but failed because, as 
chapter nine showed, of PBoC opposition. It continued to lobby for such 
financing routes during the drafting of the SL. Then, in 1999, the CSRC 
leadership successfully won support in the State Council for securities companies 
to obtain bank loans, access the inter-bank market, and to expand their registered 
capital.1045 The CSRC has also been actively involved in planning and managing 
the consolidation of the industry, taking charge of the restructuring of small 
brokerages, the securities arms of numerous TICs and STCs into securities 
companies.1046
1042 EIU (2000a).
1043 Interview-51, Shenzhen, 2001.
1044 On the GEM, see Green (2001c). The CSRC leadership appeared to be keen supporters of the 
project during 1999-2000, but Zhu Rongji postponed the plan.
1045 COL (1999c).
1046 Xinhua (1998d).
305
Figure 68 summarises the major differences between the equity institutions of 
China and the United States discussed above.
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Figure 68. The China Securities and Regulatory Commission and the American Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000.
China United States
Industry scope of securities 
regulator
Securities markets (including futures), related infrastructure 
(stock exchanges, clearing organisations), securities 
companies, TICs’ securities businesses, investment fund 
companies, futures exchanges and brokers.
Securities markets (including options), related infrastructure 
(stock exchanges, clearing organisations), broker-dealers, 
investment companies and section-20 affiliates.
Other relevant regulatory 
organisations (excluding SROs) 
and their main tasks
The PBoC: co-regulates investment funds’ custodian banks 
with the CSRC; also regulates the non-securities activities of 
TICs.
The Federal Reserve: regulates commercial bank bolding 
companies (which include securities broker-dealers, and are 
themselves registered with the SEC and a SRO). The 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC); supervises 
commodities markets and futures.
General powers of the regulator Investigative, legislative and adjudicatory. Investigative, prosecutorial, legislative and adjudicatory.
Senior appointments CSRC chairman and vice-chairmen (variable number) 
appointed by the State Council, on the advice of CCP organs 
(the FELG, FWC, the Organisation Department of the Central 
Committee and the Politburo). They have no fixed terms and 
can be removed without cause. Until 2000 only CCP 
members were allowed to take up senior positions within the 
CSRC.
Five SEC commissioners are appointed by the president on the 
advice and consent of the Congress. The president designates a 
chairman from among them. No more than three commissioners 
may be of the President’s own party. Commissioners serve 
fixed five terms, on a staggered basis, and cannot be removed 
without just cause.
Mid-level appointments CSRC department directors interviewed and approved by the 
FELG and/or the FWC.
Made by the commissioners.
Relationship with the executive The CSRC operates directly under the State Council. While 
not a government organ, or State Council member, the CSRC 
enjoys administrative powers and ranking comparable to a 
State Council ministry (buwei).
The SEC is an independent agency. Apart from powers of 
appointment of commissioners, the president has no role in SEC 
operations.
Relationship with the 
legislature
The NPC has no oversight powers. Congressional committees monitor SEC rulings and actions, 
and can call commissioners to explain their actions.
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Enabling legislation
The role of self-regulatory 
organisations (SROs)
SRO appointments 
Local presence 
Enforcement mechanisms
Legal liability of the regulatory 
agency_____________________
The Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China (1999). 
In practice, State Council administrative regulation 
(xingzheng guize) operates with the authority and efficacy of 
statutory legislation.
In theory, the SHGSE and SHZSE are SROs, but in practice 
they are directly administered by the CSRC and do not in 
enjoy the powers and responsibilities commonly associated 
with SROs. The SIA also operates directly under the CSRC.
It does not promulgate rules or principles for its members and 
is only involved in organising education activities for 
securities professionals.
Members of the stock exchange and SIA senior management 
are appointed by the CSRC.
Nine regional CSRC branches, two municipal offices and 25 
‘emissary offices’ operating under the branches.
CSRC can act administratively to seek fines and the recovery 
of ill-gotten gains. It can withdraw licences from securities 
companies and, in co-operation with the PBoC, from TICs. 
Criminal cases are dealt with by the PSB. The CDIC deals 
with all matters o f Party members acting illegally.
Extremely limited. Actions have only been successfully 
brought against the CSRC for procedural irregularities.
The Securities and Exchange Act (1934). The Securities 
Investors Protection Act (1970) set up a fund (to which 
financial institutions contribute) to compensate customers of 
brokerages which encounter difficulties.
SROs, including the NYSE and NASD, write their own rules of 
business, play an important regulatory role and manage most 
disputes through arbitration, under SEC oversight. However, 
the SEC does enjoy significant powers over them; it affirms and 
amends SRO rules and compels them to keep records that it can 
examine. It can also expel a member from an exchange and 
suspend a share from trading.
Senior appointments are made by the SROs’ boards of 
directors.
Federal securities regulatory bureau; operate according to the 
same standards as the national SEC.
The SEC can suspend or ban firms from the securities business, 
file injunctions in federal courts, and proceed administratively 
against regulated entities. It can seek fines and the recovery of 
ill-gotten gains. It can also represent itself in court.
Civil actions can be brought against the SEC to challenge its 
rules and decisions.
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Market socialist regulation and the enforcement problem
IOSCO recommends that securities regulation should be organised around three 
broad objectives: the protection of investors; ensuring that markets are fair, 
efficient and transparent; and reducing systematic risk.1047 How well does 
regulation in China as of 2000 deliver these goods? As the thesis has shown, 
during the 1990s much of the non-implementation of formal rules, fraudulent 
issuance and weak enforcement of trading regulations, was due to local capture 
of equity institutions. Disputes within the central government prevented an 
effective response to the developmentalism of local leaders. The post-1997 
structure has delivered institutional capture to the CSRC leadership and greatly 
improved the zhongyang leadership’s ability to oversee and direct development. 
Policy principals within the leadership calculated that by concentrating powers in 
a single, central government sub-principal, better implementation of their 
policies could be assured and in many respects, the post-1997 experience has 
proven them right. With the new monitoring mechanisms in place, the space for 
opportunist defection by the leaders of the stock exchanges and SAOs in support 
of local interests has been greatly reduced. Moreover, since the regulator has 
gained an exclusive mandate to oversee equity policy, the space for inter-bureau 
dispute has been reduced (and the old site of veto, the SCSC, has been entirely 
eliminated). As a result, one might expect an improvement in the quality of 
regulation in terms of greater transparency, better protection for small investors 
and fewer systemic threats to financial stability.1048 Has this been the case or 
have other factors prevented the effective enforcement of the rules that are in 
place? Such a question is, of course, extremely difficult to answer since illegal 
activities are by their very nature resistant to investigation and the CSRC, like 
any other central government bureaux, remains difficult to research.1049 
However, the available evidence suggests that although key areas of regulation 
improved during 1997-2000, these improvements were limited. While there are a 
number of reasons for this, the fundamental factor is institutional.
1047 IOSCO (1999), 1.
1048 Green (2000e).
1049 Shapiro (1984), 136.
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Some aspects of regulation, especially issuance, have improved since 1997. It is 
generally agreed in the industry that the quality of companies coming to market 
is better, and that the procedures that had been put in place were better able to 
detect false disclosure. Those involved in fraudulent issues now tend to receive 
larger fines and more serious administrative punishments than before 1997. A 
small number of senior managers in the cases of Hongguang Industries, Daqing 
Lianyi and other baozhuang companies were sacked, fined and even 
imprisoned.1050 Many other punishments remain undisclosed: one interviewee 
suggested that the CSRC prefers to deal with most problems in IPOs internally, 
in order not to panic investors.1051 Moves have been made to improve corporate 
governance at listed firms.
In the secondary market, many analysts believe that disclosure has also 
improved. One interviewee estimated that about 70-80% of company reports and 
accounts were on the whole trustworthy as of the end of 2000, a significant 
improvement on previous years.1052 The frequency and thoroughness of the 
inspection of these accounts by SAO staff has also increased. Some SAOs even 
now systematically monitor press reports and launch investigations on the basis 
of problems reported there. Others suggest that the managements of listed 
companies are now less willing to engage in manipulation of their own shares 
because of a more credible threat of punishments from the CSRC.1053 Securities 
companies’ use of customer funds to trade shares, an all too common problem 
during the 1990s, has been significantly reduced. The CSRC estimates that 
during the year 2000 securities companies ‘borrowed’ (only) about 5% of their 
customer funds. There has also been a rise in the number of investigations and 
fines. Figure 69, based on data supplied by the CSRC, shows an increase of
1050 Regulations issued by the SCSC in August 1993 defined four types of fraud (insider trading, 
price manipulation, false disclosure and cheating investors), and the relevant punishments 
(confiscation of ill-gotten gains plus fines of Rmb30,000 to Rmb5m). The CSRC refined these 
regulations during 1994-97 and heavier punishments were extended in statutory legislation. The 
Securities Law has 36 articles devoted to liabilities in the event of illegal behaviour. The 
Criminal Law, revised in October 1997, criminalised fraudulent offerings, insider dealing, the 
spreading of securities-related rumours, inducing investors to deal in securities and market 
manipulation, all of which now can lead to a prison term of up to ten years, Pan (1999), 174; Cai 
(1999), 135.
1051 Interview-36, Shanghai, 2000.
1052 Interview-58, Shenzhen, 2001.
1053 Interview-53, Shenzhen, 2001.
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225% in cases punished in 1998 compared to 1997 and a huge increase in the 
total amount of fines handed out in 1997 compared to 1996. According to 
another source, between January 1993 and October 2000, the CSRC investigated 
440 cases, imposing administrative fines worth Rmbl.4bn in 199 of them.1054 
These were heavily concentrated during 1998-2000 and appear to indicate the 
growing use of the considerable powers at the regulator’s and courts’ disposal.
1054 COL (2001a).
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Figure 69. Punishments of securities (excluding futures) crimes by the CSRC, 1993-1998
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Number of cases 4 1 4 11 15 49 90
Number of organs disciplined 10 1 7 55 19 110 208
Number of people punished 2 3 2 36 9 94 146
Total fines (Rmb m) 1.3 29.1 31.4 16.8 265.9 476.8 821.2
Total amount confiscated (Rmb m) N/A 25.0 29.1 1.5 236.0 402.9 694.4
Huang (1999), p. 90.
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Yet despite these improvements, at year end 2000 stock market regulation in 
China was still gravely deficient. The market bore a strong resemblance to 
America’s stock market in the 1920s, a market in which matched orders, wash 
sales and pools were common.1055 Wu Jinglian, an economist with the State 
Council’s Development Research Centre, has frequently castigated the 
government on its deficient enforcement practices and in early 2001 went so far 
as to compare China’s stock market with a casino. The stock market was worse 
since at least at a casino, he argued, rules were enforced.1056 Pools, associations 
of large investors (known as zhuangjia) aiming to manipulate a stock, often in 
alliance with the company’s management, are still common. Interviewees in 
2000 and 2001 stated that anywhere between 30% and 70% of China’s fisted 
shares were being manipulated at any one time. One large investor, in 
conversation with the author, simply laughed at the suggestion that it was getting 
harder to manipulate stock prices.1057 Another interviewee claimed that the 
managements of fisted companies were still often involved in insider dealing.1058 
The spectacular manipulation of the share prices of so-called high-tech 
companies China Technology Enterprise (Zhongke Chuangye) and Yorkpoint 
Technology (Yian Keji), both of which involved the companies’ managements, 
dominated the news in late 2000 and early 2001.1059 Both faked assets injections 
and high-tech business plans in order to attract investors and, after their prices 
had soared, the manipulators dumped their holdings. In late 2000, a leaked 
SHGSE report revealed extensive price manipulation by fund managers at Boshi, 
Guotai and Nanfang investment management companies.1060 Numerous other 
companies are suspected of similar practices. One of the most common abuses is 
matched orders, a practice in which large investors sell shares to themselves, or 
to connected parties, to force up the price and create the impression of heavy 
trading. One interviewee claimed that although the problem had been reduced, 
many FIIs were ‘still doing this...because the regulation is still so weak.’1061 
There are also serious doubts about the veracity of fisted company reports. The
1055 Teweles (1998), 329-347.
1056 Wu (2001), 1-30. Comments which triggered an angry backlash from other economists, 
including Li Yining.
1057 Informal conversation with the author, Shanghai, June 2000.
1058 Interview-53, Shenzhen, 2001.
1059 EIU (200 li).
1060 Ping and Li (2000).
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National Audit Office, in a random check of 32 audits of listed firms in late 
2001, found 23 to have ‘gravely inaccurate’ information. If the figures are 
projected for a national stock market that listed some 1,150 companies, about 
800 companies in total could be expected to have similarly serious problems.
The regulatory response has been deficient. As of March 2001, only two 
individuals had been criminally prosecuted for securities fraud, despite the 
extensive criminal liabilities laid out in legislation.1062 As of mid-2000, the 
CSRC’s Investigation bureau in Beijing was only pursuing about five cases of 
insider trading a year, probably less than 5% of the total.1063 Owing to limited 
resources, the bureau tended to only investigate a stock for manipulation if its 
price had risen by over 200% over a six-month period or if it was reported to it 
by another bureau or member of the public.1064 Although cases of price 
manipulation and fake accounts were being regularly punished, up to year end 
2000, He Shaoqi reports that only case of insider trading had been investigated 
and administratively punished.1065 In the case of companies falsifying their 
accounts or engaging in illegal activities the CSRC rarely administered fines. 
Only when a case was extremely serious or had achieved national prominence, 
like Hongguang Industries and Daqing Lianyi, would harsh punishments be 
administered. Instead, the regulator typically issued an internal notice outlining 
the problems it had discovered and requested the firm to correct the problems 
within a given time period.1066 Even when evidence of price manipulation was 
obtained and the CSRC imposed a fine the sums tended to be small, around 
Rmb 100m.1067 Thus, despite its rank, its concentration of powers, its national 
branch network, its enviable financial resources, arguably the best educated staff 
in central government, a quality set of legislation and regulation, and public 
demand for better regulation, the CSRC’s enforcement practices continued to be 
weak. While there a number of reasons for this, including China’s lack of ‘soft
1061 Interview-59, Shenzhen, 2001.
1062 Cai (1999), 141
1063 Interview-41, Beijing, 2000.
1064 Green (2000b).
1065 He (2000), 3.
1066 Interview-58, Shenzhen, 2001.
1067 Manipulators can often profit as much as Rmbl billion from a single scam, Interview-41, 
Beijing, 2000.
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infrastructure’, technical difficulties and the CSRC’s limited administrative 
capacity, its weak enforcement practices was ultimately an institutional problem.
Because of its integration with the executive, and the lack of other constraints on 
its actions, the CSRC must follow the dictates of State Council industrial policy. 
This means its enforcement practices are subordinate to policies designed to 
protect SOEs from market disciplines and that the regulator is extremely 
vulnerable to extensive political interference. During 1997-2000, industrial 
policy dictated the style of regulation that the CSRC practised. The overriding 
imperative for the State Council, and for the CSRC leadership, was to support the 
re-financing of the SOE sector. In order to deliver this, the secondary market had 
to be nurtured, to create the expectation of higher prices and thus demand for 
primary issues. Tough enforcement practices would in contrast diminish share 
trading turnover, cause a fall in prices and undermine demand for IPOs, a 
dynamic best summed up by the aphorism; ‘as soon as one regulates, the market 
dies; as soon as one relaxes control, there is chaos’ (yiguan jiusi, yifang 
juilun).1068 ‘The CSRC have their own interests’, explained one interviewee in 
mid-2000. ‘They need a bullish market so that they can issue and list SOE 
shares. If they clamped down, the markets would not be half as active as they are 
now’.1069 Another agreed: ‘We know all this manipulation is going on, but the 
[CSRC] leadership is not interested in investigating’. The stock market has not 
only been subordinated to industrial policy: equity institutions have also been 
oriented to delivering macro-economic goals. For instance, in May 1999, the 
senior zhongyang leadership appeared to be attempting to recreate the American 
‘wealth-effect’ in order to combat price deflation. Through a series of Renmin 
Ribao editorials propounding the wisdom of share investment and predicting the 
market’s positive future, the government appeared to be aiming at triggering a 
bull market in shares that would invigorate consumer spending.1070 The bull 
market faltered in September 1999, without having any measurable impact on 
consumer spending, which since less than 1% of the total population invests in 
shares was hardly surprising.
1068 He (1998), 18.
1069 Interview-53, Shenzhen, 2001. Interview-41, Beijing, 2000.
1070 COL (1999d).
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The political logic of equity regulation also extends to delisting. Article 157 of 
the Company Law states that listed firms with three continuous years of losses, 
false accounts, serious illegal behaviour or other financial conditions that would 
disqualify it from an initial listing, must be delisted or, at the very least, be 
suspended from trading.1071 In practice, however, local and central government 
leaders, have an interest in non-implementation of this rule. Once listed, a 
company can raise additional finance through rights and secondary issues and the 
tight quota controls on each province’s ability to list companies has meant that 
each firm that does succeed in gaining a listing is a valuable financial resource 
for local leaders. Even if the company is insolvent, local leaders will usually 
attempt to arrange a debt restructuring and asset injection and will strongly resist 
delisting. For their part, protest from disaffected shareholders is a concern for the 
zhongyang leaders.1072 Consider the case of Zhengzhou Baiwen, a retail firm 
from Zhengzhou City in Henan province. Baiwen fraudulently listed in April 
1996.1073 In April 1999, it announced losses of Rmb500m in 1998, a loss of 
Rmb2.5 per share. Placed in the ST category Baiwen continued to report losses 
and by the end of 1999 had known net liabilities of over Rmb800m. In 
September 1999, all its Rmb 1.9 billion worth of loans from the ICBC was 
transferred to the Cinda Asset Management Corporation. After a further audit, 
Cinda filed for Baiwen’s bankruptcy and the CSRC leadership gave its informal 
nod to the firm being delisted. However, owing to pressure from Zhengzhou city 
leaders, Baiwen’s bankruptcy was delayed and offers for bids for the firm were 
invited. In December 2000, Sanlian, a retail firm from Shandong province, 
bought Baiwen for Rmb300m with the Zhengzhou government taking on most of 
the wage, debt and welfare liabilities of the firm. Sanlian was interested in using 
Baiwen as a vehicle to secure its own listing place.1074 Other highly indebted 
firms such as Hainan Minyuan have only been saved from delisting by complex
1071 Cao (2000), 131-33; Kazer (2001).
1072 In June 2001, the SHZSE received a bomb threat after news of its delisting o f a PT firm, 
Guangdong Kingman, became public.
1073 EIU (2000b), 6; Kazer (2000); Huang (2000b), 31.
1074 The sale of 14.4m state shares to Sanlian was approved by the MoF in October 2001, AFX 
(2001a).
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restructuring and high-level political backing.1075 Suspended in March 1997, 
Minyuan was wound up and existing shareholders were offered a 1:1 swap for 
shares in Zhongguancun, (the result of Minyuan’s restructuring and the inheritor 
of its listing place), a real estate development company given special (and very 
profitable) dispensation to develop Beijing’s high-tech district. Such political 
imperatives constrain the ability of the CSRC to implement the rules on delisting.
As well as these institutional constraints, the CSRC also faces a number of 
organisational and administrative problems in fulfilling its regulatory mandate. 
First, investigating securities crimes is an expensive, time-consuming and 
complicated business, made harder by the political connections most FIIs and 
listed firms enjoy. Hard evidence of wrongdoing is difficult to obtain. The huge 
number of false share accounts (probably more than 50% of the 58m open at year 
end 2000), the huge size of the funds used to manipulate prices and the scale of 
abuse make proper enforcement a Herculean labour. Second, any regulator must 
rely on ‘soft infrastructure’, boards of directors, lawyers, underwriters, fund 
managers, accountants and journalists, to help it fulfil its tasks effectively. In 
developed markets these actors share the regulatory burden: without their 
support, the regulator will inevitably be over-stretched. China still lacks much of 
this infrastructure. For example, a CSRC ruling in 2001 stated that by 2003, all 
listed firms should have three independent directors on their boards. However, it 
is extremely doubtful that the Mainland has 3,000-odd people with sufficient 
experience to fill these posts.1076 Chartered accountancy exams only began in 
1991 and by February 2001 there were only 70,000 chartered accountants 
working in 4,600 accountancy firms, and a similar number working within other
1077compames. The MoF estimated that four times this number was required. 
Intense competition within the accountancy industry has meant that the quality of
107Raudits has suffered. Consider also the media. In the West, the press provides 
assistance to regulators by revealing corruption and incompetence (in both 
private companies and in government), collecting evidence and creating a fear of
1075 Xu (1999); Li (1998b); CER (1998a); SZB (1999); Cao (2000), 135. Deng Pufang, a son of 
Deng Xiaoping, was reported to have been a major Minyuan shareholder.
1076 Hu (2002).
1077 SCMP (2001c).
1078 EIU (2002).
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public shaming for those who do commit crimes. This is beginning to occur in 
China, but only very recently and only gradually. Publications such as Caijing 
are developing reputations for investigative rigour and an ability to uncover 
corruption independently of the CSRC. The breaking of the investment fund and 
China Technology Enterprise scandals marked huge leap forwards in making 
public malpractice that the CSRC leadership apparently preferred to keep under 
wraps.1079 However, there are still limits to press coverage. In November 2001, 
for example, Securities Weekly, a sister publication of Caijing, claimed that 
Huaneng Power, an SOE listed on the HKSE, NYSE and SHGSE had been 
turned into the ‘family business’ of Li Peng, via his son Li Xiaopeng and wife 
Zhu Lin.1080 The allegations were officially denied, copies of the magazine were 
confiscated and the writer, Ma Linhai, placed under house arrest. Reports of 
corruption that touch members of the Politburo, or their close allies, remain 
censured.
Third, the regulator still lacks administrative capacity. As of mid-2000, the 
CSRC’s Investigation Bureau had only 27 staff: it was one of the few parts of the 
Chinese bureaucracy that was not over-staffed.1081 If share manipulation does 
indeed take place on the scale suggested above, between 300-700 companies’ 
share prices were being manipulated at the time, clearly outstripping its staffing 
capacity. Similar problems are faced at the local level too. The SHZSAO 
Company Disclosure department only had seven permanent staff as of year end 
2000. As a result, both the CSRC and its local branches commonly ‘borrow’ staff 
from accountancy and law firms, the stock exchanges, securities companies and
1089listed companies. Fourth, the CSRC still faces problems of co-ordination with 
other government bureaux. For instance, despite the fact that commercial banks 
are formally required to allow the CSRC access to bank records, a provision 
guaranteed in the SL, they commonly refuse CSRC officials access, citing
1079 Ping and Li (2000). An alternative explanation is that CSRC staff members, sympathetic to 
the need to improve enforcement, leak details of their investigations to the press, knowing that 
public pressure is their only hope of improving the market.
1080 Pomfret (2002).
1081 Cai (1999), 139.
1082 The lending institution continues to pay salary and gains knowledge and personal relations 
with the borrowing organisation, Interview-58, Shenzhen, 2001.
318
customer confidentiality concerns.1083 Moreover, the mechanisms of co-operation 
between the CSRC, the PSB and the Procuratorate in the investigation and 
prosecution of securities crimes were still deficient as of year end 2000. Once the 
CSRC had finished an investigation, and its leaders had determined to pursue 
criminal charges, the case was handed over to the PSB, who then carried out their 
own investigation. If they decided to pursue the case, the file was then handed to 
the Procuratorate, whose officers also made an independent investigation. The 
PSB and Procuratorate are inexperienced in financial sector crimes, and during 
the lengthy period in which a case moves through the system, defendants (and 
their funds) often disappear and momentum for prosecution is lost.1084
Concluding remarks
Socialist market regulation has four key characteristics. First, it involves close 
administrative control of regulatory institutions by the state. Second, these 
powers are highly centralised; local leaders now have little opportunity to 
develop policy or oversee its implementation. Third, all policy development and 
regulation falls under the oversight of the Party, whose organs also control senior 
appointments at the regulatory organs and market participants. Fourth, there are 
few other constraints on the powers of the regulator: neither the courts, the media 
nor the legislature are authorised to supervise its activities. Socialist market 
regulation is therefore highly discretionary and weakly accountable to organs 
other than the State Council and Central Committee.1085 This set of institutions 
has well served the zhongyang leadership’s demands for financial stability and 
stable market development: it has prevented repeats of the financial instability 
that 1992, 1995 and 1997 witnessed and has ensured that considerable financial 
resources have been transferred to the SOEs. Some of the abuses by local leaders 
have been ended, disclosures are improving, fewer customer funds are stolen, 
and more manipulation is being investigated and punished. Despite these 
successes, however, socialist market regulation is primarily oriented towards 
supporting the government’s industrial policy and, as a result, as of year end
1083 Interview-51, Shenzhen, 2001.
1084 Sito (2001a); Cai (1999). 140. At the end of 2000, there were plans for the CSRC leadership 
to establish a national network of investigation bureau with the PSB, which may go some way to 
solve these problems.
1085 Tirole (1986), 184; Gamble (2000), 2.
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2000, enforcement remained weak, market manipulation was still common and 
small investors continued to be vulnerable.
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Equity politics and market institutions
The merchandise o f securities is really traffic in the economic and social welfare o f  
our people. Such traffic demands the utmost good faith and fair dealing on the part 
o f those engaged in it. I f  the country is to flourish, capital must be invested in the 
enterprise.
President F. D. Roosevelt, on signing the Securities and Exchange Act, 19341086
Institutional change in China’s equity sector has been organised by public actors 
competing to gain economic benefits from the market. This competition has 
taken place within a three-level state. The challenge for the zhongyang principals 
has been to build equity institutions that ensure that their two sub-principals 
(central and local government leaders) and agents (leaders of the y'w-level 
bureaux) act in their interests. This has been difficult for at least two reasons. 
First, institution-making powers were initially devolved down to local leaders, 
allowing them to capture equity institutions. Through their management of the 
SMCs, SAOs, stock exchanges and STCs local leaders gained huge discretion 
over the design and implementation of equity institutions and oriented these 
institutions to supply local industry with investment funds and enrich local 
budgets with fiscal revenues. Poor regulation and regular instability resulted. 
Second, the equity institutions established within central government in the early 
1990s were ineffective: they failed to co-ordinate the divergent agendas of the 
bureaux involved and offered few mechanisms of control over local agents. 
Disputes between competing sub-principals, including the CSRC, resulted in 
policy stasis and gaps in regulation. Radical institutional change after 1997, after 
years in which problems were apparent but no real change occurred, is explained 
by two factors. First, as the market grew in size, the financial instability fostered 
by local capture became an increasingly serious threat to the interests of the 
zhongyang leadership. Second, equity developmentalism undermined the 
zhongyang leadership’s 1996 plan to use the stock market as a financing vehicle 
for large SOEs. The institutions of market socialist regulation constructed after 
1997 did much to resolve these two problems.
1086 Quoted in Karmel (1982), 45.
The first part of this chapter considers the model of institutional change 
developed in the preceding chapters, identifies its weaknesses and maps out areas 
that deserve further research. In particular, it assesses the role of crisis in 
institutional change and the problems involved in identifying state actors’ 
interests. The following sections examine three broader issues. First, the question 
of what institutional development in the equity sector tells us about state capacity 
in reform China is addressed. In the 1980s, the central government appeared to 
lose control over the collection and use of the state’s financial resources. Yet, in 
the equity sector, and in other sectors too, the state became remarkably better co­
ordinated during the late 1990s. What explains this enhancement in state 
capacity? Second, there is what might be called the ‘North paradox’. Given that 
institutional change in China’s equity market has not, as yet, supplied regulation 
that credibly protects property rights, balances information asymmetries or curbs 
predatory behaviour by FIIs and His, how has the market been able to grow so 
large so rapidly? The chapter offers explanations to this apparent paradox. The 
third section considers the future for socialist market regulation and identifies the 
forces that will shape its development over the next decade. New policy priorities 
for the zhongyang will increasingly influence equity policy, none more so than 
the imperative to fund and manage a modem pension system.
Institutional change: the role o f crisis and the interests o f bureaucrats
Lance Davies and Douglass North propose a model of institutional change that is 
driven by private actors aiming to capture the potential profits (and/or minimise 
the potential costs) caused by an exogenous change in their market environment. 
ETR approaches to regulation then go on to ask why public actors respond to 
such private initiatives and show how the institutions that are created produce
1 0 8 7winners and losers. However, as chapter two showed, institutional change in 
China’s stock market is a case of the dog not barking: private business has been 
absent as an actor. FIIs are state-owned and immature; private individual 
investors, relatively small in number, face overwhelming collective action 
problems; His are predominantly private but because of their quasi-legal status
1087 Reagan (1987), 16.
322
have not entered into the public arena to pursue regulatory change. But still, 
despite the absence of private actors, far-reaching institutional change occurred 
in the equity sector, twice in the space of six years. How can this be explained? 
The model of institutional capture developed here has retained ETR’s strategic 
view of regulation (that it apportions goods and ‘bads’), but has identified public 
actors, rather than private individuals and firms, as the key sponsors and 
promoters of institutional change. The thesis has also shown, in accordance with 
neo-institutionalist studies, how exogenous change in the market impacted on 
actors’ incentives and therefore their interests vi-a-via institutional design and 
development. The sudden, and unexpected, increase in share trading in the early 
1990s, for example, encouraged local leaders to establish stock exchanges to 
capture the investment and tax revenues they offered. Given the new imperative 
presented by industrial policy, the increased size of the stock market in 1996 
made it a credible source of funds for SOEs and therefore prompted the senior 
leadership to expand issuance. The institutional changes after 1997 had their 
roots in the senior actors responding to the threats a larger stock market now 
presented them.
Alongside these shifts in incentives, the thesis has shown that crisis, a sudden 
and acute threat to the continued viability of the system, was also required to 
‘unblock the logjam’, allowing institutional change to be forced through against 
the opposition of bureaucrats, central and local, which in normal times was 
sufficient to delay such change. The model advanced here relies on crisis as part 
of its explanation: significant institutional change, in 1992 and in 1997-98, only 
occurred in the aftermath of crisis. Such a finding is supported by research in 
other areas of the economy. Eric Girardin shows that inflationary crisis led the 
zhongyang to forcefully implement programmes of monetary retrenchment in 
1988-89 and 1993-94, which usually errant local leaders dutifully
• 1 HRSimplemented. Barry Naughton argues that it was an economic crisis in 1977- 
78 that triggered the beginning of agricultural and industrial reforms.1089 Su 
Fubin and Dali Yang find that at times of leadership transition or social 
instability, times of crisis or potential crisis, the central government is able to
1088 Girardin (1997), 87-89.
1089 Naughton (1995), 64-65, 76, 94-96.
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impose effective top-down controls on otherwise delinquent localities and effect 
radical change.1090
Using crisis as an explanatory variable is, however, problematic, not least 
because in one respect it explains nothing at all: a system which is not working 
obviously has to be changed. Moreover, there is the danger of engaging in a 
circular argument: institutional change is caused by crisis; only crisis causes 
institutional change, etc.1091 There is also the issue of determining what 
constitutes a crisis, in contrast to a serious problem, and the variety of shapes that 
crisis can take. These issues are significant and can not be completely resolved 
here: an exhaustive analysis of crisis and its effects on the policy process is 
outside the scope of this thesis. Moreover, the three crises examined here do not 
provide sufficient material to construct viable hypotheses about the role of crisis 
and its effects on institutional development. Instead, here, the three crises, their 
origins and impact, are briefly considered in order to suggest explanations for 
their different outcomes: significant but compromised institutional change after 
1992, little institutional change at all in 1995, and radical institutional change 
after 1997. In August 1992, large-scale rioting on the streets of Shenzhen was 
triggered by government corruption in an IPO. With its roots in local officials’ 
gross abuse of their regulatory powers, 8.10 directly impacted on the investing 
public and was an obvious threat to social stability. Closing the share market was 
not an option given the support of Deng but the market’s fragile ideological 
legitimacy and its small size meant that the zhongyang had limited incentives for 
forcing through central capture. The second crisis occurred in February 1995 
when massive manipulation of the TBFs market threatened bankruptcy for 
several securities companies. No change in the regulatory institutions took place: 
the SHGSE remained independent of CSRC oversight and the STCs continued 
trading, although the TBF market itself was closed. The 327 crisis was confined 
to the futures market, had little direct impact on the investing public and could be 
blamed on irregularities at a single firm. Closure of the market affected no other 
policy areas: TBFs had little economic utility since Treasury bond rates were set 
administratively. Moreover, futures attracted more ideological opposition than
1090 Su (2000), 228.
10911 am indebted to Jaime Nino and Jane Duckett for drawing my attention to this point.
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the share market because they did not supply funds to the SOE sector. In 1996 
and early 1997, a more serious crisis took place when huge amounts of bank 
deposits were channelled into the share market and several major firms engaged 
in large-scale manipulation, threatening the entire banking system, as well as a 
stock market crash. This crisis was significant in its degree and impact. First, it 
destabilised the banking system and thus impacted on one of the most sensitive 
areas for the zhongyang leadership. Second, it revealed financial officials 
throughout the Shanghai and Shenzhen banking and securities industries to be 
acting in support of local objectives, and defecting from the zhongyang's 
interests. The 1997 crisis had clear systemic implications. Comparison of the 
three periods suggests that crisis which causes social instability and/or which has 
systemic implications for the financial system is more likely to trigger 
institutional change than crisis that remains contained and out of the public eye.
However, when the leadership is prompted to respond to crisis, exogenous 
factors also influence the response: the economic costs of weak institutions, elite 
attitude to crisis and ideology. First, the costs to the senior leadership of weak 
equity institutions had increased considerably by 1997, not only in terms of the 
increased costs associated with crisis, but also because local capture prevented 
the use of the stock market to finance SOE reform. Second, elite concerns about 
stability in general increased during the 1990s. The increasing fragility of the 
financial system during the decade, added to the Asian Financial Crisis which 
began in July 1997, heightened fears of instability among senior policy makers 
and increased the incentives for an effective response to crisis. Third, once 
China’s stock market had become ‘an essential part of market socialism’ in 1997, 
institution building could occur without ideological constraint: previous to this it 
was difficult for a xitong bureau that regulated an ‘experimental’ market to be 
empowered. Figure 70 summarises the key characteristics of the three crises, as 
well as elite orientation in each of the periods. To explain the institutional 
response to crisis it is likely that both the endogenous characteristics of crisis as 
well as the elite’s orientation in terms of economics policy orientation, and 
ideology are significant. Such variety in the types of crisis experiences and in the 
context in which they occur makes analysis of crisis as an explanatory variable
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difficult: crisis unblocks logjams in institutional development, this much the 
thesis has shown, but its effects remain difficult to predict.
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Figure 70. Crisis and institutional change in China’s equity sector, 1992-97
August 1992 February 1995 1996-97
Source of crisis Corruption in IPO by local Manipulation of the Treasury bond Equity developmentalism; bank deposits
Characteristics o f crisis
officials futures market transferred to stock market; gross 
manipulation of stock prices
Social disturbance? Yes No No
Crisis destabilises other 
parts of the financial 
system?
Elite orientation at time 
of crisis
No No Yes
Cost to elite of problem 
in stock market
Limited Limited High
Stock market significant 
to national industrial 
policy?
No No Yes
Elite concerns about 
financial stability
Low Low High
Ideological legitimacy 
of the equity market?
Fragile Growing Established
Institutional change after 
crisis?
Yes, but compromised No Yes, radical
Another issue that requires further research is the preferences of bureaucrats. The 
thesis has assumed that bureaucrats are self-interested: at the provincial and ju- 
bureau levels, this self-interest translates, more often than not, into behaviour 
oriented towards maximising revenues, while action oriented towards defending 
organisational general influence is predominant within central government. Such 
assumptions are problematic for at least two reasons. First, as Patrick Dunleavy 
argues, the aims to which self-interest can be oriented and the strategies used by 
bureaucrats are various, complex and context dependent. Budget maximisation as 
a motive, for example, is not particularly illuminating until one knows which 
elements of the budget are involved; what non-pecuniary benefits are on offer; 
the value of different types of work to bureaucrats; and how collective action 
problems within an agency affect lobbying ability.1092 Such analysis requires 
detailed information on the operations, structures and decision-making processes 
within the bureaucracy, something that is not yet possible in China. The broad- 
brushed assumptions about maximising revenue and the career consideration of 
yw-level leaders used in this thesis are thus both problematic and unavoidable. 
Second, the extent of action in the public interest is difficult to assess. Many 
Chinese officials have a genuine desire to build successful capital markets in 
order to support economic reform. Some are sincerely concerned about 
protecting investors; others have quasi-nationalist ambitions to restore China to a 
significant place in the global economy. It is extremely difficult, for example, to 
impugn self-interested motives to the involvement of the SEEC officials in the 
late 1980s. Several interviewees despaired at their inability to enforce protections 
for small investors. Moreover, bureaucrats, though mostly insulated from private 
sector interests, are not entirely immune from public interest considerations. To 
some extent CSRC vice chairperson Laura Cha is correct to assert that ‘the 
CSRC is subject to the supervision of the general public and the market’.1093 
Reaction to many CSRC policies is immediate in terms of their effect on share 
prices and the investment community is often openly critical. Revelations of 
corruption undermine the government’s legitimacy and create incentives for at 
least senior officials to act in the public interest to eliminate it (at least in its most 
obvious and destabilising forms). As this chapter goes on to argue, taking into
1092 Dunleavy (1991), 147-204.
1093 Hu (2002).
account private investors’ interests will become ever more important as the 
government is forced to nurture long term demand for equity. However, without 
greater access to official documentation and to those involved in the policy 
process, the assumptions about self-interest made in the preceding chapters are 
justified by the weight of previous research on bureaucratic behaviour in China 
and elsewhere, and, moreover, appear credible in light of the evidence presented. 
However, in terms of a further research agenda, as the bureaucracy opens up to 
more detailed analysis, studies aimed at identifying and ordering the preferences 
of bureaucrats, the strategies they use to maximise them, and how career 
ambitions, non-pecuniary benefits, ideological beliefs and public interest 
considerations affect them would all be worthwhile.
Co-ordinating the Chinese state
How does the zhongyang leadership ensure co-ordination in the state it oversees? 
A number of analysts have argued that effective co-ordination is rarely achieved. 
The bureaucratic politics model developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg posits a 
state in which authority is fragmented. A protracted, disjointed and incremental 
policy process results.1094 As the preceding chapters have shown, many aspects 
of stock market development have been characterised by such compromise, 
gradualism and weak state capacity. However, the thesis has also shown the state 
to be capable at times of dramatic policy change as well as remarkable co­
ordination. How can a weak state become stronger? The answer is, of course, 
though the creation of effective institutions. As chapter two showed, previous 
research has focused attention on political mechanisms, primarily nomenklatura, 
in co-ordinating the state.1095 Yet, the thesis has shown that the system of ‘one- 
level down’ (yiji guanli) nomenklatura was ineffective in providing sufficient 
monitoring mechanisms and incentives to eliminate defection by local leaders 
(and even more so their subordinate yw-level bureau leaders) during most of the 
1990s. Given this failure, the thesis has sought to identify other institutions that 
allow zhongyang principals effective control over their agents. It has focused 
upon changes in the governance of local y'w-level bureaux, primarily the stock
1094 Lieberthal (1988), 22-25.
1095 For example, Li (1994b); Halpem (1992); Chung (1995), 503.
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exchanges and SAOs. Crucially, guanli (management) authority, including the 
power of appointment of these y'w-level bureaux leaders, was transferred to the 
CSRC after 1997, altering the incentive structures of their agents. Their welfare 
and career were now dependent upon their central, rather than local, government 
sub-principals. However, a portfolio of other institutional changes to the 
governance of these bureaux, including the recentralisation of key powers, the 
loss of economic incentives to defect, the creation of effective oversight and 
reporting mechanisms, the strengthening of Party structures, and the clarification 
of responsibilities within the Centre accompanied this change in the 
nomenklatura. It was this portfolio of institutional changes that delivered capture 
to the central government.
During the 1980s, Deng reformed through decentralisation, devolving policy­
making and regulatory powers to local leaders. This often involved institutional 
change. For example, the guanli authority enjoyed by the SPC over its provincial 
planning commissions was diminished during the 1990s to jiandu relations, 
allowing for greater local autonomy.1096 While broadly successful, however, this 
strategy extended excess latitude to local leaders to pursue local interests with 
damaging consequences for the national economy, especially in the financial 
sector: excess bank lending (leading to inflation), declining (official) fiscal 
revenues and poor quality listed companies, for example. During the 1990s, the 
reform agenda shifted, from decentralisation to re-centralisation of key powers 
and institution building. The shift was driven by an array of imperatives: to 
increase budgetary revenues, constrain local protectionism, undermine the local 
state’s capacity to engage in predatory behaviour and create a set of standard 
rules to govern an increasingly complex economy. The challenge was to 
centralise the right powers and to do all this without stifling growth.1097
thThe third plenum of the 14 Congress in November 1993, and The Decision on 
Issues Concerning the Establishment o f a Socialist Market Economy it passed,
1096 Chung (2001), 54-55.
1097 The 1993 Decision contained much that the neo-conservatives supported, notably the re- 
centralisation of macro-economic controls. However, although Zhu was equally frustrated with 
the deleterious effects of administrative localism, his reform agenda balanced increased macro- 
controls with advancing market mechanisms.
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were pivotal in this change. Reform China’s first comprehensive reform 
blueprint was comprised of measures aimed at extending market mechanisms, 
building institutions and centralising macro-economic powers.1098 The 
implications for financial policy were wide-ranging and immediate. One of the 
most important measures was reform of China’s tax system.1099 Following the 
Decision, a modem national tax agency was established; a tax-sharing system 
replaced fiscal contracting as the basis of revenue collection; and all ‘shared’ 
taxes were now to be collected at the national level and then distributed to the 
localities.1100 The National Tax Office was given powers to appoint the directors 
of local tax offices and the authority to extend tax reduction and exemptions to 
enterprises was recentralised. 1101 In 1994, the exchange rate was unified: 
previously it had been set at varying rates at PBoC-govemed foreign exchange 
swap centres around the country.1102 After 327, dozens of futures exchanges were 
forcibly merged and hundreds of futures brokers were forced to close.1103 Futures 
regulation was concentrated in the hands of the CSRC. Intense local opposition 
to many of these institutional changes slowed down implementation, but the 
agenda only intensified as the 1990s progressed. Management {guanli) authority 
over PBoC branches was transferred to the PBoC in 1998 and a new regional, 
rather than provincial, branch structure was created, constraining provincial 
leaders’ ability to direct lending. In 1999, the State Council ordered the quasi­
private Rural Credit Foundations to be closed and/or merged with the PBoC-run 
Rural Credit Co-operatives, despite their superior financial performance.1104 
Similarly, in 1995 the private urban credit co-operatives were compelled by a 
State Council notice to accept municipal governments as majority shareholders.
1098 Bottelier (1999), 6,17-22.
1099 The fiscal contracting fiscal system introduced in 1988 increased incentives for local actors to 
support economic growth and increase revenue collection, but limited the benefits of these 
actions to the centre. It also led to a decrease in official fiscal revenues (though this was mostly 
compensated for by increases in extra-budgetary funds managed by local authorities) and 
frequent negotiations about local remittances to the centre. Experiments in fiscal system reform 
(aiming to redistribute revenues and clarify spending responsibilities) began in 1992, Saich 
(2001b), 149-160.
1100 The new system saw the sharing system further clarified: each tax type was classified as 
being collected by the central government, by local authorities or shared.
1101 On fiscal reform, Tsai (2000), 12; Bachman (1987); Ahmad, Li and Richardson (2000);
Wang (1997b); Wang (2000b), 21.
1102 These swap centres were merged into a national foreign exchange market in Shanghai, Chung 
(2001), 55-57.
1103 Liu (1999c); Jiang (1999c).
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Thus nationalised, they were renamed Urban Co-operative Banks.1105 In the 
equity sector, the centralisation of regulatory powers and the elimination of local 
institutions and autonomy for local leaders paralleled these broader trends.
The Chinese state changed in the 1990s. The zhongyang leadership was shown to 
be capable of reorganising institutions, the things that structure the policy­
making process and this should prompt a reappraisal of the bureaucratic model of 
policy-making. If the institutions of a particular sector can be organised so as to 
concentrate powers in a single sub-principal, as well as to provide clear 
mechanisms of control and oversight over local agents, then the state in this area 
becomes less fragmented and better co-ordinated. Institutional reform did not 
only affect Centre-Local relations: the elimination of the SCSC removed an 
important veto site within central government.1106 The resulting policy process is 
less likely to be characterised by biased implementation, frequent vetoes and 
‘balancism’. In short, state capacity will have been improved and the 
bureaucratic model becomes less useful as an explanatory tool. Conflict between 
xitong bureaux, and between central and local governments will continue in the 
financial sector, of course, but these conflicts may well be less frequent and more 
easily resolved, while implementation bias may well be less extensive than 
before. Future research should be sensitive to the institutional context of policy 
creation and implementation. It could be profitably focused on asking how state 
capacity varies across different sectors and how different institutional 
arrangements affect the degree and style of the defection by sub-principals and 
agents.
The North paradox: can markets develop without institutions?
Neo-institutional economics holds that only when the state is credibly committed 
to clarifying and defending institutions will people feel confident enough to 
engage in economic transactions. ‘Without institutional constraints’, argues
1104 At their peak RCFs held around RmblOO billion of deposits compared to Rmb800 billion at 
the RCCs, Cheng (2000b); EIU (2001h).
1105 Huang (forthcoming), 96.
1106 In another instance of central government reorganisation, in March 1998 a number of 
industrial line ministries were eliminated and supervision o f most o f the state-owned 
conglomerate groups was brought under the SETC and vice-minister ranking inspectors,
Fewsmith (2001), 203.
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North, ‘self-interested behaviour will foreclose complex exchange because of the 
uncertainty that the other party will find it in his or her interest to live up to the 
agreement’.1107 This should nowhere be truer than in an equity market, where 
complex transactions take place across considerable time and space in an 
environment characterised by uncertainty and information asymmetries. Indeed, 
the institutional thesis could be used to argue that the development of institutions 
in China’s equity sector has been highly successful: how else could the market 
have grown so large? However, although considerable development has 
occurred, as of year end 2000 socialist market regulation still included few of the 
constraints that underpin Western stock markets: an active judiciary, an 
independent and active media, legislative oversight of the regulator, and clear 
protections for the regulator from political interference. If the state’s predatory 
behaviour vis-a-vis the stock market has been as great as the previous chapters 
suggest, how has the market grown so large so rapidly within such an adverse 
institutional environment?
There are at least six answers to this paradox: the information asymmetries 
involved in financial regulation; the structure of the equity contract; investors use 
of short-term trading strategies; administrative intervention; FIIs’ lack of hard 
budget constraints; and the incentives provided by poor regulation. First, 
financial regulation itself suffers from information asymmetries: the regulator 
knows more about the quality of regulation than investors do. This is always the 
case, but is especially problematic in China. The press, for example, has until 
recently been prevented from investigating corruption (much still goes 
unreported); the activities of the CSRC lack transparency (though they are more 
transparent than most other central bureaux). Investors who lack information 
about the deficiencies of regulation are more likely to invest. Second, consider 
the nature of the equity contract. A debt (bond) issuer is contractually committed 
to paying interest; a missed interest payment and/or default signals problems at 
the issuer; a series of such defaults by a number of issuers would destroy the 
bond market. Equity, in contrast, involves the transfer of claims of ownership, 
not a guaranteed revenue stream. The investor relies on asset appreciation and
1107 Alchian (1972); Putterman (1993), 244; North (1990), 33.
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dividend payments, neither of which are guaranteed. Even though a firm did not 
pay dividends (thus perhaps signalling its lack of revenues and/or profits) some 
investors would still trade its shares because of the incentives provided by the 
possibility of capital gains.1108 Third, consider investors’ management of risk. In 
comparison to debt, more risk is transferred to the buyer in an equity transaction. 
Neo-institutional theory would therefore suggest that more institutional supports 
are necessary. However, engaging in short-term trading can dramatically reduce 
the risks that equity investors take on.1109 By holding shares for only a few days 
‘investors’ can trade in equity not as a set of ownership rights, but simply as a 
commodity whose price varies with supply and demand. As Harold Demsetz 
argues in a slightly different context; ‘shareholders are essentially tenders of 
equity capital and not owners.. .what shareholders really own are their shares and 
not the corporation’.1110 As long as equity institutions guarantee that one receives 
profits from any appreciation in the shares one buys, then equity institutions are 
‘working’ well enough for a market to develop. The fact that the institutions that 
guarantee long-term ownership rights are lacking does not in itself prevent stock 
market growth.
The fourth reason why China’s equity market has been able to develop without 
effective market institutions is that the government has used administrative 
measures to create both ad hoc and structural incentives for investment. 
Administrative controls in other parts of the financial system have created 
incentives for share investment: interest rates are suppressed, capital controls 
prevent investment abroad, and other means of asset management have been 
absent.1111 The corporate bond market has been restricted: issuance remains 
subject to strict quota controls, interest rates are set administratively and issues 
are, unlike IPO revenues, taxed.1112 Industrial policy has also helped: asset 
injections, preferential tax treatment and cheap bank loans for listed SOEs have 
all boosted confidence in listed company share prices. Administrative measures
1108 EIU (2001c).
1109 International FIIs use similar strategies. According to CLSA, a broker, on average they hold 
equity in an emerging market for one sixteenth of the length o f time that they hold it in developed 
markets, Hu (2002).
1110 Demsetz (1967), 115-116.
1111 EIU (2001e).
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have been common in the equity market too. In the primary market, for example, 
up until early 2000 the IPO price was set administratively by the CSRC, at a 
heavy discount to secondary market prices.1113 From 1993 to 1997, the P/E ratio 
for IPOs was set at around 14 and with P/Es of 40+ in the secondary markets, 
share prices increased on the first day of trading by anything up to 900%. This 
created huge demand for IPOs. According to Li Mingliang, given an investor had 
RmblOm to invest in the IPO lottery the average return in 1997 was 100%, and 
much higher before then.1114 Fixed pricing at IPO therefore guaranteed take-up of 
equity. In the secondary market, the lack of a credible delisting policy has 
created moral hazard for investors. 118 companies reported losses for the 1999- 
2000 financial year, but their shares could still be traded with the confidence that 
they would not be delisted. In addition, as chapter five showed, the whole gamut 
of policies associated with equity developmentalism during 1995-97 boosted 
demand for shares. In leaner times, in the early 1990s, in July 1994 and in April
1999, senior government officials have used newspaper editorials to talk up the 
market, artificially bolstering confidence. The aphorism zhengce shi (‘the policy 
market’), known to every share investor in China, indicates the extent to which 
policy has been used to manipulate the market.1115 Fifth, state ownership of FIIs 
and other institutional investors, including SOEs, has played a crucial part in the 
market’s development. One criticism is that FIIs have been vulnerable to political 
interference to ‘support’ the market when commercial logic dictates otherwise. 
There were rumours, for example, of an informal agreement between the leaders 
of several major securities companies not to sell shares in the event of hostilities 
breaking out in the Taiwan Straits during 1996-97. Perhaps more important, 
however, is the fact that the SOEs that invest in the stock market, and which 
extend funds to the His, operate with soft-budget constraints. Hundreds, if not 
thousands, of SOEs established small asset management divisions or made 
informal arrangements with local professional investors to invest SOE funds 
(often using bank loans or IPO revenues) in shares. This practice is thought to be
1112 The corporate debt market accounted for only 1% of all outstanding debt instruments in June
2000, Graham (1998); Slater (2000). On China’s Treasury bond market, Xiao (2000c).
1113 EIU (2001g).
1114 The rate fell to 25% in 1999, around 15% in 2000, Li (2000b).
11,5 Hua (1999). As Walter and Howie argue, there has been an informal contract between the 
state and the investing public. ‘Individuals buy shares.. .in exchange for the state’s unspoken
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extensive, although no figures are available. Any losses from such trading could 
be passed on to the public finances; any profits could be retained and skimmed 
off.1116 Given the lack of moral hazard in their investment practices, it is no 
surprise that SOEs have been actively involved in the stock market and have 
bolstered its growth. Sixth, poor quality regulation itself has created incentives 
for large investors, with their access to superior information and large funds, to 
engage in share trading using illegal practices.
In summary, stock market growth in the 1990s has been, to a large extent, based 
not on market institutions and demand for equity from private savings, but upon 
artificial policy supports and speculative public money. The market’s 
institutional development was driven by the strategic self-interest of state actors: 
state capture of equity institutions facilitated market growth while at the same
1117time orienting that growth towards benefiting the state. Bureaucrats became 
advocates for, and beneficiaries of, market development, since this helped them 
maximise state revenues. However, the question this analysis raises is clear: how 
sustainable is stock market development on such a basis?
China’s stock market, institutional change and the future
Institutional capture has many critics within China. In late 1994, Chen Gong 
called for the government to be ‘a manager, regulator and a formulator of rules, 
not a direct participant in the market’. He also opposed the ‘rescue, boost or
1 11 Rsuppress’ approach of the government to the market. Such criticism is now 
common. Analysts like Hong Weilu argue that the CSRC’s powers are excessive
promise to price such shares cheaply and to maintain relative market stability’, or at least rising 
prices, Walter (2001), 200.
1116 Wu (1999a).
1117 A similar dynamic has been detected in the development of rural industry. Jean Oi concludes 
that credible institutions protecting property rights were not required for development of the 
township and village enterprise (TVE) sector in the 1980s. All that was required was the creation 
of the right fiscal incentives so that local bureaucrats supported, rather than preyed upon, TVE 
development. Fiscal reforms gave 93,000 government jurisdictions above the village level 
residual rights to increased revenues, giving bureaucrats incentives to foster local industry, Oi 
(1999), 193; Walder (1997), 438-444; Francis (1999). Nee (1996) and Wank (1999) show how 
informal networks and social relations can substitute for formal institutions in supporting 
economic activity. However, problems in the TVE sector in the 1990s, including their large 
debts, have again cast doubt on the sustainability of productive economic activity in the absence 
of market institutions.
1118 Chen (1994a).
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and that this harms innovation.1119 To promote development, he argues, areas 
such as the oversight of corporate disclosures and powers to punish rule 
infringements should be devolved back to the stock exchanges. He Xiaoyong 
finds serious deficiencies in the SL, notably the lack of any supervision of the 
CSRC.1120 Wu Xiaoqiu, a long time critic of institutional capture, argues that the 
state’s plan-like controls make it impossible to properly protect the rights of 
investors.1121 Zhang Caili questions the economic utility of the stock market, and 
argues, along with Wu Xiaoqiu and others, that it should not be used as a source 
of finance for the SOE sector.1122 That such ideas are now discussed, and aspects 
of institutional capture are so openly criticised, undoubtedly creates an 
environment where more market-oriented change is possible. However, ideas in 
themselves are not sufficient to cause such change to occur.
By 2000, the actors influencing equity development had grown numerous and it 
was evident that the authority and independence of the CSRC was being 
increasingly constrained. As chapter ten showed, some NPC deputies remain 
keen to establish a mechanism for regularly evaluating the regulator’s activities. 
Small investors will continue to seek redress in civil courts against listed 
companies that have falsified disclosures. If the extent of fraud is anywhere near 
that suggested in chapter four, the number of such suits will reach into the 
thousands. A failure to address valid claims will lead to increased investor 
discontent and a failure to draw additional private savings into the market. Led 
by Caijing, newspapers are increasingly ready to investigate and publicise 
corruption. Another likely constraint on institutional capture will be FIIs 
themselves. As they grow in size, expertise and confidence, they will become 
less dependent on the CSRC, agitate for more independence and will lobby 
against policy that damages their commercial interests.1123 Private FIIs will also 
enter the market in greater force over the next decade. The several hundred Ills 
will be registered and will become a significant private presence in the market.
1119 Hong (2000), 253-259.
1120 He (1999).
1121 Wu Xiaoqiu directs the Finance and Securities Institute at Renmin University, one of the 
largest financial think-tanks in China, Wu (1999b), 34, 118-134,156.
1122 Zhang (1997a).
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Foreign investor entry will also occur, probably before 2010 with the 
introduction of the QFII arrangement.1124 Both will lobby for more market- 
oriented development.
Such actors will increase in number and in the constraining influence they exert 
on the practice of market socialist regulation. However, unless extensive change 
occurs in the political system, senior CCP actors will remain relatively well 
insulated and will therefore remain dominant in defining institutional 
development. Their incentives for providing regulation for the ‘public good’ will 
remain constrained as will market participants’ ability to directly influence them. 
It is therefore the interests of the zhongyang leadership that are likely to continue 
to define the basic trajectory of institutional development in the stock market 
over the next decade. However, this does not necessarily augur the continuation 
of socialist market regulation. As chapter eight showed, the State Council’s 
industrial policy was critical in the creation of the post-1997 institutional 
settlement. If new priorities compete for the senior leadership’s attention, equity 
policy and institutions will likely be re-oriented to serve these new goals. Three 
economic issues will occupy the zhongyang over the next decade: the failure of 
industrial policy, the government’s growing financial liabilities and its need to 
create an asset management industry to fund pensions. The interplay between 
these three policies will define how the principals (re)organise equity institutions.
Industrial policy
Despite official claims to the contrary, there is considerable evidence to suggest 
that industrial policy is failing. According to the OECD, after-tax SOE profits 
fell from 18% in 1985 to 5% in 1990 to 0.9% in 1998. The most recent data for 
the average total liabilities to assets ratio for all SOEs is 62%, a debt-equity ratio 
of nearly two. Even these statistics, based on official sources, probably 
exaggerate the health of the sector.1125 Paul Heytens and Cem Karacadag found
1123 Interview-43, Shenzhen, 2001. Large SOEs are also capable of lobbying. In late 2001, for 
example, they pushed for the corporate debt and convertible bond markets to be liberalised 
because of the loss of confidence in the stock market.
1124 QFII would allow foreign companies to bring in and convert foreign currency into renminbi 
through a ‘window’ in the capital account managed by the SAFE, and then use the funds to invest 
in A-shares, subject to certain restrictions, EIU (200 lj); Cheng (2000a).
1125 OECD (2000), 22-29.
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that listed company profits fell during 1995-2000; by the first half of 2000 their 
median return on equity was only 7% on an annualised basis, while assets 
(including receivables and inventory) covered less than one third of their 
liabilities, a debt-equity ratio of three.1126 Guy Liu has found that at least 70% of 
China’s listed companies destroy value.1127 Administrative bank lending, share 
issues, asset injections and debt write-offs sustain SOEs: there is little evidence 
of increased productivity.1128 This failure even afflicts the large SOEs the 
leadership has chosen to convert into chaebol-like conglomerate groups. 
Focusing attention on the 120 enterprise groups that as of 2000 made up China’s 
‘national team’, Peter Nolan shows that they are not becoming internationally 
competitive companies.1129 Local protectionism has prevented firms from 
expanding through M&A, the quality of management remains poor and political 
interference continues to be extensive and damaging. Companies are not allowed 
to downsize or outsource to cut costs but have instead had to absorb smaller, 
loss-making SOEs, some 2,000 during 1994-97, to limit unemployment. In 
addition to these difficulties, industrial policy will become constrained under 
WTO rules.1130 The government will no longer be able to force foreign 
companies involved in joint ventures to transfer technology to SOEs; stop 
multinationals from advertising and distributing their own products; or favour 
SOEs with government procurement contracts. Competition from non-state and 
foreign-invested firms will increase. Access to cheap financing (via bank loans 
and equity issues) will be one of the few remaining means by which the state can 
protect its own firms.
1131As the state sector declines, the non-state sector increases m importance. As a 
rough measure, excluding collective firms, the private sector accounted for at 
least 50% of economic activity by the end of the 1990s. However, because bank 
and equity finance has been monopolised by SOEs, private sector growth has
1126 Heytens and Karacadag (2001), 7-8, 13-14.
1127 Talk to the China Discussion Group, Chatham House, March 22, 2002.
1128 Zhang, Zhang and Zhao (2001). Lo (1999) and Laurenceson and Chai (2000) found more 
positive results for SOE productivity and efficiency.
1129 Nolan (2001), 876-893.
1,30 Lardy (2002), 63-73, 89-100. See also Liu (2001).
1131 There are manifold difficulties involved in identifying private firms in China, let alone 
measuring their contribution to GDP or employment provision, Qian (1995), 215-222. On the 
private sector, Gregory (2000); Wall (2001); Tung (1997).
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been constrained.1132 In 1996, only 3% of new loans extended by the four LCSBs 
went to urban collectives; only 0.1% went to private firms.1133 Similarly, at year 
end 1999 there were only about 40 non-state firms being publicly traded in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen.1134
What impact will the changing industrial profile have on China’s equity 
institutions? The senior leadership has at least two incentives for making more 
listing spaces available for non-state firms. First, in order to sustain job creation 
finance must be channelled to the private sector. Second, high quality, dividend 
paying, non-state firms would do much to restore the reputation of the stock 
market. More private firms will inevitably be listed, but unless a fundamental 
shift in industrial policy occurs their numbers will remain limited. The case of 
the Shenzhen GEM is instructive. The new board, initially proposed to be 
established in 1999, would have offered an alternative to socialist market 
regulation: more powers would have been devolved down to the SHZSE to 
authorise listings; listing places were to have been reserved for small- and 
medium-sized, non-state firms; and these firms would not have had state or legal 
person shares.1135 By year end 2001, however, the GEM project had been 
postponed, perhaps indefinitely. While the Nasdaq crash and the wholesale 
failure of second boards outside the United States played a part in this decision, 
concerns over the GEM’s probable adverse impact on the main board were also 
substantial. A twin-track stock market would have developed: large, mostly 
unprofitable SOEs would have remained dominant at the SHGSE; the GEM 
would have listed smaller, more competitive and profitable companies and 
investors and their funds would have gradually shifted to the later. This would 
have been dangerous for the zhongyang leadership for at least two reasons, the 
same reasons that will continue to restrict private firms from listing. First, 
liberalising entry to equity capital would divert the flow of financial resources 
away from the SOEs. Second, the more general threat from listing successful 
non-state firms is that they would highlight SOEs’ general poor conduct in 
paying dividends, making disclosures and abusing minority shareholder rights.
1,32 Huang (2001), 57-58.
1133 Huang (forthcoming), 96.
1134 Liu (1999b).
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For these reasons, given no fundamental change in industrial policy takes place it 
is likely that SOEs will continue dominating the stock market.
Over the long term, however, a drift towards more extensive privatisation 
appears inevitable as SOE profits and productivity continue to decline. The 
SOEs’ demand for subsidies, especially via the banking system, will continue to 
weaken the state’s finances and create pressure for further disengagement. As the 
leadership gradually relinquishes industrial policy, (or a regime change facilitates 
its complete repudiation), equity institutions would then likely develop towards 
the market. State and LP person shares would increasingly become tradable and 
gradually cease to exist; considerable numbers of private firms would list; many 
listed SOEs would be delisted and allowed to bankrupt. As public ownership was 
reduced, the power of majority state shareholders would be diminished and the 
influence of private owners would grow. This would have a positive influence on 
corporate governance and it would diminish the government’s need to use equity 
institutions to support and protect its own enterprises. Press would gain freedom 
to investigate listed company corruption and the courts would gain greater 
autonomy in punishing listed company managements. When securities 
companies and investment funds were privatised, greater pressure would be 
brought to bear on the government to make the CSRC independent and 
accountable. Market socialist regulation would be increasingly constrained under 
these circumstances. Of course, given the continuation of the current political 
regime, such changes would necessarily be gradual since a full privatisation 
programme would take at least ten to twenty years to complete.
Government debt
It appears likely that senior policy-makers’ residual ideological faith in public
ownership, as well as their mercantilist ambitions, will be increasingly
constrained by the state’s worsening fiscal position. The government’s large and
increasing liabilities will force greater reliance on the stock market as a financing
11mechanism for the state and its affiliates. Official domestic government 
liabilities amounted to only 14% of GDP at the end of 2000. However, after a
1135 Green (2000c).
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decade of administrative lending to the SOE sector, the four LCSBs were 
estimated by Nicholas Lardy to have NPLs worth 65% of their total loan 
portfolios, some Rmb4.2 trillion (50-60% of GDP) at year end 2000.1137 In 
addition, the government was responsible for the following contingent and 
informal liabilities:
□ NPLs at state-owned financial institutions other than the LCSBs (10-12% of 
GDP)
□ bonds issued to finance the AMCs (14% of GDP)
□ external sovereign debt (5% of GDP)
□ bonds issued by the three policy banks (11 % of GDP)
□ unfunded pension liabilities (45-95% of GDP)
In total, government debt totalled at least 150% of GDP at year end 2000. With 
bank lending to SOEs continuing, Treasury bond issues to fund fiscal stimulus 
planned, and pensions increasingly being funded through the budget, this ratio 
was set to rise further. Fiscal revenues at 16% of GDP, (well below the 
developing country average of 23-30%), and slowing economic growth presented 
additional challenges.1138 There are a number of options for the government: 
cutback on welfare spending, print more money (thus inflating the debt away), 
and increase the sales of state assets. Given that the former two options would 
likely prompt greater social unrest, it seems probable that the government will 
promote the asset sale programme. This has the potential to influence change in 
equity institutions.
The state will likely engage in privatisation by stealth for the majority of listed 
companies. First, a further relaxation of trading restrictions on LP shares is 
likely. An auction market in them began in mid-2000.1139 Previous to this LP 
shares had been exchanged through ad hoc off-market agreements between legal 
persons, though such transactions were not common. However, rumours in early
1136 Bottelier (2001).
1137 EIU (2001k).
1138 Carsten Holz’s analysis of the state’s ‘balance sheet’ for 1997 reveals that if  NPLs at the four 
LCSBs are at 25% of total loans, then the state’s net worth is zero; if  the NPL ratio is higher, then 
the state has negative net worth, Holz (2001), 349, 366-367.
1139 EIU (2001d).
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2000 that LP shares would be soon allowed to list and trade like individual shares 
prompted professional investors {zhuangjia) to buy up LP shares from state and 
state-affiliated organs. Even though sales took place at fractions of the individual 
share price, sellers were happy since they received cash: previously LP shares 
had had little monetary value. LP share auctions were then organised, mainly in 
Shanghai. Traders were most often zhuangjia who set up companies to facilitate 
their investments: by June 2001 almost all listed companies’ LP shares had a 
price recognised nation-wide.1140 Even though this new market was highly 
speculative, it was significant for two reasons. First, the auctions involved the 
transfer of assets from the state to non-state companies, thus diluting public 
ownership. Second, the lack of a CSRC crackdown on the auctions, at least up 
until year end 2001, signalled that senior policy makers were content with the 
‘diversification’ of ownership they involved.
Second, the government will also sell off its state shares and allow them to 
become negotiable. Two experiments in selling state shares in late 1999 and July
2001 failed after difficulties with the management and pricing of the issues.1141 
The sales also had an extremely negative impact on investor confidence.1142 At 
the time of writing, the CSRC was considering proposals for the continuation of 
the sales sometime in 2002. The major issue was how to balance the SASAM’s 
demand that revenues from the sales of state assets be maximised (and that share 
prices be set using net asset value (NAV) methods) and market participants* (and 
many in the CSRC) demands that prices simply reflect market demand (and 
consequently considerably lower valuations).1143 Walter and Howie have 
estimated that the market value of LP/state shares is only 20-25% the price of 
tradable individual shares.1144 The latter trade at a substantial premium because 
of their small float, something that NAV valuations do not take account of.
1140 Interview-54, Shenzhen, 2001.
1141 Jialing Motorcycle and Guizhou Tyre sold state shares in December 1999. Jiangsu Suopu, 
Changzhou Chemical, and Shaogang Songshan were among the firms which starting selling state 
shares in July 2001, Xinhua (2001).
1142 Wu (2002); Walter and Howie (2001), 55-65; EIU (2001c).
1143 The SASAM, and many in the State Council, insist on all IPO shares being priced at above 
per share NAV. In addition to the fact that an IPO should be priced at, or just below, a market 
clearing rate, the SASAM’s methodology for calculating NAV, in which assets are valued at 
replacement cost and no write-down is allowed, is entirely irrational and leads to over-valued 
equity, Walter and Howie (2001), 122-130.
1144 Calculation based on year end 1999 market data.
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Assuming non-tradable shares were valued at 20% of individual shares, using 
year end 2000 statistics, the total number of LP/state shares in China’s 1,088 
listed companies could be expected to raise only Rmb640 billion when sold, only 
some 7% of GDP.1145 This is low in comparison with other estimates, for 
example Rmb2 trillion, some 22% of GDP, an official estimate reported by 
Bloomberg.1146 These rough calculations suggest that non-tradable shares can not 
be a major source of funds for the state, as has sometimes been suggested. To put 
the figure in context, during the year 2000, Rmb268.7 billion, some 3.0% of 
GDP, was raised through domestic IPOs. In addition, it should be noted that any 
large scale sell-off of non-tradable shares would have an enormously negative 
effect on market prices (they would fall by perhaps two thirds according to 
Walter and Howie), and would diminish demand for initial, secondary and rights 
offerings.1147
In addition to the gradual privatisation of listed firms, the state will need to 
accelerate its listing of SOEs to raise revenues. This will take various forms. 
Firms from previously banned industry sectors will be allowed to enter the 
market. For example, financial firms, prohibited from listing since 1993, will be 
encouraged to list. As of year end 2000, only two securities companies were 
publicly traded, Hong Yuan Securities and Anshan TIC. Before 2005, five to ten 
securities companies are expected to list, including CITIC, Guangfa, Guoxin, 
Guotong and Eagle.1148 Banks and insurers will also be listed, as well as most of 
the country’s other large strategic SOEs. Other industrial assets, including the 
state’s considerable holdings of land, could be securitised and sold off.1149 The 
best companies will continue to list abroad, to take advantage of the larger funds 
available there. In 2000 and IQ 2001, the subsidiaries of five major SOEs issued 
equity abroad: PetroChina, SINOPEC, CNOOC, China Unicom and China
1145 Based on a tradable market capitalisation (TMC) at year end 2000 of Rmbl .6 trillion, GDP of 
Rmb8.9 trillion and assuming tradable equity makes up 33% of all equity, CSRC (2001), 12, 138.
1146 Tang (2002).
1147 Because of these difficulties a number of different proposals have been made to soften the 
impact of the sales, including one by which the shares would be transferred to a government- 
owned fund which could only sell the shares after three years.
1148 Green (2001), 18.
1149 On land ownership, Ho (2001).
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Mobile raised a total of US$20.4 billion (Rmbl69.3 billion), some 1.9% of 
China’s GDP."50
One important question, however, is the size of the demand that exists for all this 
equity. The stock market raised Rmb268.7 billion in 2000 (3% of GDP), 
Rmb90.0 billion in 1999 (1.1% of GDP) and Rmb80.4 billion in 1998 (1.0% of 
GDP) from domestic issues.1151 The huge increase in 2000 was partly due to 
investor confidence in the midst of a series of market boosting policies and what 
seemed to be economic recovery. Sustaining such demand will be extremely 
difficult. The onus will be on the government to open up other sources of finance 
to buy equities. This section considers the possible sources of demand. Urban 
resident savings totalled Rmb5 trillion at year end 2001.1152 According to a PBoC 
survey in early 2002, urban residents held about 9.4% of their total financial 
assets in shares in the fourth quarter of 2001 and 65.5% in bank deposits.1153 
Based on these figures, it can be estimated that individuals had around Rmb718 
billion invested in the stock market at year end 2001.1154 If one makes the 
assumption that households could put 30-40% of their total financial assets into 
equities, then, as of year end 2001, there was an additional Rmbl.4 trillion to 
Rmb2.2 trillion of savings available for equity investment, some 14-23% of 
GDP. The clear onus is on the government to encourage this movement of funds 
from bank accounts to equities by improving the quality of listed companies and 
regulation. Much of this money would be channelled though institutional funds: 
investment, insurance and pension funds. Institutional funds make up about 50% 
of the capital in more mature stock markets. In China, closed and open-end 
investment funds, which could become a more important vehicle for small 
investor entry, only managed Rmb80 billion of assets by year end 2001, some
1150 Mathieson and Schinasi (2001), 75.
1151 CSRC (2001), 33.
1152 COL (2001b). Personal savings deposits totalled Rmb7.4 trillion.
1153 Xinhua (2002)
1154 Based on the fact that TMC at year end 2001 was Rmbl.29 trillion, individual investors 
apparently held some 55% of TMC. This calculation contradicts other evidence, presented in 
chapter two, that suggests that individual investors make up a far smaller proportion of TMC. 
There are a number of explanations. First, investment funds (which include individual investor’s 
funds and were worth around 6% of TMC) should be discounted. Second, it is likely that a 
significant proportion of the depositors’ money is being managed by Ills. Since bank deposits are 
concentrated (20% of accounts hold 80% of funds), it is likely that a large number of high net
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6% of TMC.1155 As of mid-2001, there were varying estimates for the money 
entrusted to Ills and securities companies for informal asset management though 
Xia Bin’s estimate of Rmb700 billion is perhaps the most reliable (some 50% of 
TMC), Rmbl 50-300 billion of which was managed by securities companies.1156 
However, a large proportion of these funds were public in origin and had been 
entrusted to these asset managers illegally.1157 It was unclear how much 
legitimate capital from enterprises and high net worth investors was available for 
equity investment. Insurance and pension funds were only allowed to invest in 
Treasury bonds and savings deposits during most of the 1990s. In October 1999, 
however, new regulations allowed authorised insurance companies to invest 5% 
of their assets in investment funds, a limit that was raised to 15% by year end 
2001 for several companies. It is likely that this limit will rise to around 50% 
over the next decade and that insurers will be allowed to establish their own 
funds and invest directly in equities. Total insurance industry assets totalled some 
Rmb300 billion at year end 2001.1158 Assuming that 40% of these assets could be 
invested in equities, this would have made Rmbl20 billion of funds available, 
some 1.3% of GDP. Pension funds, examined in detail below, were not allowed 
to invest in equities as of the end of year 2001, though they will undoubtedly be 
allowed to do so in the future. According to Stuart Leckie, China’s pension assets 
will grow to Rmb2.5 trillion by 2012, and Rmb8.3 trillion by 2022, up from 
Rmbl25 billion at year end 2001.1159 However, at year end 2001, assuming that 
40% of the Rmbl25 billion could have been invested in equities, this would have 
produced funds of some Rmb50 billion, 0.5% of GDP. Finally, foreign investors 
could provide demand for equities through a QFII scheme, although the amount 
would likely be extremely limited at first.
As Figure 71 shows, as of year end 2001, there were several sources of additional 
funds that could be tapped by the government to meet the supply of equity. The
worth investors are using Ills. Both these factors would considerably reduce the amount of TMC 
actively being managed by individual investors.
1155 McGregor (2002).
1156 Shenzhen’s Securities Times put the figure at Rmbl20 billion, of which over half came from 
listed companies, EIU (2001f); SZB (2001); AFX (2001b).
1157 In November 2001, however, the CSRC banned listed companies entrusting their IPO 
proceeds to asset managers.
1158 Jingu (2002), 8.
1159 SCMP (2001b).
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growth of the insurance and pension fund industries will further augment this 
demand. However, the gap between this potential demand and the huge liabilities 
the state faces will mean that there will be a clear and increasing incentive for the 
state to further liberalise the entry of funds into the market and to improve the 
quality of listed companies and regulation in order to attract the most important 
segment: individual savings.
Figure 71. Potential demand for equities, year end 2001
Source Estimated amount o f funds 
available, Rmb billion
Funds as proportion o f GDP,
%
Savings 1,400-2,200 14-23
Insurance 120 1.3
funds
Pension funds 50 0.5
Enterprise N/A -
financial
assets
Author’s calculations based on various sources.
Asset management and the pension problem
China’s stock market will play a critical role in supporting the country’s pension 
fund industry.1160 The population is ageing rapidly: the old-age dependency ratio 
will rise from 11% in 1999 to 36% in 2050.1161 As a result, Goldman Sachs, an 
investment bank, estimates that Rmb26.6 trillion will be required in pension 
assets by 2030 to provide sufficient income for 300m over-60s. The state is 
unprepared: according to Wang Yan and Xu Dianqing it already had an implicit 
pension-related debt of 71% of GDP by year end 2000.1162 With this 
demographic profile and the continued disintegration of the SOE-based model of 
welfare provision, the onus upon the government is to first, raise funds, and 
second, construct a system that allows both public and private financial assets to 
be profitably managed over the long term. The three-pillar pension system
1163currently being built sources funds from employees, employers and the state.
1160 Neoh (2000).
1161 The number of people aged 65+ to the number of 15-64 year-olds.
1162 The World Bank estimated that total pension reserves in 1995 were less than 1% of GDP. By 
2025 the current system will be overwhelmed as contributions will not be enough to cover 
obligations. Already in 1998, the pension system ran a deficit of Rmb5 billion. On pensions, 
Akhtar (2001); Saich (2001b), 249-254; Wang (2001), 2-5.
1163 The three pillars: (i) a defined-benefit public pillar (paid for by a payroll tax drawn from pre­
tax enterprise revenues); (ii) a mandatory-funded, defined-contribution pillar for each worker
347
For its part, the state will partially rely on state share sales to raise funds for the 
National Social Security Fund (NSSF), a fund established by the central 
government in August 2001 to supplement shortfalls in funding at the provincial 
level where local pension schemes are currently being pooled.1164 Government 
bond issuance is another likely source, as well as direct contributions from the 
MoF. As of year end 2001, the NSSF had accumulated Rmb61.6 billion, a sum 
projected to reach Rmbl00 billion by 2004.1165 At the local (provincial) level 
pension funds totalled Rmb58.7 billion in mid-1999, though these funds were 
being drawn down by increasing obligations and difficulties in collection. 
Second, these assets will have to make real rates of return at least at the same the 
rate as real wage growth. Investment in the stock market, in combination with 
Treasury and corporate bond markets, is one of the best ways of achieving 
this.1166 In the United States, about 60% of pension assets are invested in 
equities, the reminder going into fixed income securities and cash. In late 2001, 
the State Council announced it was to allow the NSSF to invest 40% of the funds 
it derived from the state of state shares (but not MoF-sourced funds) in domestic 
equities.1167 When this occurs, the NSSF will have a mandate to derive a steady 
income stream from its assets and conservatively manage its investment risks. 
The high-risk and speculative trading strategies of securities companies, 
investment funds and Ills common in the 1990s will be ill-suited to the needs of 
the pension and insurance industries. Previously the state had been only the seller 
of equity; now, in order to create an effective asset management system through 
which to meet its social liabilities, the government’s own fund managers will 
have to become purchasers of, and investors in, equity. For this, of course, the 
central government, on behalf of the NSSF and its pension industry, will require 
the sort of things that any other investor would require: higher quality listing 
companies, tougher enforcement practices, reliable financial accounts, more 
transparency in the regulatory process, a judiciary able to enforce ownership
(paid for by a payroll tax with contributions from both enterprise and employee); (iii) a voluntary 
supplementary scheme managed by the enterprise or insurance company.
1164 The NSSF is managed by the National Council for Social Security Funds, an organ operating 
under the State Council.
1165 COL (2002a).
1166 World Bank (1997), 58.
1167 With 50% marked off for Treasury bonds and 10% for corporate debt. All but Rmb928m of 
NSSF holdings at year end 2001 were from the MoF. However, the expectation was that the limit 
on equity investment would be gradually raised, AFX (200Id); AFX (2001c).
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rights and, eventually, perhaps even independent supervision of the regulator 
itself.
Concluding remarks
During the late 1990s, the zhongyang leadership had two main ambitions for 
their equity institutions: to maximise revenues from listing SOEs and to ensure 
market stability. Market socialist regulation served these needs well, even if its 
strategy of artificially boosting demand had costs associated with it. With the 
need to meet growing liabilities, there are obvious incentives for the zhongyang 
leadership to attempt to sustain this strategy. However, by 2000 there were signs 
that this style of regulation had reached its limits. The reputational costs of the 
scandals of the late 1990s were considerable: the confidence of small investors 
had been undermined and the amount of financial resources that was ready to 
invest in equity was limited. This was increasingly problematic since the state 
needed to attract additional funds to the stock market to enable it to accelerate its 
asset sales. In addition to this, by the end of the decade a third ambition was 
being entertained by the zhongyang leaders: the need for the stock market to 
deliver long-term returns on financial assets owned by the state itself.
The next decade of stock market development will therefore be defined by a 
competition between industrial and pension policy, between the leadership’s 
short-term need for the stock market to operate as a fund-raising mechanism and 
its long-term need for the market to productively manage the government’s own 
financial assets. There are considerable contradictions between these two 
priorities in terms of equity policy and the institutions that are created to deliver 
it. The latter involves making considerable regulatory improvements that will 
undermine the market’s ability to finance SOEs. Funds, much of them from the 
public sector, which had entered the market on the basis of the profits that could 
be made from poor regulation and inflated asset prices would exit if enforcement 
practices improved. Falling share prices would damage the profitability of 
securities companies, investment funds and the many SOEs that speculated in the 
market. Falling prices would also close off the markets for IPOs, rights and 
secondary issues, undermining industrial policy. However, despite the
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contradictions involved, it appears likely that as the failure of industrial policy is 
recognised and the imperative of financing pensions grows more urgent that 
stock market policy will be increasingly oriented to supporting the former policy. 
As state actors shift from being sellers of (and speculators in) equity to being 
investors, equity policy will move towards the market and the market’s 
institutions will gradually follow. One can expect better supervision of 
disclosures, tougher enforcement practices, delistings, and tougher disciplinary 
actions, including more criminal prosecutions. Institutions will be slower to 
change. The CSRC will likely remain subordinate to the State Council and 
Central Committee; neither local governments nor the NPC will be empowered 
to manage or oversee equity institutions. Movement to a SEC-model or even 
SRO-led model is unlikely as long as an activist industrial policy is pursued and 
the government retains a monopoly on political power. Some institutional change 
at the margins can be expected: limited powers may be devolved down to the 
stock exchanges; the dominance of state and LP shareholders will be eroded; a 
compensation fund for defrauded investors could be established; a greater role 
for the judiciary can be expected; and joint CSRC/PSB investigation bureau will 
be established to improve investigation.
During 2001, there were already visible signs of a market-oriented shift in stock 
market policy. The Yinguangxia scandal of mid-2001 appeared to be pivotal. The 
firm, a favourite among investors, was discovered to have faked profits of 
Rmb745m during 1999-2000 with the help of Zhongtianqin, one of the country’s 
top-five accountancy firms. The frustration of some senior leaders was all but 
tangible, and the most severe crackdown on illegal activities by the CSRC was 
ordered. This, together with state share sales beginning in July, had a huge 
negative effect on investor confidence. Market capitalisation was allowed to fall 
some 30% in the second half of the year before the senior leadership, lobbied 
furiously by industry participants, postponed the sale of state shares. The bear 
market diminished SOE financing significantly: only 74 IPOs were made during 
2001, around half the number of the year before: only Rmbll9.2 billion was 
raised from the market, down 22.7% on 2000.1168 Other policy changes hinted
1168 Of which, Rmb46.1 billion came from IPOs, Chan (2002)
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that a different agenda was coming to the fore at the most senior level. In May, 
the CSRC issued delisting procedures and in December it announced a scheme 
by which any company recording three years of losses would be automatically 
suspended. After a six-month grace period, delisting would follow if profitability 
had not been restored. Three firms were delisted during 2001, Shanghai 
Narcissus, Guangdong Kingman and Shenzhen Zhonghao, although they were all 
‘re-listed’ on an OTC basis.1169 Moves to allow the future listing of a small 
number of foreign-invested enterprises, including the China operations of 
Unilever and HSBC, and the issuance of China Depository Receipts (CDRs) 
were set to establish better benchmarks for corporate behaviour on the 
market.1170 In December 2001, the CSRC announced that all listing applications 
after January 2002 would have to contain an audit of the company by a foreign
1171accountancy firm. The CSRC’s inspection system for listed companies was
11 77improved during 2000-01. Gao Xiqing, a CSRC vice chairman, called for 
investors to be allowed to exercise their rights through courts, apparently 
supporting the use of the judicial system to punish fraudulent listed
1 1 77companies. In February 2002 the Supreme People’s Court announced that it 
would start accepting civil litigation based on false disclosures.1174 There were 
also signs of greater transparency during 2001. For instance, the CSRC invited 
proposals for how to sell-off state shares, publicised the 4,137 responses and 
made much of the evaluation process public.1175 The State Council was even 
reported to be considering making new issues fully convertible, a major policy 
reversal which augured the end of state and LP shares, one of the most important
1 17fiof market socialist institutions. After the government-inspired bull markets of
1999-2000, it was clear that something new was happening in equity market 
policy.
1169 The shares were ‘re-listed’ on the daiban gufen zhuanrang (off-board stock transfer), an 
OTC-system established at selected securities companies, with settlement facilities being 
provided by the SHZSE, Yee (2001); COL (2001d); Sito (2001b).
1170 Jingu (2002), 4.
1171 EIU (2002). Although later reports indicated that the policy may not be implemented.
1172 By giving individual SAO staff personal responsibility for a small number of local listed 
companies and shuffling the inspectors periodically, Hu (2002).
1173 Something which was not helped by the rejection in late 2001 by the Supreme People’s Court 
of class actions, SCMP (2001a).
1174 However, the notice restricted the types of cases that could be brought to court and ruled that 
the CSRC retained competence to determine any financial penalties, COL/Caijing (2002).
1175 Wu (2002).
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However, because of the continued dominance of industrial policy there will be 
limits to the improvements that can take place. Moreover, without fundamental 
institutional change, the regulator will remain vulnerable to political interference; 
without effective oversight corruption within the CSRC is likely; and until non­
tradable shares have been completely eliminated listed companies will remain 
vulnerable to dominance and abusive state shareholders. The SEC and the other 
new deal agencies of the 1930s were created as ‘outposts of capitalism’: they 
were designed, in the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, to control the 
market ‘lest capitalism by its own greed, fear, avarice, and myopia destroy
1 1 77itself. China’s regulatory agencies during the 1990s served a parallel 
purpose: they were created as outposts of market socialism, orienting the stock 
market towards supporting the state and its industrial goals. The zhongyang s 
success in accomplishing this demonstrates its ability to reorganise institutions in 
order to improve its control over economic development. It revealed the political 
leadership able to improve state capacity. However, the evidence collated in this 
thesis also suggests that the institutions of market socialist regulation that had 
been constructed by 2000 did not deliver best practice regulation and, moreover, 
were not sustainable. During the 1980s and early 1990s reform in China was 
characterised by the market growing out of the plan. However, by the late 1990s 
the success of reform increasingly depended on the state itself growing out of the 
plan, developing effective and independent regulatory institutions and allowing 
its plan-administrative functions to wither away. Over the next decade, China’s 
stock market will be as good a barometer as any to indicate the success of this 
most difficult of transitions.
1176 Hu Shuli (2002).
1177 Allen (1940), 244.
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Appendix A. Interview details.
These tables do not show interviewee names or positions since interviewees were assured anonymity.
Number Date Place Organisation Department
05 N/A Shanghai CSRC Commissioner’ Office at the SHGSE
06 11* July 2000 Shanghai SHGSE -
07 29th June 2000 Shanghai SHGSE -
08 29th June 2000 Beijing CSRC Legal Affair
09 - Shanghai CSRC Shanghai SAO
10 - Shanghai SHGSE -
11 14th March 2000 Shanghai SHGSE Membership
12 25th June 2000 Beijing NPC Finance and Economics Committee
13 27th June 2000 Beijing CSRC -
14 15th June 2000 Shanghai SHGSE Executive Office
15 13th June 2000 Shanghai CSRC Shanghai SAO
16 9th June 2000 Shanghai SHGSE Operations
17 7th June 2000 Shanghai China Forex Trade System -
18 N/A Shanghai Shanghai Caijing University -
19 29th March 2000 Beijing CSRC Enforcement
20 29th March 2000 Beijing CSRC Market supervision
21 28th March 2000 Beijing CSRC Research, international securities, policy and research division
22 27th April 2000 Beijing SEEC -
23 27th April 2000 Beijing CSRC
24 N/A Shanghai SCORES Research
25 N/A Shanghai SHGSE Research
26 28th March 2000 Beijing CSRC Institutions
27 2nd May 2000 Shanghai SHGSE
28 28th March 2000 Beijing CSRC Legal Affairs
29 12th May 2000 Shanghai SHGSE -
30 20th July 2000 Shenzhen SHZSE Listed companies
31 21st July 2000 Shenzhen SHZSE Research Institute
32 22nd July 2000 Shenzhen SHZSE Futures and bonds
33 25th July 2000 Shenzhen SHZSE
34 27th July 2000 Shenzhen CSRC
35 28th July 2000 Shenzhen SHZSE
36 11th August 2000 Shanghai Haitong Securities
37 14th August 2000 Beijing CSRC
38 16th August 2000 Beijing CSRC
39 21st August 2000 Shanghai Hua’an Fund Management
40 28th March 2000 Beijing CSRC
41 16th August 2000 Beijing CSRC
42 3rd September 2000 Beijing SHGSE
43 6th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
44 8th June 2001 Shenzhen CSRC
45 11th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
46 12th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
47 14th June 2001 Shenzhen United Securities
48 15th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
49 4th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
50 15th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
51 18th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
53 June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
54 20th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
55 21st June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
56 25th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
57 27th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
58 29th June 2001 Shenzhen SHZSAO
59 3rd July 2001 Shenzhen SHZSE
Shenzhen SAO 
N/A
Research 
Legal Affairs 
Consultant’s Office 
Research 
Fund supervision
Listed Company, Disclosure Section
Listings qualification 
Commissioner’ Office at the SHZSE 
Market surveillance 
Information Centre 
Investment Banking 
Listed companies
Settlement and clearing, B-share division
Information
Market surveillance
Informal conversations
Depository and clearing (GEM)
Listing Dept
Listed company supervision 
Market surveillance
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